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 ABSTRACT  
The University of Manchester 
Richard Colin Marshall, Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
An Appraisal of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) Initiative, Submitted 2010 
In late 1999, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) jointly launched the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) Initiative, under which low income countries (LICs) would 
be supported to develop multi-sectoral economic and social development plans. As such, these 
national PRSs would serve as the effective policy conditionality for concessional lending and 
the allocation of debt relief.  Heralded by many as path breaking, the Initiative refocused 
attention on the role of the State and identified poverty reduction, as opposed to growth alone, 
as the primary goal of policy.  However, from the outset, PRSs have been controversial. The 
most trenchant critics have described these plans as merely re-formulated structural 
adjustment packages.  Other, more considered accounts, have questioned whether PRSs’ are 
capable of overcoming the agency problems inherent to donor-recipient relationships, and 
their ability to succeed in the weak policy environment typified by most LICs. 
In spite of the passage of some ten years, a rigorous evaluation of performance has yet to be 
published. This thesis aims to provide such an appraisal drawing on both quantitative and 
qualitative evidence. It employs cross-sectional statistical and econometric methods to 
examine poverty, growth and inequality outcomes based on a specially constructed dataset; 
and two detailed analytical case studies (for Mongolia and Vietnam) to probe the causal 
processes. 
Although some aggregate evidence is found of performance gains (relating to both poverty 
reduction and growth), these effects are partial and statistically fragile. Moreover, while no 
direct evidence is found of dis-inflationary policy biases, it is possible to detect a new 
narrowness within PRS policymaking. This reflects an orthodox policy consensus which 
favours growth over distributional improvements and places emphasis on a managed 
liberalization process.   
Additionally, it proved very difficult to find a causal link been PRS adoption and beneficial 
outcomes.  The case study materials underline the pivotal role played by the IFIs in the design 
and management of PRSs, and their transitory and limited impact on actual national policy 
responses. Conclusions support many of the propositions put by the critical literature, and find 
that PRSs are poorly adapted to local institutional frameworks and neglect national political 
economies. As a result, their substance and longer term effectiveness is in doubt.   
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CHAPTER ONE:  THE PRS PROJECT AND ITS APPRAISAL 
1.1 Introduction 
Since their development, Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs) have become the primary 
means through which multilateral assistance is granted to, and managed within, low 
income countries (LICs).   It has been argued that these nationally-led but externally 
supported development plans represent nothing less than “a new aid technology” 
(Christensen & Holland, 2003 page 2), and are capable of resolving a series of failures, 
not least the principal-agent problem inherent to donor-recipient relationships.  The PRS 
Initiative’s sponsors, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs)1, assert that PRSs have 
ensured national ownership of reform programmes, enabled the building of state capacity, 
and secured a series of institutional improvements.  It is argued that these, and additional 
gains, chiefly the refocusing of policy on poverty reduction rather than economic 
objectives alone, mean the Initiative has the potential to be genuinely path breaking.    
Yet it also remains deeply controversial. Moreover, the vigour with which the IFIs, 
particularly the World Bank, have promoted PRSs has, as the title of this Chapter 
suggests, afforded the strategies near-evangelical status. In response, a fierce debate has 
emerged over the extent of national ownership and the nature of the PRS policy template.  
The most trenchant critics characterize the Initiative as merely the latest mechanism of IFI 
policy direction, while other more considered accounts question their substance and 
effectiveness.     
Surprisingly for such a major development, and in spite of some ten years of PRS practice, 
very few authoritative examinations of their performance have been carried out. This 
thesis seeks to fill this gap in the literature. It provides an investigation of the key issues, a 
rigorous appraisal of overall outcomes, and an in-country examination of their impact on 
national policymaking and performance.  Although, an empirical approach is adopted and 
the line of enquiry is driven by the evidence, this thesis holds to a generally sceptical view 
of the claims made for PRSs, and locates itself within an established body of critical 
works on IMF and World Bank policy based lending. 
                                                 
1
 Collective term for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank 
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The purpose of this introductory chapter is to frame and support the research presented. It 
provides essential background information by rehearsing the major arguments and 
controversies.  The chapter has three principal parts: the first reviews the origins, policy 
objectives and operational practice of PRSs.  The second part outlines the competing 
points made by the Initiative’s sponsors and its major critics.  The third part crystallizes 
these positions into testable hypotheses, and provides an outline of the research 
undertaken.  
1.2 The PRS Project  
PRSs have since their inception been promoted as offering a comprehensive development 
solution for low income countries (LICs).  They are steeped in the policy consensus which 
developed in the run up to the new Millennium, which combined re-appraised, but 
essentially orthodox, economic thinking with the then emergent good governance agenda.  
It is important not to underplay the extent to which PRSs’ development, and their 
progressive adoption, has been externally driven, principally by the IFIs, but also by 
leading bilateral donors.   This study characterizes PRSs as more than merely a planning 
framework, but rather, a mechanism through which orthodox economic governance and 
policies have been rolled out within the developing world.  To be clear, these 
arrangements bear little resemblance to the state orchestrated development of the 1960s 
and 1970s, including those attributed to the East Asian developmental state2.  The 
Initiative is heavily informed by new consensus thinking on the role of government, 
articulated forcefully in the World Bank’s 1997 World Development Report – The State in 
a Changing World.  As such,  PRSs are policy frameworks, not activist planning tools, 
founded on the notion that official capacity is better secured in LICs by matching the size 
of the state to its (generally limited) capability (World Bank, 1997).   This first, and most 
substantive, section of the chapter sketches out the origins and practice of what can be 
referred to as the PRS Project.      
                                                 
2
 Referring to the state-orchestrated development model given by the East Asian newly industrialized 
countries comprising a form of indicative planning administered by a capable and autonomous 
bureaucracy - see Chapter One of Woo-Cummings (1999) 
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1.2.1 History and Policy Context 
In 1999 a joint meeting of the IMF’s International Monetary and Finance Committee 
(IMFC) and the combined IFI Development Committee (DC) received, and agreed, two 
position papers on a development planning framework which would rely on nationally 
developed Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.  The first of these reports, which was 
authored by the World Bank, proposed PRSs as a new aid modality to govern the 
disbursement of its own concessional lending. The second was a joint report on the next 
tranche of allocations under the Heavily Indebted Poor Counties (HIPC) scheme. This 
proposed that PRSs be the means for linking poverty reduction objectives to debt relief, 
with adoption of an Interim PRS serving as part of the pre-selection criteria.  The two 
papers were closely coordinated - they outlined the basic shape of the arrangements, the 
supporting framework, and set down five guiding principles.  The latter remain current 
and specify that PRSs are to be: 
 Country-driven; strategies should be designed and led by the domestic authorities and 
adopted by the national  legislative body; 
 Results-orientated; policy choices are to be targeted at securing poverty reduction 
through balanced growth, and rigorously monitored;  
 Comprehensive; the strategies should address the full span of economic and social 
policymaking;  
 Partnership-based; strategies are to be compiled with IFI support and should guide 
and inform concessional lending, and provide a focus for donor actions; 
 Long term; PRSs should be based on a three to four year planning cycle, with annual 
reporting (IEO, 2004; IEG, 2004). 
The speed at which the Initiative was put together took many commentators by surprise.   
Certain sources, notably donor and IFI publicity materials, tend to portray its development 
as an interactive and open dialogue grounded in the vigorous policy debates of the late 
1990s.  However, a detailed reading of the history shows the level of discussion was more 
limited and the design process largely closed, and that a compromise between powerful 
groups with competing agendas, is a better characterization of what emerged.  
22 
 
For the IFIs, PRSs met two very distinct needs.  Primarily their rationale was and remains, 
the resolution of a set of problematic relationships associated with concessional lending, 
and the subsequent failure of the conditionality applied in the past to secure policy 
compliance.  Theoretical treatments typically characterize this in terms of a standard 
principal-agent problem, where optimization incentives are discordant and informational 
asymmetries are present.  Under a PRS arrangement the informational problem is 
mediated by requiring recipient governments to develop the policy stance (with arms 
length IFI support) prior to disbursement of concessional finance.   Yet, as will be argued 
in the following section and in chapters Four and Five, the reality proved rather different, 
with IFI inputs tending to dominate PRS compilation processes.    
Second, the IFIs faced an imperative to address a growing external and increasingly 
politicized critique of their technical competence and accountability. These pressures 
became irresistible when they acquired powerful donor advocates in the mid 1990s.  
Initiated by the publication of UNICEF’s Adjustment with a Human Face some ten years 
previously, academic and NGO critiques of IFI lending practices had come to influence 
the policy positions of a group of donor countries (UNICEF, 1987; Christiansen and 
Holland, 2003)3.  The UK’s post 1997 alignment with the calls for reform provided an 
influential channel, as a permanent member of the two executive boards, tipping the 
balance in favour of the ongoing lobbying by the Scandinavian countries and Japan.  The 
permissive position adopted by the Clinton administration in the United States was also 
important in emboldening the agenda for change.   
Christiansen and Holland (2003) track the rapid coming together of a series of lines of 
argument around the core ideas of the PRS framework in late 1998 and early 1999.  They 
describe this in terms of interactions between key players operating within interlocking 
policy circles. Further substantive policy issues were raised within this debate. These 
included: the weak attention IFI programmes had given to the supply response during 
structural adjustment and to growth issues generally; the poor phasing of policy and 
coordination errors between Bank and Fund; and the lack of protection afforded to the 
poor during past lending operations (Mosley, Harrigan & Toye, 1994; UNICEF, 1987). 
                                                 
3
 UNICEF (1987) had a major impact on thinking within NGO donor circles on the impact and conduct 
of structural adjustment, and gave birth to a strand of thinking which informs the PRS policy template.  
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The very public disputes between the IFIs over the 1997 East Asian crisis further fuelled 
the pressure for change (Stiglitz, 2002).  
While external pressures were more significant in driving the strategic aims and the pace 
of the decision making, the failures of conditionality and a more prosaic set of operational 
needs were more decisive in shaping the substance of what was finally agreed.  The 
primary template for PRSs was the World Bank’s Comprehensive Development 
Framework (CDF).  This sought to reinstate the importance of strategic planning 
capacities within LICs and arose out of the more progressive policy agenda which had 
opened up within the Bank during the Wolfensohn years.   The CDF was little more than a 
set of protocols to be applied to Bank lending and technical assistance (TA) offered under 
Country Assistance Strategies (CASs), but national PRSs became the CDF’s operational 
incarnation.  The IMF also faced a series of operational pressures.  First in re-crafting the 
then moribund Policy Framework Paper (PFP) arrangements, and second, in finding a 
device through which poverty objectives could be attached to the HIPC scheme.   
As a result, PRSs would become the mechanism for allocating and monitoring IDA credit 
lines, replace PFPs, and serve as a requirement for accessing the IMF’s Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF).   The World Bank subsequently earmarked a 
portion of its IDA funds as Poverty Reduction Strategy Credits (PRSCs) and the IMF 
renamed the ESAF lending instrument as the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
(PRGF)4. The inclusion of a substantive chapter within national PRSs detailing the 
macroeconomic stance served as the effective policy conditionality for PRGF lending.  
Although, in time, the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), an IMF fiscal 
planning protocol somewhat supplanted this requirement5. Adoption also became a 
condition for HIPC debt relief (development of a strategy was required at the decision 
point and satisfactory implementation for a year at completion point).  It was further 
decided that the scheme would also cover those countries which were not eligible for 
HIPC relief.      
                                                 
4
 In 2009 the IMF announced that the PRGF would be replaced by the Extended Credit Facility (ECF). 
5
 MTEFs should, in principle, be made consistent with the macroeconomic chapter of PRSs, with the 
latter acting as the primary source.  However, in a number of high profile cases the MTEF has 
diverged and taken precedence.  
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In addition, it is important to recognize that the PRS design process was not wholly 
isolated from the policy debates taking place in the wider world.  External views, although 
generally those close to the IFIs, also played some role.  The clearest example of this was 
the external review of ESAF undertaken by a team of mainstream academics in 19986.  
Design inputs were also offered at a later stage by commentators with more divergent 
views, with policymakers within donor and NGO circles offering briefings to the IFI 
policy departments.  Along with networking contacts, these were quite substantial.  
Indeed, as an IFI respondent of the time noted “no one participant in the development 
process was more than two handshakes away from anyone else” (Christian and Holland, 
2003 page 38).  Additionally, Uganda’s experience with its Poverty Eradication Action 
Plan (PEAP), supported by the Bank and adopted in 1997, offered something of a pilot for 
the Initiative. Yet regardless of these influences, the final set of PRS proposals were 
fundamentally a product of IFI thinking. 
From 2000, PRSs were rolled out rapidly, initially to HIPC qualifiers and progressively to 
all IDA members.  Although the basic shape of these arrangements has changed little, 
there have been some modifications to management procedures. Recent years have also 
seen some decline in the absolute primacy of PRS programming within IFI operations.  In 
2009, the IMF replaced the PRGF with the Extended Credit Facility (ECF). In addition, 
although the World Bank has retained a very strong poverty focus, new priorities emerged 
in the post-Wolfensohn years. It is broadly accurate to note that both of the IFIs have 
retreated to a more restricted development agenda.  
Developments from the recipient side have been more significant. A number of countries 
have either allowed their PRSs to fall into abeyance or abandoned the process in favour of 
national planning frameworks.  This has led some contributions, including this thesis, to 
question the Initiative’s future.  Indeed, this evaluation in some sense represents a 
retrospective on the development approach exemplified by the PRSs.  For clarity, Table 
1.1 provides a summary history in terms of the key milestones and principal actors. 
  
                                                 
6
 These external but mainstream academics were specifically: Kwesi Botchwey (Harvard), Paul Collier 
(Oxford UK), Jan Willem Gunning (Amsterdam Free) and Koichi Hamada (Yale).   
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Table 1.1: PRS Milestones 1996 to 2009 
1 2 3 
Years Milestones Key Actors 
1996 HIPC scheme proposed as mechanism to offer bilateral debt relief at IMF & 
World Bank spring meetings  
IFIs, 
Bilaterals 
Jubilee 2000 NGO umbrella group convened to campaign for LIC debt relief NGOs 
1997 Uganda PEAP adopted (served as a template for PRSs) LICs 
1998 External ESAF Review report is highly critical of the SAL conditionality 
regime, IMF accepts critique 
IFIs 
G7 Summit in Birmingham (UK), links debt relief to poverty reduction  Bilaterals  
1999 James Wolfensohn announces the CDF approach as part of the World 
Bank’s change agenda. 
IFIs 
External protests reach their height at the WTO meeting in Seattle  NGOs 
Donors promise greater & accelerated debt relief (US, UK & Germany) Bilaterals 
PRS reports prepared by the IFI policy departments & agreed by the 
Executive Boards, before presentation to the IMFC and DC meetings. 
IFIs 
PRS Initiative is formally launched & ESAF renamed PRGF - PRS adoption 
becomes a requirement of access to most concessional lending  
IFIs 
2000 Led by Uganda, the first PRSs are adopted LICs 
2001 PRSCs launched & become the greater part of IDA finance IFIs 
2003-04 First round of PRSs rolled forward  LICs, IFIs 
2004 Second Joint Progress Review recommends changes to the JSA process. 
These are subsequently adopted.  
IFIs 
IMF & World Bank Evaluations Bodies (IEG & IEO) publish critical reviews. 
Further (minor) modifications are offered by the IFIs.   
IFIs 
2005 Wolfensohn is replaced at the World Bank by Wolfowitz (& later by Zoellick 
in 2007), this signals a return to a more restricted policy agenda 
World Bank 
2006 
onward 
Several countries signal their intention to adopt national planning 
frameworks in place of their existing PRSs.  
LICs 
2009 IMF renames PRGF the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) IMF 
Source: Based on Christensen and Holland (2003), the Bretton Woods Project (see website: 
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/) and a synthesis of other contributions. 
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1.2.2 Operational practice 
As of late 2009, PRS arrangements had been adopted in 67 countries.  As Table 1.2 
illustrates, this includes the vast majority of IDA qualifying nations and LICs, and over 40 
per cent of the lower middle income group.  As is also clear from the Table, the PRSs 
have moved beyond their early association with the HIPC scheme and their geographical 
concentration in Sub-Saharan Africa. A key facet is the relatively high proportion of 
European and Central Asian nations, and the participation of five upper middle income 
countries. This pattern provides evidence of the diminishing importance of the financial 
incentives (via the HIPC scheme), and that a number of countries have participated on an 
elective basis.   However, it remains the case that IDA participants make up almost 80 per 
cent of the total, and that the PRS package has become the standard product offered by the 
IFIs to all but the most politically powerful or operationally problematic.  Notably, China 
and India have not adopted PRSs, nor have they been publically encouraged to.7 
Additionally, although the number of HIPC countries has declined year on year, they 
remain the largest group.  PRSs have also maintained their close association with aid 
management, and therefore, with the most aid dependent countries.  
The Initiative is supported by a large and well-resourced global bureaucracy, located 
principally within the World Bank.  Through their local missions, the IFIs oversee and 
regulate national PRS processes, and assist adopting countries with policy design, both 
directly and via external technical assistance (TA).  IFI influence operates through two 
channels:  the procedural framework which regulates adoption and monitoring, and via a 
process of ongoing policy dialogue and support.  This represents a clear break with the 
conditionalities associated with policy-based lending.  Financial support is dependent on 
PRS adoption and on the strategic documents meeting IFI requirements.  In this sense, 
conditionality under PRSs is a form of prior selection (given by adoption of a PRS and the 
supporting frameworks)8.  However, the IFI review process and direct policy advocacy 
                                                 
7
 Other IDA eligible but non-PRS countries include: the conflict effected (Kosovo, Somalia, Sudan, 
Solomon Islands); the politically difficult (Myanmar, Zimbabwe); the small (Kiribati, Tonga, Vanuatu); 
plus Angola and Eritrea, where PRS adoption efforts faltered (World Bank on line resources, accessed 
2010). 
8
 Selectivity or prior selection involves the specification of selection, trigger or hurdle criteria, which are 
not linked directly to policy choices.  ODA or concessional finance is made available on satisfaction of 
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involve the de facto specification of ex ante policy conditions. Moreover, ancillary 
arrangements, especially the HIPC scheme and the MTEF, require adherence to a set of ex 
post policy conditions, typically specified in terms of macroeconomic stability and debt 
management.  Nevertheless, IFI-recipient relationships under PRS arrangements are 
considerably different from those under traditional forms of conditionality.  In essence the 
framework serves as a buffer between the two sides, and this can promote greater 
negotiation. However, as will be argued, this also allows for new forms of influence and 
that the relative power of the actors is a key determinant of outcomes.         
Table 1.2: Composition of PRS adopters (May 2010) 
1 2 3 4 
Category Number % of PRSs adopted % covered by PRSs 
IDA Eligible 62 92.5% 78.5% 
Income Status    
- Low Income 38 56.7% 88.4% 
- Lower Mid Income 24 35.8% 43.6% 
- Upper Mid income 5 7.5% 10.9% 
Geographical distribution    
- East Asia & Pacific 7 10.4% 30.4% 
- East & Central Europe 10 14.9% 41.7% 
- Latin America & Caribbean 7 10.4% 24.1% 
- Mid-East & North Africa 2 3.0% 15.4% 
- South Asia 7 10.4% 87.5% 
- Sub-Saharan Africa  34 50.7% 72.3% 
Total PRSs 67 100.0% 100.0% 
  Source: IMF/ World Bank on line resources and author’s calculations 
The first channel through which IFI influence is applied is procedural. The norms and 
requirements of the PRS process represent a complex framework involving a series of 
periodic interactions between the IFIs and recipients.  Development of a PRS is a staged 
process; participants (generally) adopt an interim-PRS (I-PRS) followed up by a final 
                                                                                                                                                         
these criteria. The approach is most associated with budget support modalities - see Marshall (2008) 
for a fuller discussion. 
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version (an F-PRS) within one to two years.  Invariably this process is also explicitly 
linked to other IFI operations – HPIC, the IMF’s MTEF programme and the Bank’s local 
Country Assistance Strategy (CAS)9.  The rules require that adoption be led by a strategic 
level actor, typically the Ministry of Finance or a specialized unit within a presidential or 
prime-ministerial office.  A series of consultative structures (which are agreed in concert 
with the IFIs) are also required.   These vary locally, but in addition to being agreed with 
the IFIs, they are often financed by the Bank’s PRS Trust Fund10.  PRSs observe a three to 
four year implementation cycle, with the rolled forward strategy drafted and consulted on 
during the final year.  In addition (in principle at least) annual progress reports (APRs) are 
required from implementing governments.  Finally, all formal documents, the interim and 
final PRSs and any progress reports are the subject of the IMF and World Bank review 
process - the Joint Staff Assessment (JSA). The details of each JSA are reported to the 
Executive Boards. Although this process was loosened and renamed the Joint Staff 
Advisory Notice (JSAN) in 2004, direct supervision has been maintained11. The schematic 
given at Figure 1.1 charts the typical PRS time path over a six year period, and how the 
main IFI processes relate to each other.  
In practice, strict compliance with these requirements has varied considerably. The quality 
of annual reporting is especially variable.  The Bank has also adopted a fairly permissive 
approach, rarely imposing any penalty for non-compliance, save where PRS frameworks 
have fallen into abeyance. In contrast, the IMF has suspended PRGF arrangements where 
policy commitments given within the PRSs or the MTEF process have not been 
followed12.  While the World Bank has justified this on the grounds of flexibility and 
country tailoring, it has also led to a loss of transparency and clouded the operational 
rules.   
                                                 
9
  The CAS is a planning tool which implements the local programme of World Bank TA and support. 
10
 Individual funds are established within each adopting country and disbursed to support training, TA, 
consultation and other projects associated with the PRS.  Several of these arrangements have 
allocation mechanisms involving outside agencies (often the local UN Resident Coordinator), but none 
appear to have been entirely delegated to the recipient government.  
11
 The JSA was replaced by the JSAN following the 2005 PRS Review (World Bank and IMF, 2005). 
12
 The clearest example of this is the suspension of the entire Vietnamese PRGF facility in 2004 due to 
a dispute over audit arrangements at the State Bank of Vietnam.  
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Figure 1.1: Schematic of a typical PRS Cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2002) & IFI on line materials 
The second channel through which IFI influence is exerted is one of policy dialogue and 
support. This represents the mechanisms, through which the Bank and Fund facilitate and 
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tutor strategy design and policy choices.  It has proved the more controversial of the two 
channels, and  according the field interviews carried out to support the two case studies 
provided in Chapters Four and Five, it is these policy interactions that occupy the greater 
part of IFI-recipient contacts13.  Furthermore, it is this form of influence, which critical 
commentators focus on in characterizing the PRS process as an insidious form of 
conditionality, since it allows the IFIs direct access to policymaking.  From the initial 
point of acceptance, national authorities receive IFI guidance, training and specialized TA.  
This support is comprehensive and substantial.  This thesis refers to these processes and 
the nature of the relationship as one of policy tutelage.  Inputs are greatest during the 
development stage and the roll forward period, but ongoing discussions over the PRS are a 
feature of IFI-national government interactions. The policy content of the I-PRS (which 
generally confines itself to macroeconomic issues and broad statements of intent) is often 
drafted in concert with the local Bank and IMF missions.   
Additionally, local accounts suggest that I-PRSs draw heavily on the content and tone of 
the former Policy Framework Papers (PFPs)14.  Periodic progress meetings take place 
between joint IFI missions to appraise the development of the strategy.  Finally, at the 
close of the process the JSA/ JSAN explicitly reviews the policy content of the draft 
documents, and offers commentary.  Direct IFI influence is also maintained after adoption, 
with feedback given informally through day-to-day contacts, semi-formally within Bank-
funded projects, and formally, as part of JSA reviews of APRs.  Parallel procedures, 
notably the MTEF process, also operate to maintain the policy stance.  Indeed, these are 
often applied more robustly than those directly connected to the PRS.   
1.3 Policy Controversies and Research Rationale   
This third section outlines the key arguments in the debate over the impact of PRSs and 
articulates a research rationale for this thesis.   Its purpose is also to frame the questions 
and hypotheses identified in Section 1.4.  A more detailed account is given in the review 
of the established literature provided in Chapter Two.  The key disputes can be grouped 
                                                 
13
 Supported by evidenced from field interviews in Mongolia and Vietnam - a full list of interviewees 
given in Appendix A.  
14
 Based on personal correspondence with Ms Enkh Ariunaa, UNDP Mongolia (formerly at MOFE), 
and a high level participant with the PRS preparation process. 
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under three headings.   First, the neutrality of the Initiative and the policy content of 
individual PRSs are challenged.  Second, concerns have been raised regarding the nature 
of PRS conditionality and the extent of national ownership.  Third, there are arguments 
about the substance and implementation of PRSs – that, in practice, they have amounted to 
little more than paper plans and had no real impact on policy responses.   
Objections to the policy orientation of PRSs are an ongoing and frequently made criticism, 
and are generally made in tandem with the second set of concerns over the extent of 
national ownership.  The World Bank rejects these claims, arguing that PRSs are 
nationally owned and locally tailored documents and, therefore, free from policy biases.  
For the Bank, the benefits which flow from PRS adoption are realized through 
institutional channels; either directly by enabling better, and better-fitted, policies to be 
adopted and implemented more effectively, or via wider governance and accountability 
improvements.  
Yet this account is somewhat disingenuous.  IFI materials make clear that PRSs share little 
in common with the economic development strategies of the past, and that their ethos 
explicitly rejects indicative, as much as it does central, planning.  A clear overarching 
objective is to reconstruct national planning capacity and supplant a variety of legacy 
policy planning regimes (especially those where the State is identified as the primary 
agent within the development process).  As such, the PRS framework, drawing on the 
good governance literature of the 1990s, restricts government influence over economic 
incentives, and limits direct intervention within the productive sector (Craig & Porter, 
2006).  Equally, although there is no one set of prescriptions, PRS materials and TA are 
founded on a consensus view of poverty reduction policies, which identify short term 
growth maximization as the primary objective.  Distributional policy measures are 
downplayed, as it assumed trade liberalization and state de-control of key prices 
(specifically the supply of credit and the wage level) will automatically favour the poor by 
switching resources to agriculture and light manufactures (Lipton and Ravallion, 1995; 
Lipton 1997).  Moreover, the governance agenda at the heart of PRSs is dominated by 
public choice conceptions of government failure.   The World Bank asserts that it is via 
better governance (given by matching and resizing the State to its capabilities) that better 
(i.e. market conforming) policies and better state capacity will materialize.  PRS 
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frameworks explicitly and directly impose consultative mechanisms which operate outside 
local accountability practices (including the electoral process), and these are crafted to 
face down what the IFIs often identify as blocking coalitions of interests15.  
The second, and related set of criticisms, is directed at the impact of PRS adoption on the 
relationship between recipient governments and the IFIs, and the quality of national 
ownership.   Arguments vary here from process objections, to positions which view IFI 
influence under PRSs as representing a complete, but also veiled, form of conditionality.  
As noted, this thesis refers to this as policy tutelage, as adopting countries are schooled 
and supervised in the execution of strategic choices.  It will be argued that the level of 
tutelage can have a very dramatic effect on the autonomy enjoyed by national decision 
makers.    
However, it is also recognized that the extent of the IFI’s ability to manipulate policy 
choices will vary from country to country, and is dependent on the relative power of the 
national authorities, given in turn, by the local political economy, economic performance, 
and the quality of the national bureaucracy.  PRSs remain the de jure property of national 
governments, and thus policymakers have a freedom of action not available under 
previous lending regimes.  Politically secure and capable states are likely therefore to 
secure a better bargain with the IFIs.  The potency of IFI tutelage can also be over 
emphasized.  Alternative policy advice is provided by a variety of non-IFI actors, notably 
by the UN agencies, and these often serve as a counterweight.  In addition, much TA and 
training is jointly selected by national government officials, and it is often the recipients 
that direct the level and type of inputs received.   
The third set of arguments centre on questions of implementation, and whether PRSs have 
any substantive impact on the actual policy stance of adopting countries.  Two distinct 
objections can be made, but in essence, both are based on an argument that PRSs fail in 
resolving the core agency problem faced.  First, for orthodox critics like Nicholas Van de 
Walle (2005), this is because PRSs simply cannot succeed in most of the operating 
environments in which they are deployed.  This is because governments engage in what he 
terms “policy ventriloquism” either to access concessional funds to further private 
                                                 
15
 Field interviews in Vietnam and Mongolia 
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interests, or alternatively, that states simply do not have the capacity to deliver on the 
required policy agenda (Van De Walle, 2005, page 67).  Second, heterodox accounts reach 
similar conclusions but for different reasons.  Specifically, given the failure of the PRS 
framework to address deeper structural questions and their neglect of the national political 
economy, they are destined to be poorly embedded within decision making. PRSs are thus 
disconnected from the real policy process and adopted merely as a pro-forma means of 
retaining access to IFI resources.  Either way, it is argued that PRSs have a shallow impact 
and tend to become moribund, although again, the extent of these failures will be 
somewhat contingent on local factors and the quality of the state.   
These issues are addressed in some detail in the following chapters. There are genuine 
questions to be answered about the policy content, the extent of IFI control, and the 
impacts of most PRSs on policymaking.  The more widely held view (including that of 
many critics) is that PRSs offer something of a buffer between governments and IFIs, and 
that their content and the level of national control will reflect a negotiated compromise.  
However, any such compromise will inevitably be a function of the relative power of the 
two actors.  Past experience of IFI lending suggests that a series of factors - including the 
level of indebtedness, economic performance, the quality of the State and the local 
political economy - will condition governments’ abilities to exploit the scope offered by 
PRS arrangements to access concessional finance and avoid the pitfalls (Mosley, Harrigan 
and Toye, 1994).  
These areas of controversy provide the core rationale for this research study.  Moreover, as 
the literature review presented in Chapter Two will underline, the paucity of the existing 
appraisal literature provides a further justification. In spite of a decade of implementation, 
and extensive academic attention, there has not been any authoritative examination of PRS 
performance.  This thesis, draws on, and places itself within, a tradition established by the 
policy based lending literature of the 1980s and early 1990s, which investigated the 
impact of IFI operations during the era of structural adjustment, and adopts a critical 
perspective. 
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1.4 Hypotheses and research approach 
This section frames the core research questions and sets these down in the form of four 
testable hypotheses. It also provides an outline of the following chapters, along with a 
summary of the research techniques employed.  At the outset, it is important to underline 
that this thesis focuses on outcome effectiveness, defined ultimately in terms of higher 
levels of poverty reduction, and the extent to which policy actions are pro-poor.  The 
research approach is avowedly empirical and makes use of extensive quantitative appraisal 
techniques applied to both cross-sectional and case study data, supplemented by 
qualitative methods.  
The foremost (and first) question to be resolved is whether PRS adoption is associated 
with better poverty reduction performance, and if so what are the proximate causal 
drivers? Attention is then given to the deeper processes at work.  Three additional, and in 
sense causal, questions which can be identified are: Is it possible to make a judgement on 
the policy orientation of PRS arrangements? What is the extent of ownership and has the 
development and management of national PRSs been driven by the IFIs? Finally, can 
changes in the actual policy stance be attributed to PRS adoption?  
Informed by these questions, it is possible to frame four critical hypotheses: 
 Poverty reduction performance has not been significantly better under PRS 
arrangements.    
 PRS policy packages invariably reflect orthodox policy approaches, which focus on 
narrow economic objectives  
 The IFIs exercise considerable influence over the policy content and management of 
PRSs. 
  PRSs have had only a limited impact on the real world policy choices of adopting 
governments.  
The purpose of this framework is to provide direction to the research and bring rigour to 
assessment of the evidence.  Although, the prior positions are framed from a critical 
perspective, efforts are made to reach nuanced conclusions.  For example, in relation to 
the first hypothesis, issues of definition and measurement of outcomes are examined in 
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benchmarking outcome performance.  The question of the relevant counterfactual to be 
employed is also discussed in some detail.   
In addressing these tasks this thesis adopts a two part approach that incorporates both 
quantitative and qualitative components - part one offers a cross sectional evaluation, part 
two employs case study evidence.  Prior to this, Chapter Two provides a review of the 
established literature on the appraisal of the Initiative, and the major contributions on the 
policy based lending regimes which pre-date the introduction of PRSs. This chapter also 
outlines the main insights of the pro-poor policy and measurement literature in order to 
inform the evaluations undertaken in later chapters.   
Chapter Three presents the first substantive part of the empirical research. It provides a 
quantitative appraisal of performance for a cross section of PRS-adopting countries in the 
years since the Initiative was launched in 1999.  The focus is primarily the first research 
question, though attention is also given to the second regarding the policy mix.   
Performance, defined primarily in terms of poverty reduction but also growth and 
distributional outcomes, is benchmarked against a control group of non-adopting 
countries.  A hybrid with-without and before-after counterfactual approach is adopted 
using two specially constructed panel datasets (one based on national and one on 
international dollar-a-day poverty rates).  
Using the identity that links poverty, growth and inequality and drawing on the approach 
taken in Mosley, Harrigan and Toye (1995), progressively more sophisticated appraisal 
techniques are used to test for the impact of PRSs on outcome performance. Drawing an 
analogy with randomized control trails within medical research, the analysis construes the 
adoption of a PRS as a treatment effect gained by participating countries versus the 
counterfactual case given by the performance of non-adopting comparators16.  The 
appraisal begins with a series of tabular statistical comparisons of poverty, growth and 
inequality outcomes, and is followed by the use of panel data econometric methods.  Two 
specifications, a First Differences and Fixed Effects estimator, are used to test for poverty 
impacts within both panels. Efforts are also made to control for endogeneities through the 
use of Instrumental Variable techniques (IV).  In addition, specific attention is given to the 
                                                 
16
 In a strict sense therefore, the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) is estimated and tested.  
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policy orientation of PRSs, given by stabilization outcomes and the channels (growth or 
distribution) through which any poverty reduction gains are found to operate. 
The second part of the research (represented by Chapters Four and Five) offers a part- 
qualitative and part-quantitative appraisal of the experience of two very different PRS 
countries - Mongolia and Vietnam.  The focus within these chapters is the causal research 
questions on policy content and ownership, and the quality of implementation. The case 
studies include contextual information, performance outcomes based on a series of pro-
poor growth diagnostic techniques, and policy analyses.  Following Killick’s (1995) work 
on IMF lending, the objective is to relate the detailed data and statistical record to policy 
changes, and specifically PRS adoption.  The techniques probe the poverty orientation of 
growth, and changes in the size and geographical distribution of incomes, while the policy 
analysis seeks to test for the impact of adoption on actual responses.  The two case 
examples were selected purposively, given their comparability as Asian transitional 
economies with similar starting points, their status as claimed PRS success stories - and 
most importantly - the distinctiveness of their generic policy stances.   Notably, Mongolia 
has been regarded as an exemplar of orthodox policy thinking, whereas Vietnam has 
developed a reputation as a heterodox reformer.  The clarity of the policy signatures 
should therefore allow for easy identification of any post-PRS impacts. In addition, both 
adopted into PRS arrangements without the potentially distorting motivations of HPIC 
eligibility. 
Chapter Six of the study brings the findings from these two distinct lines of enquiry 
together, to offer conclusions on the impact and effectiveness of the PRS Initiative.  These 
are examined in reference to the key research question and hypotheses indentified above. 
1.5 Conclusions  
This introductory Chapter has provided the contextual background to the PRS Initiative, 
and identified the main issues to be addressed.   It has set out the research approach 
followed in this thesis, and set down four testable hypotheses. 
The history and operational practice of PRSs provides a powerful research rationale for 
this area of enquiry.  The complex origins of the Initiative, the competing agendas it has 
sought to address and the mechanisms through which the donor-recipient relationship has 
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been redefined, have all been identified. 
The discussion has highlighted the controversies over policy biases and the scope for the 
exercise of IFI influence.  This has made clear the new channels, particularly that of policy 
tutelage, through which the Initiative’s sponsors aim to secure compliance with orthodox 
policy choices.  It has also made clear the potential for adopting countries to enter into 
PRS arrangements as merely pro-forma commitments to reform.  Overall, the discussion 
supports critical accounts which challenge PRSs’ substance, and thus, their likely 
effectiveness.   
38 
 
CHAPTER TWO: THE ESTABLISHED LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews three distinct bodies of work, which together provide both the 
research context for this thesis and inform the analytical direction taken.  First, the 
existing, limited PRS appraisal literature is examined. Second, in light of these limitations, 
the chapter reviews several contributions to the policy based lending literature (PBL), 
which offers an appraisal of the IFI regimes which pre-date the PRS Initiative.  Third, the 
published material on pro-poor growth and policy is surveyed; this is essential in 
informing the conceptual framework and the evaluation techniques employed in later 
chapters.    
2.2 The PRS Appraisal Literature 
Four distinct strands of the directly relevant appraisal material can be identified. These are 
first, the IFI’s own periodic reports of the Initiative’s implementation; second, the two 
extensive studies undertaken by the IMF’s and World Bank’s respective external 
evaluations bodies - the Independent Evaluations Office (IEO, 2004) and the Independent 
Evaluations Group (IEG, 2004); third, a group of qualitative research studies based on 
multiple case studies; and fourth, a set of independently authored works which examine 
PRSs’ contribution to aid effectiveness.  
2.2.1 IFI Joint Reviews of Progress in Implementation 
The IFIs have, since 2002, jointly conducted a series of in-house reviews of the Initiative 
on a near annual basis.  The 2002 and 2005 reports are the most significant (IMF & IDA 
2002a; World Bank & IMF 2005).  The 2002 review addresses process issues arising out 
of the early operational experience, and served as a progress review cum-policy guide. 
Given the time of its publication, it does not offer a review of performance. The 2005 
review is rather more substantive. It appraises performance and addresses a series of 
external criticisms, not least those raised by the two critical external evaluations which 
were published in 2004.  The discussion therefore focuses on this work. 
The title of the 2005 report “Balancing Accountabilities and Scaling up Results” signals 
its primary concern is the realignment of responsibilities in pursuit of better outcomes, but 
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attention is also devoted to the PRS process.  The authors argue that mutual accountability 
lies at the heart of successful PRS arrangements, and as such, greater transparency is 
required, and a clearer division of roles between national governments and the IFIs, with 
the national authorities taking on more accountability.  The report concludes also that 
PRSs should be more ambitious in driving the national development agenda. The subtext 
is a pattern of weak implementation and still weaker governmental and institutional 
embedding.  The Initiative itself escapes substantial criticism; nevertheless, the report does 
accept the need to replace the JSA audit-type process with one which is more advisory in 
character.  Although also uncritical of the IFIs’ own conduct in managing individual 
PRSs, the report finds against the re-introduction of policy conditionality within parallel 
processes.  Interestingly, it argues MTEF targets should be consistent with, and preferably 
driven by, PRSs (World Bank & IMF, 2005).  
Although, an appraisal of performance is provided, the asserted non-testability of the 
Initiative is a major limiting factor.  The IFIs argue that the lack of policy prescription and 
the specific nature of national conditions, means there can be no well-defined 
counterfactual (World Bank & IMF, 2005, page 3).  Following this line of argument, 
individual PRSs can only effectively be evaluated at the national level and even then, only 
over a sufficiently long period of examination.   However, the joint review rather 
contradicts itself by presenting evidence of improvements in a variety of economic and 
social indicators by way of comparisons which are loosely framed around PRS adoption.  
It finds that HIPC countries (by definition PRS adopters) improve their Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessment  (CPIA) score by just short of 0.5, versus 0.1 for non-HIPC 
LICs, and 0.3 for middle income countries, on a scale running from 1 (worst) to 6 (best 
performance)17.  It also argues that HIPC countries have adopted a more pro-poor 
budgetary stance, achieving a higher proportion of poverty reducing expenditures (PREs) 
(defined as education and health spending allocations). 
Yet these comparisons are evidentially weak.  They are partial in their use of CPIA data 
(which are based on subjective assessments by Bank staff), they fail to report key statistics 
including the improvement relative to the base, and more seriously, they fail to compare 
                                                 
17
 The CPIA is the World Bank’s subjective policy and institutional metric. 
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like with like by misconstruing HIPC for PRS country effects, and in using middle income 
countries as comparators.  These weaknesses are rooted in the failure to identify a sound 
counterfactual.   
Underpinning these inadequacies is the IFIs’ assertion of non-testability, and this is 
unconvincing for a host of reasons18.  While national conditions will vary, the pressures 
affecting low income countries are often very similar.  Policy analysis has also suggested 
that not only do PRSs have a common policy template – a macroeconomic framework 
which defines the fiscal envelope followed by a series of sectoral strategies – but also that 
the policy responses themselves are based on a single template.   Booth et al (2003) 
writing on African adopting nations and Marshall (2008) on the least developed countries, 
show that PRSs adhere to a broadly orthodox macroeconomic stance and almost entirely 
neglect the real sector.  Similarly, the PRS Source Book, a tome of two volumes and the 
primary reference material for policymakers, is rooted in a policy consensus that has been 
advocated by the World Bank since the early 1990s (World Bank, 2002).  In addition, the 
Source Book echoes the key tenets of IMF stabilization in making clear the absolute 
primacy of the macroeconomic constraints on PRS decision making19.  Finally, as the 
2005 review implicitly accepts, even if there is no discernable policy counterfactual, the 
claimed outcome benefits, which accrue (according to PRS documentation and the core 
principles) from improved state capacity and more accountable governance, should, in any 
case, be testable under a standard framework.   
2.2.2 External Evaluations Bodies’ Reviews 
The reports complied by the IMF Independent Evaluations Office (IEO) and the World 
Bank’s Independent Evaluations Group (IEG), which rely on a body of joint research 
(comprising the same dataset, a series of ten case studies and an opinion survey of PRS 
participants) offer a more robust evaluation of PRS performance than the published IFI 
                                                 
18
 The non-testability of PRS arrangements is asserted in a number of IFI publications; within the 2005 
review the discussion at pages 2 to 4 is relevant.  
19
 See in particular the diagram at page 11 of Volume Two of the Source Book, which places the 
macroeconomic stance at the heart of PRS financing decisions, and the importance of any borrowing 
to support public provisioning taking place in a non-inflationary manner (World Bank, 2002). 
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material.20 Most significantly these offer quantitative analyses using comparisons of 
process outputs and initial outcomes (IEO, 2004; IEG, 2004).  They were, however, 
published separately and diverge in their analytical approach, notably World Bank’s IEG 
places greater emphasis on qualitative appraisal. They vary also in the tone adopted, with 
the IMF’s IEO being considerably more critical.  Each of the reports is reviewed in turn. 
The IEO report focuses on performance in the context of IMF lending operations and 
therefore concentrates on PRGF performance. Yet it does also address the Initiative’s 
wider effectiveness, and, in direct contradiction to the IFIs’ assertions, tests outputs and 
initial outcomes via a set of counterfactual comparisons.  Overall, the authors find that the 
Initiative falls short of its potential, and although this is in part due to the short time PRSs 
have been in place, they highlight key design and operational failures.  Their criticisms 
centre on a failure to deliver several of the core objectives, but chiefly country ownership 
and longer term orientation. The report concludes that while there has been some 
improvement in the policy process within adopting countries, the reach of national PRSs 
remains very narrow.  In addition, although they find that the IMF has been less 
prescriptive than in the past, macroeconomic policy remains dominated by external inputs.  
As a result, structural questions tend to be neglected and little consideration of alternative 
growth strategies takes place.  This finding provides some support for the sorts of claims 
articulated in the more radical critiques. 
The authors’ findings on IFI influence and implementation questions are equally 
unfavourable.  The report concludes that many adopting countries have retained parallel 
policy planning structures, and that the impact of adoption on the actual policy approach 
taken is both difficult to determine and in doubt.  PRSs are described as having little 
impact on the time horizons of policymakers, with short term concerns dominating 
national agendas.  With reference to the quality of IFI-local partnerships, the IEO find too 
much attention is devoted by national authorities to satisfying process requirements.  It is 
argued that these have, in some cases, displaced genuine engagement with local civil 
society.   The authors question the Initiative’s deliberate avoidance of the political arena, 
and specifically the electoral process, arguing that as a result, PRSs are poorly adapted to 
                                                 
20
 Formerly the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) of the World Bank 
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national decision making structures.   Drawing on the assembled case study materials, the 
IEO is sceptical of the argument that PRS adoption accounts for the apparently better 
performance given by the CPIA data (see 2.2.1). 
However, the report does find mixed outcomes with reference to several of the other core 
principles. On comprehensiveness, the authors find some positive examples of poverty 
mainstreaming, but also that most PRSs are “a long way from providing a strategic road 
map” and that any gains tend to be confined to the core ministries (IEO, 2004, page 74).  
In relation to results orientation, the findings are more encouraging. The IEO finds 
improvements in analysis and benefits accruing from the introduction of formal results 
frameworks.   
Although limited, the comparative analyses provided remain the most substantial of any 
published source on PRSs.  The report presents two principal counterfactual comparisons. 
The first is based on World Bank CPIA scores for IDA adopters and non-adopters (as 
reported in the joint 2005 review discussed above at 2.2.1). The second is based on 
macroeconomic data for a group of PRGF and non-PRS (but PRGF eligible) countries.  
Although the first set of data are similar to those which are later presented by the IFIs, as 
Table 2.1 makes clear, the IEO’s presentation of the results and its findings are very 
different.  The overall CPIA score improves less significantly for the PRS group, a 
negative variation of 1.4 per cent; while on the individual components only the public 
sector management index records a better performance (a positive variation of 2.4 per cent 
(the first and last rows of results in column 4).  PRS performance on structural policies is 
especially poor, with a negative variation of 5.5 (third row from bottom, column 4).  It is 
also worth noting that the data differ on those used in the 2005 review, in terms of the 
interval used (1999 to 2003 versus 2000 to 2004) and in using the percentage changes, 
rather than simply the level differences.  
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Table 2.1: Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) data  
1 2 3 4 
 % Change in CPIA score 1999 to 2003  
 PRS Countries Non-PRS 
Counties 
Difference  
(+ve = PRS group 
performs better) 
Overall score 3.3 4.7 -1.4 
Policy category:    
- Economic Management 0.3 0.7 -0.4 
- Structural policies 0.9 6.4 -5.5 
- Social Inclusion policies 6.0 6.0 0.0 
- Public sector management  6.7 4.3 +2.4 
Source: Adapted from IEO (2004), Table 6.2, page 79. 
The second comparative analysis presented by the IEO employs IMF data to test for 
improved economic performance. These are further used to examine claims of a 
disinflationary bias within PRS arrangements.  The data are reproduced in Table 2.2.  
Here, 23 PRS adopters (column 2) are compared against 26 non-PRS but PRGF eligible 
countries (column 3) for two three year intervals (1997-1999 and 2000-2002).  These 
intervals are either side of the primary PRS adoption year (2000), and should provide 
some signal of any initial improvement.  The pattern to emerge is a complex one.  While 
both groups generally show overall deteriorations (comparing the changes between the 
results in columns 2 and 3), the PRS group appears to perform better.  The growth position 
weakens far less markedly, from a rate of 4.8 to 4.4 per cent for the PRS group; versus 4.3 
to 1.8 per cent for the non-adopting group (block b).  This outcome is all the more 
impressive in the light of the trade data, which show a substantial deterioration in the PRS 
group’s terms of trade - a 2.0 per cent decline in the second interval (block c).  Also 
noteworthy is the greater improvement in the PRS countries debt levels, though this is 
potentially due to the impact of HIPC reliefs. 
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Table 2.2: Performance on key variables PRS and non-PRS countries 
1 2 3 
Measure (% of annual GDP unless 
stated otherwise)  
PRS Adopters 
(23 nations) 
Other PRGF Eligible 
(26 nations) 
  97-99 00-02 97-99 00-02 
(a) Fiscal & Budget 
Fiscal balance  inc. Grants -3.6 -4.9 -4.1 -5.4 
Govt revenues  20.4 21.5 25.7 26.4 
Govt expenditure & net lending  24.0 26.5 29.8 31.8 
International reserves  3.8 5.0 3.5 4.1 
External debt  97.9 92.2 58.6 57.9 
(b) Output 
GDP Growth (±%) +4.8 +4.4 +4.3 +1.8 
(c) Trade 
Current account balance  -8.3 -6.9 -8.3 -6.0 
Terms of trade change (±% change)  +1.4 -2.0 +3.0 +3.1 
Trade restrictiveness (IMF rating) 3.7 2.1 5.5 5.0 
Average tariffs (% of value of imports)  14.0 12.6 20.2 20.7 
Source: IEO (2004), adapted from Table 6.3, page 80. 
However, although the data quoted in Table 2.2 offer some prima facie evidence of better 
performance within the PRS group, the policy indicators are less supportive and cast doubt 
on the causal impact of adoption.  With reference to the budgetary variables (block a), 
there are only limited indications of better fiscal management. Rising revenues in the PRS 
group are, offset by higher government expenditures, and as a result, the overall budget 
deficit shows a similar level of deterioration in both groups.  The PRS data show the 
budget balance worsening from -3.6 to -4.9 per cent of GDP versus -4.1 to -5.4 per cent of 
GDP for the non-PRS group.  However, the IEO use also these data to support their 
finding that there is no evidence of a disinflationary bias or aid pessimism within PRS 
arrangements.  Conversely the trade restrictiveness data (see block c),  given here by the 
IMF’s subjective index and the value of tariffs, declines considerably in PRS adopting 
countries, versus a static position in the non-PRS group.  Yet the trade balance improves 
less markedly in PRS countries.  While these findings signal that PRS countries may have 
avoided the aid pessimism of the past, they do suggest that they have not escaped the trade 
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liberalization agenda.   Furthermore, this pattern of results provides some tentative 
evidence that the Initiative represents a reshaping rather than a rejection of forgoing IFI 
policy based lending.   
In addition, the IEO report includes data from the case study materials (developed in 
concert with the IEG team) which show positive performance against national MDG 
targets, including poverty levels for a small sample of 12 adopting countries. Yet, as will 
be argued below with regard to the IEG report (which makes much of this data), these 
comparisons are far from robust and offer little persuasive evidence of outcome gains.     
The IEG report (the World Bank’s external evaluations body) adopts a more discursive 
and less overtly critical tone. Informed by the Bank’s non-testability stance, the IEG also 
explicitly note the difficulties of counterfactual analyses and the limited amount of data 
available.  Like the IMF body, the IEG divides its appraisal between the design of the 
Initiative and its overall effectiveness, and the material presented makes greater use of the 
ten case study appraisals, and the opinion survey evidence. The Initiative’s design features 
are again reviewed with reference to its core principles and the report pays particular 
attention to process requirements – specifically, the role of board approval, the JSA 
process and the content of Annual Progress Reports (APRs).   
The extent to which PRSs satisfy the country ownership objectives is examined using 
three criteria: locus of the initiative (its targeting and the sources of PRS policy content), 
country commitment, and third, the quality of local participation.  The IEG’s main finding 
is that although PRSs remain dominated by IFI inputs, this is not inevitable, nor is it 
necessarily undesirable.  The key consideration, it is argued, is the space policymakers 
have to accept, reject and synthesize – and thus own such inputs.  It is worth noting this 
position finds some support in the aid effectiveness literature.   Morrissey (2002) argues, 
for example, that ownership need not mean that national authorities physically originate 
policy choices, and that it is unrealistic to expect the weakest states to have such 
capacities.  Nevertheless, the IEG report does also recognize the dangers posed by over-
tutoring policy choices.  This is reflected in the survey data for local perceptions of PRSs.  
As Table 2.3 (column 2c) shows, 30 per cent of respondents held negative viewpoints of 
the adoption process in terms of ownership, and 33 per cent felt the strategies had not 
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taken account of policy alternatives.  However, it is also the case that larger minorities of 
42 and 44 per cent respectively (column 2a) held positive views on these issues. 
Table 2.3: Selected Responses to OED Country Survey 
1 2a 2b 2c 3 4 
Statement 
 
- Response of National 
Stakeholders (%) - 
    
  
 
 
 
Agree     
  (4 & 5) 
Neither 
agree/ 
disagree 
(3) 
Disagree 
(1 & 2) 
Missing 
responses 
(%) 
 
Mean 
(Scale) 
 
 
Std 
Dev 
(Scale) 
 
The PRS was driven by 
national stakeholders 
 42% 28% 30% 8% 3.24 1.04 
The document was 
modified to take account 
of other view points 
 
44% 
 
25% 
 
33% 
 
13% 
 
3.16 
 
1.29 
 
Source: Marshall (2008) page 13 - adapted from IEG (2004) 
The IEG report also echoes many of the IEO’s conclusions.  The authors find that 
ownership is largely confined to the central ministries, and that PRSs were often only 
weakly integrated within mainstream policy processes.   Again, weak institutional 
embeddedness and a disconnection between national strategies and the political space are 
highlighted.  Furthermore, the maintenance, and often primacy, of pre-existing parallel 
policy making structures was found to be a feature of some PRS frameworks.  
The IEG’s findings are, however, more positive in relation to the impact of adoption on 
wider forms of participation, but considerable variations in practice were apparent.  
Equally significantly, it was found that official commitments to consultation tended to 
deteriorate rapidly after the first four year cycle.  Mirroring the concerns expressed by the 
IEO regarding the dominance of IFI processes, national governments were found to 
largely view community participation as an administrative requirement.  However, the 
report does identify examples of good practice, and argues that these problems are not 
insurmountable. Similarly mixed findings are reported in relation to results and time 
orientation, where state capacity and institutional effectiveness were found to be important 
in explaining variations in performance.  
The review is most critical in relation to the comprehensiveness of national strategies.  
Here the IEG found that PRSs are narrow in their treatment of poverty and far too focused 
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on macroeconomic stabilization.  These biases were also strongly reflected in the 
prioritization of policies and the resolution of conflicts.  Significantly, they conclude that 
an emphasis within the World Bank on a pared-down policy agenda (driven by concerns 
over governance failures) had contributed to these outcomes.   
The final core principle to be considered, that of the quality of PRS partnerships, attracts 
substantial consideration within the report, and the authors examine this as part of a 
specific investigation of IFI-government interactions.  Judged using six criteria ranging 
from policy dialogue to transaction costs, the authors are generally more positive about the 
impacts.  Yet the report also expresses misgivings about the ambiguity of the relationship 
between the IFIs and national governments, and concludes that the PRS framework has 
failed to resolve some of the inherent tensions of the donor-recipient relationship.  It is 
argued that this is driven by confusion over the IFIs’ role in granting approval versus 
endorsing national PRSs.  For the IEG, the spirit of the Initiative requires that IFIs support 
national governments but remain arms-length from policymaking. Moreover, aspects of 
their approach - notably the JSA process - have led to an unacceptable degree of 
ambiguity. 
The quantitative performance appraisal provided by the IEG report is more limited than 
that offered by the IEO.  It also tends to avoid direct performance comparisons, holding to 
the Bank’s line that policy objectives are nationally determined, and therefore, context 
specific.  However, in contradiction to this stance, the review does present analysis of 
what it refers to as outcome performance as recorded in APRs against national planning 
targets, and comparative material is also taken from the 10 case study evaluations.  The 
subsequent discussion is summarised under three headings: improvements in state 
capacity to deliver poverty reduction; the pro-poor orientation of policy responses; and 
initial outcome performance (IEO 2004, pages 27 to 36). In relation to the first, the review 
supplements the CPIA dataset reported above with case country experiences to show some 
improvements within PRS countries over time. Yet it also finds that the comparative 
performance (against non-adopters) has been poor.  For completeness a bar chart taken 
from the report is reproduced as Figure 2.1 below.  Like the IEO report, this shows that 
PRS adopting countries only perform better on the public sector management category.  
The discussion also notes some improvement in overseas aid flows to PRS countries 
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between 2000 and 2003, and that aid levels in these countries are well above those 
enjoyed by non-PRS IDA members. The increases were most substantial for the early 
adopters.  The analysis is, however, limited and only graphical evidence is provided.  
Figure 2.1: CPIA scores for PRS and non-PRS Countries 1999 to 2003  
 
Source: Adapted from IEG (2004), page 35 
The second area of consideration, covering the poverty orientation of policy, is examined 
using the ten case study evaluations.  The report’s conclusions here are rather more 
positive, with the qualitative evidence suggesting that greater attention is being given to 
poverty objectives within strategic policymaking.  Quantitative budgetary analysis is 
provided for 14 PRS countries with reliable expenditure data, and this is also shown as 
supporting better PRS performance.  The report finds that there has been a shift to what 
they refer to as Poverty Reducing Expenditures (PREs) - defined largely as allocations to 
the education, health and social welfare sectors.  Compared with the pre-adoption years, 
PREs in the PRS group showed an average increase of 1.4 per cent of GDP in 1999 and 
3.9 per cent of general government expenditure (GGE) between 1999 and 2003.  
However, the sample size here is exceptionally small (at 14 of the 67 PRS adopting 
nations), and, moreover, it is apparent that the upward trends were already well-
established in the pre-adoption period.    
The analysis of poverty outcomes is still more circumspect.  Here the report focuses on 12 
PRS countries which had provided annual progress reports (APRs) by 2004.  Using the 
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APR targets specified by individual national governments, and grouping these within the 
eight MDG categories, the IEG find that progress has been made for all goals save for the 
child mortality and maternal mortality targets (IEO, 2004, page 34).  Yet the number of 
countries that responded and the indicators used for each goal varied considerably.  
Indeed, only three of the APRs directly reported (all positively) on the poverty reduction 
goal, and troublingly, these three reports (out of a total of fourteen) are interpreted by the 
IEG as clear evidence of overall progress.  It also has to be appreciated that APRs are not 
neutral documents, but monitoring reports provided by national governments.  
Taken together, the assessment offered by the IEO and IEG external reviews is not a 
positive one.  Each finds failures in the Initiative’s design alongside relatively weak 
evidence of any performance improvement, given by somewhat better macroeconomic 
data and process indicators.  Admittedly, as both were published in 2004, and given 
poverty reduction is a lagging variable, the evidence available may then have been limited.  
In relation to the Initiative’s core principles, both report weaknesses in the key criteria of 
national ownership and partnership orientation.  A suite of procedural remedies is 
recommended, including: improvements to the policy space offered to national authorities; 
enhancements to in-country consultations; and improved accountabilities of the IFIs 
versus those of the national governments.  Each of these issues centre on the core 
principal-agent problem that PRSs were designed to resolve. Although not addressed 
directly, the two reports’ findings cast doubt on the ability of any such framework to 
resolve the conflicting incentives at the heart of this problem. 
It is also worth briefly referencing within this subsection, the findings of a number of 
other official evaluation studies of the Initiative.  These include the CDPR’s review of 
PRSs in Asia prepared for DFID (CDPR, 2004), and the UNDP Evaluation Office’s 
review of the UNDP’s role in the PRS process (UNDPEO, 2003).  Although reaching 
broadly similar conclusions to the IEO and IEG evaluations, these and other donor studies 
tend to be more optimistic about the Initiative’s future potential.   
Drawing on extensive case study materials the two cited contributions regard the basic 
approach as sound, but recommend that modifications are made to current practice, 
particularly in relation to national ownership and capacity building.  The UNDPEO review 
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adopts a more critical perspective with regard to IFI dominance and policy neutrality. 
Somewhat anticipating a key argument made by this thesis in later chapters, the authors 
find that PRSs often represent rather narrow development strategies, noting that while “... 
most (PRSs) provide a coherent growth strategy, this may not always be pro-poor” 
(UNDPEO, 2003, page 7).    
2.2.3 Qualitative Case Study Materials 
A third strand of the PRS appraisal literature consists of individual country, and multiple, 
case study evaluations authored by independent commentators.  These contributions have 
proliferated in recent years, and this review focuses on those studies which synthesise 
their findings at the global level.   Three studies are reviewed: Booth et al (2003), Eberlei 
(2003) and Craig and Porter (2006). These are qualitative in character and examine PRSs 
from either an institutional or a political economy perspective, though Craig and Porter’s 
work is also rooted in a historical analysis of neo-liberal thinking on development.  The 
performance criteria employed are, generally, the extent to which PRSs have embedded 
themselves within policy and decision making processes, and their impact on the 
prevailing distribution of power.  The latter refers both to the balance of power between 
the IFIs and national governments and between domestic political interests.     
Of the three, Booth et al (2003) is the most referenced and builds on an extensive field 
project funded by the Strategic Partnership for Africa (SPA)21. His work offers a synthesis 
of the Initiative’s performance and seven detailed case studies from Sub-Saharan Africa22.  
Effectiveness is gauged by conducting country-level appraisals of the extent of 
institutionalization (defined in terms of their fit with, and formalization within, national 
governance structures) and the impact of adoption on the domestic political arena.  The 
study’s concerns are those identified by the good governance agenda: dysfunctional state 
apparatus, corrupt and demoralized civil services, patronage dominated politics and 
atomized and estranged civil societies.  Authors within this tradition, such as Van de 
Walle (2005), are generally pessimistic about the impact of PRSs, yet Booth and his co-
authors have a very different starting point.  As declared PRS optimists, they argue that 
                                                 
21
 The SPA is an association of donor countries and African partners. 
22
 The cases are specifically: Benin, Kenya, Mali, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda and Tanzania. 
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the Initiative can genuinely be path-breaking - precisely because it places emphasis on 
national ownership and governmental accountabilities, and thus offers, through a set of 
reforms, a means of displacing ineffectual governance (Booth et al, 2003, Chapter One).  
Nevertheless, this contribution also acknowledges PRSs’ impact will be mediated by the 
quality of implementation, and here the case study evaluations reveal very mixed findings. 
Five criteria for judging their success are identified:  the extent of mainstreaming of 
poverty reduction; the complementarity of other governance reforms; the origination of 
new spaces for dialogue; the quality of monitoring and evaluation; and the strength of 
donor-recipient relations.  On the first criterion, Booth et al (2003) find considerable 
variations in outcomes, and raise questions about the substance of commitments within 
these national strategies.  Yet, conversely, the study concludes that PRSs have taken 
poverty out of the “social welfare ghetto” and that poverty reduction has become salient 
within national electoral politics (Booth et al, 2003, page 18). With regard to wider 
governance reforms, the findings are less positive. The authors find that synergies within 
major governance reforms, notably the IMF-sponsored MTEF process, are largely non-
existent.  An examination of the complementary governance pay-offs, given in terms of 
civil society dialogue and direct consultation, finds potential but few realized gains.  
Instead, the case materials merely find efforts to satisfy IFI requirements.   On the final 
two criteria their findings are nuanced. With regard to monitoring and evaluation, while 
the PRS framework is considered a best practice model, the supply and demand for 
information at country level is judged to be inadequate and that local operational 
experience falls short of the ideal.  On donor and IFI relationships, the authors argue that 
although the Bank and Fund had often skilfully dealt with national authorities on a day to 
day basis, this promoted merely a technical ownership of the strategy.  Thus, although the 
de jure room for manoeuvre within PRSs was extensive, continued surveillance and the 
presence of non-negotiable elements of IFI packages (notably the MTEF) had fostered a 
lack of political commitment. 
Booth et al’s (2003) overall conclusions are finely balanced.  The authors are optimistic 
about national PRSs and conclude their introduction has reshaped development discourse, 
re-orientated policy objectives and improved national planning capacities.  Yet they do 
recognise that the history of the Initiative is a short one (at the time of publication in 2003) 
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and reserve judgement on its longer term effectiveness. Drawing on the findings of the 
seven case studies which identify a variety of operational failures, the authors conclude 
that the Initiative’s potential is at risk.  A key issue remains PRSs’ explicit avoidance of 
the political dimension.  The study also emphasises concerns over state capacity and the 
opaque nature of IFI and governmental accountabilities.  
The study by Walter Eberlei (2003) of the Institute for Development and Peace at the 
University of Duisburg has a similar area of enquiry, but a rather different research 
approach.  PRS effectiveness is again measured in institutional terms and described as the 
extent of “institutionalized participation” (Eberlei, 2003 pages 1-3). This benchmark is 
somewhat less subjectively defined than that used by Booth et al, and provides a ranked 
categorization based on a scoring method.  This study is also part of a wider research 
project and focuses on Sub-Saharan Africa, but Eberlei’s research methods offer a hybrid 
quantitative/ qualitative appraisal.  His team collect data for 38 indicators for 21 countries 
and use a matrix of four criteria – rights and rules, structures, legitimacy and capacity to 
rate and then categorize the level of institutionalization as strong, moderate or weak.  He 
finds only two PRS countries to have performed strongly (Burkina Faso and Uganda), 
three moderately so (Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia) and the remaining 16 only very 
weakly.  Eberlei concludes that this level of performance is disappointing, and attributes 
failures to familiar themes such as weak attention given to capacity building, a lack of 
transparency and inadequate legitimization via the political process.  More novel insights 
are offered on the quality of PRS governance structures, and specifically the extent to 
which key decision making practices, especially budget setting, are driven by national 
PRSs.  These attributes are found generally to be inadequate, with many cases showing 
that the fiscal envelope had driven PRS content, not vice versa.    
With regard to causation, he finds that national governments, as the ultimate authors of 
PRSs and the custodians of the associated processes, are responsible for these 
disappointing outcomes.  Echoing the findings of others, he also finds that IFI procedures 
often provide incentives to national authorities not to build effective consultation 
structures.  The text refers to such domestic feedback as forms of “alibi processes”, where 
governments employ sham consultations to legitimize often derivative policy choices 
(Eberlei, 2003, page 2).  The study also argues that the IFIs need to stand back from PRS 
53 
 
development, and Eberlei criticizes the IMF’s often claimed position, that the 
macroeconomic strategy is non-negotiable.  Additionally, like others, he finds against 
formal approval of PRSs via the JSA process on the grounds that this is a clear and 
unacceptable violation of national ownership, but he goes further in recommending the 
complete abandonment of direct IFI involvement in the approval of PRS policy packages.  
The third contribution examined is Craig and Porter (2006).  These authors identify 
poverty reduction and the good governance agenda as part of a Polyanian “double 
movement” within neo-liberal thinking – in essence, the new policy approaches represent a 
reflex to the failure of the Washington consensus reforms of the 1980s (Craig and Porter, 
2006, pages 21-26)23.  As such, PRSs are viewed as the operational mechanisms, and the 
IFIs as the implementing agents, of this double movement involving the social 
consolidation, re-regulation and re-territorialisation of unfettered market expansion.   
Their research, which is both theoretical and case-study based, takes a political economy 
approach.  Interestingly, their cases include a developed country (New Zealand) alongside 
three low income PRS-adopters (Pakistan, Vietnam and Uganda). They draw out global 
parallels in policy developments rooted in the new institutional economics and public 
choice theory.  Two questions are examined which are relevant to the Initiative.  First, has 
the targeting of poverty reduction, as opposed to economic growth alone, changed the 
substance of the policy debate on development, and specifically, mainstream positions 
within that debate?  Second, have national PRSs altered the distribution of power and 
policy choices within adopting countries? Their approach is avowedly heterodox in 
character, and they benchmark PRS performance in terms of the extent to which the 
associated reforms have genuinely supported economic and social transformation.   
While they find that poverty reduction, as a guiding objective for policy formulation, is a 
significant development, they remain unconvinced of the PRS Initiative’s substance and 
question its sustainability and wider effectiveness.  Four supporting arguments are made.   
First, they note that the basic liberal policy prescription (rooted in static allocative 
efficiency gains and its disdain for structural change) is central and inherent to the PRS 
                                                 
23
 Porter and Craig (2006) adapt Polyani’s (1944) thesis that a self regulating market cannot exist for 
any sustained length of time without threatening its human and natural base.  Thus a phase of re-
regulation and social consolidation follows every phase of deregulation and capitalistic expansion.    
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Initiative.  Second, and in spite of much rhetoric to the contrary, PRSs fundamentally 
neglect issues of income and wealth distribution.   Third, they find that PRS adoption has 
not substantially altered the power relationship between aid donors (specifically the IFIs) 
and recipients, and that this both encourages dependency and reinforces the shallow nature 
of policy choices. As such, fundamental issues, including land reform, redistribution and 
structural change remain off the agenda.  Fourth and most significantly, they find PRSs, 
although empowering in some senses, have failed to alter the balance of power within 
adopting countries in favour of genuinely transformative coalitions of interests (Craig and 
Porter, 2005). 
In summing up, although addressing similar concerns, notably the quality of PRSs’ 
institutional fit and the policy template, it is hard to generalize the findings of these case 
study-based works.  It is also rather difficult, and troubling, given their empirical basis, to 
separate the ideological character of some of these contributors from their findings.  
However, three observations are worth making.  First, this body of work (and even the 
most critical contributions) recognize that PRSs represent a significant change in the 
thinking and modus operandi of the IFIs.  Second, and as a result of this, there is some 
scope for changed outcomes.  Third, that any pay-offs will be mediated by the extent to 
which the IFIs abide by the core tenets of the Initiative (especially the commitment to 
national ownership) and the political gains which accrue to interest groups which support 
a genuinely pro-poor policy agenda.  
2.2.4 The Aid Effectiveness Literature  
This fourth subsection reviews relevant contributions within the burgeoning aid 
effectiveness literature.  Here PRSs are examined as an ODA modality against other 
management and allocation mechanisms. These accounts are especially useful in 
understanding the Initiative’s ability to meet its strategic objectives around the core 
principal- agent problem.    
The renewed debate over aid effectiveness is a function of the radical scaling up of ODA 
flows that has taken place in recent years.  However, unlike the big push initiatives of the 
past, the new aid agenda has adopted a very different approach to the role of the State and 
a new, welfare-defined, set of policy goals.  As has been argued in Chapter One, the PRS 
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mechanism is itself a product of this new agenda.  It represents, alongside other 
developments, a framework under which ODA, rather than being directed at making good 
shortfalls in investment, is used to promote a series of institutional and governance 
reforms, alongside financing TA and supporting basic public provisioning.  The 
replacement of discredited forms of ex post conditionality is central to the debate over aid 
effectiveness, and clearly the Initiative is informed by the movement towards selectivity in 
aid allocations.   Indeed, the PRS approach falls somewhere between ex ante 
conditionality, whereby prior adoption of a detailed set of policy choices governs 
allocation (here, the policies within national PRSs), and the practice of prior-selection 
under which countries can access ODA funds after meeting pre-defined hurdle or trigger 
criteria (here PRS adoption).   
As a product of consensus thinking, PRSs receive most support from published IFI 
materials, and authors who are sympathetic to the new aid agenda. A major contribution is 
the World Bank’s 2005 Review of Conditionality, which views the approach as pivotal to 
putting right the problems of the past.  Similarly, aid optimists, such as Sachs (2005) 
generally view PRSs favourably, but question their policy neutrality and the extent of 
national ownership.  Following a similar line of argument, Riddell (2007) argues that any 
gains in aid effectiveness will be contingent on the degree of ownership and the ability to 
consider policy alternatives.  In contrast, heterodox accounts hold to the view that PRSs, 
as a creature of the IFIs, cannot be neutral, nor can they genuinely permit policy 
adaptation outside the prevailing consensus.  A common claim made by these writers is - 
as the title of the contribution by Cling et al (2001) signals - that the PRS Initiative merely 
amounts to “old wine in new bottles”.  These accounts, as noted in Chapter One, intersect 
with more radical views expressed by campaigning NGOs, which tend to characterize 
PRSs as drawing a veil over unreformed orthodox policy packages24.   
Equally strong criticisms are provided by the aid pessimists.  Easterly (2006) in a 
broadside at development planning, argues that PRSs are the latest incarnation of a 
tradition of misguided external interventions.  In a highly polemic account he maintains 
that you can no more strategize poverty reduction than you can economic growth 
                                                 
24
 See for example the Bretton Woods Project (http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org) 
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(Easterly, 2006, pages 127-128).   A more considered account is given in Van de Walle’s 
monograph on the political economy of what he terms “Stagnant Low Income States”, in 
which he argues that a PRS simply cannot succeed in the policy environments typified by 
most LICs (Van de Walle, 2005).  This is due to a basic lack of state and institutional 
capacity, but also, because of pervasive dysfunctional governance.  As quoted in Chapter 
One (see 1.3), Van de Walle views PRS policy development as something of a charade, 
and he coins the phrase “policy ventriloquism” to describe the behaviour of many states 
seeking to secure IFI loans (Van de Walle, 2006. page 67).  For him, PRSs will simply 
aggravate governance weakness, and therefore, that IFI lending should return to more 
traditional forms of conditionality. However, he accepts that PRSs may have a role within 
those countries with better established (and democratic) governance environments.  
The contribution by Morrissey (2002) on pro-poor conditionality offers a critical but less 
pessimistic account of the Initiative.  While recognizing the gains, he counsels against 
current operational practices and the IFI’s unchanged tendency to use conditionality 
coercively.  This account is useful in providing a framework for understanding the 
importance and nature of national ownership and the policy environment in which 
individual PRSs are crafted.  For Morrissey ownership is often misconstrued as implying 
both adoption and origination of a particular policy stance.  Instead, he argues that it is 
unrealistic to expect weak states to have advanced policy formulation capacities. 
Moreover, he maintains that authorities can be committed to - or in the in the language of 
the principal agent problem - have a clear preference for a set of policy reforms without 
formally owning them.  He notes that such preferences can be strengthened by external 
agents, through the provision of external resources, be these financial or technical.  In 
addition, he finds, in contrast, that policy coercion can weaken pro-poor reform 
preferences.  
Furthermore, Morrissey argues the key considerations that need to be taken into account 
when designing support packages relate to the political and governance environment. The 
two salient dimensions are political commitment (made up of policy preferences and the 
political ability to prevail over opponents) and the State’s administrative (i.e. its technical 
and management) capacity.  He illustrates these points with a matrix showing likely 
success of PRS policy regimes under different scenarios. This provides some guidance as 
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to the sorts of external intervention that might succeed given different conditions (see 
Figure 2.2).   He concludes PRSs’ potential will only be realized in the fourth quadrant 
(the bottom right hand box) where administrative capacity and political commitment are 
guaranteed.  Without these their impact will only be, at best, partial.    
Figure 2.2: Policy Environment for Pro-poor policies and likelihood of success 
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IV Extensive 
Ideal F-PRS 
Nationally owned policies 
 Source: Adapted from Morrissey (2002), page 12. 
Morrissey argues, therefore, that PRS sponsors should strive to relieve these political and 
governance constraints, in order to secure commitment, build capacity, and hence, reach 
the fourth quadrant of the matrix.  He also asserts that conditionality is a dangerous 
weapon to deploy since it weakens political commitment.  Morrissey recommends that in 
addition to TA to build administrative skills, donors should seek to shape preferences 
through dialogue and to embolden political will through the early disbursement of funds 
for pro-poor spending.   In many ways the stated modus operandi of PRSs fulfils his 
agenda, but Morrissey (2002) concludes, that in practice far too much emphasis has been 
placed on the policy content of PRSs and coercing recipients into an agreement which the 
IFIs are comfortable with.  To be clear, he is not arguing against rigorous performance 
management, and he advocates that governments should specify minimum policy 
benchmarks and be rewarded for exceptional performance; moreover, that disbursed funds 
(dependent only on PRS adoption) be tracked via the composition of budget expenditures. 
This subsection has reviewed a diverse set of contributions within the aid effectiveness 
debate, and this diversity makes overall generalizations difficult.  However, two 
observations are worth making.  First, it is clear that few of these accounts provide PRSs 
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with a clean bill of health. Indeed, although the more positive see the potential of these 
arrangements, they express misgivings over the conduct of the IFIs and the quality of the 
policymaking environment within LICs.  Second, critical accounts within this strand of the 
literature have strong points to make about the extent and quality of policy 
implementation.  Both orthodox and heterodox writers argue  (or different reasons) that 
PRSs will rarely succeed in shifting the actual policy stance in adopting countries, and 
that, as a result, they will often be irrelevant to outcomes. 
2.3 The Policy based Lending (PBL) Literature 
The previous section has shown that although there is sizeable and growing PRS appraisal 
literature, there remains no authoritative study of overall performance, and that the few 
quantitative contributions lack analytical rigour.  The paucity of empirical sources also 
ensures there are few guides to the type of appraisal techniques that might be employed to 
examine the research questions posed by this thesis.  This second section therefore 
reviews an earlier related literature which examines the structural adjustment and 
stabilization lending of the 1980s and 1990s.  This is a deeper and more sophisticated 
body of work, which also played some role in shaping the initial design of the PRS 
Initiative.  The analytical techniques used can be summarized four ways: statistical testing, 
cross-sectional econometric evaluations, general equilibrium simulations, and detailed 
case studies.  The more authoritative contributions combine several of these approaches.  
Research associated with the IFIs, for example, Dollar and Svensson (1998) and Kahn 
(1990) tend to be narrower and econometrically based.   
Researchers generally employ a formal counterfactual within their analyses. The with 
versus without approach, where outcomes of a policy adopting group of countries are 
compared against the situation without policy (usually proxied by the performance of a 
similar non-adopting group),  receives the most support, on the grounds that it offers a 
closer approximation to experiments within the physical sciences.  The discussion below 
separately considers evaluations of World Bank and IMF lending operations. 
2.3.1 World Bank Structural Adjustment Lending (SAL) 
The study by Mosley, Harrigan and Toye (1995) on World Bank operations represents the 
most comprehensive work within the literature, and given the policy content of structural 
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adjustment programmes, it is also the most directly applicable to this thesis.  Their two 
volume contribution asks two principal questions of Bank operations: first, does policy 
conditionality confer power on lending institutions, specifically the World Bank, to 
directly influence choices; second, did SAL programmes actually do borrowing countries 
any good?  In answering these questions, their study includes a theoretical discussion of 
the core relationship between donor and recipient, a series of quantitative appraisals, and 
nine case studies.   
The authors present a theoretical account of concessional lending as a strategic game 
between two players (lenders and recipient governments), under conditions of asymmetric 
information.   Here the lender attempts to secure its fiduciary interests by enforcing policy 
compliance via ex post evaluations of the recipient’s conduct (making future 
disbursements dependent on past decisions).  In turn, national governments respond by 
seeking to escape the conditionality while retaining the concessional finance.  Neither 
partner enjoys complete information in these interactions, intentions are also therefore 
revealed ex post.  Yet, in contrast to other accounts, the authors explicitly assume that the 
lender simultaneously faces incentives to disburse funds regardless of performance, and 
that these operate against their fiduciary interests.  As a result, the equilibrium position is 
one where the recipient enjoys an advantage.  They also argue that the World Bank faces 
greater pressure to disburse funds and therefore has proved considerably more flexible 
than the IMF.  Mosley, Harrigan and Toye test this characterization and examine the 
impacts on borrower countries.  
The study’s empirical content is substantial and includes four parts.  Within the statistical 
testing employed at the first stage, an innovative approach is used where countries under 
SAL arrangements are paired with economically and geographically similar non-SAL 
recipients, to create a matched control group.  They also classify the SAL countries into 
high and low slippage groups, reflecting the degree of adherence to the agreed policy 
package.  The second part comprises OLS econometric evaluations of SAL participation 
on various policy outcomes - growth, investment, capital flows, and a host of stabilization 
variables.  Innovations include an examination of the impact of the policy framework as 
distinct from the ODA funds disbursed, and the interactions between World Bank SAL 
and IMF stabilization arrangements.  The third part of their work employs general 
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equilibrium models for the Moroccan and the Malawian economies to simulate idealized 
outcomes (defined by acceptance of Bank policy advice). These are then compared against 
actual performance, thus providing an alternative with-without counterfactual.  The fourth 
part of the appraisal is provided in a second volume.  This represents nine detailed case 
studies of SAL adopting countries during the 1980s and early 1990s.  These offer a mix of 
discursive and analytical evaluations of performance, and pay specific attention to the 
impact of national political economies on performance. 
Overall, the authors find in favour of their conceptualization of an iterated game between 
lenders and recipients, with the competing pressures defining their relative strengths. The 
equilibrium is one where national governments follow a strategy of limited compliance, 
and that the Bank’s permissive approach accommodates such strategic behaviour.  They 
also find that the national context, including the level of indebtedness and dependency on 
the IFIs, geopolitics and local political economy, shape the ability of recipients to exploit 
lending arrangements and, in turn, mediates the strength of the World Bank in enforcing 
compliance.  
Their findings on economic outcomes can be summarized three ways.  First, mixed 
evidence is found for the impact on the target variables of growth and investment.  Both 
reveal a relationship with SAL participation – weakly positive for growth and strongly 
negative for investment.   They find that low slippage (i.e. highly compliant) countries 
exhibited this pattern more strongly, especially the apparently contradictory impact on 
investment levels.   Second, their analysis shows clear improvements in stabilization 
variables (inflation and balance of payments equilibrium), which are secondary objectives 
for SAL programmes.  Again this was more marked for high compliance countries. Third, 
the case materials, and some of the statistical evidence, showed that experience varied 
very considerably between countries.   
Mosley, Harrigan and Toye (1995) conclude that even though there appears to be a mild 
improvement in outcomes, policy based lending fails over the long term to deliver its core 
structural adjustment objectives of re-orientating national economies to more productive 
outcomes.  Furthermore, that rapid stabilization figured too strongly in programmes, and 
that as a result, investment often collapses and this runs counter to SAL’s rationale.  
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Moreover, any short run gains in growth are often a product of trade liberalization, which 
given the lack of attention to capacity constraints and the supply response within most 
SAL arrangements, will ultimately prove self-defeating.  In addition, they find that policy 
compliance is generally weak. This is due both to the failures of conditionality and the 
preponderance of external shocks.  They also note that the presence of significant non-
programme factors makes it difficult to effectively test for the quality of SAL policy 
packages.  Their simulation exercises for the Moroccan and Malawian economies offer 
some benefits here, in suggesting that better compliance may have improved performance, 
but this evidence remains sketchy.   
The World Bank’s 1988 appraisal of lending operations provides a rather narrower 
evaluation and relies only a series of statistical tests and cross sectional regressions of 
performance under SAL arrangements (World Bank, 1988).  Its researchers adopt a 
similar counterfactual and testing framework to Mosley, Harrigan and Toye (1994) and 
find broadly similar results, yet they reach very different conclusions.  For the World 
Bank, the very weak improvements in growth are taken as evidence of successful 
structural adjustment. Moreover, the key issues identified above, the lack of policy 
compliance (and therefore the causal impact of programmes) and the longer term 
implications of reduced investment, are entirely neglected.  A major limitation is the sole 
use of aggregate appraisal techniques.  This is a hallmark of much of the IFI-sponsored 
research, and it will be argued below that these are inadequate in tracing the processes at 
work and that a wider research approach is required.  Nevertheless, such appraisals have 
their place, and it is interesting that separate work by the Bank of a similar character, 
notably the study by Dollar and Svensson (1998) is less positive about SAL practices and 
outcomes. This contribution highlights political economy considerations and the local 
context, as being significant in determining performance.   
2.3.2 IMF Stabilization Programmes 
The literature on IMF operations is more extensive, but those studies directly associated 
with the Fund tend to be narrow in their approach, relying almost exclusively on 
econometric techniques.  Important contributions are reviewed in Ul Haque and Khan 
(1998).  The core narrative of this IMF review paper is one of ever more complex 
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techniques being applied to the same basic data to reveal progressively stronger impacts of 
IMF programmes.  However, the discussion begins with a review of the work of Killick 
(1984 and 1995).  
His two contributions stand out within the mainstream literature on the IMF operations, in 
that he relies on both quantitative and qualitative methods, and adopts a more overtly 
critical approach.  Killick is also the most referenced independent source, and as the 
second study devotes specific attention to the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
(the IMF lending facility which would later become the PRGF) its content is particularly 
relevant to this thesis.  Although the following discussion concentrates on Killick’s second 
volume the methods adopted in the two studies have much in common.  Both offer a 
synthesis of multiple case study materials and statistical comparisons but the former does 
also employ cross-sectional regression analysis.   The findings vary somewhat, with the 
initial study finding no real gain in the key target variables, whereas the latter shows clear 
but limited impacts.  In contrast to other contributors, Killick employs a before-after 
counterfactual which compares post-policy outcomes against past performance.  However, 
he also discusses a number of with-without comparisons made by other studies, and 
examines performance against planning targets within case materials.  His work provides 
something of a menu approach to evidence gathering and appraisal, in that he draws on a 
number of techniques and analytical traditions.  
The second study, Killick (1995), employs 17 detailed case studies, and given the 
presence of multiple arrangements, provides an appraisal of 48 IMF operations.  Although 
a scrupulously neutral line is adopted in examining the IMF’s performance, it must be 
recognized that Killick accepts, without much scrutiny, the theoretical basis of the IMF’s 
monetary approach to the balance of payments, and thus he assumes a priori the potential 
effectiveness of stabilization policy.  The key research objectives are an examination of 
impact performance and, within this, the character of IMF-government relationships and 
the role played by conditionality.  
The findings as they relate to this thesis can be summarised under three headings.  First, 
with regard to the impact of IMF conduct, Killick (1995) concludes that although 
controversy dogs individual stabilization packages, both supporters and critics tend to 
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overestimate the Fund’s power to enforce policy choices and to coerce national 
governments.  He substantiates this by showing that financing operations are managed far 
less rigorously than the rhetoric (on both sides) suggests.  Although the IMF has the 
option of cancelling a programme, the more common outcome is the issuance of waivers 
and/or post suspension renegotiation (often on terms favourable to the borrower).  He also 
finds evidence of arbitrariness in performance assessment processes, and shows that 
certain countries have faced less stringent penalties for deviating from their agreed 
programmes.    
Second, on outcomes, his findings bear some similarity to those of Mosley, Harrigan and 
Toye (1994).  Gains were most evident for stabilization variables, whereas growth and 
inflation outcomes were generally weaker and in many cases not statistically significant.  
These results are mildly encouraging for the Fund, but the magnitude of the stabilization 
gains was disappointing when compared against the targets.  The analysis also provides 
some support for critical accounts of the level of disabsorption that followed IMF 
interventions, and that this was largely achieved through cuts in investment rather than 
consumption.   By the same token, however, Killick (1995) finds that public expenditure 
reductions were generally achieved by cutting capital, as opposed to current expenditures, 
thus, he questions the claimed level of social retrenchment.   On the supporting policy 
variables - exchange rates and domestic credit creation - the study finds the impacts are 
also far more muted than might be expected.  On the longevity of the impacts, although 
evidence was found of some longer term benefits, there was no catalytic effect on future 
capital flows.  
Third, in relation to the ESAF (i.e. the poorest) countries, Killick (1995) found the same 
pattern of outcomes, except in relation to growth, where the evidence of any gains was 
still weaker.   Although, he offers no direct evidence on the impacts on poverty levels, the 
study references other sources, which found that the wages share of national income 
generally declines under IMF programmes, and from his own data, prices generally rise. 
This is a very disappointing outcome for the Fund, which specifically tailored ESAF to 
meet the needs of the poorest borrowers, and it augured poorly for future PRGF 
performance.   
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It is  worth underlining that Killick’s most striking finding, in both studies, is that both the 
IMF and its vocal critics over estimate the impact of its programmes. He argues that they 
rarely succeed in stabilizing vulnerable economies for any sustained period of time, and 
equally rarely do they impoverish entire populations.  An important conclusion is his 
characterization of IMF conditionality as a “toothless tiger” and wholly inadequate for its 
claimed task (Killick, 1995, page 121).  This is partly due to the nature of the relationship 
and conflicting incentives, but crucially also because the IMF’s practice has been poor – 
sometimes exercising too much leniency, but at other times applying it too strictly and in 
too doctrinaire a manner.  He also argues geopolitical influences are important in shaping 
IMF decision making, and that a group of chronic borrowers emerged, and were in effect, 
engaged in an iterative game with the Fund.  These points very much anticipate the 
debates that informed the development of PRSs some five years later. 
The bulk of the other contributions within this branch of the literature are almost 
exclusively econometric in nature.  It is also possible to identify a growing complexity in 
the approaches employed to control for initial conditions and other forms of unobserved 
heterogeneity, and to allow for selection biases.  This prompted IMF authors Ul Haque 
and Khan (1998), who provide a review of the literature, to refer to the later studies as 
adopting a “Generalized Evaluation Estimator (GEE)”, which they define by the use of 
more advanced panel methods and instrumental variable (IV) techniques (Ul Haque & 
Khan, 1998, page 10).  While early contributions found mixed evidence, later and more 
technically sophisticated studies adduce clear beneficial impacts on stabilization variables 
and lagged growth effects.  However, the magnitude of the growth improvements is weak, 
and this is disappointing given the progressively greater importance placed on growth 
within ESAF operations.  Moreover, most of these contributions also found negative 
output impacts in the short term, with growth rebounding in later years as adjustment sets 
in (Ul Haque & Khan, 1998).   
Problematically, these studies do not allow for variations in compliance (via slippage 
variables), or the local policy dynamics identifiable from case study evaluations. Thus 
they offer no real substantive account of the causal processes through which any gains are 
achieved.   The veracity of their claims is also not helped by the relative weakness of the 
results for the key intermediate policy variables or the relatively poor overall explanatory 
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power they record. Troublingly, these contributions recognize few of the econometric 
challenges or the limitations of the techniques used.  
In summary, the PBL literature both provides the policy context for the evaluation of the 
PRS Initiative undertaken within this thesis, and it serves as a methodological guide.  It is 
also striking that the contemporary controversies over PRSs have much in common with 
the debates over past IFI lending operations.  With regard to specific methods, several of 
the studies cited provide a technical resource for the examination of PRS performance. 
The discussion also underscores the value of a mixed quantitative and qualitative 
evaluation, based on a sound counterfactual. However, it is also important to recognize the 
specifics of the PRS approach; the formal identification of poverty as opposed to growth 
as the primary goal of policymaking; and the changed relationship between the IFIs and 
recipient governments.  
2.4 Pro-Poor Growth Policies and Measurement 
This third and final section reviews the pro-poor growth literature, which is concerned 
with the relationship between poverty reduction, growth and distributional change.  
Contributions in this field are important because they provide the conceptual framework 
for the study of poverty reduction processes and policies, and provide a set of techniques 
for measuring PRS effectiveness, which are deployed in later chapters.  This literature is 
extensive, but the discussion here is restricted to three areas: measurement and definitional 
issues, the causal dynamics of poverty reduction, and pro-poor policymaking.    
Before considering these issues, it is useful to make clear the arithmetic connections 
between the principal variables.  Assuming a fixed poverty line, any change in the poverty 
level (P) can be attributed to either, growth in incomes - the growth effect (PG), or a the 
redistribution of income - the inequality effect (PI).  This yields what Bourguignon 
(2002) describes as the “standard relation”: 
∆ = ∆ ± ∆            [2.1] 
Assuming a fixed poverty line (z), it is possible to decompose a change in any additive 
poverty measure (P), following a change in average incomes (ȳ1 to ȳ2) and distributions (σ1 
to σ2), into growth (G) and inequality effects (I) plus a residual term (R).  
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The separate contributions of growth and inequality to changes in the poverty level can be 
calculated.  This is done by simulating the distribution neutral and zero growth outcomes, 
and then differencing these against the actual data (from the starting or end points). This 
yields the growth effect, where distribution (σ1) is held constant, but income is allowed to 
vary (ȳ1 to ȳ2): 
 =  
ȳ	
, σ  −  ȳ , σ       [2.3]  
Plus, or more commonly minus, the inequality effect, where income (ȳ1) has been held 
constant, but the distribution has been varied (σ1 to σ2): 
 =   
ȳ
, σ	 −  ȳ , σ       [2.4] 
The residual term has no specific meaning and represents the difference which arises 
depending on whether the start or end position is taken as the reference point (see Datt and 
Ravallion, 1992).  
The intuition behind this decomposition is central to the issues considered, and 
specifically, in defining and measuring pro-poor growth, and the poverty orientation of 
policy choices.  The literature is host to a series of contested concepts and policy disputes 
which centre on the importance of distributional change, and moreover, these 
disagreements are rooted in opposing ideological positions.  
2.4.1 Measurement and definitional issues 
The most fundamental dispute is the debate over the definition of pro-poor growth. There 
are two primary positions: the so-called Weak view, which defines pro-poor growth as any 
period of growth which reduces poverty, regardless of the impact on distribution; and the 
so-called Strong view, which requires that pro-poor growth must disproportionately 
benefit the poor (Kakwani et al, 2004; Cord et al, 2003)25.  Neither position is without 
measurement and conceptual problems. The Weak view neglects both the dynamic impact 
                                                 
25
 Note that other authors use different labels to represent these positions – for example Cord et al 
(2003) use “strict versus general”; whereas Ravallion (2004) uses “relative versus absolute”. 
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of growing inequality on the poverty level, and its static role in mediating the gains from 
growth at different levels of the distribution.   It also seems intuitively unattractive, in not 
placing any weight on the distributional pattern.  Yet the Strong definition downplays the 
impact of growth on absolute poverty levels, and would be forced, for example, to regard 
a growth episode where poverty and inequality fell only marginally, as superior to one 
where poverty fell very considerably but inequality increased by a little.  It is worth noting 
these two positions are associated with opposing schools of thought - the weak viewpoint 
with orthodox, and the strong, with heterodox accounts.  Although more drawn to the 
strong view, this thesis examines the question of pro-poor growth from both perspectives. 
A set of metrics have been assembled to operationalize different conceptions of pro-poor 
growth. However, analysts associated with the Strong position, for example Kakwani et al 
(2004) and Son (2006) have been the major contributors. Table 2.4 lists a selection of the 
metrics used in Chapters Four and Five, their respective formulas and their interpretations. 
These include: the basic Growth Elasticity of Poverty (GEP) which measures the 
responsiveness of the poverty level to growth in incomes; the Pro-Poor Growth Index 
(PPGI) which provides a means of tracking the distributional neutrality of growth; and the 
Poverty Equivalent Growth Rate (PEGR), which represents the growth rate consistent 
with the level of poverty reduction had there been no distributional change.  The PEGR is 
useful in that it can be interpreted from either of the positions: from the strong by way of a 
comparison against the actual growth rate; and the weak simply by its magnitude.  
Commonly, and within this thesis, pro-poor growth metrics are defined in relation to the 
Headcount measure.  However, it would be possible to employ any of the additive money 
metrics, and conceivably also, multi-dimensional measures such as the Human Poverty 
Index (HPI).  For completeness these are also reported as memo items in Table 2.4 below. 
The case studies presented at Chapters Four and Five, also include reviews of the basic 
data for standard metrics. Comparison difficulties prevented use of the HPI, instead 
discussion is provided for the more general, and less data-demanding, Human 
Development Index (HDI)26.    
                                                 
26
 The standard poverty measures are those given in Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984); see UNDP 
on line resources for a discussion of the HPI (http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices/hpi/). 
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Table 2.4: Pro-poor growth Metrics    
1 2 3 
Measure Formula Interpretation 
Growth Elasticity 
of Poverty (GEP) 
- Total 
- Partial 
 
 
 
εH = δP/ δµ  µ/P  
εHG = δPG/ δµ  µ/P  
Where P is the 
poverty measure , µ  
the mean income & 
δPG the change in  
poverty holding 
distribution constant 
The GEP measures the responsiveness of the 
poverty rate (see memo items below) to growth. It is 
the ratio of the proportionate changes in both. The 
relation can be depicted in partial terms, by holding 
inequality constant). The GEP is accepted by both 
Strong & Weak positions, but comparisons of the 
total & partial measures are favoured by those 
holding the Strong view (see PPGI below). It is worth 
noting that neither measure is wholly adequate in 
tracking the impact of growth and inequality & neither 
is monotonic27. 
Pro-poor Growth 
Index (PPGI) 
φ = εH / εHG 
Where εH is the total 
poverty elasticity of 
growth & εHG the 
partial elasticity 
The PPGI, as a ratio of the two elasticities, offers a 
measure of the extent to which rising inequality 
weakens the poverty reducing impact of growth. 
Developed by Kakwani et al (2004), it is favoured by 
supporters of the Strong view. A value of unity 
implies direct pass through from growth to poverty. 
Poverty 
Equivalent Rate 
of Growth 
(PEGR) 
 
 
γ*= φ γ  
Where γ is growth 
rate of mean income 
& φ the PPGI 
 
The PEGR is the level of growth that would result in 
the same level of poverty reduction as the growth 
rate, if not accompanied by a change in inequality. It 
can be interpreted: (a) on its own by adherents to the 
weak position (its magnitude); and (b) in comparison 
with the mean growth rate by adherents to the strong 
position (a lower PEGR indicates growth is less pro-
poor); see Kakwani et al (2004). 
Memo Items: Alternative Poverty Measures (P) 
Headcount 
Depth 
Severity 
n/N 
1/n Σ((z-yi)/z) 
1/nΣ((z-yi)/z)2 
Where N is the total 
population the poor & 
z the poverty line 
These are the standard Foster, Greer and Thorbecke 
(1984) (FGT) measures. The Headcount represents 
the proportion of the population in poverty; the Depth, 
the average gap between the incomes of the poor 
poverty line; and the Severity measure, the average 
of the squared gaps. 
Human Poverty 
Index HPI1 
[⅓ ( P1α+P2α+P3)]1/α 
Where Pn represents 
the three domains & α 
a value of 3.  
This is UNDP’s multi-dimensional poverty metric, 
being the geometric mean of three domains: the 
probability of not surviving to age 40; adult literacy; 
and the unweighted average of the proportion of 
children under weight for their age, and the 
population without access to a clean water source.  
Sources: UNDP and World Bank websites (see: www.hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices/hpi/ and 
www.worldbank.org/poverty)  
                                                 
27The GEP is normally negative; however a positive value can arise in the extreme cases of 
immiserizing growth (increasing poverty alongside growth) or that of a pro-poor recession (falling 
poverty alongside falling incomes). 
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2.4.2 Causal processes 
Running alongside these definitional disputes, is a set of disagreements over the deeper 
causal processes at work.  It is argued by orthodox commentators that, although reductions 
in inequality can explain falls in the poverty rate and in that sense are causal, the empirical 
potency of this effect versus that of growth is low, and that, in the longer run, there is a 
negative relationship between the two.  Mainstream authors conclude, therefore, that 
generalizations about the importance of inequality cannot be made and that country-level 
examinations are necessary.  This would include consideration of the distributional 
starting points (for income and wealth), the sectoral composition of the economy (notably 
the industrial versus agricultural share), the degree of urbanization, and the level and 
distribution of human capital. 
Opposing these arguments is a set of heterodox accounts which place greater emphasis on 
the role played by re-distribution, and particularly, when time-bound poverty reduction 
targets are imposed.  In an innovative contribution Dagdeviren et al (1997) illustrate this 
via the application of an analytical framework which specifies three generic poverty 
reduction strategies: Distribution Neutral Growth (DNG), the path advocated by the policy 
consensus; Redistribution with Growth (RWG), a growth process with ongoing 
distributional gains; and the opposite base-line given by a one-off transfer of current 
income (RCY).  They also reference, but do not model, the more common outcome of 
growth processes, that of Inequality Increasing Growth.  Using this framework, a basic 
distributional rule and data for 50 developing countries for the 1980s and 1990s, the 
authors find that RWG is the most successful outcome for the vast majority of the 
countries in meeting medium term poverty reduction targets. However, some caution is 
required in that their distributional rule is fairly demanding, as it equalizes the increase at 
each percentile to the mean nominal gain. This implies a high effective marginal tax rate 
on those incomes above the mean and substantial percentage gains for those at the bottom 
of the distribution.  It is worth noting, also, that the authors recognize the importance of 
country conditions in shaping the relative potency of growth versus re-distribution, and 
that growth is the more significant driver of poverty reduction in lower income countries 
(Dagdeviren et al, 1997).    
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It is also important to reference the contribution by Agenor (2006), which is highly critical 
of these disputes.  For Agenor, this debate is merely a distraction, as inequality and growth 
are jointly determined.  Furthermore, as their effects cannot meaningfully be separated, he 
argues they cannot be regarded as causally separate. As such, policy evaluation requires 
the specification of a macroeconomic model and its parameterization.   He asserts, only 
policy, and not growth can be described as pro-poor. 
This discussion needs also to be reviewed against the separate ongoing debate over the 
connections between growth and inequality initiated by Kuznets’ (1955) finding of a long 
run inverted U shaped relationship between the two variables.  Kuznets explained initially 
worsening distribution in terms of a process of differential opportunities that occurs with 
structural change.  The early debate on these issues was inconclusive and included some 
unlikely alliances (with Kaldor, for example, arguing that higher inequality tends to favour 
higher growth via greater aggregate savings).  The orthodox case, which is usually put in 
terms of the impact of inequality on incentives, eventually won out against structuralist 
positions that viewed maldistribution (especially of assets and land) as a key limiting 
constraint to productivity growth (Thirlwall, 1999). The accepted consensus position 
became one that viewed worsening inequality as either a by-product of the development 
process, or as being mildly beneficial for growth.    
During the 1990s the pendulum swung back, with contributions from a variety of authors 
finding that inequality is growth reducing.  These accounts mainly focussed on the impact 
of inequality on credit constraints (Aghion et al, 1999), but this line of argument includes 
others, such as Lipton (1997) who emphasised inequality’s association with the 
distribution and take up of human capital, and Alesina and Rodrik (1994) who highlighted 
the importance of political economy tensions within unequal states.   The currently 
accepted position is far from settled. Yet there is now some agreement that growth and 
lower inequality (especially in the distribution of assets) are both causally positive for 
poverty reduction over the longer term, with the proviso that country conditions remain 
important28.          
                                                 
28
 Lopez (2004) provides a comprehensive review of the arguments and empirical evidence. The case 
in relation to wealth distribution is fairly settled, arguments persist around the importance of income 
distribution for poverty reduction, especially at the early stages of development.  
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2.4.3 Pro-Poor Policymaking 
The third area of consideration is the suite of policies to be adopted in pursuit of poverty 
reduction objectives. This is especially pertinent to PRSs given their association with the 
orthodox policy consensus which emerged in the late 1990s.  The work of Bourguignon 
(2002 and 2004) is important in underlining the role of grand policy choice in mediating 
the core relation, via what he refers to as the poverty-inequality-growth triangle.  He 
argues that the broad policy stance can have a decisive effect on the nature of the growth 
process, and that management of distributional change is central to securing sustained and 
substantial poverty reduction. Moreover, this thinking gained some influence within 
mainstream policy circles, with the Bank at least recognizing the instrumental importance 
of inequality in securing poverty reduction (World Bank, 2001). 
Nevertheless the policy stance remains contested, and it is important to underline that the 
new consensus does not include an endorsement of wholesale income and wealth 
redistribution.  Typically, it is argued that the specific characteristics of LICs – notably, 
the dominance of agriculture within their economies and mass poverty, favour a growth 
first strategy at the early stages of development.  These positions are married to a narrative 
of weak governance, to argue for progressive liberalization (internal and external) targeted 
at exploiting the static gains from trade (generally in agriculture) and providing vent for 
surplus (from the use of under-employed labour).  Mainstream accounts maintain that as 
the poor live and work overwhelmingly in rural areas and are labour abundant, then 
growth through liberalization will favour labour intensive growth, without the need for 
specific attention to be given to distribution (Lipton, 1997).  Growth-first type positions 
have also been supported by the high profile (and much criticized) work of the World 
Bank economists David Dollar and Aart Kraay (2002 and 2004)29.  
Mainstream thinking has, however, exhibited some distributional concern in seeking to 
ensure labour displaced through technical progress is absorbed within light manufactures; 
in expanding state provision of schooling and better health care; and in the maintenance of 
basic welfare safety nets, particularly during periods of adjustment.  Yet, the justifications 
                                                 
29
 Many criticisms have been levelled at Dollar and Kraay. These include fundamental methodological 
objections (see Lubker et al, 2002) and thoroughgoing econometric critiques (see Amann et al 2004). 
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for these policies were, until recently, crafted in terms of economic efficiencies leading to 
poverty reducing growth, rather than their direct effects on poverty.  The efficiency of the 
labour market and its ability to absorb the oversupply of labour is also central to orthodox 
accounts of poverty reduction.  The role of the State becomes one of facilitating market-
driven adjustment in line with revealed comparative advantages, while avoiding policy 
distortions. Unsurprisingly, the PRS consensus also draws heavily on the good governance 
agenda (Craig and Porter, 2006).  Securing macroeconomic stability becomes national 
authorities’ primary function.  This policy template has been established over a number of 
years, and its early form is articulated most clearly in the manual authored by Lipton and 
Ravallion (1995) on pro-poor policymaking, and these ideas remain dominant in the 
World Bank’s PRS Source Book (World Bank, 2002). 
It would be wrong, however, to conclude that the consensus has remained static in the 
period since the first PRSs were adopted.  Many mainstream voices have come to question 
the adequacy of the policy mix being advocated30. Concerns have included the durability 
of growth-first strategies to sustain reductions in poverty over time, and a debate is 
underway within PRS policy circles over the management of inequality.  However, the 
more radical ideas - including structural reforms (such as selective industrialization and 
trade measures, and land reform), _redistribution (progressive tax and transfer systems and 
statutory minimum wages) remain anathema to the orthodoxy, and are the subject of very 
divisive disputes. A key argument that this thesis will make in later chapters is that the 
policy consensus remains shallow and self-limiting31. Additionally, it will be argued that 
unless PRSs come to address deeper structural and institutional questions they will fail in 
securing their ultimate goals.   
However, before concluding, it is also worth referring to a further contribution to the 
policy debate rooted in the political realities of LIC state action.  Kanbur (2009) argues 
that the feasibly of radical policy action on inequality and its underlying drivers is 
necessarily limited in most LICs, due to the challenges faced in confronting powerful 
vested interests. For Kanbur, this underpins the narrowness of the policy consensus and 
                                                 
30
 These include one of its founding authors – Michael Lipton – see Lipton (1997). 
31
 Dagdeviren et al (1997) provides a review of direct re-distributional measures and structural reforms 
and their applicability to low income countries – see pages 399-405. 
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the focus on growth in most PRSs. Yet he also concludes that it is unrealistic to expect 
externally-driven plans to address more radical options (such as land reform and factor 
prices) and that critics underestimate the challenges faced by national politicians.  
2.5 Conclusions  
This chapter has provided a comprehensive review of three established literatures, which 
are central to this evaluation of the PRS initiative.  Key insights are followed by a 
discussion of how these literatures assist in answering the principal research questions 
posed in Chapter One (see section 1.4).   
Although the PRS appraisal literature is now substantial, it remains limited in its depth and 
lacks analytical rigour.  Particular omissions are an aggregate quantitative appraisal of 
outcomes and a failure to specify an adequate counterfactual for performance 
comparisons.  An alleged limiting factor has been the claimed non-testability of PRSs, due 
to their bespoke nature and the varying national contexts in which they operate.  This 
thesis contests this claim.  This is firstly because it should, in any case, be possible to test 
for improved outcomes of the claimed institutional benefits, and secondly because this 
chapter finds prima facie evidence that PRSs do possess a common policy template.  
Independent contributions to the PRS literature underline that there is a clear case to 
answer. The external evaluations bodies of the IMF and World Bank found serious 
weaknesses in the approach and few solid indications of progress towards its objectives.  
Published case study materials provide more damning, though admittedly partial evidence, 
to support the arguments made by long standing critics of IFI dominance, policy biases 
and weak institutionalization. These positions are given greater force by a segment of the 
aid effectiveness literature which suggests that PRSs can only partly resolve the principal-
agent problems at the heart of donor assistance.  A key insight is the likely poor 
correspondence between PRS adoption and subsequent policy actions. 
The second body of work reviewed, that of the policy based lending appraisal, provides a 
valuable resource in setting out how this thesis might tackle its core research objectives.  
Particularly useful is the notion of a menu approach as recommended by Killick (1995), 
under which a variety of empirical methods and counterfactual analyses are employed. 
The study by Mosley, Harrigan and Toye (1994) on World Bank lending provides a 
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directly applicable framework made up of a cross sectional evaluation followed by a series 
of qualitative case studies.  These two works also provide a developed understanding of 
the practice of IFI lending operations in the past.  These are the gap between rhetoric and 
outcome performance, the power of aid bureaucracies to reshape policy instruments to 
serve status quo interests and the importance of local conditions, notably national political 
economies, in determining the outcome of lending operations. 
The third part of the Chapter, which examines the pro-poor growth measurement and 
policy literature, outlines the conceptual background to the core set of relationships being 
examined, and helps inform the analytical basis of the case study appraisals undertaken in 
Chapters Four and Five.  A key innovation offered in this thesis over past case materials 
will be to back qualitative insights with more substantive quantitative evidence.  This 
literature is also helpful in identifying the policy template associated with the PRS policy 
consensus and the key disputes, and chiefly, the importance of growth versus 
distributional change. 
It is useful to examine how the existing literature would answer the four primary research 
questions posed in Chapter One, and this effectively provides a baseline for this thesis.  
Each question is considered in turn.  
Firstly, with reference to PRS performance, the existing evidence is incomplete, lacks 
reliability and is somewhat contradictory.  While the IFI accounts adduce some post-
adoption improvement in inputs and outputs, their external evaluations bodies’ 
conclusions are highly equivocal, finding few clear improvements.   Most significantly, no 
direct evidence of better poverty outcomes is presented.  The qualitative case materials, 
which focus on different research questions, tell an equally inconclusive story.  Broadly, 
they find potential for, but very little realized evidence of attainment.  A key challenge 
remains the lack of quantitative appraisals based on a sound counterfactual case.   
On the question of policy neutrality, there is a clear disconnect between the assertions 
made within the IFI published materials and the rest of the literature. The rigorous 
appraisals undertaken by the external evaluations bodies unambiguously find that the 
policy positions adopted within PRSs are narrow, and little consideration alternatives has 
taken place.  This finding is also largely supported by independent case study-based 
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works.  These tend to reveal that choices tend to mirror the established policy consensus 
outlined in Section 2.4.  However, it is also worth noting that the evaluation bodies find no 
strong evidence of disinflationary biases within PRSs.  Moreover, the more ideologically 
neutral case study contributions are still optimistic about the Initiative’s potential.  
Similar difficulties are faced in addressing the third research question regarding the extent 
of IFI influence within PRS development and implementation.  IFI assertions of national 
ownership are challenged by the empirical record.  On balance, the published case study 
evidence suggests that IFI operational practice has been rather more intrusive than 
intended by its architects when the Initiative was launched.  Furthermore, the aid 
effectiveness literature offers a more significant critique by questioning whether PRSs 
even have the potential to resolve the core agency problems posed by donor-recipient 
relations.  Yet the situation is somewhat fluid, and notable revisions to PRS development 
and monitoring processes have been made. It also has to be kept in mind, as articulated by 
Morrissey (2002), that ownership need not require the origination of policy, and that the 
real criterion is one of control.    
Firm judgements also cannot be made in relation to the fourth and final question regarding 
PRS implementation.  The aid effectiveness literature, particularly the case study 
materials, substantiates many of the concerns given within critical accounts, especially in 
finding that national PRSs have often amounted to merely paper strategies.  In contrast, 
the IFI materials, and the IEG report more convincingly, do provide some evidence of 
policy influences.   It seems, therefore, that outcomes vary between countries.  This 
question is potentially the most important causal consideration in determining the 
effectiveness of the PRS Initiative.    
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CHAPTER THREE: CROSS SECTIONAL EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents and discusses the results of a cross-sectional appraisal of PRS outcome 
performance.  It examines the evidence, at the aggregate level, for enhanced poverty reduction 
and its proximate drivers of economic growth and more equitable income distribution.  This is 
achieved through a set of statistical and econometric evaluations, based on counterfactual 
comparisons between two specially constructed panel datasets of PRS-adopting and non-
adopting countries. This chapter represents the first substantive part of the empirical body of 
work reported in this thesis.  In addition to providing a set of free standing conclusions, it also 
seeks to inform the case study evaluations which follow in Chapters Four and Five. 
The Chapter has four principal sections. The first outlines the analytical approach, the core 
relationship to be tested and the various analytical techniques employed.  It also addresses key 
research issues, chiefly, the challenges associated with assembling consistent and comparable 
panel data.  The second section provides the results of a series of statistical cross tabulations 
of differences in performance between PRS and non-PRS groups of countries.   The third 
section reports the results of two standard panel data econometric approaches - First 
Differencing and Fixed Effects estimation.  Finally, the concluding section brings the various 
strands of the analysis together. 
3.2 Research approach 
Central to the research approach is the explicit assumption that PRSs form an identifiable, and 
therefore testable, set of processes and/ or policy choices and, as such, adoption of a PRS is 
viewed as having a country-level treatment effect. This is defined as the difference in 
performance accruing from having PRS in place, and is estimated by way of a comparison 
with a counterfactual case.   As will be discussed, the precise counterfactual varies within 
each of the techniques applied, but in the main a with-without approach is used where the 
effect is estimated by differencing outcomes for treated observations (i.e. the PRS group) from 
a set of non-treated (control) observations (i.e. the non-PRS group).   
However, the assumptions that underpin this analytical approach are controversial.  First and 
foremost, recalling the discussion in Section 2.2, the World Bank maintains that PRSs have no 
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distinct policy agenda and are fitted to national contexts, and thus cannot be tested in 
aggregate terms.   This is countered by two lines of argument.   First, although it is difficult to 
identify a specific set of common policies across all PRSs, a strategic orientation and a policy 
template can be discerned.  Second, even if the Bank’s description of PRSs is accepted, it 
must be possible to test for the claimed framework and institutional benefits.  Nevertheless, 
this dispute does shape the nature of the evaluation approach adopted.   This is reflected in the 
emphasis placed on testing for policy outcomes (chiefly poverty reduction), and in the 
parsimony of the basic model used throughout.   In essence, the impact of PRS adoption on 
poverty is examined within the standard growth and distributional relation (introduced in 
Section 2.4), where the poverty level and poverty reduction varies positively with growth in 
incomes, and negatively with growth in inequality.   
Second, the definition of the counterfactual is open to question.  In line with best practice, a 
with-without specification is employed as it better approximates the  approach used in natural 
experiments, and it is the method used extensively in similar appraisal exercises (see for 
example Mosley, Harrigan and Toye, 1994 and World Bank, 1988)32.  However, it is 
emphasized that PRS adoption is an elective, and therefore non-random decision, and that the 
identification of a fully representative control group is problematic.  Nevertheless, 
considerable efforts are made to counter this. 
The evaluation approach is layered in terms of its complexity, beginning with comparisons of 
treatment versus control groups of countries by way of standard statistical tests, followed by 
more rigorous econometric examinations, which enable heterogeneity and selection biases to 
be addressed.  It is, however, important to be clear about the research objectives and the 
limitations imposed by the data environment.   The core question being examined is the first 
of those identified in Chapter One; whether better poverty outcomes are associated with, and 
can be traced to, PRS adoption.  In addition, attention is given to the second research question 
relating to the policy mix, and specifically those critical accounts which cite the Initiative as a 
latter day vehicle for implementing stabilization and structural adjustment policies (see 
sections 1.3 and 1.4).  Given the arguments noted above over testability, the analytical 
                                                 
32
 But note data availability necessitates the use a hybrid with-without/ before-after approach. 
78 
 
approach is exhaustive but also cautious.  A further objective is to provide empirical insights 
for the case study evaluations which follow.     
Inevitably, the quality of the analysis undertaken is heavily dependent on the availability of 
reliable (consistent and comparable) longitudinal data.  In order to facilitate this, two separate 
panel datasets were constructed; one based on international dollar-a-day poverty lines, and the 
other on national poverty lines.  Collecting these data and ensuring basic comparability was a 
major undertaking, especially in the latter case.  Indeed, as will be discussed (in 3.2.3), a 
strand of the poverty monitoring and evaluation literature has increasingly come to question 
the usefulness of longitudinal poverty data (Reddy and Pogge, 2005).   
3.2.1 Theoretical Underpinning 
The overall framework used to test for the impact of PRS adoption throughout the analysis, is 
the growth-inequality identity introduced in Section 2.4. This defines poverty reduction (the 
end goal of PRSs) as the part product of growth in average incomes, and part, the change in 
the distribution of income.  This lies at the heart of the poverty decomposition methodologies 
developed by Datt and Ravallion (1992) and by Kakwani (1997) and their application to 
poverty dynamics by Bourguignon (2002 and 2004).   
Figure 3.1 depicts the dynamics of the relation graphically, in terms of a movement from the 
original distribution (the bold line) to the new distribution (the light broken line).  In the 
scenario depicted (which employs a logarithmic scale) the mean income (the maximum point) 
is seen to move across and upwards, the movement across is associated with growth in 
incomes (the growth effect), and the movement upwards with the reshaping of the distribution 
(the inequality effect).  By simulating the distribution-neutral outcome (the non-bold curve 
labelled I), the separate growth and inequality contributions to the change in the poverty level 
be identified. Their magnitudes are given by the areas between the curves to the right of the 
vertical axis (which is set at the poverty threshold).  The light shaded area represents the 
impact of growth and the hatched area the impact of (in this case) improved inequality. 
Although, in Figure 3.1, the two effects are complementary, the more typical outcome is one 
where the beneficial impact of growth is offset by worsening inequality.  
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Figure 3.1: Graphical depiction of the standard decomposition relation 
 
Source: Bourguignon (2004), page 7 
Formally, the decomposition identity, described by Bourguignon (2002) as “the standard 
relation”, can be specified in terms of a change in any additive poverty measure and a fixed 
poverty line. This is expressed below for the change in the Headcount measure (H) over two 
time periods (t, t-1); where (F) depicts the income distribution function; and (z) a real terms 
constant poverty threshold.  
∆ =  − =  −                                                       [3.1] 
If we normalize by the average income (ȳ), the change can be written as the decomposition of 
the two effects, in which the terms are independent of the scale of incomes.  Thus, in Equation 
3.2, the first square bracket represents the income or growth impact (the change where the 
distribution is held constant), and the second bracket, the distributional effect (where income 
is held constant).    
∆ =     ! −  

 "#!$  +  

 ! −  

 !$     [3.2] 
Bourguignon (2004) argues that aggregate changes in the poverty level, which are a function 
of growth in incomes, the initial distribution of income, and distributional change can be 
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influenced by policy choices and institutions.  Moreover, he describes this process in terms of 
an interlocking relationship – “the poverty-growth-inequality triangle” which is depicted in 
Figure 3.2.  Here the channels through which poverty reduction is secured, growth in per 
capita output and the changes in inequality, are mediated by the chosen development strategy 
(Bourguignon, 2004 pages 3-5).   Thus the impact of strategic choices (in this context, PRS 
adoption) is a conditioning variable on the standard relation. As outlined above, in the 
analyses that follow in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, adoption is modelled as a treatment effect and 
evaluated on the basis of counterfactual comparisons between treatment (PRS) and control 
(non-PRS) groups of countries33. 
Figure 3.2: Bourguignon’s (2004) Poverty-inequality-growth-triangle 
 
Source: Bourguignon (2004) page 4 
3.2.2 Evaluation Techniques 
As outlined in Chapter Two, due to the limited nature of the PRS appraisal literature, the  
evaluation approach draws on studies of past IFI policy based lending - chiefly that given by 
Mosley, Harrigan and Toye (1995).   The analyses which follow make use of two panel 
datasets (one using national and one using international poverty lines) comprising 68 PRS-
adopting and non-adopting groups of countries over a 12 year time frame running from 1996.   
Appraisal techniques test for differences in outcomes between the two groups; first by way of 
statistical tests of difference of means (for outcome variables); and second, via econometric 
                                                 
33
 Drawing an analogy with the medical sciences, a national PRS framework is defined as a form of 
treatment for adopting countries. 
Absolute poverty and 
poverty reduction 
Distribution and 
distributional changes 
Aggregate income level 
and economic growth 
Development Strategy 
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evaluations, in which any PRS effect is identified using a binary variable.  Within each of the 
evaluations, poverty is represented by the Headcount measure, distribution by the Gini 
coefficient, and incomes (and hence growth) by an index of constant US dollars per capita.   
In recognition of the heterogeneity of the data (discussed in more detail below at 3.3 and in 
Appendix K), statistical testing makes some use of propensity score matching (PSM) methods.  
These are a sophisticated form of the pairing approach used in Mosley, Harrigan and Toye 
(1995), and aims to improve the quality of the control group by ensuring the country episodes 
are more comparable.  Changes are also annualized to allow for variations in the length of the 
poverty reduction episodes within the sample.  The econometric approaches address the 
challenges posed by unobserved heterogeneity directly within the specifications employed, 
but vary somewhat in the model and the format of the two datasets used.  The First 
Differences (FD) estimator models poverty change in terms of contiguous changes. In order to 
achieve sufficient balance in the panel, the 12 years of data were parsed into four blocks 
(1996-1998, 1999-2001, 2002-2004 and 2005-2007) and averaged.  In contrast, the Fixed 
Effects (FE) estimator models the relation in levels as a pooled cross section for the full 12 
year sample.  Instrumental variables (IV) techniques are also employed to control for 
endogeneities arising from the non-random nature of PRS adoption.    
3.2.3 Data Issues and the Measurement of Poverty 
The assembly of two panel datasets with a sufficiently large number of PRS adopting 
countries was a substantial undertaking.   A major issue to be resolved was the operational 
definition of poverty.  In the interest of clarity and data availability, the Headcount ratio based 
on income or consumption data and a fixed poverty line was selected.  The conceptual 
limitations of the Headcount are, however, acknowledged. These are specifically that: it is 
narrow indicator of deprivation and excludes consideration of basic capabilities; it fails to 
meet the weak transfer axiom discussed in the poverty measurement literature34; and like other 
estimated money-based metrics, it suffers from a host of comparability issues.  Regardless of 
these failings, the Headcount is the measure PRS documents identify as the target of policy, 
and, as such, it must be the primary benchmark for examining their performance.  
                                                 
34
 Specifically, the Headcount is not necessarily responsive to transfers from a poor individual to a less 
poor individual Sen (1976). 
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Two alternative headcounts are available: those given within national surveys undertaken 
primarily by government statistical agencies; and the international dollar-a-day poverty 
dataset held by the World Bank35.  On first inspection the former would appear to fail a key 
test of comparability across countries, and potentially that of consistency through time.  
Although, surveys have increasingly adopted similar methods and a common calorific base to 
the definition of poverty lines, there remains a tendency within national surveys towards 
subjective inflation in poverty thresholds (Ravallion, 1994). In line with other researchers 
therefore (see for example, Ravallion and Chen, 1997 and 2008), international lines would 
appear to be the preferred choice.  However, such a conclusion overlooks a number of 
weaknesses.  Foremost, a critical literature has developed over the quality and consistency of 
international poverty lines, which questions their claimed superior longitudinal and cross-
country comparability.  Four major criticisms are worth noting.  First, considerable disquiet 
has been expressed over the reliability and consistency of the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
adjustment, especially during the intervals between valuation years (Reddy and Pogge, 2005).  
It is worth noting that the 2005 re-valuation (which took place while the analysis to support 
this thesis was being undertaken) resulted in very substantial changes in global poverty levels 
and the relative positions of individual countries (Chen and Ravallion, 2008).  Second, it 
remains the case that international and national poverty survey data often rely on the same 
source, and that any potential measurement errors within the survey methods (referred to 
below) would also affect the comparability of the dollar-a-day series.  Third, there is a 
definitional problem, in that the dollar–a-day line, inevitably, is somewhat arbitrary and has a 
weak correspondence with welfare (Reddy & Pogge, 2005).  Fourth, given that PRSs 
universally target nationally-generated poverty data, it would be perverse to track their 
performance using this alternative metric.  This issue is central to determining the causal 
impact of PRSs is returned to in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 and in the concluding chapter.  In 
recognition of these challenges, and the benefits accruing from the triangulation of results, 
national and international panels were constructed and employed in the analyses which 
follow.   
                                                 
35
 It is worth noting that these two sources do often rely on the same survey data – national poverty 
surveys supported by the World bank-funded Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) 
programme. 
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The primary means of ensuring the comparability within the national panel  was a strict 
filtering exercise to ensure that all data records were of a sufficiently high standard - 
benchmarked to the Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) programme and rooted in 
a common calorific (2,100 calories a day) threshold36.  This required building the panel from 
primary sources (LSMS publications, World Bank Poverty Assessments and national poverty 
reports) for the 12 year period from 1996 to 2007.  The dollar-a-day line data were sourced 
from the World Bank’s Povcalnet database (which is an augmented form of the World 
Development Indicators series).  
It is, nevertheless, important to record that the comparability of poverty data, across time and 
across countries, remains a major evidential challenge in both panels.  Debate continues over 
the adequacy of poverty records, both national and international.  A primary set of concerns 
relate to the theoretical and methodological basis of the cost of basic needs approach, which is 
central to the methods employed within LSMSs, and on which, virtually all poverty data are 
now sourced.  Some critiques come close to rejecting the possibility of longitudinal poverty 
measurement; in essence, it is argued that consumption poverty is too complex a phenomenon 
to be measured accurately or consistently.  Less pessimistic, but equally damaging, is the case 
put by Reddy and Pogge (2005), referred to above, on international poverty data.   In a series 
of papers they argue that the World Bank’s preferred series simply does not measure the poor 
nor is it consistent over time.  They support this by showing that the dollar-a-day definition is 
not anchored in any objective measure of welfare; and that the use of PPP methods to price-
adjust the data fails to secure consistency - due primarily to the use of a global re-pricing 
index in the intervals between revaluation years.   Finally, several empirical studies, see for 
example Marshall et al (2009), show that the quality of survey methods vary to such an extent 
as to question the comparability of individual country records. In part, this is due to the 
evolution and refinement of methods, but much also remains unexplained.  These authors find 
that around 30 per cent of poverty records, based on LSMS data, were subject to ex post 
revisions by the World Bank and that policymakers in LICs are effectively “flying blind”. A 
common recommendation is the abandonment of cross country poverty measurement in 
favour of a correlates approach based on proxy variables (typically health/nutrition related or 
                                                 
36
 Given in terms of meeting the practices adopted within the World Bank’s Living Standards 
Measurement Survey (LSMS) series. 
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those rooted in local living conditions), which are easily countable and are directly related to 
welfare.   
While this thesis acknowledges the force of these criticisms, a positive approach is adopted in 
accepting the published poverty record as fit for the purpose required here.  This cautious 
optimism is underpinned by three considerations.  First, although the potential failures are 
serious, they would have to be very considerable if they are to undermine fully any aggregate 
trends in the data.  Second, the purpose here is not to determine the magnitude of global 
poverty reduction or to make individual country comparisons, but rather purely to distinguish 
variations in performance between two sets of countries (those with and without PRS 
arrangements).  Third, the use of two panels with two distinct definitions of poverty allows for 
the triangulation of results.   
Both datasets include the variables required by the standard model (poverty levels, per capita 
incomes and distributional data, specifically the Gini coefficient).  Additionally, PRS status 
(year and length of adoption), and the basis of the poverty estimates (income versus 
consumption) were recorded.   Further variables were incorporated within the three separate 
formats of each dataset, which were shaped to meet the requirements of the different stages of 
the analysis.  Each of the formats – episode-based, periodic and annual are provided in 
Appendices B, C and D respectively.  Additional variables included IFI indebtedness 
(employing various lags) to allow for the use of IV methods within the econometric 
modelling, and structural adjustment proxies within the statistical testing data to investigate 
the presence of deflationary biases within PRS arrangements.  The panels included data for a 
12 year period from 1996, cleaning of the datasets took place, including some limited use of 
interpolation for missing values. 
Data availability was a key issue during the compilation process.  The initial objective was to 
include all 67 PRS adopting countries within the panel, yet astonishingly, only 29 had 
undertaken two or more high quality poverty surveys.  This in itself is a major finding, 
underlining the widespread inadequacy of monitoring and evaluation in PRS countries.  The 
data from adopting-countries were supplemented (in each dataset) with 34 non-adopting 
countries to form a control group.  Selection of this group was also conditional on data 
availability, again introducing the possibility of non-comparability, but efforts were made to 
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balance the sample both geographically and in terms of economic characteristics.  Moreover, 
the inclusion of data prior to the introduction of the Initiative (in 2000), permitted some same-
country records to be employed, thus considerably boosting the number of records.  Given 
some of these included PRS countries prior to adoption, this effectively means the basis of 
comparison is a hybrid with-without counterfactual approach, as adopters’ performance is 
being benchmarked against non-adopters and their own data prior to adoption.    
The varying requirements of the different stages of analysis necessitated the compilation of 
three formats of the two panels and thus six datasets were complied.  The key issue was the 
need to allow for the sporadic nature of poverty measurement which, at best, followed the 
three to four year LSMS cycle, and therefore a large number of missing records.  In addition 
to this, efforts sought to allow for the representation of time effects and to get the maximum 
out of the data available. The three formats of the panel data were as follows:  
 For the statistical testing, each country’s record was divided into poverty reduction 
episodes (as in Bourguignon, 2002).  Episodes ranged between two and seven years; the 
annualized change was then calculated for each of the variables. This process yielded 83 
observations for the national and 143 for the dollar-a-day panel (see Appendix B).  
 For the First Differences (FD) estimator, the datasets were divided into four three year 
periods.  Annual observations within each period were averaged. Some interpolation was 
necessary to provide a contiguous balanced panel.  This gave 75 records for the national 
panel and 129 for the dollar-a-day panel (see Appendix C).  
 For the Fixed Effects (FE) estimator, the core 12 year dataset was retained with very 
minor modifications.  This annual dataset yielded the largest number of observations, 175 
for the national and 256 for the dollar-a-day panel (see Appendix D). 
A further set of tests was included within the initial statistical evaluation to examine the 
impact of PRS adoption and stabilization variables.  At each stage of analysis, standard 
restricted samples were also modelled: at the testing stage by imposing a common support 
restriction (derived from an estimated propensity score, explained below in Section 3.3); and 
at the regression stages by excluding income-based survey data.   Throughout the analysis, a 
lead-in time of two years was allowed for the time between PRS adoption and the treatment 
impact to emerge.  This period was chosen as the maximum lag given the limited data 
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availability (note that one and zero year lead-in alternatives were also modelled to gauge the 
level of sensitivity).     
3.3 Statistical Evaluation 
This section presents and discusses the results of standard cross tabulations (and the 
associated statistical tests) for changes in the principal variables against PRS status. These 
comparisons provide a difference in differences examination of outcomes between adopting 
and non-adopting groups of countries.  This initial stage of the evaluation seeks to highlight 
prima facie evidence of performance differences and to identify any relationships requiring 
further investigation.  In addition, the tests also examine the channels through which any PRS 
poverty reduction benefit may be operating (growth in incomes and/ or distributional 
changes); and probe critical arguments that PRSs have merely represented a re-packaged form 
of structural adjustment lending.   
The tests are in the form of comparisons of the mean annualized change in poverty, per capita 
incomes and inequality of the treated (i.e. the PRS) and control (the non-PRS) groups of 
country poverty reduction episodes (periods of two to seven years bounded by two 
comparable poverty surveys) within the 12 year sample interval.   The tests for the principal 
variables are supplemented with others for the Growth Elasticity of Poverty (GEP) to probe 
the extent to which growth has been more pro-poor under PRS arrangements, and for the 
stabilization outcomes of PRSs.  A statistically significant differential between the two groups 
indicates a correlation between PRS adoption and the outcome variable. It is emphasized, 
however, that these basic tests are prone to statistical limitations. A significant correlation is 
not definitive evidence of a causal link and the differential only offers an approximate 
estimate of any treatment effect.   
In order to improve reliability and statistical power, a second set of tests using a restricted and 
more comparable control group were carried out.  The restricted group was derived using 
propensity score matching techniques. These methods, which are described in detail in 
Appendix F, order the records according to the likelihood of participation in the PRS scheme. 
This ordering, given by the Propensity Score (PS), is based on a probability (probit) regression 
of PRS adoption on several conditioning variables. The restricted control group is given by 
the overlap of the PS distributions of the two country groups (known as the area of common 
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support)37.  As such the control group is restricted to those non-adopting country episodes 
with a high probability of PRS participation. 
Given the critical approach adopted by this thesis, within the formal hypotheses employed (for 
poverty, growth and inequality outcomes), the null is given as PRS performance being either 
worse or no different to that of the comparator control group, and the alternative, as the 
reverse. The test statistics establish this by examining the significance of the difference 
between the means for the two groups.  Significant results are indicated in the tables by single, 
double or triple asterisks for the 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels respectively and results are 
reported for both the full and a restricted sample 38.   
The results and supporting discussion follows below (in Tables 3.1 to 3.5), the full test output 
is provided in Appendix G.   The tests rely on the episode-based format of the two panels: 
with 83 country episodes in the national dataset (26 treatment and 57 control observations); 
and 143 episodes in the dollar-a-day dataset (30 treatment and 113 control observations). The 
key statistics provided are the mean changes and accompanying t-statistics.  These are given 
for the one sided test (i.e. the treatment mean is greater or lower than that of the control 
group), and its double sided counterpart (i.e. that the difference between treatment and control 
mean outcomes is not zero).  The one-sided test is the primary basis for establishing a 
significant relationship as the purpose is to test for better performance within the PRS group.   
3.3.1 Poverty Outcomes 
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the test results for poverty reduction outcomes.  The 
annualized changes in the Headcount by country are also graphically illustrated in Figure 3.3 
for the national data and Figure 3.4 for the dollar-a-day data.  Here the PRS adopting country 
episodes are shown as filled blocks.  In line with the discussion above, the formal hypothesis 
test specifies the null in terms of lower poverty reduction taking place within the PRS group.  
Counter-intuitively, as a reduction is a negative value, the null (worse PRS performance) 
would be accepted where there is a negative (or zero) difference (d) between the group 
                                                 
37
 Use of a restricted and better matched sample reduces the impact of selection biases and the level 
of heterogeneity, with clear benefits for both the accuracy and power of the tests.  It is important to 
note that PSM methods are only being partially implemented here. Full details are given in Appendix F  
38
 Prior to testing, variance comparison tests were undertaken to determine whether an unequal 
variance procedure was required (Satterthwaite’s approach was used here).   
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outcomes; and would be rejected by a positive difference in outcomes (i.e. the case of better 
PRS performance): 
 % =  ∆0'(')*+) − ∆0)*+) 
, ∶ % ≤ 0;  /  : % > 0         [3.3] 
On first inspection the poverty results are encouraging for PRS adopters.  However, the test 
statistics only support the presence of a treatment effect in the dollar-a-day panel, with a 
significant variation of 1.16 recorded in the full and -1.12 in the restricted samples (at the five 
and ten per cent levels respectively – see column 6).  The difference in performance between 
the two groups is not significant in the national dataset (in the full or restricted tests). 
Although the differential in the dollar-a-day sample is at around substantial at around 1.1 
population percentage points, the standard deviation remains high at around 2.0 to 3.0 
population percentage points. 
Table 3.1: Cross tabulation of Poverty reduction and PRS Status  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Category Non-PRS 
Mean Change 
[Std. dev.] 
PRS Mean 
Change 
[Std. dev.] 
Overall Mean 
Change   
[Std. dev.] 
Difference 
in means 
[t statistic] 
Probability  
d>0 [d≠0] 
National Panel 
- Full Sample 
- Restricted 
 
-0.90  [2.99] 
-1.09 [2.93] 
 
-1.75 [3.22] 
-1.75 [3.22] 
 
-1.17 [3.07] 
-1.39 [3.06] 
 
0.85 [1.14] 
0.66 [0.79] 
 
0.13 [0.26] 
0.22 [0.43] 
Dollar a day Panel 
- Full Sample** 
- Restricted* 
 
-0.34 [2.19] 
-0.37 [3.20] 
 
-1.49  [2.70] 
-1.49 [2.70] 
 
-0.58 [2.33] 
-0.80 [3.04] 
 
1.16 [2.17] 
1.12 [1.67] 
 
0.02 [0.04] 
0.05 [0.10] 
Source: Author’s calculations  
Note: The purpose of the tests is to examine the data for any correlation between PRS adoption and 
performance outcomes; a significant test result does not provide definitive evidence of causation. 
The apparent poverty gain to PRS adoption is also reflected in bar charts given in Figures 3.3 
and 3.4 which rank annualized poverty reduction rates for the two datasets (see overleaf).  In 
both charts, the PRS country episode changes (the filled bars) generally appear in the lower 
part of the graph, indicating higher rates of reduction.   
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Figure 3.3: Annualized change in the dollar a day headcount 1996 to 2007 
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Figure 3.4: Annual change in the National poverty headcount 1996 to 2007  
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However, these charts also reflect the ambiguity of the test results, especially within the 
national panel, where the charts make clear the large variations in individual country 
experiences.  A key factor is likely to be the presence of heterogeneity in both panels, which 
the restricted sample comparisons only partially mitigate.  Episodes of different lengths are 
pooled for the full 12 year period. Moreover, time and non-programme effects are not 
controlled for.    
3.3.2 Per Capita Incomes 
The test data for differences in growth performance (given in Table 3.2) provide more 
decisive evidence of a PRS benefit.  Interpretation of the test results are more intuitive here in 
that the null, based on lower growth in the PRS group, would be accepted where there is a 
positive (or zero) difference (d) in outcomes between the two groups; and rejected where there 
is a negative difference.  
% =  ∆23'(')*+) − ∆23)*+) 
,: % ≥ 0;         / : % < 0         [3.4] 
Table 3.2: Cross tabulation of changes in Per Capita Incomes and PRS Status 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Category Non-PRS 
Mean Change 
[Std. dev.] 
PRS Mean 
Change 
[Std. dev.] 
Overall Mean 
Change   
[Std. dev.] 
Difference 
in means 
[t statistic] 
Probability  
d<0 [d≠0] 
National Panel 
- Full Sample*** 
- Restricted** 
 
+2.45 [3.70] 
+3.02 [4.09] 
 
+5.38 
[5.24] 
+5.38 
[5.24] 
 
+3.36 [4.43] 
+4.11 [4.77] 
 
-2.94 [-2.93] 
-2.36 [-1.86] 
 
0.00 [0.00] 
0.03 [0.07] 
Dollar a day Panel 
- Full Sample* 
- Restricted 
 
+3.29 [4.49] 
+3.38 [5.41] 
 
 +4.88 
[5.05] 
+4.88 
[5.05] 
 
+3.63 [4.64] 
+3.95 [5.30] 
 
-1.59 [-1.57] 
-1.50 [-1.25] 
 
0.06 [0.12] 
0.11 [0.22] 
Source: Author’s calculations  
Note: The purpose of the tests is to examine the data for any correlation between PRS adoption and 
performance outcomes; a significant test result does not provide definitive evidence of causation. 
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The superior performance in the treatment group is sizeable and statistically significant in 
both national and dollar-a-day panels.   Within the full sample, the difference in the 
annualized change in the indices is 2.9 points in the national panel versus 1.6 points in the 
dollar-a-day panel (see column 5). However, the level of significance is higher in the national 
panel - reaching the one per cent level in the full, and the five per cent level in the restricted 
sample, but only the 10 per cent level in the dollar-a day panel (see column 6).  The level of 
variation, although sizeable, is considerably less than that for the poverty data. Clearly, better 
growth outcomes underpin the reductions in poverty found above.   
However, the apparent mismatch between the growth and poverty results within the national 
data, and therefore the lack of any feed through from rising incomes, requires further 
consideration.  Two alternatives present themselves; either growth is having no impact on 
national poverty rates; or national poverty thresholds are not consistent through time.  Indeed, 
Ravallion (1994), in arguing for the use of international poverty data for cross country 
comparisons, notes the tendency for real terms growth in the value of national poverty lines, 
and thus an increase in recorded poverty39.  It is also worth underlining that the concerns 
noted above, over sample size and unobserved effects, particularly temporal impacts, remain 
pertinent. 
3.3.3 Distributional changes 
Table 3.3 presents the test results for changes in the Gini Coefficient within the two groups. 
Here the null hypothesis is based on lower increases (or reductions) in the Gini coefficient 
within the non-PRS group. Therefore the null would be accepted where there is a negative (or 
zero) difference (d) between the outcomes; and rejected (indicating better PRS performance) 
where there is a positive difference. 
% =  ∆787'(')*+) − ∆787)*+)  
, : % ≤ 0;              /  : % > 0         [3.5] 
  
                                                 
39
 This should, however, be somewhat mitigated by the use of LSMS data.  
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Table 3.3: Cross tabulation of Change in Gini Coefficient by PRS Status   
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Category Non-PRS 
Mean Change 
[Std. dev.] 
PRS Mean 
Change 
[Std. dev.] 
Overall Mean 
Change   
[Std. dev.] 
Difference in 
means 
[t statistic] 
Probability  
d>0 [d≠0] 
National Panel 
- Full Sample 
- Restricted 
 
+0.05 [1.25] 
+0.11 [1.40] 
 
+0.06 [1.41] 
+0.06 [1.41] 
 
+0.05 [1.29] 
+0.09 [1.39] 
 
-0.01 [-0.04] 
0.05 [0.14] 
 
0.48 [0.97] 
0.55 [0.89] 
Dollar a day Panel 
- Full Sample 
- Restricted 
 
 
+0.03 [1.19] 
+0.07 [1.56] 
 
+0.12 [1.26] 
+0.12 [1.26] 
 
+0.50 [1.20] 
+0.09 [1.44] 
 
-0.09 [0.37] 
-0.50 [-0.15] 
 
0.36 [0.72] 
0.44 [0.88] 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Note: The purpose of the tests is to examine the data for any correlation between PRS adoption and 
performance outcomes; a significant test result does not provide definitive evidence of causation. 
Examination of the test results reveals that there is no statistically significant difference in 
performance between the adopting and non-adopting groups in either dataset, in the full or 
restricted tests (see column 6).  Although the data very tentatively suggest a greater worsening 
of the Gini in the PRS group, the level of variation is exceptionally high.  
Taken together, the test results for the primary variables underline the importance of growth 
as the channel through which gains in poverty reduction appear to have been secured within 
PRS countries.  There is also no evidence that the trajectory of inequality has been any 
different in PRS countries, and therefore, following the Strong viewpoint (discussed in section 
2.4), that growth has been any more pro-poor under PRS arrangements.  This is an important 
finding, and is further examined through tests for variations in the Growth Elasticity of 
Poverty (GEP).   
3.3.4 Growth Elasticity of Poverty (GEP) 
As a measure of the responsiveness of poverty, defined here in terms of the Headcount  (P), to 
changes in per capita incomes (ȳ), the GEP provides a general measure of the extent to which 
growth is pro-poor.  This statistic can therefore be compared between the two groups, to 
examine the extent to which PRS adoption has had a distributional impact on the growth 
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process. It is defined as the ratio of the proportionate change in the headcount to average 
incomes: 
9 =  :; = <)<  

)                                                                                               [3.6] 
Informed by the standard relation discussed above (see Equation 3.2), rising inequality 
weakens the potential poverty reduction impact of economic growth, whereas progressive 
distributional change augments the growth impact.  Although, the interpretation of the GEP is 
conditioned by the debate over the meaning of pro-poor growth (see Section 2.4), a GEP of 
negative unity indicates full pass through of any poverty reduction gains from growth, with 
variations either side of this showing more and less than proportionate changes.  Positive GEP 
values are rare, but possible for the two extreme circumstances: the case of immiserizing 
growth where poverty rises in spite of growth in incomes; and that of a pro-poor recession, 
where very significant distributional change results in poverty reduction alongside declining 
incomes.  Bourguignon (2002) finds that GEPs for developing countries typically cluster 
around a value of  three, indicating a one percentage of growth results in a three per cent 
decline in the poverty rate (note these refer to percentage changes on the base value, and not 
the level differences).   
The GEP statistic was calculated for both datasets.  However, some deletion of outlying 
values was necessary as the GEP’s specification in terms of the relative proportionate change 
introduces considerable volatility40.  In all, three observations were deleted from the national 
panel taking the sample size to 80 observations, and 16 from the dollar-a-day panel, reducing 
the sample size to 127 observations.  As a higher negative GEP reflects better performance, 
the null is specified as a lower value being recorded for non-PRS countries, and is thus 
accepted where there is a negative (or equal) difference (d) between the Non-PRS and PRS 
outcomes.  The null would be rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis (of better PRS 
performance) by a positive difference in outcomes: 
% =  ∆9'(')*+) − ∆9)*+)  
, : % ≤ 0                 /  : % > 0         [3.7] 
                                                 
40
 GEP values of less than -20.0 and greater than +20.0 were excluded. These were generally 
countries with low base levels of poverty, where small changes resulted in large percentage variations.  
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The cross tabulated results for the GEP are presented in Table 3.4. Although on face value, the 
data are worse for PRS adopters, the test statistics reveal that the performance differences are 
not significant.  Driving this result is the high level of variation. However, this also implies 
that the pattern of outcomes, and any connections with alternative policy choices such as PRS 
adoption, may be very different within individual adopting countries.  
Table 3.4: Cross tabulation of Growth Elasticity of Poverty by PRS status  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Category Non-PRS 
Mean Change 
[Std. dev.] 
PRS Mean 
Change 
[Std. dev.] 
Overall Mean 
Change   
[Std. dev.] 
Difference in 
means 
[t statistic] 
Probability  
d>0 [d≠0] 
National Panel 
- Full Sample 
- Restricted 
 
-1.61 [4.79] 
-1.68 [4.26] 
 
-1.00 [2.00] 
-1.00 [2.00] 
 
-1.41 [4.09] 
-1.36 [3.39] 
 
-0.62 [-0.63] 
-0.68 [-0.75] 
 
0.27 [0.53] 
0.23 [0.46] 
Dollar a day Panel 
- Full Sample 
- Restricted 
 
-1.38 [6.12] 
-1.38 [5.40] 
 
-0.37 [3.69] 
-0.37 [3.69] 
 
-1.15 [5.66] 
-0.97 [4.77] 
 
-1.01 [-0.84] 
-1.01 [-0.87] 
 
0.20 [0.40] 
0.19 [0.38] 
Source: Author’s calculations  
Note: The purpose of the tests is to examine the data for any correlation between PRS adoption and 
performance outcomes; a significant test result does not provide definitive evidence of causation. 
In addition, the overall GEP for the full sample at 1.4 in the national panel, and 1.2 for the 
dollar-a -day panel, is low compared with that found by Bourguignon (2002).  It is also worth 
reflecting on the somewhat arbitrary exclusion criteria employed.  Although the excluded 
observations were often middle income countries with low base poverty levels (notably within 
the dollar-a-day panel) this was not always the case.   Several low income countries also 
exhibited large reductions (or increases in poverty) alongside low (high) levels of growth, and 
consequently large GEPs.   Issues of data quality and sample size, which are re-examined in 
Section 3.3.2, are especially pertinent here. 
3.3.5 Stabilization Outcomes 
Statistical testing was also used to examine highly critical accounts, referenced in Chapter 
One (Section 1.3), that PRSs merely represent a facade for IFI-sponsored structural 
adjustment policies.  The tests here made use of a similar, but separate, 12 year dataset for the 
same 68 countries, which included balance of payments and inflation data in place of poverty, 
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growth and inequality variables.  This substantial database of around 800 observations is 
provided in Appendix H. Several tests were carried out to examine the impact of PRS 
adoption on stabilization variables (taken as hallmarks of the initial impact of structural 
adjustment policies). These included comparisons of the current account, the trade balance, 
and Consumer Prices Index (CPI) and GDP deflator, specified in levels, in differences and in 
variations against the mean.  The results for the preferred test - that of divergences from 
national means for the current account balance and the Consumer Prices Index (CPI), are 
reported in Tables 3.541.   
The proposition being tested is that PRS adoption is strongly associated with improved 
stabilization outcomes (lower deficits and lower rates of inflation), however, as with the other 
tests, this is given as the alternative hypothesis.  It is also important to note that rather than the 
first difference, the variables are expressed in terms of their variations against the mean 
(indicated by a double dot accent in equations 3.8 and 3.9). In addition, as differences in 
performance on the two variables would be signalled by movements in opposite directions the 
two hypotheses are specified separately.  
For the current account (CA) balance, the null would be accepted where there is a positive (or 
no) difference between the non-adopting and adopting groups (worse PRS performance), and 
rejected when the difference was negative (indicating better PRS performance): 
% =  2= >?@?8AB '(')*+)C − 2= >?@?8AB  )*+)C   
, : % ≥ 0                       /  : % < 0       [3.8] 
Conversely, for the CPI, the null would be accepted where there is a negative (or no) 
difference between the non-adopting and adopting groups (indicating worse PRS 
performance), and rejected when the difference was positive (indicating better PRS 
performance): 
% =   2 '(')*+)C −  2 )*+)C   
, : % ≤ 0                              /  : % > 0       [3.9] 
  
                                                 
41
 These were preferred as they show the variation against longer term trends under control and 
treatment groups for the most commonly accepted measures of internal and external balance.  
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Table 3.5: Cross tabulation of stabilization variables against PRS Status  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Category Non-PRS 
Mean Change 
[Std. dev.] 
PRS Mean 
Change 
[Std. dev.] 
Overall Mean 
Change   
[Std. dev.] 
Difference in 
means 
[t statistic] 
Probability  
CA Balance: 
d<0 [d≠0] 
CPI:  
d>0 [d≠0] 
Current account  
as % of GDP*** 
+0.33 [4.13] -1.29 [4.92] -0.00 [4.35] 1.62 [4.23] 0.00 [0.00] 
Consumer Prices 
Index (CPI) 
-0.64 [43.3] +2.30 [5.45]  -0.00 [38.45] -2.94 [-0.89] 0.81 [0.37] 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Note: The purpose of the tests is to examine the data for any correlation between PRS adoption and 
performance outcomes; a significant test result does not provide definitive evidence of causation. 
These test results are striking and strongly dispute the critical claims made.  The balance of 
payments data (the first row of results) show a highly significant variation between the two 
groups.  Yet contrary to expectation, the PRS group actually performs considerably worse 
than the non-PRS group. The adopting group’s average current account deficit worsens 
(relative to the mean) by around 1.3 per cent of GDP, whereas the latter records a mild 
improvement of 0.33 per cent of GDP relative to the mean (see columns 2 and 3).  The test 
data for the CPI (final row) are not decisive, with no significance attached to the results 
(column 6). Yet, even this result, suggests that at the aggregate level PRS arrangements are 
not dominated by the policy biases claimed by some authors. 
3.3.6 Data Quality and Sensitivity 
Finally, it is important to reflect on the adequacy of the testing approach and the sensitivity of 
the results, and it is worth emphasizing again that any significant results have been interpreted 
cautiously. Three major criticisms can be made.  First, the test statistics are rather fragile due 
to the small sample sizes and the quality of the data.  The national dataset is particularly small 
at approximately 90 observations, and, moreover, the treatment sub-sample in both panels is at 
the margin of adequacy (with 26 observations in the national panel and 30 observations in the 
dollar-a-day panel).  Second, there is the question of unobserved heterogeneity within the 
data, as underlined by the high level of variation within all of the test samples.  Although the 
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use of annualized changes and the matching procedure ameliorates this to an extent, basic 
statistical testing cannot properly control for country characteristics or the pooling of various 
time periods.   The third issue is the potential endogeneity of the data generation process.  
PRS adoption is a non-random event and arises out of a series of pressures operating on low 
and middle income countries.  These include the level of dependency on the IFIs and the 
incentives provided by access to concessional credit lines and HIPC debt reliefs.  There is, 
therefore, a very basic difference between adopters and non-adopters, and thus the 
counterfactual employed only approximates a randomized natural experiment.  
However, in spite of these challenges, the testing exercise is helpful in highlighting the main 
issues to be addressed.  Four key points can be made.  Foremost, the test results offer some 
prima facie evidence that superior poverty reduction and growth performance are associated 
with PRS adoption. This must, nevertheless, be qualified by noting that the supporting 
evidence is largely confined to the dollar-a-day panel.  Second, it is clear that declining 
poverty within the PRS group is supported solely by better growth outcomes, with no 
discernable distributional improvement. Thus, third, there is little evidence that growth is any 
more pro-poor under PRS arrangements and this contradicts a core PRS policy objective.  
Fourth, and more positively (for the Initiative), there appears to be no substance in critical 
claims that PRSs have a policy bias towards harsh stabilization outcomes.   In sum, although 
there is some evidence of a PRS effect, it is not unequivocal and requires further, more 
thoroughgoing investigation.   
3.4 Regression-based Evaluations  
This section presents and discusses the results of regression-based evaluations of PRS 
performance.  The objectives are to address the limitations of the statistical tests reported 
above and to extract additional information from the data.  Two regression approaches, First 
Differences (FD) and Fixed Effects (FE), are employed to identify and evaluate the magnitude 
of any PRS adoption effects on poverty outcomes.  The model specified under both 
approaches, is based on the standard relation linking poverty reduction to growth and 
distributional change.  Informed by Bourguignon (2004), policy choices are taken to mediate 
this relation.  The presence of a PRS impact is indentified by binary adoption variable 
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(defined where a national PRS has been in place for at least two years) and is examined using 
both the national and dollar-a-day datasets.   
3.4.1 Summary of approach 
As noted in the initial methodological discussion in Section 3.2, the two regression 
approaches necessitated some reshaping of the basic panel datasets: 
 First Differences (FD) estimation relies on parsed version of the original datasets into four 
equal three year periods, covering the 12 year period from 1996. This yielded two 
contiguous, contemporaneous, and therefore fully balanced panels of 76 countries in the 
national dataset and 129 countries in the dollar-a-day dataset. 
 Fixed Effects (FE) estimation used the original annual datasets for the full 12 year period 
as two pooled cross sections. This gives two unbalanced panels of:  175 records and 58 
groups in the national dataset; and 256 records and 63 groups in the dollar-a-day dataset.       
These standard panel methods have the advantage of removing non-time varying unobserved 
effects (the ai parameter below in equations 3.7 to 3.13) from the basic relation being tested42.  
This parameter represents country-level heterogeneity and would include attributes such as 
culture, history and geography.  In the FD model, this is achieved through differencing - 
shown below with reference to a model with a single explanatory variable (x) and two 
consecutive periods (t =1, 2): 
D = 2:  FG	 = H, + I, +  HJG	 +  ?G +  KG	                                                      [3.10] 
D = 1:  FG = H, +   HJG +  ?G +  KG           [3.11] 
If equation 3.11 is subtracted from 3.10, then the time invariant unobserved effect (ai) is 
purged: 
FG	 – FG =   I, +  HJG	 – J +  ?G −  ?G +  KG	 – KG           [3.12] 
This can also be written as: 
∆FG =  I, +  H∆JG + KG                                                                                     [3.13]  
                                                 
42
 See discussion in Wooldridge (2006) pages 460 to 467. 
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In the FE model the unobserved effects (ai) are removed through a time de-meaning process43.   
Thus using the same starting model as above:  
FG = H, +   HJG +  ?G + KG                                                                                      [3.14] 
And averaging this equation over time gives:  
FN = H, +   HJOG +  ?N +  KN         [3.15] 
The unobserved effect can then be purged by subtracting equation 13.15 from 13.14: 
FG −  FNP = H, − H, +   H JG −  JNP  +  ?G − ?NP  +  KG − KNP                      [3.16] 
Using a double dot accent to denote the time de-meaned form, the FE estimator can be written 
(without an intercept term) as: 
FNC =  HJCG + KG                                                                         [3.17] 
These specifications are modelled using the standard relation: poverty as the dependent 
variable and incomes and distribution as the independent variables (specified in differences or 
levels); with binary variables added for PRS adoption and time effects.  The FD estimator is 
the preferred specification as it more naturally captures the performance hypothesis being 
examined, and the dynamic form of the standard relation.  However, given the unbalanced 
nature of the original panel datasets, the FE estimator is potentially more efficient in its use of 
the available data. To some extent therefore, the FE results are employed as a means of 
triangulating the findings arising from the FD regressions. 
The main regression results (as with the statistical tests) offer a hybrid with-without 
counterfactual comparison, where PRS-adopters are compared against observations for non-
adopting countries and their own data prior to adoption.  A significant (negative) coefficient 
on the PRS binary variable is taken as evidence of a beneficial PRS treatment effect on 
poverty outcomes.  Where found, further efforts are made to identify whether these resulted 
from higher growth and/ or a more equitable distribution of incomes.  This was achieved by 
interacting the PRS dummy with the respective per capita income and Gini coefficient 
variables and re-estimating the regressions.  Efforts were also made to test for differences 
                                                 
43
 See Wooldridge (2006) pages 485 to 489. 
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between early and later PRS-adopters and HIPC and non-HIPC status, however, the limited 
sample size made this line of inquiry impractical.  
To address potential endogeneity biases, Instrumental Variable (IV) techniques were applied 
to the base specifications which are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  These 
biases have a number of sources but are likely to arise mainly from the non-random nature of 
selection into treatment, and hence the presence of simultaneities.  The level of indebtedness 
to the concessional financing facilities of the IFIs in the current period and in the years prior 
to adoption, are used as instruments for PRS adoption.  The intuition behind this is the parallel 
requirements of the HIPC scheme, for which adoption is a decision point condition, and thus 
participation is separately conditioned by pressures to secure debt relief44.  Two instruments 
were employed – the current level of all concessional IFI finance outstanding as a share of 
GDP, reflecting the post adoption impact of debt relief; and second, the position some three to 
four years previously (made up of the two year lead-in time and the PRS preparation period of 
one to two years)45.  The expectation is that while the latter would be strongly positively 
correlated with PRS status, the former would have a negative correlation in differences, and a 
positive, but low magnitude, correlation in levels.    
A standard two stage procedure was used to estimate the IV results, with the fitted values of 
the first stage (the probability of adoption) being substituted for the binary PRS adoption 
variable in the second stage.  However, prior to this, test regressions were carried out to 
examine the strength of the correlation between the debt variables and adoption, and thus their 
validity as instruments.  In the event, this requirement was only satisfied in the case of the FD 
models.  These were followed up by auxiliary regressions, and standard statistical tests for the 
FD IV estimators, to determine the presence of endogeneity.  The indebtedness data, used for 
both the FD and FE specifications, are given in Appendix E.  
The analysis yields two sets of results (FD and FE) for the two (national and dollar-a-day) 
panels. In the case of the FD results these are further divided two ways, the base OLS and IV 
regressions. The base estimates are also presented with restricted sample results comprising 
                                                 
44
 The HIPC scheme has two stages of hurdle conditionality – the decision point which governs entry 
into the scheme, and the completion point when full debt relief is granted.  
45
 This lead in time also accommodates the one to two year period between HIPC decision and 
completion points. 
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only consumption-based data. This is in recognition that the full panel includes a number of 
income-based surveys, potentially altering the growth and distributional parameters within the 
standard relation.  The FD IV results are compared against a comparable base OLS regression.  
The full regression output is provided in Appendix I for the FD and in Appendix J for the FE 
models, this includes the auxiliary and IV regressions.  Given the presence of non-normality 
in the FD estimators and heteroscedasticity in both approaches, robust standard errors were 
used throughout46. 
3.4.2 First Differences Estimator (FD) Results  
The base FD model is based on a standard relation expressed in differences form (for poverty, 
income and distribution).  In order to allow for minor variations around the average three year 
period, the differences were also annualized.    
∆ B?%AQK8D =  R + H∆8AQSB + H	∆787 + HTU + HV BW7Q% 3 + HY BW7Q% 4 + K 
            [3.18] 
The two stage IV estimation procedure relies on IFI indebtedness - both the current level and 
lagged by one three year period as instruments for PRS adoption (this approximates the likely 
four year interval referred to above). Given PRS adoption is a binary variable, the first stage 
regression (equation 3.19) is estimated as a linear probability (LPM) model. The independent 
variable is the probability of PRS adoption and the dependent variables are specified in 
differences: 
 Prob  U = R +  H ∆ _B`D +  H	 ∆  _B`D +  HT∆ 8AQSB +  HV∆787 +
+HY BW7Q% 4 + K               [3.19] 
In the second stage regression, the binary variable is replaced by the estimates from the first 
stage (denoted in equation 3.20 by the accented PRS term): 
 ∆ B?%AQK8D =  R + H∆ 8AQSB  + H	∆ 787 + HTUa + HVBW7Q% 4 + K     [3.20] 
It is important to emphasize that the datasets for the IV regressions (and the counterfactual 
basis) are different from the main regressions.  Here the data are restricted to post 2002 
observations. This is because PRSs did not exist prior to 2000, and in addition, the two year 
lead time used in identifying any adoption effects needs to be taken into account.  The 
                                                 
46
 These were established during the initial modelling. 
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counterfactual being tested is therefore a pure with-without comparison.  In order to maintain 
comparability, the base OLS regression is re-estimated on the same basis.  Hence, in the 
model, only one time period dummy is included. 
The results for the base OLS regressions are provided in Table 3.6 and the IV results with the 
comparable OLS output are given in Table 3.7.  Referring first to the base results given in 
Table 3.6; the national panel data (see columns 2a and 2b) merely find support for the 
standard model.  The per capita income variable is significant and strongly so (at one per cent 
level) in the full regression (column 2a) with a coefficient of -0.24 and within the restricted 
(consumption only) regression (column 2b) with a coefficient of -0.19.  The Gini coefficient is 
also close to being significant in the full base regression. The treatment (PRS) dummy is not 
significant in either of the national data regressions.  The R-squared value is 0.21 and is 
significant at the five per cent level in the base but falls somewhat in the restricted regression 
to 0.16.  Time effects are not found to be significant in either set of results.   
In contrast, the dollar-a-day results show PRS adoption to be strongly significant at the one 
per cent level in both the base and restricted OLS regressions (columns 3a and 3b).  The 
adoption variable has a coefficient of -1.9 and -2.4 respectively.  This implies that the 
marginal effect of adoption drives down the Headcount ratio by around two population 
percentage points per annum. The overall explanatory power of the model (with an R squared 
value of 0.12) is lower than in the national dataset, but significant at the five per cent level in 
the full regression, and at the 10 per cent level in the restricted regression.  Again no evidence 
of any time effects is present in either set of results.  A further set of iterations of the base 
regressions were made to test for the impact of varying the PRS lead-in time.  This exercise 
found that the results (including the PRS performance gain) to be fairly stable. Analysis, 
reported in Appendix K, shows the PRS effect remained significant with a lead-in time of one 
year, but was not apparent when no lead-in period was allowed for.    
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Table 3.6: Summary results for First Differences (FD) base OLS regressions 
1 2a 2b 3a 3b 
FD of Variable [t & F Statistic] 
Dependent variable =  Poverty 
Rate 
National data Dollar-a-day data 
FD OLS FD OLS  
Ex. Income 
FD OLS  FD OLS  
Ex. Income 
Per capita income   
 
-0.2339***  
[-3.65] 
-0.1860*** 
[-3.25] 
-0.0817 
[-1.23] 
-0.0976 
[-1.04] 
Gini coefficient  
 
0.4576 
[1.59] 
0.3986 
[1.32] 
0.3393 
[1.36] 
0.2974  
[1.02] 
PRS adoption     
 
-0.6018 
[-0.85] 
-0.1198 
[-0.17] 
-1.8752*** 
[-2.79] 
-2.360*** 
[-3.10] 
Period 3 dummy 
 
0.2797 
[0.39] 
-0.2583 
[-0.36] 
0.5656 
[0.98] 
0.9459 
[1.11] 
Period 4 dummy              
 
1.4362 
[1.41] 
0.7932 
[+0.86] 
-0.0574 
[-0.10] 
0.3823 
[0.50] 
R squared 
 
0.2105** 
[3.16] 
0.1617** 
[2.57] 
0.1200** 
[2.43] 
0.1262* 
[2.07] 
Observations 76 66 129 83 
Source: Author’s calculations 
The IV results, given in Table 3.7 overleaf, reveal a rather different picture.  The IV and 
comparable OLS regressions for the national panel (columns 2a and 2b) simply support the 
standard relation - per capita income has a coefficient of -0.26, and the Gini variable a 
coefficient of +1.02. Both are significant at the one per cent level.  More importantly, within 
the dollar-a-day panel (columns 3a and 3b), the PRS impact, which is still evident, at the one 
per cent level with a coefficient of -1.97 in the comparable OLS regression (column 3a), is not 
present in the IV results (Column 3b). Therefore, after instrumenting for PRS adoption, there 
is no evidence of a performance benefit in either panel.   
These findings represent a major qualification, and cast doubt on the treatment effect evident 
in the base regressions.  The R2 value for the national IV regression is high at 0.40 and 
significant at the one per cent level.  Although the IV regression for the dollar-a-day data is 
statistically weak, the first stage results showed the instruments are both significant and valid. 
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Moreover, follow up tests suggest that endogeneity is present in the dollar-a-day model 
(though not in the national dataset)47.   Full details of the first stage IV regressions, and the 
tests carried out, are provided in Appendix I. 
Table 3.7: Summary results for First Differences (FD) IV regressions 
1 2a 2b 3a 3b 
FD of Variable [t & F Statistics] 
Dependent variable =  Poverty 
Rate 
National data Dollar-a-day data 
Comparable 
FD OLS 
FD IV  Comparable 
FD OLS 
FD IV  
Annual change in Per capita 
income   
-0.2575*** 
[-3.58] 
-0.2602*** 
[-3.92] 
-0.0837 
[-0.99] 
-0.2030 
[-1.43] 
Annual change in Gini 
coefficient  
1.0187*** 
[4.49] 
0.9924*** 
[4.20] 
0.2574 
[1.01] 
0.0013 
[0.00] 
PRS adoption  
 
-0.4636 
[-0.69] 
-0.6402  
[-0.75] 
-1.9713*** 
[-2.85] 
1.6036 
[0.70] 
Period 4 dummy 
 
1.1390 
[1.56] 
1.0578 
[1.44] 
-0.6375 
[-1.19] 
-0.3756 
[-0.62] 
R2 
 
0.3985*** 
[7.40] 
0.4047*** 
[7.07] 
0.1797** 
[2.67] 
0.000 
[0.35] 
Observations 51 50 85 82 
Source: Author’s calculations 
As a further exercise, the dollar-a-day base FD regression was re-estimated with two PRS-
interacted variables (in place of the adoption dummy) to determine the channel through which 
the estimated poverty reduction gains are operating.   The results for this exercise are given in 
Table 3.8. These confirm (as in the statistical tests) that poverty reduction is being secured 
through higher levels of growth alone, with the interacted per capita income variable 
significant (at the 10 per cent level) and correctly signed.  The non-interacted Gini coefficient 
variable is close to being significant at the 10 per cent level, whereas its interacted counterpart 
is not significant.  This further underlines the apparent lack of any distributional gains from 
                                                 
47
 Following standard practice evidence of endogeneity was examined using an auxiliary regression 
testing procedure (Wooldridge, 2006 pages 532-533). This involves including the residuals from the 
first stage within the structural model as an additional independent variable, and testing the 
significance of the respective coefficient.  These tests were statistically significant in the case of the 
dollar-a-day data (at the five percent level) but not the national data (refer to Appendix I).  
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PRS adoption. The F statistic shows that the regression is significant at the 10 per cent level 
and the R-squared (at 0.13), although low, has a similar value to the base regressions.  
Table 3.8: Results of interacted FD Dollar-a-day data regression   
1 2 
FD of Variable  [t and F Statistics] 
(Dependent  variable =  Headcount Ratio) 
FD OLS  
Annual change in Per capita income (PCY) 
 
-0.0086 
[-0.20] 
Annual change in Gini coefficient 0.3963 
[1.33] 
PRS status interacted with PCY 
 
-0.2689* 
[-1.87] 
PRS status interacted with Gini  -0.3290 
[-0.69] 
Period 3 dummy 
 
0.2943 
[0.50] 
Period 4 dummy 
 
-0.1770 
[-0.27] 
R2 
 
0.1283* 
[1.88] 
Observations 129 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Overall, the FD results cast considerable doubt on the adoption benefit suggested by the 
statistical tests.  While there remains an indication of superior PRS performance in the base 
regressions, this is restricted to the dollar-a-day panel and is not maintained in the IV results.   
Nevertheless, it might be argued that the IV regressions, which employ a highly restricted 
sample, are evidentially weaker.  In addition, if the presence of a PRS effect is accepted, the 
interacted regressions suggest that poverty reduction gains are operating through the growth 
channel alone.  Therefore, as indicated by the statistical testing results, there is no evidence of 
a distributional improvement in PRS adopting countries.    
Two specific qualifications are, however, worth making.  First, FD estimators do have certain 
measurement disadvantages; differencing tends to reduce variation, and the process inevitably 
cuts the available sample size.  Second, these difficulties are made worse in this context by the 
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parsing method used to ensure a balanced panel, and this leads to some mismatching and 
required some limited interpolation of missing values.  These tend reduce the efficiency and 
statistical strength of the estimates, and hence also the reliability of any findings.  
3.4.3 Fixed Effects (FE) Estimation 
Fixed Effects (FE) estimation offers an alternative econometric treatment for the analysis of 
panel data, which also deals with the challenges posed by unobserved heterogeneity, and 
additionally can be more efficient than the FD approach in weaker data environments.   The 
FE estimation process does not require a balanced panel as it pools the observations, and 
allows for country level effects by effectively employing an intercept term for each record.  
As a result, sample sizes are substantially larger.   In this situation, the number of observations 
within the national panel rises to 175, and within the dollar-a-day panel, to 256.   However, 
under this approach, the standard relation is, in effect, specified in levels, and this somewhat 
departs from a direct representation of the core hypothesis being tested. 
FE estimators can be implemented a number of ways, but here, a time de-meaning process is 
adopted, where the group mean for each country is deducted from each country observation.  
As such, the modelled variation is confined to that around country means.  Again the model is 
regressed on both the national and dollar-a-day datasets and employs a similar two year lead-
in binary variable to measure the presence of any treatment effect.  As the full 12 years of data 
are pooled, this requires the use of 11 time variables (year 2 to year 12).  As in the FD 
regressions, the base model was regressed using the full sample and a restricted version 
employing only consumption-based survey data.  The precise specification is as follows, the 
double dot accent signifies the de-meaned value of the variables (the intercept term here is 
omitted48): 
B?%AQK8D C =  H8AQSBC +   H	b8bC + HTUC + HV..V3B?W	..	C +  K       [3.21] 
In line with standard econometric practice, the models were also estimated using a Random 
Effects (RE) procedure.  This approach, in contrast to FE estimation, assumes the unobserved 
heterogeneity is variable, and therefore, deducts a weighted proportion of the group mean 
from each observation.  RE estimation offers efficiency gains, but can threaten the consistency 
                                                 
48
 The intercept is removed by the d-meaning transformation (Wooldridge 2006, page 487).   
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of the estimates. A Hausman specification test was performed to test for any efficiency 
improvements. In the event this found against any improvement, and the FE results alone were 
retained49.   
As with FD estimation, efforts were made to deal with possible endogeneity biases arising 
from the non-random nature of the PRS process. Again IV methods, with IFI indebtedness 
variables (current and lagged) were specified and tested. However, although a wide range of 
lags was employed (zero to four years), as the results in Appendix J show these were found to 
be inadequate instruments.  Resultantly, IV results are not reported for the FE models, and this 
is a major limitation.   
Table 3.9 provides summary results for the base OLS FE regressions, for both datasets, and 
for the full and restricted (consumption data only) samples. The complete regression output is 
provided in Appendix J.  Overall, the results are positive for PRS adoption, and notably some 
significant benefit is evident in both panels.  In the full regressions, PRS adoption is 
significant in the national data (column 2a) at the 10 per cent level with a sizeable negative 
coefficient of 4.28; and significant in the dollar-a-day panel (column 3a) at the one per cent 
level with a negative coefficient of 4.27. Within the restricted sample regressions, the effect is 
not present in the national panel (column 2b), whereas it increases to a negative coefficient of 
4.96 in the dollar-a-day panel (column 3b). These findings suggest that PRSs are having a 
substantial impact on poverty levels, although, again, the effect is better supported by the 
dollar-a-day data.  Moreover, further iterations, in which the lead-in time was varied, showed 
the apparent performance gain to be fragile in the national data.  Here the effect was only 
present in the standard specification of a two year lead-in. Yet the treatment effect remained 
strong and consistent in the dollar-a-day data, where the effect was significant at the one per 
cent level with lead times of zero, one and two years.   The full details of these analyses are 
given in Appendix K.    
                                                 
49
 For a full discussion of Fixed versus Random Effects see Wooldridge (2006) pages 493-498. 
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Table 3.9: Base OLS Fixed Effects (FE) results 
1 2a 2b 3a 3b 
Variable (in levels) [t & F 
statistics]  
Dep variable =  Poverty Rate 
National data Dollar-a-day data 
FE OLS FE OLS  
(Ex income) 
FE OLS FE OLS  
(Ex. Income) 
Per capita income -0.1852*** 
[-2.74] 
-0.1631** 
[-2.49] 
-0.0040  
[-0.15] 
-0.0096 
[-0.24] 
Gini coefficient 0.1124 
[+0.38] 
0.1375 
[0.44] 
0.1178  
[0.88] 
-0.013 
[-0.08] 
PRS adoption  -4.2841* 
[-1.92] 
-3.0432 
[-1.25] 
-4.2664*** 
[-2.89] 
-4.9580*** 
[-2.78] 
1997 dummy -2.2126 
[-0.63] 
-0.7801 
[-0.20] 
-2.5301 
[-1.81] 
-4.5798 
[-0.160] 
1998 dummy -2.1350 
[-0.75] 
-1.6177 
[-0.53] 
-0.6650 
[-0.51] 
-1.0470 
[-0.46] 
1999 dummy 0.5567 
[0.14] 
1.4529 
[0.33] 
-0.0369 
[-0.02] 
0.0564 
[0.02] 
2000 dummy -0.0373 
[-0.01] 
0.9691 
[0.29] 
-1.3749 
[-1.46] 
-2.0161  
[-1.11] 
2001 dummy -2.0082 
[-0.75] 
-1.8208 
[-0.61] 
-1.1781 
[-0.85] 
-1.8558 
[-0.83] 
2002 dummy -1.9374 
[-0.69] 
-2.7370 
[-0.89] 
-0.6177  
[-0.53] 
-0.9953 
[-0.50] 
2003 dummy -0.3626 
[-0.11] 
-1.4362 
[-0.41] 
0.4232  
[0.29] 
0.3168 
[0.10] 
2004 dummy -0.6051 
[-0.15] 
-2.9503 
[-0.72] 
-3.6323** 
[-2.12] 
-4.8225 
[-1.78] 
2005 dummy -3.9578 
[-1.14] 
-5.651 
[-1.41] 
-2.4186*  
[-1.73] 
-1.9489 
[-0.75] 
2006 dummy -2.6908 
[-0.71] 
-2.6042 
[-0.57] 
-4.2340***  
[-2.95] 
-5.8336** 
[-2.31] 
2007 dummy 7.6660* 
[1.80] 
5.4047 
[1.15] 
-5.0344** 
[-2.07] 
-6.6290** 
[-2.32] 
Within  R squared 0.3400*** 
[3.09] 
0.3711*** 
[2.75] 
0.2421*** 
[3.92] 
0.2783*** 
[3.66] 
Observations  [Groups] 175 [58] 150 [48] 256 [63] 171 [49] 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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In terms of the other variables, income is separately significant in the national data (column 2a 
and 2b), at the one per cent level in the full, and at the five per cent level in the restricted 
sample); albeit with low coefficients of -0.19 in the full and -0.16 in the restricted sample.  
Aside from, the PRS effect, the only significant variables in dollar-a-day results are a series of 
time effects. In the full panel, their coefficients range from -2.42 for 2005 to -5.03 for 2007 
(see column 3a).  These suggest that poverty reduction accelerates from 2004.  Although these 
effects are replicated to some extent in the restricted sample (column 3b), they occur only 
from 2006. The time effects (in both samples) are of varying significance, it is also worth 
noting that the time pattern is at odds with that given in the FD results, which showed weaker 
poverty reduction in the final period.  The models are all significant, but the explanatory 
power, given by the R2 values, is higher in the national panel (at 0.34 for the full national 
sample versus 0.24 for the full dollar-a-day sample)50. 
As with the FD analysis, attention was given to investigating the channel through which any 
PRS impacts were operating.  Again this took the form of repeating the base regressions with 
two interaction terms in place of the binary treatment variable.  The results are reported in 
Table 3.10.  The national data (column 2) reveal very little, with neither of the interacted 
variables found to be significant.  Indeed, these findings somewhat discount the validity of the 
PRS-supporting result within the base regressions, but it has to be recalled that this correlation 
itself was only significant at the ten per cent level.   The dollar-a-day results (column 3) are 
considerably more illuminating.   The income interacted variable has both the right sign and is 
significant (at the five per cent level) whereas the Gini interacted term is not.  This again 
underlines that it is the growth channel through which any benefits are being felt. This 
matches with the FD results and the findings of the statistical tests.  The broad patterns 
revealed in the main regressions are also maintained in these results, with the income variable 
strongly significant in the national panel, and positive time effects again showing for the later 
years in the dollar-a-day panel. 
  
                                                 
50
 As an FE model the Within R2 value is quoted.   
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Table 3.10: FE Regressions with PRS interaction terms  
1 2 3 
Variable (in levels)  [t & F Statistics]  
Dependent variable =  Poverty Rate 
National Dollar- a- day 
FE OLS FE OLS 
Per capita income -0.2369*** 
[-2.94] 
0.0234 
[1.00] 
Gini coefficient 0.1495 
[0.49] 
0.1120 
[0.84] 
PRS interacted with income 0.0464 
[0.83] 
-0.0660** 
[-2.01] 
PRS interacted with Gini -0.2211 
[-1.24] 
0.1156 
[1.24] 
1997 dummy -2.211 
[-0.61] 
-2.3973* 
[-1.71] 
1998 dummy -2.0545 
[-0.70] 
-0.8045 
[-0.62] 
1999 dummy 0.6570 
[0.16] 
-0.0204 
[-0.01] 
2000 dummy 0.4048 
[0.13] 
-1.6795* 
[-1.74] 
2001 dummy -1.3525 
[-0.48] 
-1.4741 
[-1.03] 
2002 dummy -1.4431 
[-0.49] 
-1.3602 
[-1.15] 
2003 dummy -0.4569 
[-0.14] 
-0.0186 
[-0.01] 
2004 dummy -0.0652 
[-0.02] 
-4.4385** 
[-2.53] 
2005 dummy -3.6894 
[-1.02] 
-3.4061** 
[-2.42] 
2006 dummy -2.3138 
[-0.61] 
-4.900*** 
[-3.37] 
2007 dummy 7.1434* 
[1.69] 
-6.0921** 
[-2.87] 
Within R squared 0.3357*** 
[3.08] 
0.2475*** 
[3.69] 
Observations [Groups] 175 [58] 256 [63] 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Taken together, the FE regressions go some way in rebalancing the evidence, and they reassert 
the presence of a positive PRS treatment effect.  However, the position is far from conclusive 
and three important qualifications are necessary. First, it remains the case that the supportive 
evidence is largely confined to the dollar-a-day panel. Although there is a weakly significant 
result in the national data, it is exceptionally fragile, and this falls out in the restricted results 
and when the lead-in time is varied.   Second, and importantly, the inability to provide a set of 
comparable IV regression results means it is not possible to reach a view on the potential 
endogeneity bias within the FE results. This is especially problematic given such biases are 
shown to be present in the FD models. Third, as with the tests and FD results, it is clear that 
the poverty reduction benefits associated with adoption are being secured by better growth 
outcomes alone.  Contrary to the policy objectives of the Initiative and assertions made by the 
IFIs, there no real evidence of better distributional outcomes within PRS countries. 
3.5 Conclusions   
This Chapter’s has primarily investigated the first research question posed in Chapter One 
regarding PRS performance, by undertaking an exhaustive appraisal of two specially 
constructed panel datasets. This appraisal was layered in its complexity beginning with 
statistical testing of outcomes and moving on to a rigorous econometric evaluation which 
drew on two standard panel techniques and instrumental variable analysis. The overall pattern 
of findings to emerge is complex and nuanced, with evidence of a PRS effect on performance 
varying between stages of the analysis.  The decision problem is summarized in the matrix 
given in Table 3.11, which records the position with regard to poverty, inequality and growth 
outcomes, and classifies any relationship between PRS adoption and outcomes as being non-
existent, moderate, or strong (columns 2a and 2b).   
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Table 3.11:  Summary of Analytical Results 
1 2a 2b 
Type of Analysis Presence and strength of relationship 
National dataset Dollar-a-day dataset 
Statistical tests 
  
- Full Sample Weak – growth impact only Strong – poverty & growth impacts 
- Restricted Sample  Moderate – weak poverty impact 
FD Regression  
  
- OLS None Strong – poverty impact (via growth) 
- OLS  Consumption data  None Strong – poverty impact (via growth) 
- IV None None 
FE Regression 
  
- OLS Moderate – poverty impact Strong – poverty impact (via growth) 
- OLS  Consumption data  None Strong – poverty impact (via growth) 
Source: Review of author’s calculations  
In spite of this complexity, four substantive conclusions can be made. First, and most 
significantly, there is evidence of a performance gain associated with PRS adoption, in 
relation both to poverty reduction and growth. Furthermore, although the supportive case 
varies, some benefit is evident at each stage of the analysis, and (albeit tentatively) within 
both the dollar-a-day and national datasets.   
However, this conclusion cannot be made without making several major qualifications. 
Foremost, the gains are largely confined to the dollar-a-day dataset. Where a benefit is 
apparent within the national panel, it relates more to growth outcomes and is fragile to 
changes in sample and method.  Yet, problematically, PRSs simply do not target dollar-a-day 
poverty rates, and thus if we accept this evidence, then we are doing so on the basis of a 
policy goal which these frameworks never sought to influence.  In addition, the evidence of 
superior performance does weaken as the methods become more sophisticated.  This is 
apparent at all stages of the analysis, but especially so within the FD results, where the IV 
regressions find no significant treatment effect. Given the likely presence of endogeneities in 
the core relation being examined, these results offer advantages over the base regressions, and 
it is unfortunate therefore, that it was not possible to provide IV results for the FE regressions.   
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. 
It can secondly be concluded that there is little indication that PRSs represent merely the latest 
form of IFI-sponsored structural adjustment.  This conclusion is supported directly by the 
statistical tests, and implicitly, by the evidence of enhanced growth and poverty reduction.  
This does not necessarily contradict the discussion in Chapter Two, which suggested that 
PRSs emphasize macroeconomic stability at the expense of other policy priories, but it does 
underline that the outcomes have not been as damaging as has been claimed by the Initiative’s 
more radical critics. 
Third, it is apparent from both the test results and the regression analysis, that reductions have 
been driven by enhanced growth outcomes alone. Additionally, PRS arrangements are not 
associated with improvements in the level of inequality, and accepting the Strong position 
within the definitional debate (defined at 2.4.1), PRSs not been distinctly pro-poor.  This is a 
major finding which runs counter to both the Initiative’s objectives and the claims made by its 
sponsors.  Moreover, in the light of this, and the failure to find aggregate evidence of 
stabilization biases, it is possible to construe PRSs as reshaped, but narrowly-based, growth 
strategies.  Such a characterization fits well with the discussion provided in Chapter Two, 
which describes, in some detail, the consensus thinking which underpins the PRS policy 
template.  This neglects issues of distribution and favours the targeting of near term growth, 
through a series of liberalization measures.     
Fourth, it is, nevertheless also clear that the evidential basis of the analysis is weak.  Two sets 
of objections can be made.  The first relate to the quality of the underlying data, specifically, 
the small sample sizes and the comparability and consistency of the poverty data (within both 
panels).  These concerns generally cast doubt on our ability to identify the presence of a 
genuine treatment effect, but there is also potentially, an inherent a self selection bias within 
the data.  As section 3.2 reported, only 29 of the 67 PRS adopting countries possessed poverty 
data of sufficient quality to be included in the panel datasets.  Yet given it is likely that the 
availability of reliable data itself indicates something about governmental and institutional 
capacity, so the selected treatment group will tend to over represent those countries which are 
better equipped to devise and implement poverty reduction policies.  Thus, the counterfactual 
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comparisons employed in the analysis will systematically tend to overstate PRS performance.  
This is a major issue with no obvious technical solution. 
The second group of objections relates to the use of aggregative techniques for policy 
analysis. By their nature, these tools can reveal little about the complex causes and dynamics 
which shape policy driven outcomes within particular countries.  Arguably, PRSs are 
especially difficult to examine through these approaches due to their claimed policy neutrality 
and doubts over the extent to which they actually influence national policy responses.  In 
order to establish causation, what can be termed identification and attribution problems need 
to be resolved.  The identification problem is an elaboration of the World Bank’s objections to 
counterfactual testing of the Initiative, and relates to the extent that PRSs can genuinely be 
said to represent a defined policy stance.  Although, this issue is resolved to some extent by 
the arguments made regarding the existence of a PRS policy template and the presence of 
institutional effects, more definitive and more grounded evidence would be advantageous.   
The second issue of attribution refers to the sourcing of evidence of the actual implementation 
of PRSs. This is a more difficult problem to resolve, since effective cross-sectional evaluation 
of this dimension would require that the extent of this be measured and recorded within the 
data.  However, in the analysis presented above, it is assumed that possession of a PRS for 
two years or more implies delivery of the strategy.  Attribution was addressed in the past 
policy based lending literature by means of slippage variables identified by the IFIs during the 
course of an arrangement (see for example Mosley, Harrigan and Toye, 1994).   Yet such an 
option is not available for PRSs.  These points do not amount to an outright rejection of 
aggregate level appraisal techniques, but suggest that the findings above require some 
triangulation. 
This usefully links to the secondary objective of this chapter, to identify the types of country 
cases and the issues to be examined in the Chapters which follow.  Drawing on the above, 
case countries need necessarily to be successful PRS adopters (given by a clear record of 
poverty reduction), and there is also some merit in examining cases where the national and 
international poverty records are discordant.  The two cases selected, Mongolia, which is 
successful on the dollar-a-day metric but not the national poverty record, and Vietnam, which 
is strongly successful on both accounts, fit these requirements well.  Given the difficulties of 
116 
 
policy attribution, case studies must also possess clear and unambiguous policy stances.  This 
is again a hallmark of the two countries chosen.  
It is important to recognise that the role of the case studies is to broaden the area of enquiry to 
the latter, and more causal, of the four research questions posed in Chapter One.  As such, 
three sets of points can be made with regard to the issues to be examined.  Firstly, it is vital 
that a more detailed account of the poverty reduction process is provided, including, the 
relative importance of growth versus distributional changes, and the underlying dynamics at 
work.  Secondly, the materials can assist in substantiating and expanding on some of the 
rather incomplete conclusions made above - notably in relation to the policy template, the 
apparent neglect of the distributional dimension, and the role of the IFIs.  Finally, a country-
based approach offers the most fruitful means of addressing the attribution and identification 
problems which prevent strong claims from being made about the Initiative’s real impact on 
poverty levels. 
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 CHAPTER FOUR:  MONGOLIA’S ECONOMIC GROWTH SUPPORT AND 
POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY (EGSPRS) 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter, which is the first of two detailed case studies, employs the Mongolian 
experience to examine the in-country impacts of PRS adoption.  It draws on independent 
research and analysis, and field studies carried out in November 2008 (a list of interviewees is 
provided in Appendix A).  These two case studies examine all four research questions posed 
in Chapter One, but place particular emphasis on those issues which could not be addressed 
with aggregative appraisal methods.  These are, specifically, the post-adoption policy 
orientation, the nature of IFI influence during development and execution of the PRS, and the 
extent of implementation.  Mongolia, with its distinctive transition strategy based on rapid 
shock therapy reforms, the presence of high levels of poverty, and an established longitudinal 
poverty record, provides an excellent vehicle for examining the interplay between policy 
choices and outcomes.   
The chapter has four parts. It begins by outlining the historical and geographical context, 
including a discussion of Mongolia’s transition.  The second section reviews the Economic 
Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (Mongolia’s F-PRS), its supporting processes, and its 
impact on the wider policy stance.  The third part then tracks the economic and social 
outcomes. The final section brings the strands of the discussion together to examine the 
effectiveness of the PRS arrangement through the use of alternative counterfactual 
comparisons.  
4.2 National context 
Mongolia’s remoteness, difficult geography and its location between two of the World’s great 
powers generate a very specific set of developmental challenges. These characteristics, 
especially the geo-political context, have also shaped the national political economy and the 
evolution of its transition strategy.   Indeed, unusually for Asia, the State has pursued rapid 
and far reaching market-based reforms following the collapse of the centrally-planned 
economy in 1989. 
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Modern Mongolia (see Figure 4.1) is a large, landlocked and sparsely populated country with 
an unforgiving climate. At the closest point, its frontier is some 800 kilometres from the sea. 
Its population of approximately three million people inhabits a land just short of the size of 
Western Europe. Located at the centre of the continent, the country has one of the highest 
seasonal temperature ranges in the world, with summer averages of 30 degrees centigrade 
plunging to minus 30 during winter nights.  The country’s isolation is deepened by the 
absence of any significant infrastructure - a single railway links the capital, Ulaanbaatar, with 
Beijing and Moscow, and other than a highway to the Russian border, there are no major 
roads.  Mountainous topography in the north and west, and the difficult hydrology of the Gobi 
desert in the south also severely limit communications and economic opportunities.  
Figure 4.1: Modern-day Mongolia 
 
Source: Marshall et al (2008) 
During the early transition, Mongolia effectively de-industrialized, leaving incomes and 
employment dominated by nomadic pastoralism, and, in spite of the emergence of a vibrant 
minerals extraction sector over the last ten years, some 40 per cent of the population still 
remains directly dependent on herding.  The pattern of activity and the climatic realities 
impose a series of vulnerabilities, which are felt most keenly by the rural population – and 
made clear during the Dzud (extreme winter) of 1999, when upwards of 11 million animals 
perished and livelihoods suffered greatly (UNDP, 2004).  However, the country also possesses 
naturally given advantages, chiefly its minerals wealth, and it is this sector, along with 
associated growth in construction and services, which has underpinned the economic 
expansion of recent years.  Mongolia is a major exporter of copper, zinc and gold, and further 
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discoveries, notably the vast Oyu Tologi deposit, offer considerable future economic 
opportunities51.  Yet dependence on minerals has brought additional vulnerabilities to changes 
in global patterns of demand and commodity prices.  Falls in the price of copper during the 
global recession of 2008/ 09, led to a sharp deterioration in the external balance and the 
budgetary position.  Although, prices recovered during 2010, the public finances remain weak. 
Geo-politics have greatly affected Mongolia’s developmental history.  The establishment of 
the modern Mongolian state in 1921 within the boundaries of the former Outer Mongolian 
Bogd Khaanate, marked the beginning of the country’s economic and strategic alignment, 
though not its full integration, with the Soviet Union52.  Initially near-feudal in character, 
Mongolia had become a full command economy by the mid 1970s.  Soviet style planning laid 
the foundations of its industrial base, and this period saw major structural and social change.  
Growth averaged five per cent during the 1980s and education and health outcomes were 
transformed (Nixson and Walters, 2000; UNDP, 2004).  Yet by the 1980s Mongolia’s soviet 
economic model was stagnating and sustained by very significant transfers from the Soviet 
Union, which immediately prior to the transition amounted to around 30 per cent of GDP 
(Marshall, 2004).    
The transition to a market economy began in earnest in 1990, a year before the collapse of 
Soviet communism, and was consolidated with the adoption of a new constitution in 1992. 
Mongolia’s shock therapy approach of near simultaneous liberalization, privatization and 
decontrol of the economy can also be traced to that time (Pomfret, 1999).  The early post-
socialist years were a cathartic, but also, a chaotic period. Reform was unrelenting but poorly 
executed and phased.  Nixson and Walters (2000) characterize the policy process as being one 
of organizational chaos, where different ministries pursed divergent and often contradictory 
objectives.    
                                                 
51
 Located in Southern Mongolia, this vast prospect is anticipated to increase national output by 
around 30 per cent in the next five years (source: RTZ website).  
52
 Under the Chinese Qing Dynasty, Mongolia was divided into two administrative parts.  The Bogd 
Khaanate, a theocratic state (covering Outer, and what would become, modern Mongolia) headed by a 
Buddhist spiritual leader, declared independence from Chinese rule in 1911, but this was only 
effectively secured in 1921 after a campaign supported by Russian, and later, Soviet troops.  The 
Mongolian Peoples’ Republic was subsequently declared in 1924 (Ewing, 1980).    
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Over time, the policy stance became more consistent, and decision makers have held, 
regardless of changes of government, to an orthodox package of rapid structural reforms and 
fiscally cautious economic management.  These included rapid price liberalization, the lifting 
of trade restrictions, the privatization of small enterprises via direct assignment and major 
ones via voucher allocations, a host of deregulation initiatives and (at times) stringent 
stabilization53.  This stance was maintained in spite of a severe transition recession which, 
according to the official data, saw a GDP per capita compression of around 30 per cent (see 
Figure 4.2).  Moreover, as Boone (1994) argues, the reduction in domestic absorption was still 
higher at around 60 per cent, if the withdrawn Soviet subsidies and the terms of trade shocks 
are taken into account54.  This caused severe economic and social dislocation.  By the mid 
1990s, the industrial base was defunct, a mass return to the land took place as Mongolians 
sought coping strategies, and the Headcount ratio reached 36 per cent of the population.   As 
the figure also makes clear, GDP only surpassed its real terms 1989 value in 2002. 
Figure 4.2: GDP and GDP per capita during the transition 
 
Source: Marshall (2004) 
The stabilization outcomes of the strategy were somewhat better.  A spike in inflation 
following rapid price liberalization in 1992 was followed by a progressive return to stability in 
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 See any standard account of shock-therapy transition approaches – for example Stigliz (1999). 
54
 This stemmed from the need for hard currency trading following the collapse of the Council for 
Mutual economic Assistance (CMEA). 
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the mid 1990s. The Mongolian Tugrik (MNT) stabilized after initial heavy depreciation and 
the current account achieved a state of balance, albeit one sustained by large aid flows, which 
by the mid 1990s, had come to match the proportion once represented by Soviet transfers.   
From 2002 onward, with the emergence of large scale minerals extraction, Mongolia’s 
economic fortunes were transformed. The importance of aid has declined and GDP grew by 
just over 50 per cent (42 per cent in per capita terms) between 2002 and 2007.  Yet, as will be 
discussed below, this economic expansion has brought with it a series of challenges, and 
somewhat paradoxically, official estimates of poverty and vulnerability have remained high.  
Moreover, with the onset of the global recession in 2008, Mongolia’s economic fortunes 
deteriorated sharply, as commodity prices fell precipitously and GDP fell by 1.6 per cent in 
2009.  As a result, the Government announced a package of stabilization measures supported 
by a new standby arrangement of some USD 230 million with the IMF in April of 2009. 
While the IMF reported in 2010 that a strong recovery was underway, many uncertainties 
remain (IMF, 2009 and 2010).       
The later years of the transition saw very dramatic shifts in the population to Mongolia’s 
metropolitan core.  By the late 1990s the initial return to the land had halted, and as economic 
conditions improved, these migratory patterns reversed dramatically.  By 2007, close to 40 per 
cent of the population was living in Ulaanbaatar. These flows have since slowed, but remain a 
major feature of Mongolia’s demographics.  Migrant settlements are temporary in character 
with a majority of dwellings made up of traditional Mongolian Gers55 and are located in the 
peri-urban areas of Ulaanbaatar and the northern cities of Darkan and Erdenet.  Sizeable rural-
urban migration is central to Mongolia’s recent developmental history. 
Post-transition Mongolian politics have been dominated by two parties, the post-communist 
Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) and the opposition Democratic Party (DP).  
The former has been the more unified and electorally successful, and represents the 
establishment force within national politics.  In contrast, the DP has often relied on a loose 
and shifting coalition of interests.  However, both have held to the programme of rapid 
                                                 
55
 A Ger, the traditional nomadic dwelling, is similar in character to the Russian Yurt. The so-called Ger 
districts are varied in character, with some representing little more than shanty towns, while others 
have become more developed with a mix of temporary and semi-permanent housing and basic 
infrastructure. 
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reforms and ongoing liberalization of the economy.   Serious political violence was unheard of 
until the post-election riots of summer 2008, when tragically four protesters were killed.  
Indeed, both the initial transition and the subsequent economic dislocation were accompanied 
by boisterous but largely non-violent protests.  Mongolian politics has become distinctly more 
fractious in recent years, underpinning this has been the emergence of new economic interests 
and competition between powerful elites56.  Grand corruption and a matching rise in public 
mistrust and disengagement are also features of contemporary political culture (ADB, 2009). 
4.3 The PRS and the policy stance 
Mongolia’s PRS framework can be dated to 2001 when the government adopted an Interim 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRS). This was followed by the development of the Final 
PRS – the Economic Growth Support and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EGSPRS) in 2003 
(GOM, 2001 and 2003).  This section reviews the history of Mongolia’s PRS framework and 
locates its development within the broader transition strategy.    
Table 4.1, which lists the major policy milestones since the initial transition divided into the 
pre-and post-PRS periods, makes clear that the impact of adoption is not easy to discern.   
Policy choices have held, throughout, to an orthodox template of reforms.  However, it is 
possible to identify some change of emphasis, notably in the years spanning the development 
of the PRS.  Indeed, the chronology shows some slowing of the reform programme from 2000 
with the re-imposition of a basic tariff rate and the development of the F-PRS during 2002 and 
2003.  However, from 2004 the trajectory of reform has been mixed - including both 
accelerated privatization (of land and public services), alongside a greater commitment to 
social policy objectives, given by the Child Money Programme (CMP) launched in 2005, and 
the statutory commitment to the MDGs (made in the same year).  In recent years however, the 
PRS framework has fallen into abeyance.  It will be argued below, that this pattern of change 
and the potency of the PRS within policymaking are a product of the importance of the IFIs, 
and inter alia, their financial support; and the dynamics of Mongolia’s post-communist 
political economy. 
                                                 
56
 The emergence of new, and more divided, sectional interests during the minerals boom years was 
sourced from field-based interviews. NGO respondents were especially critical. Official and donor 
sources also highlighted grand corruption as a threat to the development process.  
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Table 4.1: Transition policy milestones pre and post-PRS adoption 
1 2 
Year Milestones 
(a) Pre-PRS adoption 
1990 Major political change, followed by initial steps towards transition stance  
Wild privatization effectively sanctioned through state-decontrol of production 
1991 Complete and rapid price liberalization 
Privatization by assignment (voucher-based) of medium sized SOEs  
1992 Transfer of herds and privatization of agricultural cooperatives  - the Negdels 
Banking re-structuring, including  major privatization of Banks 
1993 First IMF ESAF arrangement agreed.  Tugrik floated and becomes fully convertible 
Some capital account deregulation takes place. External tariff reductions made (to an 
average of 10%) 
1994 National Poverty Action Program  (NPAP) launched 
1996 Full price deregulation, Abolition of all tariffs (an effective 0% rate)  
1997 Second IMF ESAF arrangement agreed, Mongolia’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) 
Further deregulation of capital transactions and tax holidays offered to foreign investors 
Transfer (by assignment) of residential property, directly and at no cost to occupiers 
2000 Tariffs re-imposed at 5%, Strategic SOE privatization announced 
(b) Post PRS adoption (I-PRS, 2001) 
2003 Final PRS adopted 
2004 Privatization of the Economic and Social sectors (the so-called  New Zealand Model) and 
Land privatization initiated 
2005 Child support scheme for poorest families launched (the CMP), MDG targets given legal 
force (Ikh Hural Resolution number 25) 
2006 Windfall tax imposed on mineral companies to support a National Development Fund  
Reductions in income and value-added taxes 
2007 MDG-based National Development Strategy launched, CMP is universalized 
2008 Public sector wages increased by 30 per cent and across the board pensions increases 
Election pledge of mineral wealth dividend.  Coalition formed following civil unrest 
2009 IMF Standby arrangement agreed 
Source: Marshall (2004), field studies and press reports 
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Mongolia was encouraged to prepare an I-PRS to maintain access to the IMF’s PRGF lending 
mechanism, initially granted under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF).  The 
I-PRS offers a standard poverty profile and puts forward an orthodox reform agenda focusing 
on economic stabilization and economic management.  Growth alone is cited as the route to 
poverty reduction and no mention is made of the need to manage distributional outcomes.   
Moreover, the growth strategy specified is a narrow one and can be summarized under three 
headings: creation of an enabling environment through further decontrol of the economy and 
institutional reforms; public provisioning targeted at human capital along with some 
infrastructural investment; and structural reforms (chiefly privatization) to secure higher levels 
of efficiency.  Disappointingly, although the supporting discussion within the I-PRS 
highlights a series of structural failures including a maladapted industrial base and weak 
capital markets, alongside strong evidence that poverty is rooted in economic inactivity, the 
document conspicuously commits the authorities to avoiding activist growth policies.  On 
state directed investment the text asserts “the government will refrain from… measures or 
moral suasion to subsidize and/or direct credit to favoured industrial and other activities” 
(GOM, 2001, paragraph 45);  and on trade policy  that “Mongolia’s liberal trade regime has 
served the country well and will remain key to promoting… investment” (GOM, 2001 
paragraph 48).   
The policy mix very clearly drew on the content of the preceding Policy Framework Papers 
(PFPs) prepared under the two IMF ESAF arrangements concluded in 1993 and 199757.  
While it is difficult to fully gauge the level of local ownership, national participants have 
noted that the I-PRS relied very heavily on external inputs, and chiefly from the local IFI 
missions58.  The structure and the tone of the document are also rather derivative.  It is clear, 
in addition, that there was some divergence between ambition and implementation capacity. 
Discussion of operational management and the oversight of the strategy are vague. Equally 
inadequate is the monitoring and evolution framework. 
                                                 
57
 PFPs were joint IFI and national government authored strategic documents, and somewhat 
anticipated the content of the macroeconomic chapter of PRSs. These were used in concert with 
ESAF arrangements in the 1990s and subsequently abandoned.  
58
 Taken from an interview with Ms. O Enkh-Ariunna (former Deputy Director of Economic Policy 
Ministry of Finance & Economy); and discussions with Ministry officials (MOFE and MOSWL). 
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In spite of these points, the IMF and World Bank Joint Staff Assessment (JSA) of the I-PRS 
finds the document meets the requirements for the continuation of lending arrangements, and 
welcomes the government’s adherence to an orthodox policy stance. Particular weight is 
placed on the value of Mongolia’s liberal trade regime.  Yet their endorsement is not 
complete.  The commentary raises concerns about the substance of the commitments made, 
and directly questions the capacity of the government to deliver them. Perplexingly, although 
the JSA commends the level of national ownership, it also acknowledges that the strategy is 
too reliant on Bank and Fund staff inputs (IMF and IDA, 2001a).  
The EGSPRS (the F-PRS), in contrast, has the flavour of a nationally crafted document and 
the diagnosis of poverty and its dynamics are more substantive (GOM, 2003).  In addition, 
key policy issues, such as Mongolia’s dysfunctional welfare system, receive a genuine 
hearing. However, the F-PRS also suffers from a number of limitations.  Most significantly, it 
is a poorly focused volume of some 300 pages, in which the strategic direction is not clearly 
articulated, and it does not represent a functional planning mechanism.   Although compilation 
of the F-PRS was led by the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE), its development took 
place within sectoral working groups and was dominated by sector specific priorities.  Key 
operational questions including management and coordination responsibilities, the interface 
with the executive and governance structures, and the machinery required to support 
monitoring and evaluation are neglected.   Moreover, although the document pays attention to 
wider issues, including structural questions and the importance of managing inequality, the 
economic policy stance remains avowedly orthodox.  The priorities are macroeconomic not 
structural, and poverty reduction is, as before, largely viewed as a by-product of an unfettered 
growth process rooted in state-disengagement.    
However, it is important not to overlook some genuinely novel developments. First, several 
new policy themes emerge: the policy salience of poverty reduction as opposed to growth 
alone; the recognition, albeit partial, of distributional questions; the targeting of social sector 
priorities; and some emphasis on new infrastructure (though this section largely outlines 
projects already taking place outside the PRS).   Second, it is possible to identify at the 
periphery, more activist measures to secure more balanced economic outcomes. These include 
competitive management of the exchange rate, a nascent re-distributional regional policy and 
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selective support for processing industries. However, these latter proposals are muted and very 
tentative. 
The second IFI JSA commends the F-PRS and accepts it as a basis for ongoing lending 
operations (IMF and IDA, 2003).  Yet the staffs explicitly criticize the document for including 
what they describe as contradictory and non-market based policy choices.  Indeed, they go as 
far as describing the very limited regional and trade policies as “outdated” and “misplaced 
interventionism” (IMF and IDA, 2003, page 8 and page 12).  Although the JSA also raises 
weak implementation capacity (specifically monitoring and evaluation) and the quality of the 
poverty analysis employed, the hostility towards the few policies which lie outside the 
orthodox template is striking and wholly disproportionate. 
The ebb and flow of government-IFI relations serve as a back-drop to the policy importance 
of the PRS framework in Mongolia.  Participants within the PRS drafting process recall that 
the IFI representatives were distinctly suspicious of any new domestically-sourced policy 
proposals, especially those which might be perceived as attempts to include activist measures.  
For example, prior to adoption, proposals to track and target deposit-lending rate spreads, and 
to include non-economic conditions (such as employment requirements) within asset 
divestitures were dropped following IMF objections59.  In addition, accounts of the pre-
development period also highlight the IFIs’ power to shape the PRS agenda, and hence, the 
wider set of policies considered.   The joint IMF and World Bank round of briefing and 
training events following the conclusion of the I-PRS in 2002, and the supportive materials 
(not least the PRS Source Book), appear to have constrained the policy approach. These 
influences, which Chapter Two describes as policy tutelage, were especially potent in a 
country with low state capacity and a fairly shallow civil society.  Indeed, the greatest 
opposition to what was effectively an entrenched policy stance, before the drafting EGSPRS 
got underway, came from other international actors – chiefly the UN agencies.  The IFIs 
generally reacted negatively to these interventions, the best example being the IMF’s response 
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 Sourced from personal record during assignment with UNDP (located within MOFE) and personal 
correspondence (and interviews) with former UNDP and Ministry colleagues (November 2008). 
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to the UNDP-sponsored economic policy dialogue and draft economic strategy – the so-called 
Griffin Report in 2001 (UNDP, 2001)60.  
These accounts of the Mongolian experience, its inherently weak state capacity and the 
primacy of the IFIs, fit well with heterodox critiques, and some of the case-based empirical 
analyses of the PRS process, articulated in Chapter Two (see section 2.2).  However, it is 
possible to overplay the dominance of the IFIs, and other evidence suggests that the PRS was 
dysfunctional for other reasons. Indeed, post-adoption practice underlined that the national 
authorities were themselves guilty of policy ventriloquism to obtain concessional finance, as 
described in Van De Walle’s (2005).   
The last formal PRS document to be produced by the Mongolian authorities was the EGSPRS 
Progress Report in 2005 (IMF and IDA, 2005).  Drafted as part progress update, part rolled-
forward strategy, this document text holds to the original policy approach, reporting outcomes 
and making only minor modifications.  As a piece of analysis it is underwhelming, it is poorly 
put together and the analytical content is inadequate.  Crucially, the report fails to examine the 
implications of the burgeoning mining sector for poverty reduction and Mongolia’s 
vulnerability to external shocks, and how these developments might be better shaped to affect 
the lives of the poor. The report does, however, recognize the prominence of MDGs in policy 
targeting, and within monitoring and evaluation.  Underpinning this was the very active UN-
sponsored campaign which culminated in Ikh Hural (parliamentary resolution) 25, which gave 
legal force to the Mongolian version of the goals. 
Although, in a formal sense, the PRS’s strategic planning objectives were incorporated within 
the National Development Strategy (NDS) published in 2006, the de facto position is that the 
framework has fallen into abeyance and the associated analytical and monitoring capacity has 
been lost.  The Poverty Research Group (PRG) which acted as the coordinating agent within 
MOFE has been disbanded and the former reporting arrangements dismantled. Currently, no 
governmental agency actively targets poverty reduction in a strategic way.  Some capacity 
within NSO has been retained, which has enabled the improvement of the national poverty 
survey (the HIES) to meet international standards, and the government, in concert with the 
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 Griffin reflects in a later publication, that the IMF, in particular, was highly dismissive of attempts to 
broaden the policy agenda in Mongolia (Griffin, 2003).  
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UN agencies, has continued to report on progress with respect to the Mongolian MDGs.  It is 
worth noting that Mongolia is also no longer in receipt of the IMF’s PRGF lending facility, 
nor is it eligible for World Bank PRSCs. 
In operational terms, the NDS has proved to be disappointing, and if anything, is still less 
credible than the EGSPRS.  Completed outside official circles, and in spite of the concurrent 
establishment of a National Development Fund (NDF), the NDS remains moribund61.  
Discussions during field studies indicated the option of forming a National Development 
Agency (NDA) to assume responsibility for the NDS was receiving serious consideration.  
However, these proposals had not yet come to fruition some four years after the inception of 
the NDS.  The reasons for this failure are not merely a lack of political will.  The NDS is a 
poorly structured document, is analytically weak, fails to provide a coherent action plan, and 
is generally unfit for purpose.  Additionally it is important to recognize that the adoption of 
the MDGs as a monitoring framework, outside of the NDS structures, also served to weaken 
the focus of strategic planning efforts.  The MDG reporting regime, championed and 
resourced by the UN agencies, has resulted in the imposition of a myriad of policy targets and 
has inculcated an ad hoc approach to policymaking within line ministries. 
The overall trajectory of policymaking can be explained in terms of the varying influence of 
the IFIs against the changing imperatives of Mongolia’s political economy.  Although, 
adoption of the I-PRS was a product of the administrative necessities of retaining PRGF 
finance, compilation of the EGSPRS did represent some new level of commitment.  
Mongolia’s post-Dzud economy with vulnerability affecting a majority of the population 
ensured that poverty reduction was a central feature of electoral politics at the turn of the 
century.  These concerns receded as the minerals-boom took hold, and the political imperative 
of poverty reduction was further diluted by an emergent urban middle class.  In addition, 
although society has become more pluralistic, Mongolia’s political culture remains 
exceptionally shallow and ideology plays little part in national politics.  Political judgments 
are increasingly privatized and the distinctly populist tone adopted by both major parties in the 
years after 2004, can be viewed in terms of the shifting economic fortunes of Mongolia’s 
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 The NDF is supported by taxes on the extractive sector and a sizeable balance has been 
accumulated.  Its funds are formally restricted to financing development projects, but the Government 
has effectively used it to co-finance mainstream expenditures.  
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median voter.  In parallel, the buoyancy of public revenues between 2002 and 2008 weakened 
the ability of the IFIs to promote a more a pro-poor model of policymaking (albeit a narrowly 
defined one).   Yet, the global recession which hit Mongolia in late 2008 and the re-emergence 
of Dzud conditions in the winter of 2009 do not appear to have reversed these trends.   
The pattern of events can also be interpreted and offered as a critique of IFI conduct during 
the EGSPRS period – in over tutoring the authorities, in prescribing management 
arrangements and in precluding certain policy choices.   In the language of the empirical 
literature on PRSs (see 2.2.3), they failed to embed the EGSPRS in the national institutional 
matrix (see Booth et al, 2003).  In addition, an explanation of the failure of the PRS 
framework, based on the heavy handedness of the IFIs combined with weak capacity and 
political commitment, can be framed in terms of the model offered by Morrissey (2002). 
A deeper contributory cause has been the very significant concentration of wealth that has 
occurred during this period which, in turn, has given rise to the unfavourable changes in 
Mongolia’s political economy62.  Driven both by the privatization process and an ability to 
extract rents from the minerals sector, the governing elite have secured considerable business 
interests, and as a result, the capitalist and political classes are increasingly one and the same.  
The elites have both a material and a political interest in opposing a more distinctly pro-poor, 
and hence re-distributionist, agenda.  The waning official interest in poverty issues and the 
emergence of an ever more populist fiscal policy are both by-products of this process.  Field 
level interviews with NGOs and development organizations also indicated considerable levels 
of mistrust of official motivations, on the basis that these are often aligned with private 
objectives.  Additionally, the ownership of Mongolia’s mining wealth and the distribution of 
the associated income streams have become public controversies.  The political disturbances 
of summer 2008 were themselves related to divisions over the State’s ownership of the mining 
sector and the associated tax revenues63.  
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 This finding of growing asset inequality is supported by field study interviews undertaken during 
November 2008 (see Appendix A).   There are no authoritative data for wealth concentration in 
Mongolia, yet the income-based Gini coefficient worsened by 9.1 per cent, and the more distribution 
ally sensitive Thiel index by a striking 33.3 per cent, between 2002/ 2003 and 2007/ 2008. 
63
 See report in the International Herald Tribune,  July 1st, 2008 
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The fallout of the global recession, and the harsh winter of 2009/10, might have been expected 
to return poverty reduction to front line politics but, as noted, there seems to be little 
substantive change, save for the voices of a small group of campaigning NGOs64. The IMF 
Standby arrangement agreed in spring 2009, however clearly anticipates some social 
dislocation. It asserts the need for measures to protect the vulnerable during what will be fairly 
painful years of adjustment (IMF, 2009a).  While the substance of the official commitment to 
stabilization is unquestionable, it is far from clear that the emphasis on social protection will 
materialize.  Published materials suggest that the government is to rely on the ADB and World 
Bank to finance poverty alleviation measures, including the provision of food aid. Field based 
interviews in late 2008, indicated that a more fundamental change in policy, or indeed, the 
rehabilitation of the PRS structures, remains unlikely.         
4.4 Economic and Social outcomes 
This section provides a review and analysis of policy outcomes in the years since the adoption 
of the interim PRS in 2001.  A key issue to emerge is the poor comparability of the poverty 
record and evidence of major discontinuities is found.  The discussion begins with a review of 
economic performance; secondly, the poverty record and efforts to re-establish a consistent 
poverty record are reported; thirdly, the text examines trends in inequality; finally, a brief 
review of social outcomes is provided.   
4.4.1 Economic outcomes 
As Figures 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate, the economy improved considerably in the years between 
2002 and 2007.  Fed by the expansion in mining and associated service sector growth, and 
more latterly, stronger agricultural output, GDP growth has averaged 9 to 10 per cent in recent 
years.  Underpinning these trends have been strong commodity prices and an opening up of 
the minerals sector through substantial direct foreign investment (DFI) which amounted to 
approximately USD 800 million between 2005 and 2007 (World Bank, 2008)65.  Alongside 
mining, the service sector and the construction industry have been direct beneficiaries, with 
the majority of the expansion taking place in Ulaanbaatar.  As the sector trends (see Figures 
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 Based on a review of press reports in early 2010 – see UB post website www.ubpost.mn  
65
 Total DFI for 2005 to 2007 was USD 1.2 billion, World Bank (2008) estimates the mineral sector’s 
share was 67 per cent. 
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4.3 and 4.4) make clear, service sector growth has been especially strong (except for 2004), 
and by 2008, services were estimated to represent around 27 per cent of output.  Higher wool 
and cashmere prices and productivity gains in livestock herding have independently 
contributed to growth, alongside some expansion in textiles (World Bank, 2008).  
Figure 4.3: GDP Trends by Sector (2001 =100) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NSO (2008 and 2009)66 
Figure 4.4: GDP Annual Growth rates by sector  
 
Source: NSO (various years) 
                                                 
66
 The Mongolian NSO website provides summary data (http://www.nso.mn/) 
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However, the global recession severely weakened the established trend; outturn projections 
show that GDP actually fell by 1.6 per cent during 2009 and this is considerably worse than 
projected (IMF, 2010).  Given ongoing population growth, the per capita figure will be one to 
two per cent worse.  The precipitous fall in the global demand for minerals, notably for copper 
(which fell by around 50 per cent in 2008 before regaining ground during early 2010), and the 
impact on revenues, forced the Government to conclude a Standby arrangement with the IMF 
in April 2009.  This committed the authorities to a series of stabilization measures including 
spending restraint and greater exchange rate flexibility (IMF, 2009 and 2010).   
Underpinning the severity of the reduction in output is Mongolia’s dependence on minerals 
extraction and the narrowness of its productive base.  Mining accounted for some 84 per cent 
of exports in 2008, and close to 40 per cent of budget revenues (World Bank, 2008 and 2009).  
Mongolia’s proximity to China as a source of demand for its exports, and the revival in 
growth does, however, offer some protection. Additionally, the coming years will see further 
major expansions in the sector.  Encouragingly, the IMF notes in its latest review of the Stand-
by arrangement that the outlook has improved considerably (IMF, 2010). Yet, as the 
discussion below argues, minerals dependency has also had major distributional 
consequences.  Extractive industries, as elsewhere, are a capital intensive activity with low 
employment needs, unequal geographical impacts and weak linkages to the wider domestic 
economy (Berry, 2008).     
The level of inflation in the years leading up to the global financial crisis has also been a key 
concern, especially given its disproportionate impact on the real incomes of the poor.  
Considerable price rises took place during the years of economic expansion, and these were 
acute in 2008, with the annualized change in the CPI reaching close to 40 per cent during July 
(NSO, 2009). As Figure 4.5 shows, the source of these inflationary pressures was the rising 
cost of food.  The World Bank note in their final quarterly economic report for 2008, that 
rising fuel prices and the importance of transportation costs in Mongolia were the deeper 
causal factors (World Bank, 2008).  Clearly, as the poor spend a greater proportion of their 
income on basic staples, their purchasing power was squeezed hardest.  A participatory 
assessment, carried out for the ADB in the summer of 2008, suggested that the incidence of 
steep price rises also had a geographical dimension, with the poor in peripheral urban areas 
suffering the most (ADB, 2009). 
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Figure 4.5:  Relative contributions to CPI   2007 -2008 
 
Source: World Bank (2008)  
Although the underlying cause was external, government policy actions, notably, a 30 per cent 
increase in public sector salaries in early 2008 and the universalization of the Child Money 
Programme (CMP) in 2007 had very significant effects. These choices, and an 
accommodative monetary response, exacerbated the inflationary pressures.  IFI and donor 
concerns over the conduct of policy were heightened by the Minerals Windfall Dividend, a 
proposed direct cash payment of around USD 1,000 to every Mongolian citizen (World Bank, 
2008).  This commitment, which was made by both political parties during the fractious 
general election campaign of 2008, was subsequently shelved.  Nevertheless, fiscal policy 
during the years of the minerals boom was distinctly populist and consequently, highly pro-
cyclical. 
Following some initial improvement in 2002 and 2003, the external account worsened year on 
year from 2004, and declined dramatically in late 2008 with the collapse in the copper price 
(World Bank, 2008).   Although mining-related equipment accounted for a sizeable portion of 
the growth in imports, the trade deficit widened as the economy continued to draw in vehicles, 
luxury goods and consumer durables. The deterioration in minerals prices ultimately forced 
the government to negotiate the Stand-by arrangement in early 2009 (IMF, 2009).  In contrast, 
the capital account had remained healthy until recently, with large DFI flows making up the 
bulk of the financing needs (World Bank, 2008).   The Tugrik strengthened against the US 
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dollar from 2006, but to a lesser extent against other currencies.  However, the level of 
inflation has resulted in a considerable real terms appreciation, including against Mongolia’s 
principal trading partners of Russia and China.  This has had wider implications for 
competitiveness and raises the possibility of Dutch Disease effects arising from the mineral 
sector. The position has, nevertheless, reversed somewhat, both the exchange rate and the 
capital account worsening from 2009. Stability returned following the conclusion of the 
Stand-by arrangement, a partial recovery in copper prices, and a fairly harsh policy response 
(IMF, 2010).  
World Bank projections suggest unemployment fell progressively between 2002/03 and 
2007/08, but also suggest rises have, and will take place as the global recession plays out 
(World Bank, 2008; IMF 2009).  In addition, as the UNDP’s National Human Development 
Report for 2008 on the labour market found, official data, despite being ILO compliant, not 
only under-reports unemployment but the headline figures disguise the underlying trends 
(UNDP, 2008).  The UNDP found that many workers, and an increasing share of those newly 
classified as fully employed, worked for only a few hours a week and thus, that under-
employment is sizeable and growing.  Many jobs, particularly where growth has been 
strongest in Ulaanbaatar, are in the informal sector and provide merely subsistence levels of 
income.  The report finds, additionally, that mismatches between the skills required in the 
growth areas of the economy and those provided by the vocational education and training 
system, are limiting the poverty reduction pay-offs of growth (UNDP, 2008).  
Closely tracking and interacting with economic outcomes have been substantial demographic 
changes.  Mongolia has a young and growing population and although the growth rate has 
slowed, the population is still estimated to be increasing at around 1.4 per cent per annum 
(NSO, various years).  A further major feature has been very substantial population 
movements from the periphery (especially the Western region) into the central areas and 
Ulaanbaatar.  It is estimated that around 40 per cent of the population, around a million 
people, now live in the capital city.  As Table 4.2 illustrates, this represents a rise of some 37 
per cent on the 2002 level (see column 4). Migrants appear in the main (numerically and 
proportionately) to have arrived from regional capitals - the Aimag centres.  This has given 
rise to considerable urban deprivation in the peri-urban Ger districts including poor sanitation, 
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limited water supply and air pollution. However, these movements have also been central to 
the recent economic expansion.   
Table 4.2: Population change between 2002 and 2007, main administrative domains 
1 2a 2b 3a 3b 4 
  2002 2007 Change (in Nos)  
2002 to 2007   No. % Share No. % Share 
Ulaanbaatar 747.3 30.2% 1025.2 39.4% +37.2% 
Aimag Centres 624.8 25.2% 532 20.4% -14.9% 
Soum Centres 400.8 16.2% 387 14.9% -3.4% 
Countryside 702.5 28.4% 658.2 25.3% -6.3% 
 Total 2475.4 100.0% 2602.4 100.0% +5.1% 
Source: NSO (2008 and 2009) and author’s calculations 
Post transition demographic changes have also included substantial international migration. 
Some estimates suggest that there have been around 200,000 departures since 1995, although 
perplexingly, the latest information from the Ministry of Foreign affairs suggests there are 
only 100,000 Mongols working outside the country (ABD, 2009).   While the overall numbers 
have slowed, the net position continues to show a net outflow and, even on the basis of these 
lower estimates, around a tenth of the economically active population is working overseas 
(MPDA, 2005).  A by-product of this has been the emergence of substantial remittance flows, 
which are estimated to have been USD 194 million in 2009, equivalent to USD 74 per capita 
(UNDP, 2009). These have supported the economy and familial incomes through additional 
purchasing power.  However, the direct impact of remittance inflows on poverty is disputed67.  
4.4.2 Poverty Outcomes 
The Mongolian National Statistical Office (NSO) has undertaken a series of internationally-
compliant household consumption surveys, and a complete poverty record can be traced from 
1995.  However, the reliability of the longitudinal record is disputed.  This subsection begins 
by outlining the data and the host of comparability problems. Subsequently, it sets out the 
                                                 
67
 Survey evidence shows the vast majority of migrants had higher educational qualifications and did not have 
poor backgrounds (MDPA, 2005).  There seems little direct impact on poverty levels. Nevertheless remittances 
are a significant source of (local) aggregate demand and important to individual family incomes. 
136 
 
considerable efforts undertaken by this thesis to re-establish the poverty record. Second, it 
reviews the spatial and demographic patterns of poverty, based on the latest (2007/08) data.  
Under UNDP and World Bank supervision, three Living Standards Measurement Surveys 
(LSMSs) were carried out in 1995, 1998 and 2002/03, and from mid 2007 the NSO has 
undertaken the biannual Household Socio-Economic Survey (HSES) to provide a regular 
internationally compliant data series and the results are now available for 2007/0868.  These, 
and those for past surveys, are reported in Table 4.3, and are illustrated in Figure 4.6 (NSO 
1996, 1999, 2004 and 2009).  However, the World Bank has challenged the continuity of the 
data between 1998 and 2002/03, and re-estimated the 1998 results.  Their adjusted figures and 
the adjusted changes are shown in italics in the table (columns 4 and 6). 
Table 4.3: Summary Longitudinal Poverty Data  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 LSMS 
1995 
LSMS 
1998 
(Chg on 95) 
WB Re-
estimate  
1998 
LSMS 
2002/03 
(Chg on 98) 
LSMS 
2002/03 
(Chg on WB 
98) 
HSES 
2007/ 2008 
(Chg on 02/ 
03) 
Headcount 36.3 35.6 (-1.9) 43.1 36.1 (+1.4) 36.1 (-16.2) 35.2 (-2.5)  
Depth 10.9 11.7 (+7.3) n/a 11.0 (-6.0) n/a 10.1 (-8.2) 
Severity 4.8 5.6 (+16.7) n/a 4.7 (-16.1) n/a 4.0 (-14.9) 
Source: NSO (1996, 1999, 2004 and 2009) and World Bank (2006) 
The headline results suggest that poverty has been stagnant throughout the transition, falling 
only slightly in recent years to just above 35 per cent of the population (first row of the 
results, columns 2, 3, 5 and 7).  The depth and severity measures, in contrast, show an 
ongoing improvement from 1998.  However, if the World Bank’s upward revision to the 1998 
data is accepted, the Headcount also records a very large reduction of 16.2 per cent between 
1998 and 2002/03 (column 6).  The Bank’s case is controversial as it effectively re-writes the 
poverty reduction story of the later transition.  Equally problematic is the fact that this claimed 
large reduction has a very poor fit with the wider data, which showed weak levels of growth 
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 The HSES is an updated version of the non-internationally compliant Household Income & 
Expenditure Survey (HIES).  This has been achieved with UNDP and World Bank support.   
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 See Marshall et al (2008) on Mongolia’s disputed poverty record; and Berry (2008) on minerals 
based economies in general.
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In the light of these issues, and the requirements of the later analyses, this thesis examines the 
available evidence, and where required, re-establishes a consistent estimate of the headcount 
ratio.  This was a challenging task, due both to the weakness of the published data and a lack 
of transparency on the part of the authorities. This represents a new contribution to the study 
of poverty in Mongolia.  The two discontinuities are reviewed in turn.  Owing to the level of 
non-disclosure, the methods used make use of aggregative estimation tools, specifically the 
World Bank’s POVCAL software, which permits the simulation of poverty data70.    
The claimed break in the record between the 1998 and 2002/03, and the World Bank’s 
subsequent restatement of the 1998 data, is supported by a set of measurement and survey 
arguments.  The Bank sets out a case based on four key points: that the latter survey employed 
a wider consumption basket; geographical pricing adjustments in place of separate regional 
poverty lines; a longer recall period was used; and the second survey employed a larger 
Mongolia–wide sample frame (World Bank, 2006).  Yet a detailed examination of their case, 
drawing on the poverty measurement literature, is far from supportive71.  Indeed, while two of 
the arguments made, most notably extension of the recall period and the sample frame, would 
tend to increase the relative value of the poverty proportion in the later (2002/03) survey, the 
use of a wider consumption basket would work in the opposite direction. In addition, it is 
difficult to reach a judgement either way on the change in the re-pricing methods (Marshall et 
al, 2008).   
However, a comparison of the value of the nominal thresholds (given in Table 4.4) suggests a 
different and more basic source of the discontinuity - simply that there has been real terms 
inflation in the poverty line and the latter threshold therefore specifies a higher welfare level.  
As shown, while the CPI (column 4) closely tracks the change in the nominal values of 1995 
and 1998 poverty lines (columns 5 and 6), the 2002/03 line is some 31 per cent above the 
combined CPI (column 7).   Although some variation is to be expected, as the poor will have 
different consumption patterns to the average, and because tastes and preferences will become 
more sophisticated, and therefore more expensive as incomes grow, this level of change 
                                                 
70
 POVCAL is a poverty simulation program provided by the World Bank. It enables the estimation of 
poverty aggregates given basic income and distributional data. It has a number of applications and is 
used extensively in this thesis.  Chen et al (1991) provide a discussion and user guide to this software.  
71
 See Deaton (2004) on the impact of varying the survey methods (such as the recall period and 
sample frame) and Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2001) the general comparability of poverty lines.  
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cannot be explained away. It is also worth noting that the CPI used here is the average of the 
discordant series reported by the IMF and Mongolian NSO (columns 2 and 3). Nevertheless, 
even on the basis of the higher IMF series, a discontinuity is recorded. 
Table 4.4: Comparison of the 1995, 1998 and 2002/ 03 Poverty Thresholds 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Year 
 
CPI (IMF) 
 
CPI (NSO) 
 
Combined 
CPI 
Poverty 
Lines 
Implied 
Index 
Variation on 
Combined CPI (%) 
1995 100.00 100.00 100.00 7.240 100.00 0.00 
1998 219.32 184.67 202.00 14,674 202.68 +0.34 
2002 282.33 241.18 261.75 24,743 341.75 -30.56 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on IMF (on line data) and NSO (various years)  
A similar exercise can be applied to the second interval, and the results (see Table 4.5) show 
that there is a large variation here also between the nominal values of the respective poverty 
lines (column 4) and inflation indices (columns 2 and 3).  An examination of the core methods 
and assumptions employed by these two surveys reveals there were no substantive changes.  
The HSES and the LSMS both employ a cost of basic needs approach (CBN), the threshold is 
anchored to a daily adult food intake of 2,100 calories, and regional re-pricing is undertaken 
to provide the poverty line.  Both surveys also use a similar sampling frame and stratification 
approach.  Yet as shown in Table 4.5, the 2007 poverty line is some 63 per cent higher than 
that implied by the CPI (column 6).   
Table 4.5: Comparison of the 2002/03 and 2007/08 Poverty Thresholds 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Year 
 
CPI 
 
Food Inflation 
Index 
Poverty lines 
 
Implied index 
 
Variation on 
CPI % 
Variation on 
Food index  % 
2002 100.00 100.00 24,743 100.00 0.0% 0.0% 
2007 155.15 178.24 62,484 252.53 +62.8% +41.7% 
Source: Authors calculations based on NSO (2009)  
Alternatively, accepting that the poor spend a disproportionate portion of income on basic 
staples, a comparison using the change in food prices shows a variation of 42% (column 7).  
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The break in comparability in this period is real therefore, and again appears to have been 
driven simply by inflation in the nominal threshold. 
The method for re-establishing a consistent record assumes that the surveys in each of the two 
intervals specify a different real terms welfare minimum – with the earlier survey representing 
a lower threshold value, and the later survey, a higher one.  Comparable (future and past) 
notional headcounts were estimated using the POVCAL simulation software, which allows the 
estimation of poverty aggregates on the basis of distributional data. In essence, this program 
fits Lorenz curves to input income data, and is thus able to predict the associated poverty 
aggregates.  This required the re-pricing of the nominal poverty lines and means using the 
given inflation indices, and parameterizing POVCAL with the respective distributional data 
for the survey years.   
The re-pricing process was difficult and encountered a number of problems.  In the first (1998 
to 2002/03) interval, the variation between the published NSO and IMF CPI series meant an 
average of the two had to be used.  Moreover, for the second interval, considerable inflation 
and a sizeable differential between the CPI and price rises for basic staples merited the 
calculation and use of an additional index which better reflected price changes faced by the 
poor.  The results of the simulation exercises are given in Table 4.6 for the first interval and in 
Table 4.7 for the second.  These present two scenarios based on the lower and higher 
threshold values.  For the second interval, further simulations based on the alternative CPI and 
the prices affecting the poor index (PAP) are reported.  Comparisons are made against the 
base positions and the respective published data.  Further details of the methods and data are 
provided in Appendix L.   
Referring to the first interval, the results closely track, and therefore, vindicate the Bank’s re-
worked estimates for 1998, and indicate a sizeable reduction in poverty.  The higher threshold 
scenario suggests the comparable Headcount for 1998 would have been 43.3 per cent (column 
2), and thus, the reduction recorded in 2002/03 was 16.6 per cent (column 4).  This compares 
favourably with the Bank’s estimated headcount of 43.1 per cent and a 16.2 per cent 
reduction.  The lower scenario estimated the comparable 2002/03 headcount at 29.1 per cent 
of the population, and the equivalent reduction at 18.3 per cent (column 4). This lower 
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estimate is employed as the preferred scenario in subsequent analyses. It is worth recalling 
that the official record suggested an increase of only 1.4 per cent between the two surveys. 
Table 4.6: Re-estimated headcount ratios for the second (1998 to 2002/03) interval 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 1998 2002/ 03 Change 
between 
surveys 
(%) 
Variation on  
published 
1998 
(%) 
Variation on  
published 
2002/03 
(%) 
Higher (02/03) Poverty Line  43.3 36.1 -16.6 +21.6 n/a 
Lower  (98) Poverty Line 
(Preferred option) 35.6 29.1 -18.3 n/a -19.4 
Published results 35.6 36.1 +1.4 n/a n/a 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank (2006) and NSO (2004) 
The results for the second interval are more complex as, in addition to lower and higher 
threshold scenarios, there are alternative simulated Headcounts based on different indexing 
options.  Given a closer approximation to the consumption basket of the poor, the PAP index 
is the preferred re-pricing option, and its use also reduces the variation on the published data.  
Nevertheless, as Table 4.7 reports, all of the simulations show major changes compared with 
the headline figures and large reductions in poverty rates.  For the higher threshold, the 
estimated comparable 2002/03 Headcount ranges between 51.6 per cent (PAP basis) and 55.7 
per cent (CPI basis), versus the published 36.1 per cent (see column 2).  The equivalent 
reductions over the interval are 31.8 and 36.8 per cent respectively, versus the published 
decline of 2.5 per cent (column 3).   For the lower threshold, the simulated comparable 
Headcounts for 2007/08 are 21.8 per cent (PAP basis) and 19.1 per cent (CPI basis) (also 
given in column 2). The respective reductions on the base for the lower scenario are 39.6 per 
cent and 47.1 per cent (column 3).  In the interests of consistency the lower threshold PAP 
values are adopted as the preferred option, and employed in all subsequent analyses. 
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Table 4.7: Re-estimated headcount ratios for the third (2002/03 to 2007/08) interval 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 2002/03 2007/08 Change 
(%) 
Variation on 
published 02/03 
(%) 
Variation on 
published 07/08 
(%) 
Higher (07/08) poverty line   
- PAP basis 
- CPI basis 
 
51.6 
55.7 
 
35.2 
35.2 
 
-31.8 
-36.8 
 
+42.9 
+54.3 
 
n/a 
n/a 
Lower (02/ 03)  
- PAP basis (preferred) 
-CPI basis 
 
36.1 
36.1 
 
21.8 
19.1 
 
-39.6 
-47.1 
 
n/a 
n/a 
 
-38.1 
-45.7 
Published results 36.1 35.2  -2.5 n/a n/a 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank (2006) and NSO (2009) 
Although the results of these re-estimation exercises add complexity, the overall pattern is one 
of a declining headcount as opposed to the static position reflected in the official data.  Figure 
4.7 brings the published (the bold dotted line) and the simulated results (the dashed lines) 
together. The various simulated trends (based on different re-pricing assumptions and lower 
and higher thresholds) show a progressive decline in poverty from 1998. A continuous trend 
cannot be shown as the changes were re-estimated separately for each interval.  
Figure 4.7: Published and simulated headcounts 1995 to 2007 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NSO (Various years)  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Jan-94 Jan-96 Dec-97 Dec-99 Dec-01 Dec-03 Dec-05 Dec-07
Official data track World Bank 98-02 restatement
Adjusted lower track 95-98-02 Adjusted higher track 98-02
Adjusted lower track 02-07 (PAP) Adjusted lower track 02-07 (CPI)
Adjusted higher track 02-07 (PAP) Adjusted higher track 02-07 (CPI)
143 
 
Clearly, such a pattern of change is significant.  However, it is difficult to provide a 
convincing causal explanation for these sizeable reductions, especially in the first interval, as 
the minerals expansion only gathered pace in the latter years of the period.  It is important, 
also, to emphasize that the simulated results on which these changes are based are necessarily 
approximate.  The lack of access to household or more detailed distributional data ensures that 
the estimation approach is based on partial information and is reliant on a number of 
assumptions72. Moreover, replication from the primary records is made impossible by the non-
availability of the source data (for either interval) and the World Bank’s failure to disclose its 
2002/03 re-estimation methods73.  The substance of the apparent reduction and the underlying 
causal factors are returned to in the following section (see 4.5.2). 
Consideration is now given to the spatial patterns and demographics of poverty in Mongolia.  
These issues have received growing recognition as population flows accelerated in the late 
transition and it is argued in later sections (see 4.4.3 and 4.5) that the overall trend of 
worsening inequality has strong spatial dimensions. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 below, present a 
detailed disaggregation of the 2007/ 08 survey data.  Table 4.8, lists the three main poverty 
aggregates by administrative strata, a national classification, and by standard regions (see 
blocks a and b).   
Comparisons against the national rates show high levels of variation (columns 3, 5 and 7), 
with Ulaanbaatar having the lowest rates for each of the poverty aggregates in both spatial 
presentations.  The Headcount ratio for the capital, for example, is 29.9 per cent versus a 
national rate of 35.2 per cent (a 38 per cent variation – see column 3).  The Headcount data for 
the countryside shows a similar but opposite (i.e. positive) variation of close to 42 per cent 
(columns 2 and 3).  The most substantial mismatch occurs on the Severity index for the 
impoverished Eastern region which is some 65 per cent worse than the national average 
(column 7).  
                                                 
72
 Specifically that re-pricing is applied to the distribution uniformly, that decile data adequately capture 
the shape of the respective Lorenz curves and the POVCAL software, which relies on basic linear 
regression methods, accurately models the distributions and Headcounts.   
73
 Mongolian statistical law forbids the release of household data. In spite of enquires, the World Bank 
have not disclosed their re-estimation approach. However, off-the record remarks by a Bank 
statistician suggested that there were serious misgivings about the restated poverty data.  
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Table 4.8: Poverty aggregates by administrative domain (HSES 2007/08) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Category Headcount 
ratio  
(%) 
Variation 
on  
national 
(%) 
Depth 
(% of 
mean) 
Variation 
on  
national 
(%) 
Severity 
Index 
(squared 
gap) 
Variation 
on 
national 
(%) 
(a) By administrative strata 
National 
 
35.2 0.0 10.1 0.0 4.0 0.0 
Rural 
 
46.6 +32.4 13.4 +32.7 5.2 +30.0 
Soum Centres 
 
42.0 +19.3 12.7 +25.7 5.2 +30.0 
Countryside 
 
49.7 +41.2 13.9 +37.6 5.3 +32.5 
Urban 
 
26.9 -23.6 7.7 -23.8 3.1 -22.5 
Capital (UB) 
 
21.9 -37.8 6.3 -37.6 2.6 -35.0 
Aimag Centres 
 
34.9 -0.9 9.9 -2.0 3.9 -2.5 
(b) By region 
West 
 
47.1 +33.8 12.8 +26.7 4.7 +17.5 
Highland 
 
46.6 +32.4 13.6 +34.7 5.3 +32.5 
Central 
 
30.7 -12.8 8.4 -16.8 3.3 -17.5 
East 
  
46.7 +32.7 14.9 +47.5 6.6 +65.0 
Ulaanbaatar 
 
21.9 -37.8 6.3 -37.6 2.6 -35.0 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NSO (2009) 
Clearly, poverty in Mongolia has a sizeable spatial dimension. In general, poverty is 
concentrated in rural areas; its incidence (on all three measures) is lowest in the capital city, 
close to the national average in urban areas outside Ulaanbaatar, and high in rural areas.  
There is also evidence of a core-periphery pattern with the central region (in addition to 
Ulaanbaatar) recording far lower levels of poverty (its Headcount is some 13 per cent lower 
than the average).  The non-core regions have broadly similar Headcount ratios (of around 47 
per cent – see block b, column 2), but there is some variation in the secondary measures.  
Underlying these patterns is the concentration of economic activity in the mining, service and 
construction sectors in the central regions.  Troublingly, in spite of better productivity in 
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agriculture and considerably milder winters in recent years, poverty remains very high in the 
countryside.  
Table 4.9 provides a similar presentation for household characteristics – specifically, the type 
of dwelling (block a), household size (block b) and the gender of the head of household (block 
c).  Again substantial variations against national averages are evident (columns 3, 5 and 7). 
Table 4.9:  Poverty aggregates by household characteristics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Category 
 
 
Headcount 
ratio 
(%) 
Variation 
on 
national 
(%) 
Depth 
(% of 
mean)  
Variation 
on 
national  
(%) 
Severity 
(squared 
gap) 
Variation 
on 
national 
(%) 
(a) Dwelling type: 
Ger 
 
48.8 +38.6 14.6 +44.6 5.9 47.5 
House 
 
32.6 -7.4 8.6 +14.9 3.3 -17.5 
Apartment 
 
8.5 -75.9 2.2 -78.2 0.9 -77.5 
Other 
 
44.3 +25.9 12.9 +27.7 4.7 17.5 
(b) Household size: 
1 
 
8.9 -74.4 1.7 -83.2 0.5 -87.5 
2 
 
13.4 -61.9 2,9 -71.3 1.0 -75.0 
3 
 
21.8 -38.1 4.9 -51.5 1.6 -60.0 
4 
 
30.3 -13.9 7.8 -22.8 2.8 -30.0 
5 
 
38.6 +9.7 10.8 +6.9 4.1 +2.5 
6 
 
47.8 +35.8 14.5 +43.6 5.9 +47.5 
7 
 
53.6 +52.3 18.1 +79.2 8.0 +100.0 
8+ 
 
69.0 +96.0 24.8 +145.5 11.5 +187.5 
(c) Gender of Head of Household 
Male 
 
35.3 +0.3 10.0 -1.0 4.0 0.0 
Female 
 
34.7 -1.4 10.3 +2.0 4.2 +5.0 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NSO (2009) 
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Referring first to the data presented for dwelling type (see block a), poverty incidence is 
lowest for apartment dwellers where the Headcount is some 76 per cent below the national 
average (column 3). In contrast, Ger residents and those with non-traditional homes 
experience very much higher levels of poverty; here the respective Headcounts are 38.6 and 
25.9 per cent higher than the average.  This is explained by the close correspondence between 
dwelling type and location; apartments and houses are the mainstay of urban housing, whereas 
Gers predominate in rural areas.  The household size data reveal a familiar pattern of rising 
poverty as the number of family members rises.  Each of the measures increases 
monotonically with family size, but the rate and level of deterioration is strongest on the 
Severity measure, which is close to double the national average for the largest families, with a 
variation of 187.5 per cent on the base (block b, column 7).  Averaged sized households 
(around 4 members) experience below average levels of poverty (13.9 per cent lower on the 
Headcount ratio) further suggesting that the poor have distinct demographic characteristics.   
The gender data (block c), in contrast, and counter to expectations, appears to show near 
equality between male and female headed households (the female headed headcount is 
reported as 34.7 per cent and the male headed 35.3 per cent, versus the national rate of 35.1 
per cent).  Although, households headed by women perform marginally better on the 
Headcount, they do worse on the Depth and Severity measures (with variations against the 
national average of -1.4, +2.0 and +5.0 per cent respectively).  This pattern is also at odds 
with qualitative evidence and the past data record, which have suggested significant gender 
differences.  Accounting for this change is difficult, and while some recent policy decisions, 
chiefly the establishment and later universalization of CMP to all families, have directed 
resources to women, other measures such as work force participation rates, are not supportive 
of increased gender equality. 
4.4.3 Inequality 
The level and trajectory of inequality assumes importance within the evaluation of PRS 
outcomes, as inequality represents both a policy target in its own right, and plays an 
instrumental role in securing more pro-poor growth.   This subsection begins by setting out the 
headline data, before investigating (through the use of two standard decomposition methods) 
the relationship between inequality, growth and poverty reduction, and then, its evolving 
147 
 
spatial pattern.   These analyses are employed extensively the comparative appraisal which 
follows in Section 4.5.  
With a Gini coefficient of 0.36, inequality in Mongolia is low by international standards.  
However, as Table 4.10 makes clear, income distribution worsened considerably in the latest 
survey, the Gini coefficient by over 9 per cent and the quintile ratio by 2.5 per cent (column 
8).  The long term pattern of change has varied, however, with the Gini coefficient, for 
example, worsening (increasing) by 12.9 per cent between 1995 and 1998, and then improving 
by 5.7 per cent between 1998 and 2002/03, before deteriorating again (columns 3 and 6).  
Although, the different measures also show variation, the overall trend is, nevertheless, one of 
worsening inequality, and this matches with the empirical literature on minerals dependent 
low income economies (Berry, 2008)74 
Table 4.10:  Summary comparison of inequality measures, 1995 to 2007 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Year LSMS 
1995 
LSMS 
1998 
Change 
% 
LSMS 
02/ 03 
Change 
% 
HSES 
07/ 08 
 
Change 
% 
Gini coefficient 
 
0.31 0.35 +12.9 0.33 -5.7 0.36 +9.1 
Ratio of top to 
bottom quintile 
shares 
5.6 4.9 +11.0 5.4 +10.1 5.6 +2.5 
Income share of 
bottom 30% 
 
12.7 13.7 +8.0 12.9 -6.1 12.7 -1.2 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Povcalnet data (www.worldbank.org/povcal) 
Figure 4.8 provides the Lorenz Curves for the 2002/03 and 2007/08 surveys. These show 
unambiguously that the distribution has worsened across its full range, though the divergence 
is strongest in upper deciles.  The pattern of change reflects a hollowing out of the 
distribution, a feature which has been observed in other transitional economies adopting shock 
therapy type reforms (Birdsall and Nellis, 2002). This finding is echoed in Nixson and 
Walters’ (2006) study of the poverty and distributional impacts of privatization in Mongolia.  
                                                 
74
 This is the standard position, but there is however debate as to the precise correlation between 
mineral dependence and inequality. Ross (2007) provides a useful outline of the various arguments. 
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However, the precise impact of growing inequality on poverty reduction is unclear, and as 
noted, the curves show the deterioration to be less severe in the lower deciles.    
Figure 4.8:  Lorenz curves for the 2007/08 and 2002/03 surveys  
 
Source: author’s calculations based on Povcalnet data (www.worldbank.org/povcal) 
However, the highly peaked nature of the income distribution, depicted in density form in 
Figure 4.9, underlines the importance of changes in inequality, and the likely high elasticity of 
the poverty rate. The proximity of the threshold (MNT 62,484) to the maximum demonstrates 
that a large proportion of the population subsist close to the poverty line, and thus, that the 
proportion made up by the poor is highly sensitive to changes in any of the key parameters. 
Figure 4.9: Estimated density of consumption (2007/08 data) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NSO (2009) and Povcalnet data 
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Much poverty reduction might be gained, therefore, if growth was more distributionally 
favourable.   This implies also that the Headcount is very sensitive to changes in the threshold 
itself.  This has major implications for the accuracy of the techniques employed above to re-
establish a consistent poverty record. 
To investigate these issues further, growth-inequality decomposition exercises were 
undertaken for the three intervals bounded by the four poverty surveys (1995-1998, 1998-
2002/03 and 2002/03-2007/08).   These relied on the methods outlined in Kakwani (1997), 
and identify the separate contribution of growth and distributional change to the change in the 
headcount ratio. These are isolated by differencing actual versus simulated growth-neutral and 
distribution-neutral outcomes, and averaging them from the base and the end positions75. 
Formally, the change in any additive poverty measure (P) between two surveys, specified by 
their means (d, d	) and distributions,specified by their respective Lorenz Curves (e, e	), 
can be decomposed as follows76: 
d	, e	 −  d, e =       
  ½ { gd	, e −  d, e h + gd	, e	 − d, e	h} 
- a Growth Component, plus 
½ { gd, e	 −  d, e h + gd	, e	 − d	, eh}   [4.1] 
- an Inequality Component  
The POVCAL simulation software (referred to Footnote 68) is used to simulate the zero-
growth and distribution-neutral Headcounts, which can then be differenced in line with the 
formula above, to quantify the respective effects.  As noted, this requires a consistent 
longitudinal poverty series, and therefore, the data generated in the previous subsection, and 
not the published results, are used as the basis of the analysis for the second and third 
intervals.  For consistency, and to avoid unnecessary complexity, the lower threshold 
scenarios are adopted in both cases77.   
                                                 
75
 Kakwani's (1997) method is preferred over that of Datt and Ravallion (1992) as it avoids a residual 
term. 
76
 This formal specification is taken from McCulloch and Baulch (1999) 
77
 The PAP re-pricing option is used as the base data for the second interval. 
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Table 4.11 reports the summary results of the decomposition for all three periods, full details 
of the method and data are provided in Appendix M. The table lists the separate impacts of 
growth on the Headcount in the first column, changes in inequality in the second, and the 
overall actual change (the net of the two effects) in the third column.  The rows represent the 
impacts, first, in terms of the change in the Headcount ratio, and second, as a ratio of the 
growth component.  Thus the latter indicates the extent to which the inequality effect has 
boosted or retarded the poverty reducing potential of growth. Referring to the latest (2002/03 
to 2007/08) interval, the data show that the substantial growth-driven fall in the Headcount 
over the five year period (column 2), was offset by a sizeable worsening of inequality (column 
3).  Had the distribution remained the same the (re-estimated) Headcount would have been a 
full 3.4 population percentage points lower, representing some 19 per cent of the potential 
reduction (block a, column 3).    
Table 4.11: Decomposition Estimates for Mongolia 
1 2 3 4 
 Growth 
effect 
Worsening 
Inequality effect 
Overall change  
[% change on base] 
(a) 2002/03  – 2007/08* 
Change in Headcount -17.7 +3.4 -14.3 [-39.6%] 
As a % of the growth effect  100.0 19.2 80.8 
(b) 1998  – 2002/03* 
Change in Headcount -6.7 +0.2 -6.5 [-18.3%] 
As a % of the growth effect 
 
100.0 3.0 97.0 
(c) 1995  – 1998 
Change in Headcount -1.9 +1.2 -0.7 [-1.9%] 
As a % of the growth effect 100.0 63.2 36.8 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NSO (various years). See Appendix M for further details. 
Note: Asterisked data are based on the preferred re-estimation scenarios (i.e. the lower poverty lines). 
However, as these have separately been calculated, the changes cannot be chained together. 
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The data for the earlier 1995-1998 and 1998-2002/03 intervals show that distributional 
changes have had an ongoing negative impact (retarding potential poverty reduction by 3 per 
cent and 63 per cent respectively - see column 3).  This pattern echoes theoretical and 
empirical accounts of economies with similar structural characteristics, chiefly the dominance 
of the mining sector and the rapid transition strategy (Stiglitz 1999; Berry, 2008).  Moreover, 
the wider pro-poor growth literature has suggested that inequality effects will become more 
significant as incomes rise and rapid deteriorations in distribution can become self-reinforcing 
(Lipton, 1997). 
Several contributions to the national literature have highlighted the importance of migration, 
and of geographic variations in economic opportunities, to growing inequality in the overall 
size distribution (World Bank 2006; ABD, 2008d). These questions are also discussed in 
relation to geographical variations in the poverty rate (see 4.4.2 above).  Therefore, the level 
of spatial inequality (the variation across groups and geographical areas), and any changes in 
the pattern between the two most recent intervals, was also investigated.  Table 4.12 provides 
the position at, and the changes between, the two surveys in terms of the Gini coefficient 
(columns 2, 3 and 4) and the Theil index (columns 5, 6 and 7).   
Table 4.12: Gini and Theil measures for administrative domains (2007 versus 2002/3)78 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Administrative category Gini 
02/03  
Gini  
07/08  
Change 
% 
Theil  
02/03  
Theil  
07/03 
Change  
% 
National  0.33 0.36 +9.1 0.18 0.23 +27.8 
Rural 0.31 0.32 +3.3 0.17 0.19 +11.8 
Soum Centres 0.32 0.35 +9.4 0.17 0.22 +29.4 
Countryside 0.31 0.30 -3.3 0.16 0.16 -0.0 
Urban 0.33 0.36 +9.1 0.18 0.23 +27.8 
Ulaanbaatar 0.33 0.36 +9.1 0.19 0.23 +21.1 
Aimag Centres 0.32 0.34 +3.0 0.18 0.20 +11.1 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NSO (2009), Table 1.6, page 21. 
                                                 
78
 Uses the Theil index (GE=1) and is based on decile groped data – see Appendix O. 
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Referring to the fully decomposable and, therefore, comparable Theil index, several points 
can be made.  First, in 2007/08 levels, there is a clear divide between the more unequal 
distribution in Ulaanbaatar (with a Theil index of 0.23) and the other domains (Theil indices 
ranging between 0.16 and 0.22); and between the towns (Soum centres have a value of 0.22 
and Aimag centres 0.20) and the relatively equitable countryside (with a Theil index of 0.16).  
Indeed, inequality grows monotonically with the degree of urbanization. The pattern in levels 
is also reflected in the Gini data and Lorenz curves for each of the Strata for the 2007/08 
survey, though the Gini is rather more stable than the Theil data.  Second, referring to the 
changes on 2002/03; the survey data show both convergence within the settlement strata, and 
a divergence between countryside and other domains (column 7).  The overall effect is one of 
worsening inequality, of which town versus countryside variations are the major component.  
It is also important to note that there has been a break with the more traditional urban-rural 
split in evidence during the early transition.  This is driven, in part, by the rapid growth in 
inequality within rural towns (the Soum centres).  
Figure 4.10: Estimated Lorenz curves by administrative domain (2007/08 data) 
. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NSO (2009) 
The trends and patterns in inequality were further investigated through the application of 
standard spatial decomposition techniques.  These methods attribute a portion of total 
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and to the within groups component, the inequality which exists over and above the mean 
differences between groups.   This achieved by partitioning the data and estimating the 
inequality at group level and then, across the partitioned groups.  The procedure requires that 
the inequality measure is fully decomposable, and commonly a member of the generalized 
entropy (GE) class is employed.  Here (y) represents income or consumption, (n) the 
population size and (c) the GE parameter, which reflects the sensitivity of the measure to 
inequality at the lower end of the distribution. 
9jF = jkj  

l ∑  
n 
ȳ !
jl − 1$          [4.2] 
Formally, the between group (Ib) and within group (Iw) components can be estimated for a 
population (n) made up of (j=1, 2..k) mutually exclusive groups (such as locations) as given 
below, where the income share of each group is (vj) and the population share (fj)79. 
 = o + p           [4.3] 
o = ∑ qr  j srj 9Artru         [4.4] 
p = jkj  v∑ srtru  
ȳw
ȳ
!j − 1x       [4.5] 
The empirical approach adopted here, and outlined in full in Appendix O, makes use of the 
Theil measure where the GE parameter is set at 1 (i.e. the Theil index).    
 9 =    l ∑  ln
n 
ȳ .
n 
ȳ ! l         [4.6] 
The analysis, which follows in Table 4.13, employs the standard Mongolian administrative 
strata.  In line with the above, the between (and spatial) component is given by calculating the 
Theil Index based on the respective group means weighed by the group population shares. The 
within component is given by the consumption weighted sum of the group coefficients.  The 
underlying data are sourced from the 2007/08 and 2002/03 surveys. The full calculations are 
set out in Appendix O (NSO, 2006 and 2009). 
  
                                                 
79
 This derivation relies on the discussions in Shorrocks and Wan (2005) and Litchfield (1999). 
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Table 4.13: Spatial decomposition of inequality 2007 versus 2002/ 2003 
1 2 3 4 
Theil Coefficient   2002/03 HSES 2007/ 08 LSMS Change % 
Between group (or spatial) component 0.008 0.034 +325.0 
Within group component 0.174 0.209 +20.1 
Total 0.182 0.243 +33.2 
Spatial component as a % of total 4.4% 14.0% n/a 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NSO (2009) 
The results given in the table suggest that there has been a substantial increase in spatial 
inequality between the two survey dates:  the between group component rises to 0.034 
(column 3) from 0.008 (column 2), representing a change of 325 per cent on the base figure 
(column 4).  Moreover, its share of total inequality increases from 4.0 per cent in 2002/03 to 
12.1 per cent in 2007/08.  Although a spatial component of this size is not unusual by 
international standards, the level of change is striking.  As the strata level data (given in 
Appendix O) illustrate the divergence between Mongolia’s metropolitan core, especially its 
capital city, and the rest of the country is a major causal factor.   Driving this is likely to be the 
unbalanced nature of the growth process, rooted in minerals extraction, and an associated 
concentration of rents and asset price inflation in the core areas.  The worsening distribution 
within Soum centres is more difficult to account for, but field study interviewees attributed 
growing rural inequality to greater variations in livestock holdings and the emergence of a 
rural entrepreneurial class80.        
Finally, it is interesting that these trends, like the basic inequality data, indicate an accelerated 
deterioration since 1998.  This is, to an extent, also mirrored in the poverty aggregates. 
Moreover, the decomposition analysis showed that growing inequality is now limiting the 
scale of poverty reduction.  There is a danger that these dynamics, which are rooted in the 
economy’s dependence on minerals extraction, may become self-reinforcing (Berry, 2008). 
Although the situation is far from Bhagwati’s characterization of immiserizing growth, the 
economic gains of the recent economic expansion are clearly not being shared equitably.  
                                                 
80
 Evidenced during field studies - interviews at the USAID supported rural livelihoods project 
suggested wealthier herder families are increasingly located in district centres and taking over rural 
business services.  
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4.4.4 Social Outcomes 
Broad measures of social outcomes, like those for poverty post 1998, paint a rather positive 
picture of the Mongolian transition. As Figure 4.11 demonstrates, which plots the five yearly 
values of a comparable series of the UNDP’s composite development metric, the Human 
Development Index (HDI), improvement has been underway from the mid 1990s after the 
initial recession had abated81.  The HDI has risen year on year since 1995, and by 9.7 per cent 
over the ten year period from 1995 to 2005.  It is worth noting that Mongolia also benefited 
from the revised purchasing power parity adjustment (PPP) applied by the World Bank in 
2008 to GDP per capita data on the basis of the 2005 USD relativities. The restated values for 
the most recent years are depicted by the broken line in Figure 4.11. 
Figure 4.11:  Mongolia’s HDI 1985 to 2005  
 
Source: UNDP on line HDR data (http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/) 
Note: Broken line represents post-PPP adjustment HDI values 
More recent annual data for the HDI, given in Table 4.14, which disaggregates the index into 
its primary components, show that adult literacy (ranging from 97 to 98 per cent) and life 
expectancy (ranging from 64 to 64 years), given in the first and second rows of the table, have 
                                                 
81
 The HDI is a composite index produced annually for all member countries of the United Nations by 
the UNDP. It has three equal components: Income (given by the logged PPP value of GDP per capita), 
Education (a weighted average of school enrolment ratios and the adult literacy rate), and longevity 
(given by average life expectancy).  Each of the components is expressed as a sub-index in terms of 
progress between a base and ceiling value (usually defined by the best and worst performing 
countries). These sub-indices and the HDI are standardized to a value between 0 and 1 (with a higher 
value indicating better performance). Given its construction, and the use of a logged value for income, 
the Index is non-linear, and the relative impact of the three components varies with the level of 
development. A full discussion of the calculation approach is provided in UNDP (2009). 
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been relatively static over the most recent five years.   Although, educational enrolment rates 
have made some contribution to the overall improvement, the key factor has been GDP 
growth (growing by 7.6 per cent in 2003 and 10.0 per cent in 2004).  It is worth noting that the 
2006 GDP value (which shows a 27 per cent increase), and therefore the HDI for that year, 
rely on the revised PPP adjustment and are not comparable.   
Table 4.14:  HDI and its components 2002 to 2006 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 2002 
(change) 
2003 
(change) 
2004 
(change) 
2005 
(change) 
2006 
(change) 
Life 
Expectancy 
63.7 (n/a) 64.0 (+0.5%) 64.5 (+0.8%) 65.9 (+2.1%) 66.3 (+0.6%) 
Adult 
Literacy 
97.8 (n/a) 97.8 (0%) 97.8 (0%) 97.8 (0%) 97.4 (-0.4%) 
Combined 
Enrolment 
Ratio 
70.0 (n/a) 74.0 (+5.4%) 77.0 (+3.9%) 77.4 (+0.5%) 79.0 (+2.0%) 
GDP per 
capita (PPP 
USD) 
1,710 (n/a) 1,850 (+7.6%) 2,056 
(+10.0%) 
2,107 (+2.4%) 2,887 
(+27.0%) 
Overall HDI 
 
0.668 (n/a) 0.679 (+1.6%) 0.691 (+1.7%) 0.700 (+1.3%) 0.720 (+2.8%) 
Source: UNDP data (http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/) and author’s calculations  
A more disaggregated account of performance, based on the MDG targets, sourced from the 
UNDP funded reporting framework, reveals a mixed pattern of gains and losses.  Progress is 
measured in terms of the attainment of midpoint values (at 2006/07) towards the final goals 
(at 2015).  As shown in Table 4.15, the authors of the report estimate that of the 24 goals 
within the Mongolian MDGs:  4 have, or will be, achieved early (column 1a), 10 will be 
achieved by the target date (column 1b), 3 are judged as slow (column 2a) and 10 to have 
regressed (column 2b).  Overall, therefore, progress can be described, at best, as being below 
the original planning expectations.  
Alternatively, if the first two categories are defined as On Plan and the latter two as Off Plan, 
as Table 4.15 illustrates, the picture improves somewhat with progress against the planned 
trajectory splitting 58 per cent positive, to 42 per cent negative.  However this rather neglects 
the varying importance of individual goals and the variation in levels of performance.  Indeed, 
it is apparent that many of the goals identified as being Off Plan are some of the most 
significant – including the poverty level, the proportion of people living in unsanitary 
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conditions and net enrolment in primary education.  It is worth noting, however, that the 
national authorities have listed the poverty goal as lagging on the basis of the published 
aggregates, whereas the re-estimated data (given at 4.4.2) suggests far better progress.  
Table 4.15: Summary of Mongolian MDG performance 
1a 1b 2a 2b 
On Plan Off Plan 
Achieved Likely to be achieved Slow Regressing 
Female - Male ratio 
in secondary 
education 
Prevalence of 
Underweight Children 
Reduce the poverty 
level by half 
Net enrolment in 
primary education 
Children covered by 
measles 
immunization 
Female-male ratio in 
primary education 
Female to make ratio 
in tertiary education 
Pupils starting grade 1 
who reach grade 5  
Infant mortality  Percentage of women 
candidates in elections 
Proportion of 
population living in 
unsanitary conditions 
Literacy 16-24 
Under fives mortality  Maternal Mortality rate  Women employed in 
non-agricultural sectors 
 
Percentage of birth 
deliveries attended by 
skilled personnel 
 Percentage of women 
elected to parliament  
 
Death rates associated 
with TB 
 Incidence of TB 
 
Percentage of TB 
cases diagnosed and 
treated with DOTS 
 Percentage of land area 
covered by forest 
 
Caron dioxide 
emissions 
  
 
Percentage of 
protected land 
  
 
Percentage of 
population with access 
to safe water 
  
  Source: GOM (2007) with author’s adaptations 
It is also important to recognize that the analytical methods employed in the MDG progress 
report rely only on linear trends in projecting future outcomes. This is problematic for two 
reasons; first, because policy inputs tend to have a stronger initial effect on social indicators, 
which subsequently diminishes; and second, forward projection without reference to 
causation, is necessarily of limited value, as changes in related variables may overwhelm any 
trend evident in past data.   
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The analysis is on stronger ground in providing evidence of poor sectoral performance where 
several indicators exhibit the same trend. Such evidence is still more convincing when this is 
corroborated by external data, and this is the case in two specific areas. The first is education, 
where three of the targets are shown as worsening (literacy, primary enrolment and dropout 
rates) and one as slow (female to male ratios in higher education82).  These deteriorations are 
each substantial and these results match anecdotal accounts and qualitative evidence on access 
to schooling and educational quality (NSO, 2006).  Questions over education policy choices 
have also been raised by a variety of actors: the World Bank on secondary schools in rural 
localities; NGOs and local governors on the quality of schooling in Ger areas; and the UNDP 
over the vocational training system (ADB, 2009; UNDP, 2008).  The second area relates to 
public health outcomes. TB incidence and the continued prevalence of non-sanitary conditions 
underline that Mongolia faces serious health challenges.  Moreover, qualitative evidence 
suggests these issues are bound up with the large migratory flows to the peri-urban areas of 
the central cities (ADB, 2008d).  It appears that while considerable resources have been 
expended, and with some success on previously lagging outcomes (notably maternal and 
infant mortality)83, performance against targets associated with the quality of the public 
environment has worsened.   
4.5 Counterfactual Appraisal of PRS effectiveness  
This section provides a comparison-based appraisal of Mongolia’s post-PRS adoption 
performance.  It does so through the use of two counterfactual comparisons: a with versus 
without approach where outcomes are contrasted with those of similar countries; and a before 
versus after appraisal, based on Mongolia’s experience either side of adoption.  It is, however, 
useful to begin by noting that the identification of a counterfactual for policy analysis is 
necessarily difficult and neither approach offers a perfect benchmark.  This section does, 
nevertheless, aim to provide as close an account, as is possible, of the PRS’s value added. 
4.5.1 With versus without comparisons  
This approach, which seeks to examine actual outcomes against those which would have 
occurred without the given policy instrument, most closely replicates the conditions of a 
                                                 
82
 The gender ratio MDG target for primary education is reversed to reflect greater female participation.  
83
 Maternal health was identified as a priority and received specific attention in the PRS (GOM, 2003) 
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controlled experiment and is, therefore, the more favoured option within the policy analysis 
literature.  However, such comparisons are often the most difficult to operationalize since 
there is no clear analogue for a specific country’s performance over a specific period of time.  
In the following, Mongolia’s economic and poverty reduction outcomes are tracked against: a 
set of comparator country-group averages; its two neighbours and major trading partners, 
Russia and China; and that of Kazakhstan, the only proximate country with a similar 
economic structure.  It is accepted that this selection is necessarily problematic, due to the 
difficulties of providing a comparison against Mongolia’s highly specific characteristics.  
Moreover, it is important to emphasize the role played by specific non-programme factors on 
individual country performances, most notably in Mongolia’s case, the rapid expansion of the 
mineral sector from 2003/04 onward.  This timing also presents problems, since given a lag of 
two to three years following adoption, any PRS impacts would emerge concurrently.    
Figure 4.12 charts Mongolia’s annual per capita economic growth rate since 2001 (the year 
the I-PRS was adopted). Although outcomes have been consistently better than the low 
income country (LIC) average, performance has been varied (with Mongolia’s annual growth 
ranging from 2 to 9 per cent). This is less impressive when compared against others, and 
especially, China and the East Asian regional average.  However, in 2004, per capita output 
outstrips all of the comparators (at 9.1 per cent) except for China (at 9.4 per cent), and in 
2007, Mongolia’s annual growth rate (at 9.2 per cent is above those of the other two minerals 
dependent economies within the group, Russia (8.4 per cent) and Kazakhstan (7.7 per cent). 
Figure 4.12: Annual per capita growth performance versus comparators (2001 to 2007) 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on WDI data accessed via ESDS (www.esds.ac.uk) 
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As the cumulative presentation in Figure 4.13 shows, Mongolia has the weakest overall 
performance except for the LIC average - rising by only 48 per cent on the base year versus: 
China (up by 77 per cent) , Kazakhstan (up by 67 per cent), the East Asian average (up by 63 
per cent) and Russia  (up by 53 per cent).  It is worth emphasizing that this occurs in spite of 
the very rapid expansion of the minerals sector after 2003, and peak global prices for 
Mongolia’s primary exports in the latter years.  There is, nevertheless, a suggestion of better 
relative performance at the end of the period.  Yet, clearly, this cannot convincingly be 
attributed to PRS adoption. 
Figure 4.13: Cumulative growth performance versus comparators (2001 to 2007)  
 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on WDI data accessed via ESDS (www.esds.ac.uk) 
An examination of the comparative poverty and inequality data shows a more positive picture.  
Drawing on the specially constructed panel dataset of national poverty data developed for the 
analysis reported in Chapter Three, Table 4.16 provides annualized percentage changes in 
comparator averages for PRS and Non-PRS countries, alongside the respective Growth 
Elasticity of Poverty (GEP) statistics.  To recap, this is a pooled dataset of 83 country episodes 
of varying lengths during an interval of 12 years. The PRS group (of 26 countries) is 
indentified where a PRS has been in place for at least two years.  These are compared against 
Mongolia’s post adoption performance, taking the 2002/ 03 LSMS data as the baseline. 
Encouragingly, Mongolia’s poverty record, on the basis of the re-estimated data (the preferred 
option given in 4.4.2), is very favourable.  Referring to column 2, poverty reduction in 
Mongolia (an annualized reduction in the headcount of -9.6 per cent) ranks above the global 
sample average (-3.34 per cent); well above that for the non-PRS country group (-2.89 per 
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cent); and somewhat above that of the adopting group (-4.33 per cent).  It is worth noting, 
however, that these figures rely on the preferred re-estimated scenarios, and if performance is 
assessed on the basis of the published data (an annualized reduction of -0.5 per cent) the 
comparative picture is very different.    
Table 4.16: Comparative poverty and inequality data for Mongolia (post PRS adoption) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 Average annualized % change in:   
Average 
Growth 
Elasticity of 
poverty 
(separately 
calculated)   
National 
Headcount 
 
Gini 
coefficient 
 
Income or 
Consumption 
per capita 
Mongolia (02/03 - 07/08) 
Preferred re-estimate 
[Published data 
 
-9.6 
-0.5 
 
+1.82 
+1.82 
 
6.81 
+2.79 
 
-1.02 
-0.16] 
Pooled PRS countries  (02 -07) -4.33 +0.21 +4.18 -1.00 
Pooled non-PRS countries (96 - 07) -2.89 +0.28 +2.13 -1.61 
All sampled countries (96 - 07) -3.34 +0.26 +2.77 -1.41 
Source: Author’s calculations based on re-estimated data  
The growth data (given in column 4) are also very positive for Mongolia, with the increase in 
per capita consumption (based on the re-estimated scenario) running at 6.81 per cent per 
annum post-2002.  This is well above the comparative rates given (with the sample average of 
2.77 per cent per annum). However, it must be underlined that these are not fully comparable 
as the group averages rely on SNA as opposed to survey data. 
In contrast, the distributional outcomes are poor (see column 3). Mongolia experienced a 
significantly higher percentage annual deterioration in the Gini coefficient compared with 
each of the group averages (1.82 per cent versus a worsening of a mere 0.26 per cent for the 
global sample).  This somewhat explains the mismatch between the relatively high levels of 
growth and the more moderate reductions in poverty.  This poor comparative performance is 
replicated in the data for the Growth Elasticity of Poverty (GEP), which offers a measure of 
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the responsiveness of the poverty rate to growth84.  The figures given in column 5, based on 
the re-estimated poverty level, show Mongolia’s GEP to be only -1.02 versus a global average 
of -1.41. However, this figure is still close to the average GEP for the PRS adopting group (at 
-1.00).  Overall, the data confirm the findings of Section 4.4 that the recent growth, although 
poverty reducing, would have been more pro-poor had the distribution not deteriorated. It is 
worth noting that GEP for Mongolia’s published poverty data is strikingly low at -0.16. 
Some qualification of the above findings is however necessary, as two comparability 
problems arise in matching the Mongolian data record with the pooled dataset.   First, there is 
a timing issue. The pooled averages represent annualized changes for poverty episodes of 
varying lengths over a 12 year interval from 1996.  In contrast, the Mongolian series runs 
from 2002/3 to 2007/08.  As global economic growth was higher in the later years, and given 
the majority of the poverty reduction episodes included within the pooled dataset come from 
the earlier years, the comparators’ performance may be underestimated.   Second, there is a 
sample selection issue.  The averages rely on 57 poverty reduction episodes for non-PRS 
countries and 26 episodes for PRS countries.  The groups also vary widely, including low and 
middle income countries from different regions of the world.  Closer examination of the data 
reveals substantial variation within each of the measures and each of the comparator groups, 
and clearly, the quality of the comparisons suffers as a result.   
4.5.2 Before versus after PRS-adoption comparisons 
This subsection builds on the examination of the post-PRS period provided in Section 4.4, but 
offers a more focused longitudinal comparison by applying a series of pro-poor growth 
diagnostics to the three episodes given by Mongolia’s four poverty surveys.  The first two of 
these (1995 to 1998 and 1998 to 2002) fall in the pre-PRS period, and the third (2002/03 to 
2007/08) the post-adoption period.  It is useful to recap the key poverty and inequality trends 
and fit these within the three episode framework, allow for the variations in episodes’ lengths 
(by providing annualized percentage changes) and to map out the different versions of the 
longitudinal record.  These data are provided in Table 4.17 and the supporting calculations are 
given in Appendix L.   In reviewing the data it is, again, important to underline that, although 
                                                 
84
 Note that the GEP data is calculated separately and then averaged, and therefore the quoted 
statistics do not reconcile the group averages for poverty and income changes.  
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both sets of revised results rely on the lower poverty line, they cannot be chained as the series 
is not continuous.    
Table 4.17: Annualized changes in base data by poverty reduction episode  
1 2a 2b 2c 3 4a 4b 
 Official Poverty Record 
 LSMS/ HIES (NSO 1999, 2005, 2009) 
World 
Bank 
Revision 
Re-estimated by this 
study 
(See Appendix L) 
Change in variable 95-98                  
Ann. % 
Change 
98-02/03                    
Ann. % 
Change 
02/03-07/08 
Ann. % 
Change 
98-02/03 
Ann. % 
Change 
98-02/03 
Ann. % 
Change 
02/03-07/08 
Ann. % 
Change 
Headcount -0.65 +0.31 -0.50 -3.86 -4.38 -9.60 
Depth +2.39 -1.36 -1.69 - - - 
Severity +5.27 -3.82 -3.17 - - - 
Gini  +4.13 -1.37 +1.82 - - - 
Average  
consumption  
+0.40 +6.00 +2.79 +3.75 +2.77 +6.81 
Memo: Econ.  
Growth 
+2.09 +1.65 +7.25 +1.65 +1.65 +7.25 
Source: NSO (2004 and 2009), World Bank (2006), IMF on line resources (accessed 2009) and 
author’s calculations (see Appendix L) 
Referring first to changes in the poverty level, as before, the pattern varies between the 
official and revised data records.  According to the official account (columns 2a to 2c), the 
Headcount is stagnant throughout the full period.  In contrast, the World Bank’s revisions to 
the 1998 survey data (column 3) imply that poverty falls substantially in the second episode 
(an annualized reduction of 3.86 per cent).  Alternatively, if the re-estimated data presented in 
this thesis are accepted (columns 4a and 4b), the reduction begins in earnest in the second 
episode (an annualized -4.38 per cent) and accelerates in the third (an annualized -9.60 per 
cent).  The Depth and Severity measures are reported on the basis of the official record only.  
The Depth worsens in the first, by an annualized 2.39 per cent (column 2a) but then improves, 
by 1.36 per cent per annum in the second (column 2b) and improves by a further 1.69 per cent 
in the third episode (column 2c).  The Severity measure follows a similar trend, but shows 
larger annual changes; an increase of 5.27 per cent in the first, followed by declines in the 
second and third episodes of -3.82 and -3.17 per cent respectively.   
164 
 
The Gini data also rely on the published record (however, the coefficient should be invariant 
to revisions to the underlying data)85.  Its pattern of change replicates that described in sub-
section 4.4.3. There is a deterioration in the initial period of 4.13 per cent per annum, which 
moderates in the second episode with an improvement of 1.37 per cent per annum, and 
worsens in the third by 1.82 per cent per annum (again given in columns 2a, 2b and 2c).   
The data for the growth in consumption, which serve as a proxy for income and hence, 
economic growth, were also subject to major revisions. The published record shows weak 
annualized growth of 0.4 per cent in the first episode, followed by a substantial increase of 6.0 
per cent in second, and 2.79 per cent in the third episode (columns 2a, 2b and 2c).  The World 
Bank’s revision of the 1998 data brings consumption growth in the second episode down to 
3.75 per cent per annum (column 3). The adjustments reported in this thesis cut this back to an 
annualized 2.77 per cent, but also increase the rate in the third episode to an annualized 6.81 
per cent (columns 4a and 4b).  Table 4.17 also records, as a memo item (in the final row), the 
annualized per capita economic growth rates and clearly there is a considerable variation on 
the consumption-based data, moreover, there is closer match with the re-estimated results. 
Reaching a decision on the overall trends is difficult, and any findings depend greatly on 
whether the revisions to the post-1998 record are accepted.  This also applies in judging 
whether there is any evidence of a PRS adoption benefit.  While the World Bank’s account 
rather disputes any PRS-related gains, showing the largest reductions in poverty take place in 
the second (and immediately prior to adoption) episode, the published record, and the re-
estimated data presented in this thesis, show a clear improvement in the post-adoption years.  
Similar findings can be made in relation to growth (in consumption), both the official and 
World Bank data show no clear PRS improvement. In contrast, the data re-estimated by this 
thesis, and the SNA economic growth data, show a considerable improvement in the post-
adoption (2002/03 – 2007/08) episode.   
A further limitation faced is the inability of crude before-after comparisons to account 
effectively for concurrent non-policy events, and crucially, in Mongolia’s case, the emergence 
of the minerals-based economy, and its very rapid expansion in the post PRS period.  Standard 
pro-poor growth analyses offer some means of dealing with this problem, by isolating the 
                                                 
85
 The Gini coefficient is defined by the area between the Lorenz curve) and normalized to a value 
between 0 and 1, as such it is invariant to changes in the mean.
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impact of the growth and distributional impacts, and a number of these metrics are reported 
below. It is important to note these require a consistent poverty series, and therefore the re-
estimated poverty data is employed throughout86.   
Recalling material presented in the previous section, the results of the growth-inequality 
decomposition exercise are given in Table 4.18 below.  This presents the separate growth and 
inequality components for changes in the Headcount. The columns refer to three episodes and 
the rows the magnitudes of the two effects, given by their impact on the Headcount. The final 
row, details the inequality effect as a proportion of the growth effect. Overall, the data in 
Table 4.18 show that reductions in poverty have throughout been driven by growth in incomes 
alone, and that distributional changes have consistently moved against the poor.  Worsening 
inequality offsets the gains from growth by 63.5 per cent in the first episode (column 2), by 
3.0 per cent in the second (column 3), by 19.2 per cent in the third (column 4).   The 1998 to 
2002/03 results are particularly noteworthy, revealing an offsetting inequality effect even 
though the Gini coefficient (a measure depicting the entire distribution) actually improves.  
Table 4.18:  Growth-inequality decompositions of poverty change 
1 2 3 4 
Effect 1995 – 1998 
 
1998 - 2002/03  
Re-estimated 
2002/03 – 2007/08 
Re-estimated 
Growth Effect  
(% change on base) 
-1.9  
(-5.2%) 
-6.7  
(-18.8%) 
-17.7  
(-48.9%) 
Inequality Effect  
(% change on base) 
+1.2  
(+3.3%) 
+0.2 
(+0.6%) 
+3.4  
(+9.3%) 
Total Change in Headcount  
(% change on base) 
- 0.7  
(-1.9%) 
-6.5  
(-18.2%) 
-14.3  
(-39.6%) 
Inequality effect as a % of the 
growth effect 
63.2% 3.0% 19.2% 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NSO (2004, 2009) and World Bank (2006); see Appendix M 
Coming to a view on the impact of PRS adoption on the basis of these data is difficult.  
Clearly, while the inequality effect worsens in the final episode, the absolute level of poverty 
reduction increases dramatically.  Judgment here is likely to be conditional on the definition 
                                                 
86
 In both cases: the strong assumptions are made within the re-estimation exercise (see Appendix L 
for full details), and in the first case specifically, there is a poor fit with external data, especially those 
for economic growth.  
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of pro-poor growth.  As discussed in Chapter Two, this is a matter of controversy within the 
established literature.  Two basic positions exist: those who hold to what has been termed the 
Strong position - that growth is only pro-poor where it disproportionately benefits the poor 
(implying that growth must be accompanied by distributional improvements); versus others 
who hold to the Weak position, that pro-poor growth is any growth that is poverty reducing, 
regardless of its distributional impact.  Here, while the post-PRS period is highly pro-poor 
from the weak view, it fails the distributional requirement of the strong view. 
Further insights on the extent to which growth has favoured the poor are provided by the 
calculation of a series of pro-poor growth statistics.  These measures, which were introduced 
in Chapter Two, gauge the potency of growth for poverty reduction. The Mongolian data are 
reported in Table 4.19, the three episodes are given in the columns, and the results are listed in 
the rows.  The calculations are based on the re-estimated poverty data and decomposition 
analysis given in Section 4.4. The calculation bases and the interpretation of the metrics were 
outlined in some detail in section 2.4.1.  A full set of supporting calculations for the Mongolia 
is provided at Appendix L. 
Table 4.19:  Pro-poor growth statistics pre- and post-PRS adoption 
1 2 3 4 
Statistic 
 
1995 – 1998 
Published 
98 - 02/03 
Re-estimated 
02/ 03 – 07/08 
Re-estimated 
Growth Elasticity of Poverty 
-Total  
- Partial (inequality held constant) 
 
-1.65 
-4.47 
 
-1.40 
-1.43 
 
-1.02 
-1.25 
Pro-poor Growth Index (PPGI) 0.37 0.98 0.81 
Poverty Equivalent Growth Rate (PEGR) +0.4% +12.8% +31.6% 
Memo items 
Reduction in the headcount rate (%) 
Total growth in mean consumption (%) 
 
-1.93 
+1.20% 
 
-18.26 
+13.08% 
 
-39.61% 
+39.03% 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Note that the re-estimated data have been calculated separately for the two episodes, and are not 
therefore are comparable and cannot be chained.  Further details are provided at Appendix N  
Each of the metrics is reviewed in turn.  The data for the two variants of the GEP suggest that 
poverty in Mongolia has become less responsive to growth as time has progressed. Reading 
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across the first block of results: total growth elasticity falls from 1.65 in the first episode to 
1.02 in the third episode; and the partial elasticity from 4.47 to 1.25.  It is also instructive that 
there is some variation between the full and partial measures reflecting the substantial 
offsetting inequality effects.   The data also show that the post-PRS episode is little different 
from the immediately preceding period.  
The Pro-Poor Growth Index (PPGI), as a ratio of the two elasticities, indicates the extent to 
which growth’s poverty impact has been weakened by deteriorations in the distribution.  The 
results data reflect a generally similar trend to the GEP statistics.  However, the second 
episode with a value close to unity (0.98) appears somewhat more pro-poor than the third (and 
post-PRS) episode (with a value of 0.81). 
The Poverty Equivalent Growth Rate (PEGR) represents the growth rate consistent with the 
actual level of poverty reduction had no change in the distribution taken place.  In essence, it 
discounts (or augments) the actual growth rate for the impact of any changes in inequality.    
Following the definition provided in 2.4.1, it can be interpreted from the Strong position by a 
comparison with the actual growth rate, or from the Weak position, simply by is magnitude.  
The PEGR results for the three intervals generally ranks the third (and post-PRS) episode as 
being the most pro-poor.  The recorded PEGR of 31.6 per cent (column 4) is considerably 
higher than the other two periods.  However, the variation on the actual growth rate (provided 
as a memo item on the final row of the table), is proportionally smaller in the second (pre-
adoption) episode.  
Overall judgments on the specific PRS impact on the basis of the various statistics are (again) 
rather dependent on the position taken within the definitional debate.  From the strong 
perspective, the pro-poor growth statistics tend to reflect a process which is only mildly pro-
poor in the post-adoption years.  Although the data for the first episode are considerably less 
favourable, those for the period immediately prior to adoption are generally better.  From the 
Weak position, the record is far more positive, with the post-PRS data showing very high 
reductions in the Headcount, although this is countered by evidence that this trajectory of 
change had already been established prior to adoption. 
Graphical tools offer an alternative, and potentially more informative, means of assessing the 
different poverty impacts in that they depict the entire distribution.  Growth Incidence Curves 
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(GICs) map the percentage increase (or decrease) at different levels of consumption between 
two survey dates. Thus they depict the pattern of winners and losers across the distribution. 
GICs for the three episodes bounded by Mongolia’s’ poverty surveys are provided in Figure 
4.14.  The curves are based on the re-priced decile midpoints of the survey data for the first 
episode, and the estimated midpoints for the second and third.   
Although somewhat crude due to their reliance on decile data and the re-estimated results for 
the second and third intervals, the three curves presented trace out the three very different 
distributional patterns.  The shape of the first episode’s GIC (the continuous line) is consistent 
with post transition economy experiences elsewhere, in that the pattern favours the upper 
deciles (eight and above), and shows growing differentiation in incomes. The curve for the 
second episode (the dotted line) is starkly different and depicts an unusually pro-poor pattern 
of change. The first two deciles perform well, while the middle income groups receive low, 
and in the eighth and ninth deciles, negative, rates of growth.  Such a characterization runs 
counter to expectations.  The third curve (the dashed line) is positive throughout its range and 
appears to show a hollowing out of the income distribution with the very poorest (decile one) 
and very richest (deciles nine and ten) receiving increases above the median. Although there is 
some precedent for such a pattern, the magnitude of the gains to the lower deciles is unusual87. 
Figure 4.14: Growth incidence curves for the three survey episodes  
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NSO (2004 & 2009), and World Bank (2006) 
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As with the pro-poor growth metrics, it is difficult to reach definitive conclusions about the 
impact of PRS adoption on the basis of the GICs, and again the definitional question matters 
considerably.  From the Strong position, account must be taken of the entire distribution 
relative to the gains or losses accruing to the poor.  Clearly, the second (and pre-adoption) 
episode most closely approximates a pro-poor growth process.  This pattern appears to be 
sustained to some extent in the third, but the gains to the poor are less marked.   From a Weak 
position, the key criterion of success is the impact on the range covering those below or close 
to the poverty line, and the magnitude of the change.  Here the post-adoption GIC dominates 
those of the first and second episodes. However, it has to be recalled that these periods 
although similar, are not of equal lengths.   
Overall, the two counterfactual approaches provide some evidence of an improvement in 
performance following PRS adoption. However, the strength of this evidence varies between 
the two approaches, and is dependent on the position adopted within the pro-poor growth 
debate. Indeed, while the with-without comparisons found that there is only a mild PRS gain 
above comparator averages; the before versus after appraisals offers far stronger support 
(albeit based on the weak definition of pro-poor growth). However, the presence of non-policy 
factors, specifically the concurrent expansion of the minerals sector, rather questions the 
substance of any post-PRS improvement.  It must also be emphasized, that much of the 
supporting analyses suffers from having to rely on a very questionable longitudinal record.  
This is specifically because the latter two episodes rely on crude simulations to provide a set 
of comparable poverty data, and it is worth recalling that the official published record shows 
no real change in the poverty rate for the entire period from 1995.   
4.5.3 Discussion: Matching outcomes to policy choices 
This final subsection aims to link the analysis above to the policy discussion provided in 
Section 4.3, and thus it critically examines the causal relationship between PRS adoption and 
the pattern of outcomes.  Two distinct issues are confronted:  first, whether the policy stance 
articulated in the PRS can be fitted to the empirical record; and second, whether that policy 
stance was actually implemented, and therefore, can be cited as causing any changes.  
The discussion of the policy content of Mongolia’s PRS (Section 4.3) can be summarized 
three ways.  First, at the macro level, the stance was little different from the existing approach, 
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favouring a rapid transition based on the maintenance of economic stability, and in the real 
sector, further liberalization and privatization.  Second, there was some general re-focusing of 
policy on poverty built on a more elaborate growth strategy, including greater public 
investment in infrastructure and at the periphery limited activist measures (including regional 
policy and proposals to manage the Tugrik’s trade-weighted value).  Third, attention was to be 
given to redistribution through basic social welfare safety nets, and better health and education 
provision.  Summarizing the pattern of outcomes described above (accepting the re-estimated 
poverty record); the Headcount ratio falls dramatically prior to adoption and this continues in 
the PRS years; and the period also saw a significant deterioration in inequality. Analysis also 
shows this was accompanied and driven by accelerated economic growth rooted in the 
expansion of the minerals sector.  
A comparison of these two summaries shows there is very little in the way of a causal pattern. 
While it might conceivably be argued that the focus on stability, and that the liberal trade 
regime, fostered the mining-based expansion, from a counterfactual perspective, it is very 
difficult to ascribe the poverty impacts to the PRS.  The limited measures to broaden 
economic activity outside of the core sectors, and its geographical concentration, appear 
largely to have failed.  There was little industrial development outside of the mining sector, 
and spatial variations in economic activity have worsened (ADB, 2009).  Rather, the estimated 
high reductions in recent years are the by-product of an unbalanced growth process, which is 
progressively being limited by growing overall and spatial inequality (Marshall et al, 2008).   
It is possible, however, to discern some peripheral impacts of the limited pro-poor elements of 
the PRS.  These include a greater general awareness of poverty alleviation in the conduct of 
policy, the direct interventions in health and in education, and the roll-out of the initially 
means-tested CMP.  The health measures can be matched with falling infant and maternal 
mortality rates. Educational enrolment rates have at least stabilized and the CMP may explain 
somewhat better gender and rural outcomes in the 2007/08 survey data88.  Additionally, 
although it is very difficult to identify any clear impact on the overall poverty level, field 
studies suggested some positive impacts of policy (specifically via infrastructure spending) on 
agricultural incomes, alongside the emergence of some basic provision for the most poor. Yet 
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 The rural impact is made clear in the tables in section three; the 2007 survey data also showed a 
narrow differential between poor male and female headed households. 
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equally, in spite of limited reforms, the welfare budget remains poorly allocated and Mongolia 
continues to lack a system of anti-poverty transfers (ADB, 2009). Moreover, the 
universalization of the CMP, the across the board increases in pensions and salaries, and the 
proposed minerals wealth windfall payment indicates that policymakers’ instincts are far from 
pro-poor.   
In relation to the second consideration – the extent and quality of implementation - two major 
points are worth making.  First, the economic appraisal given in 4.4.1 illustrates that 
regardless of the articulated commitment to macroeconomic stability, outcomes in recent 
years have been very different.  The annual CPI reached close to 40 per cent during 2008, and 
this inflation which took place during a period of dollar weakness, has led to a real terms 
appreciation of the Mongolian Tugrik, and in turn, growing external imbalances, which have 
favoured asset prices and limited employment opportunities.  The recent stop-go cycle of 
fiscal expansions, driven by populist spending and tax measures, followed by monetary 
contractions have also been potentially damaging for output and the poor.  With regard to the 
few progressive elements of the policy mix, such as the competitive management of the 
exchange rate and regional policies, there is little evidence of any real implementation. 
Second, as the review of the conduct of policy in the post adoption years given in Section 4.3, 
and field-based studies, underline, the PRS structures were never fully accepted within the 
decision making process. The national planning framework which replaced the PRS is now 
moribund (ADB, 2009).  Several of the field interviewees suggested that the PRS was 
progressively identified within official circles as a mechanism for engaging with the IFIs (and 
specifically the World Bank) rather than the primary planning tool it was intended to be.  It is 
possible to trace its decline, and in parallel, the significance of poverty reduction within policy 
circles, to the fiscal improvement driven by the minerals boom and the associated weakened 
bargaining power of the IFIs.   
It is worth re-iterating that the minerals boom also decisively altered Mongolia’s political 
economy, rewarding the political elite, as well as driving growth in average incomes. Over 
time, poverty reduction became a peripheral rather than a mainstream political concern.  The 
mining sector’s much heralded future expansion has also served to divert attention away from 
securing more balanced growth. Indeed, for some policymakers the attainment of developed 
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country levels of income seems to be viewed as a fait accompli.   The advent of the global 
recession in 2008/09 and the recurrence of Dzud conditions in early 2010 raise serious 
questions about the potency of poverty and inequality as political issues.  Yet, thus far, these 
appear to have made little headway in the national political discourse.   
4.6 Conclusions 
Mongolia was selected as a case study for examining the effectiveness of the PRS framework 
on a number of bases.  First, it was identified is an adopting country with an apparently high 
quality longitudinal poverty series dating back to 1995.  Second, it had been reported as 
something of a PRS success story by the World Bank.  Third, the clarity of its pre-existing 
policy stance rooted in a radical version of shock therapy offered an ability to read the impact 
of policy change from outcomes. 
On closer inspection, however, several of these advantages were found to be more claimed 
than real. With regard to the poverty record, this chapter has documented serious 
comparability problems.  These failures, which relate to survey methods and the consistency 
of the poverty threshold, have necessitated the restatement of the published data.  A lack of 
transparency has hampered these efforts, with the result that the re-established data can only 
be described as approximating the underlying trends.  It is also troubling that these are 
dramatically different from the published results, with the official record suggesting there has 
been little change over the fifteen years since 1995, whereas the revised record suggests there 
has been a very substantial decline in poverty from 2002/03 onward.  In addition, the outcome 
success claimed by the World Bank is based on their own re-estimated data.   
Setting these challenges aside, a set of conclusions can be made on the basis of the 
(admittedly approximate) reconstructed record and the wider evidence.  These are given 
below in terms of the four core research questions posed by this thesis: whether there is any 
evidence of better post-adoption outcomes; the nature of the PRS policy stance; the influence 
of the IFIs in the development and management of the PRS framework; and the quality and 
extent of implementation.  
In relation to the first question, although it is possible to discern some acceleration in the 
reduction of the Headcount, it is difficult to attribute these, on a counterfactual basis, to the 
adoption of the PRS.  Two arguments support this.  First, the post-2002/03 reduction is of a 
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similar pattern to that experienced in the immediately preceding interval. The decomposition 
analysis and the various pro-poor growth metrics show that reductions have been driven by 
growth alone, and additionally that inequality has continued to offset a proportion of the 
potential gains.  Thus in a strong sense, post-adoption growth has not been any more pro-poor.  
Secondly, and more significantly, the policy template within the PRS has varied little on that 
of the pre-adoption years.  Indeed, the policy changes which can be identified are very much 
at the margin.  The poverty reduction model, if one can be discerned, is rooted in a 
trickledown process from the minerals sector.  It is, nevertheless, difficult to be definitive.  A 
key countervailing argument is that the PRS, through better programming of output 
supporting public investment, obtained more rapid growth in mining output.   However, it is 
also the case that the modest increase in infrastructure spending was in place prior to adoption, 
and moreover this was enabled by the release of concessional finance, rather than orchestrated 
by the PRS.  
This usefully leads on to the second consideration - that of the impact of the PRS framework 
on the policymaking process and the nature of the choices made.  In overall terms it is 
apparent that the official stance has remained avowedly orthodox in character. The 
macroeconomic focus is one of securing price stability within a transition strategy of 
liberalization and further privatization.  In spite of some marginal proposals within the PRS, 
no real concessions were made to structural change objectives or strategic trade measures.  It 
is possible, to identify some greater commitment to public provision (in health, education and 
social welfare); especially as post-PRS ODA, and later minerals tax receipts, became 
available.   Yet even these proposals remained narrow and short lived, and were seen within 
official circles as forming part of the effective PRS conditionality.  
In addition, there was some initial change in attitudes around the time of adoption towards 
viewing poverty as a general policy concern, and there was a drive to address particular 
welfare issues.  However, official interest in social sector reform, and poverty overall, waned 
as the minerals boom accelerated.  Indeed, it is possible to construe the EGSPRS and the 
structures established in 2003 as the high watermark of pro-poor policymaking.  Since then, 
the PRS framework has fallen into obsolescence d.  The waxing then waning of poverty 
reduction as a major policy theme is best understood in terms of the country’s evolving 
political economy and the shifting patterns of economic power.  If there is a legacy of the PRS 
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it is twofold:  that concessional finance was used to support some growth supporting 
infrastructures; and that poverty survey and statistical capacity was built within the NSO.     
Third, it can be concluded that the IFIs, especially the World Bank, were absolutely central to 
the development and maintenance of the PRS, and, to an extent, policy was externally tutored 
and highly regulated.  However, contrary to the usual expectations, the PRS framework in 
Mongolia’s case constrained decision makers to a more pro-poor stance than would have 
emerged in its absence.  This is substantiated by the nature of transition strategy which was 
largely unconcerned with poverty and inequality, and the re-emergence of populist policies in 
recent years.  It can be argued that the few distinctly pro-poor impacts that can be identified – 
for example better health outcomes and child support - stem from a lack of national 
ownership, not the reverse.  Moreover, that the IFIs served as something of a counterweight to 
the emergent political economy pressures.  Additionally, although there is some limited 
evidence that the process produced better fitted choices at the margin, there is very little to 
show that consideration of a wider set of alternatives ever took place.  It is difficult to gauge 
whether this was because national actors were not pre-disposed to less orthodox ideas, or 
whether the very heavy external supervision served as the effective constraint. It seems likely 
that both played a role, with the latter reinforcing the path-dependency which had developed 
early in the transition.   
The final question concerning the quality of implementation is rather easier to resolve. The 
PRS was never fully accepted by Mongolia’s policymakers nor was it institutionally 
embedded.  Politicians and officials alike primarily saw the document and the associated 
framework as a requirement for obtaining finance from the World Bank and retaining access 
to the PRGF.  Thus the EGSPRS was an act of policy ventriloquism.  Yet the IFIs, for their 
part, both failed to address these perceptions, and the weak institutional basis which allowed 
for the easy abandonment of the PRS.  Ownership was never really secured, and often, other 
frameworks, particularly the MTEF took precedence. In time, the PRS fell into abeyance - 
precisely because national policymakers no longer faced any incentive to maintain it, both as 
the economy grew and the relative power of its IFI backers receded.     
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CHAPTER FIVE:  VIETNAM’S COMPREHENSIVE POVERTY REDUCTION AND 
GROWTH STRATEGY (CPRGS) 
5.1 Introduction 
This second case study examines Vietnam’s experience of the PRS process. Its objective is to 
test at the country level, the four core research questions identified by this thesis.  This is 
achieved via an appraisal of outcomes, and the impact of the PRS on national policymaking 
and implementation.  The evidence draws on independent research and analyses, and on a 
field mission carried out in August 2007 (a full list of interviewees is provided in Appendix 
A).  Vietnam was, in part, chosen due to its distinctive transition strategy and clear policy 
signature. Its approach, emphasizing gradualist change, represents a near mirror image of 
Mongolia’s rapid shock therapy reform programme.  In addition, the presence of a detailed 
data record, comprising five internationally-compliant household surveys over a period of 
fifteen years, provides a sound basis for quantitative analysis.  Vietnam has also been 
identified, by a number of commentators, as a having an exemplary poverty reduction record. 
The chapter follows a similar four-part structure to that adopted in the preceding case study.  
It begins by reviewing the national context and the transition strategy.  The second section 
traces the development of Vietnam’s PRS, the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction Strategy 
and Growth (CPRGS), paying specific attention to the impact on the pre-existing policy stance 
and the relationship between the government and the international financial institutions (IFIs).  
The third part then reports on post-adoption economic and social outcomes.  The fourth and 
final section provides a counterfactual appraisal of the PRS and its supporting structures and 
relates outcomes to the policy choices made.  
5.2 National context 
Vietnam’s geography is defined by its 2,000 mile long coastline, running from southern China 
to the gulf of Thailand.  As a result, the country has two climatic zones with the temperate 
areas of the north progressively giving way to the tropical climate of the south. This 
geographic separation, which was once a political reality, is further strengthened by the 
presence of the two major river deltas at opposite ends of the country – the Red River in the 
North and the Mekong in the far south.  These areas provide the mainstay of the country’s 
agricultural land and are adjacent to its two principal cities.  The central coastal region is also 
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important in terms of agricultural output, but is less developed. Vietnam’s peripheral and 
poorest areas are the remote uplands, the northern and central highlands. These are also where 
the various ethnic minority populations (excluding the Chinese) are predominant.  The 
majority of the country’s sizeable population, some 87 million people, reside in the coastal 
zones, with the highest densities found in the two deltas and in the cities of Hanoi, Ho Chi 
Minh and Da Nang.  The country’s strategic location in the heart of Southeast Asia (see 
Figure 5.1) has ensured a long and chequered involvement in geopolitics.   
Figure 5.1: Map of Vietnam within Southeast Asia 
 
Source: CIA World Fact Book (www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ ) 
A history of struggle, both external and internal, is a defining feature of Vietnamese identity, 
and a central plank of the communist-nationalist ideology of Ho Chi Minh.  The political 
authority of several institutions, not least the Vietnamese Communist Party, draws on a 
tradition of self reliance and indigenous opposition to external influence (Stern, 1994).  This 
value set includes a deep commitment to social cohesion and stability, which has its roots in 
both the socialism of Ho and the country’s pre-colonial history (Salomon, 2007; Van Arkadie 
and Mallon, 2003).  It is possible also to construe the State as serving a paternal function 
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within national life, and this is highly relevant in understanding official perspectives on 
poverty and social exclusion (Craig and Porter, 2006). 
Like its northern neighbour, the Peoples Republic of China, Vietnam has remained a one-
party state while pursuing a vigorous, but highly phased, transformation to a market-based 
economy.  The Communist Party has maintained its authority throughout the transition, and 
political stability accompanied by progressive change, has been a central theme of 
contemporary national politics.  However, the Party has not ruled Vietnam within a vacuum, 
and interest-based pressures, both inside and outside its cadres have been highly significant in 
shaping policy responses and driving the pace of change.  Indeed, the initial Doi Moi 
(renovation) reforms were partly a product of political tensions arising out of economic 
hardships, particularly food shortages (Stern, 1994).  Moreover, as many commentators note, 
the pre-existing Vietnamese communist state was only ever weakly centralized89.  Economic 
activity in the South was never fully collectivized and informal production outside the 
planning framework was an important facet of the economy.  The State was never able to 
assert itself in the manner of the Soviet model. Deeply rooted cultural attachments to 
household land tenure and resistance from the pre-reunification order (in the South), ensured 
that central planners were forced to orchestrate rather than dominate the economy.  In 
addition, remoteness and poor communications and inadequate infrastructure enforced a high 
degree of administrative decentralization (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003).  Nevertheless, by 
the 1980s State control over the macro-economy was virtually complete, and close to 
complete within the modern industrial sector. Its control over agriculture and household 
output varied; influence was exercised through a mixture of indirect controls and purchasing 
mechanisms (Murray, 1997).   
The Doi Moi reforms were initiated in 1988 under the premiership of the reformist General 
Secretary Nguyen Van Linh during a period when the authorities faced the threat of political 
instability arising out of food shortages and accelerating price inflation90.  The reforms aimed 
specifically to address the failures of more partial reforms which had gone awry by the mid-
                                                 
89
 Sourced from an interview with Jonathan Pincus (then Country Economist at UNDP Vietnam in 
August 2007) and draws the discussions in Van Arkadie and Mallon (2003) and Stern (1994). 
90
 An extensive discussion of the early Doi Moi years is given in Stern (1994) and Fforde and Vylder 
(1988). 
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1980s. However, it is also important to recognize that, as Van Arkadie and Mallon (2003) 
note, there was also some continuity with the pre-1988 reform process91. Additionally, Weeks 
(1997) finds the prior reforms played an important role in supporting the initial stabilization 
efforts.  Doi Moi is generally translated as renovation but conceptually is closer to renewal, 
and encapsulates the modernization themes evident in the contemporary transition strategy.  
The reforms had two near term objectives: to stabilize the macro-economy, and within the real 
sector, to stimulate agricultural production (the primary source of the political tensions of the 
time).  The measures included vesting land usage rights in households and permitting the 
establishment of household enterprises.  This programme took place alongside an initial fiscal 
and monetary tightening, and incorporated a hardening of the budget constraint faced by State 
Owned Enterprises (SOEs). As Figure 5.2 shows, these policy responses succeeded fairly 
quickly in boosting output, with annual growth running at around 6 per cent in the late 1980s. 
It is however important to recognize that the stabilization programme was atypical 
incorporating both a policy tightening and direct government interventions to expand the 
productive capacity. Two key dimensions were the exploitation of off-shore oil and a 
considerable expansion of agricultural exports, chiefly rice production, with exports rising 
from zero in 1988 to over US$ 400 million in 1992.  As Weeks (1997) observes it was the 
adept phasing of policy which allowed stabilization to take place within an expanding 
economy. Moreover, he argues the strong supply response had been facilitated by the pre-Doi 
Moi organizational and production reforms.  Indeed, paraphrasing Fforde and de Vylder 
(1988), Vietnam prevailed not by getting prices right, but by enabling prices to matter 
(Weeks, 1997, page 102). 
The collapse of the CMEA in 1991, following the effective demise of the Soviet Union, 
consolidated both the political support and the economic rationale which underpinned the 
reforms.  It is striking that even with the loss of managed trade, the impact of paying for 
imports in hard currency, and the implicit Soviet subsidies, growth accelerated to around 9 per 
cent per annum until the onset of the East Asian crisis in 1997/98. 
  
                                                 
91
 Van Arkadie and Mallon (2003) describe the prior reforms in terms of an experimental stage - 
leading to, and necessitating, the adoption of the Doi Moi agenda.  Weeks (1997) regards them as 
more significant in supporting the supply response during the initial stabilization phase of Doi Moi. 
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Figure 5.2: Vietnamese GDP and per capita GDP 1989 to 2007  
 
Source: World Bank WDI data base accessed via ESDS http://www.esds.ac.uk/ 
Of equal importance was the meta-level signal conveyed by Doi Moi - that the relationship 
between state and economy and the rules mediating economic behaviour had changed 
decisively. From this point, Vietnam embarked on the wholesale re-orientation towards – in 
the language of the authorities - “a socialist-orientated market capitalist economy” (SRV, 
2002, page 35).  Vietnam’s economic reforms, which the following section reviews in more 
detail, can be characterized in terms of a process of gradual deepening punctuated by 
accelerations to overcome key constraints. But it is also one where issues of equity were taken 
very seriously. Debate however, rages over whether these commitments, especially to those to 
the poor, have weakened with time, and the extent to which they were motivated by necessity 
or ideology92.  Equally, significant themes in this rapid but phased, development strategy have 
been extensive expansion in the industrial sector, and intensive modernization of productive 
capacity within agriculture and light manufactures93.   
                                                 
92
 The commitment to equity was most apparent in the distribution of formerly collective assets 
(especially agricultural land), but remains evident in the level of public provisioning to remote areas 
and ethnic minority groups.  See discussion in Conway (2004) on the political pressures. Field 
interviewees offered varying accounts of the importance of ideology.  Nguyen Thang, Head of VASS 
(interviewed in August 2007) describes a socialist orientation as being firmly embedded in political 
attitudes; others saw it as more fragile.   
93
 The potential contradictions of these themes has been recognized by some commentators, 
Jonathan Pincus, for example, doubts the effectiveness of extensive growth objectives pursued in new 
areas such as ship building (personal interview 2007). 
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In addition, it is important to note that formal reforms have often run in parallel, and at times 
behind, socio-economic and informal institutional changes.   By the mid 1990s something of a 
dynamic process had developed.  Indeed, it is hard to identify the direction of causation of a 
series of administrative and policy changes, with reforms relating to matters such as property 
rights and local governance amounting to a codification of practices and informal institutional 
arrangements which had already emerged (Steer and Sen, 2008).  
With time, Vietnam’s political economy has become somewhat more fluid, with new 
economic, and to a lesser extent, new political interests emerging.  These have included 
agricultural landowners, both small and large scale capitalists and powerful local 
bureaucracies.  Several of these interests cross the boundaries between public and private 
sectors, with agents from within the organs of the State, chiefly local administrations and the 
armed forces, becoming capitalistic owners in their own right.  Although, the openness of the 
political system and competitive forms of government have developed to a greater degree than 
in China, change has still been exceptionally limited.  The bureaucracy has become more 
technocratic, while non-party and quasi-party, institutions, notably the National Assembly, 
have assumed some prominence, and thus state structures have become corporatist in 
character (Salomon, 2007). Nevertheless, the Communist Party remains the primary 
instrument of policymaking and its central committee has continued to exercise effective 
executive authority.  The decisive political structure remains the five year cycle of party 
congresses, updated by annual plenary meetings.  In the economic sphere these are reflected 
by the matching cycle of five yearly Socio-Economic Development Plans (SEDPs) within a 
longer ten year planning framework. These represent the modern incarnation of Vietnam’s 
former central planning mechanism.  The SEDP codifies medium term objectives and frames 
decision making based on the ten year goals given by the ten year strategy (SRV, 2006).  It is 
also apparent that the state bureaucracy, especially at the higher levels, is highly capable and 
technically skilled (Van Arkadie & Mallon, 2003).    
However, providing an effective account of how policy originates within the Party, the 
structures which support it, and importantly, its interface with the State, is very difficult.  
Western writers, while acknowledging the substance of the Party’s role, and to an extent, the 
quality of the choices made, provide little in the way of real insights.  It is clear, however, that 
the Party ultimately draws its power from its popular legitimacy, from its historic role in 
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opposing external forces and in developing post-war social welfare, but latterly, also in 
securing economic expansion (Holmes, 2007; Koh, 2007).  Additionally, its ability to arbitrate 
between competing interests, where necessary, through the use of patronage, is significant94.  
Defining the relationship between party and state is equally difficult, and although there have 
been disputes over their separation, it is still accurate to refer to the two as a single political 
complex. 
External accounts of the performance of the Party-State can roughly be separated into two 
groups: a set of critical contributions rooted in orthodox perspectives and the new institutional 
economics, which essentially view the Party as maladapted and corrupt (see Holmes, 2007; 
and Koh, 2007); and a second, more empirically-based group which offer political economy 
and alternative institutional explanations (see Stern, 1994; and Conway, 2004).  The first set 
tends to apply prior conceptions to the limited evidence available, and cite the lack of 
transparent and formal accountability as evidence of dysfunctional governance. Yet these 
accounts are unconvincing in that they are forced to ascribe the emergence of Doi Moi, and 
indeed the subsequent level of economic growth and social stability, as incidental to the 
strategic choices made by the Party.  Instead, they either identify the causes of the economic 
expansion as being rooted in adaptation and a pre-communist institutional value set with 
official policy choices playing no active role (Murray, 1997; Kim, 2008)95; or that the positive 
trajectory of reforms was the outcome of a series of expediencies forced on a corrupt elite 
facing a legitimacy crisis (Holmes, 2007; Koh, 2007)96.  Although these accounts have some 
value, especially the emphasis placed on legitimacy and an inherent opacity, they often fail to 
articulate whom or what is driving these dynamics, or what has sustained the generally 
positive set of policy decisions. However, it is also important not to romanticize the Party.  
                                                 
94
 Evidence of what Van de Walle (2005) describes as neo-patrimonial governance (where the state is 
run and dominated by the interests of a corrupt elite) is hard to come by.  Moreover, several field 
interviewees noted that although the state had permitted key insider groups to obtain rents, these were 
effectively controlled, and to an extent, orchestrated (interviews with Pincus and Thang). 
95
 The contribution by Kim (2008) is novel in fusing New Institutionalist perspectives with social 
cognition theory to provide some explanation of why state action was not the primary driver of 
economic transformation.  
96
 Conway (2004) also provides a less ideologically coloured discussion along these lines. Quoting 
McCarty (2002), Conway argues that key policy decisions were often crisis driven. 
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Corruption and elite capture are important issues in latter day Vietnam, and are likely to be 
increasingly so as the Party’s authority is challenged by newly emerging interests97.   
The second group, which accepts that the evidence is more nuanced, generally views the 
Party-State as a framework of relations in which conflict between different political and 
regional factions takes place (Salomon, 2007).  Stern (1994), who provides a detailed 
examination of the political economy of the early Doi Moi period, describes the Party in terms 
of a hot house in which debate between reformists and conservatives raged, ultimately with a 
group of cautious reformers winning out.  Conway (2004), in commenting on the role of the 
PRS and the later transition, notes that an effective central leadership has skilfully used 
internal and external resources to secure and accelerate reforms.  However, these accounts are 
also inadequate in explaining the forces, incentives and causal processes which have sustained 
the Doi Moi process.  Field studies suggest that, although the Party is far from transparent and 
the level of functionality varies between localities, its structures are more responsive than 
western writers give it credit for. Local Party representatives are accountable to local 
communities and the leadership to the quinquenial party congresses.  The opening up of the 
National Assembly to non-party interests has also helped to bolster the level of accountability.  
Although the constituency in favour of disestablishing the Party from the State has now been 
sidelined, there is evidence of a growing separation of duties, with the former driving policy 
and the latter becoming more technocratic. The Party is also highly socially embedded - in 
enterprises in both the private and public sectors, and in a series of national non-governmental 
institutions, notably, the Fatherland front98.     
5.3 The PRS and the policy stance 
It is within this opaque environment that this thesis aims to gauge the impact of PRS-adoption 
on Vietnam’s policy stance and on socio-economic outcomes.  This section begins by 
examining the transition strategy and the pressures which have shaped it.  This is followed by 
a discussion of the adoption process and execution within the context of the established 
approach.  Finally, attention is given to more recent developments.  
                                                 
97
 Based on field research – interviews with Jonathan Pincus (July 2007) and Brian Van Arkadie 
(October 2007). 
98
 Interviews with Jonathan Pincus (UNDP) and Nguyen Thang (VASS), August 2007 
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Transition scholars typically describe Vietnam’s generic approach in terms of a highly phased 
gradualism drawing on the Chinese model.  Yet such accounts neglect important nuances.  At 
times the approach has been rapid, for example in relation to macroeconomic policy in the 
early stages, experimentalist with regard to property rights, and gradualist in relation to state 
ownership and trade liberalization.  As Van Arkadie and Mallon (2003) argue, although 
policymakers have held to a long term vision of an economy where the State remains a 
dominant force, they have exercised a practical orientation, with policy learning and dialogue 
influencing both day to day responses and longer term choices.  Moreover, although China’s 
experience has been important, other influences, especially those of the East Asian 
developmental state are evident, and have become increasingly significant as the transition has 
progressed.  In some areas the strategy has also gone further and taken different paths from its 
peers – for example, in land reform, where private titles are inviolable and fully tradable, and 
in public service delivery which has embraced mixed (public/ private) provision.  It is also 
possible to discern more orthodox influences in recent times, including the advice of the IFIs 
(Nixson and Walters, forthcoming).   
Official documents describe Vietnam’s economic policy in terms of building a modern 
market-based economy with a socialist orientation. The key operational objectives articulated 
in successive post-Doi Moi five year plans are a focus on growth and structural change 
through both liberalization and accumulation (SRV, 2006).  It is possible to identify a state-led 
industrial policy rooted in SOE reforms and the orchestration of sector specific direct foreign 
investment (DFI).  As time has progressed, transitional goals, have increasingly given way to 
broader developmental objectives.  Six key elements of the strategy can be identified:  
 Growth supporting macroeconomic stability – an initially restrictive approach gave way 
to a growth supporting stance (an accommodative monetary and fiscal policy) in the 
1990s.  Policy has, however, when necessary, been cautious, containing inflationary 
pressures when required, and building reserves.  
 Rapid agricultural land reform – one of a triad of early reforms (with macroeconomic 
stability and SOE reform). Vietnam has successfully pursued land reform and the 
realignment of incentives to support an increase in agricultural output.   
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 Permissive private sector development – support has been provided in the institutional 
sphere and infrastructure development to foster the growth of SMEs, initially in the 
agricultural sector, and progressively in services and light manufactures.   
 Asymmetric foreign investment and trade policies – trade policies have promoted 
strategic integration within the global economy, but capital account convertibility has 
(until very recently) been very limited. DFI has been encouraged as a major route for 
securing investment and improved competitiveness, but foreign ownership has been 
regulated.    
 State-led industrial policies - SOEs have remained the mainstay of Vietnam’s industrial 
base albeit with considerable structural reform and some divestiture.  Policy has also 
included equitization (a form of commercialization of enterprises, where the state acts as 
shareholder) and the building of conglomerates in the form of SOE holding companies. 
 Distributional orientation – equity has been an inherent consideration in a number of 
policy areas, including land reform, infrastructure development and public service 
provision.   
Vietnam was an early PRS-adopter, agreeing an interim strategy in 2001, and finalizing its 
Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (CPRGS), the title of its F-PRS, in 
2002.  Yet it must be emphasized that Vietnam is also an atypical PRS country, having a 
strong economic record in the pre-adoption years and sustainable levels of public debt.  
Moreover, the involvement of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in the early 
transition was limited, and in contrast to other PRS countries, it was not the subject of a Policy 
Framework Paper (PFP) arrangement.  Seemingly, therefore, the Vietnamese voluntarily 
selected into the Initiative, and many have argued that this has ensured an unusually high 
degree of national ownership (Conway, 2004).  
Exceptionalism is also evident in the content and tenor of the early PRS documents, and to an 
extent, in the initial approach taken by the IFIs.   In contrast to elsewhere, World Bank TA, 
although offered, was only partly taken up, and more significantly, oversight was exercised at 
arm’s length. Explicit criticism, which typically surfaces as part of the JSA process, was 
muted in spite of serious misgivings, particularly within the IMF (Conway, 2004).  However, 
with time IFI dissatisfaction grew, and moreover, following a long dispute over the conduct of 
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the State Bank of Vietnam (the central bank), the IMF suspended the PRGF arrangement in 
200499.  The World Bank, in contrast, remained generally supportive, but tensions eventually 
surfaced. The relationship between the government and the IFIs is complex and ambiguous. 
The I-PRS is distinguished by its brevity and its highly strategic content (SRV, 2001).  It 
articulates the existing policy agenda but does not set out detailed objectives.  Policy planning 
is limited to communicating the strategy and the preparation timetable for the F-PRS. The 
IFI’s Joint Staff Assessment (JSA) surprisingly says very little on what is essentially an 
unorthodox document that advocates an unorthodox strategy. The staffs confine themselves to 
raising concerns over capacity and capability (IMF and IDA, 2001b). Although lacking detail, 
the I-PRS largely re-iterates Vietnam’s existing policy stance of state-orchestrated 
development, an approach which was criticised extensively in other IFI documents of the 
time.   
The F-PRS published in May 2002 adopts a more standard and lengthy format of six major 
chapters (SRV, 2002). These follow a familiar template: a situation analysis, policy 
discussion, then policy proposals and operational challenges. Yet unusually, it includes a 
section (within the policy chapter) devoted to explaining how the existing post-socialist 
framework (the SEDP) will inform CPRGS (SRV, 2002, pages 67-94). The introductory text 
also explains how the two would operate together, with the PRS described as an operational 
plan which makes the approach given in the SEDP more concrete, and that synchronization 
will be maintained by the Ministry of Planning and Infrastructure (MPI) (SRV, 2002, pages 2-
3).  This explanation is, however, unconvincing, and given the IFI’s ambition that PRSs 
should form the primary planning framework, this represents a major institutional failure. It 
also offers an indication of the relatively weak authority of the PRS.  
The second JSA is more critical, but again its objections are muted (IMF and IDA, 2004).  
Surprisingly, the retention of the SEDP as the primary planning framework is accepted, albeit 
with reservations.  More serious concerns are expressed in relation to the costing of the policy 
proposals and a series of management issues. Notably also, policy objections are made more 
strongly - for example, in relation to the use of discretionary subsidies and taxes. Yet the 
                                                 
99
 The dispute related to the audit of the central bank (a breach of PRGF conditionality). See Vietnam 
News Briefs April 2004 - http://www.saigon.com/pipermail/vnbiz/2004-April/004139.html 
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overall assessment is positive, commending in particular the strong level of national 
ownership, and the CPRGS is endorsed as a sound basis for IFI lending (IMF and IDA, 2004).  
However, an issue not referred to in the JSA, is the often contradictory nature of the CPRGS.  
A defence of the existing policy stance and an (admittedly limited) set of heterodox proposals 
are followed by a mainstream critique of the transition approach.  Moreover, the diagnoses 
and policy proposal articulated by the CPRGS strongly reflect donor concerns, especially 
those favoured by the IFIs.  Moreover, these often contradictory themes, and an alternative IFI 
agenda for Vietnam, are increasingly evident in the three subsequent formal annual progress 
reports (APRs) (SC and IMWG, 2003, 2004, 2005). The tone of the documents also suggests 
that the PRS process, although nationally owned, has an external audience.  In addition, the 
structures established to support the PRS, specifically the Standing Committee and Inter-
Ministerial Working Group (SC and IMWG), and the consultative groups, operate somewhat 
independently of the government and enjoy significant donor inputs.        
Views on the extent to which the PRS has an impact on the content and conduct of policy 
differ greatly. The World Bank provides the most positive assessment, arguing that the 
CPRGS has both transformed the decision making process and secured poverty reduction as a 
policy goal (World Bank, 2004).  Other official reviews of the PRS are more balanced but 
generally favourable. For example CDPR (2004) prepared for DFID, UNDP (2004) and 
UNDPEO (2003) commend the participatory nature of the preparation process, the policy mix 
and the linkages to the existing national planning framework.  However, major criticisms are 
also noted regarding the lack of political endorsement and the ad hoc, “cut and paste” 
approach to policy choice (UNDP, 2004, page 65).  Other independent authors, Conway 
(2004), for example, although more guarded in relation to the policy stance, argue that the 
PRS process has had an impact, in that it has placed poverty and distributional issues on an 
agenda that was previously dominated by economic objectives.  He also finds that the 
consultative apparatus of the CPRGS framework has proved useful, in exposing policies to 
scrutiny and the Party-State to popular pressure.  
In contrast, commentators, interviewed during field studies, were markedly less positive, 
ranging from those who saw the PRS as a donor-government interface, to others who 
characterized it as simply the latest form of IFI conditionality. Indeed, in the words of one 
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interviewee, PRS adoption was “... the cost of doing business with the World Bank”100. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that this Thesis will argue that the relationship between the PRS 
and the pre-existing policymaking framework proved to be entirely one sided, with the latter 
remaining pre-eminent. 
These important questions will be examined in Section 5.5, but an overview of the policy 
milestones, provided in Table 5.1, demonstrates that there was very little change in emphasis 
after the I-PRS was concluded in 2001.   As the Table illustrates, the trajectory of policy in the 
pre-adoption years reflected the well-established phased transition, with initial 
macroeconomic stabilization, followed by institutional reforms alongside progressive price 
and trade liberalization.  The changes in the real sector follow a similarly graded path with 
major agricultural reforms in 1986 and 1988, followed by SME reform and only latterly by 
SOE restructuring.  Tellingly, the years immediately before and after PRS adoption are 
indistinguishable in policy terms.  
The post adoption period sees further liberalization measures, notably the third land law 
enacted in 2003, but the pace is unaltered.  Vietnam also only complies with WTO 
requirements some six years after PRS adoption, indicating the country’s continued 
unorthodox approach to trade policy.  It is also important to recognize that in 2006, the 
authorities decided to absorb the CPRGS within the five year SEDP process.  This 
development was welcomed in principle, but heavily criticized in policy terms by the IFIs.  
The JSAN on the final APR concludes that the SEDP relies too heavily on “state-led 
investment... posing risks for fiscal sustainability” and that it potentially places “ultimate 
poverty reduction objectives in jeopardy” (IMF and IDA, 2006, page 8).  The pattern of 
events appears to undermine the policy centrality that the World Bank has claimed for the 
PRS framework in Vietnam. 
 
  
                                                 
100
 This is sourced from a field interview with Mr Nuygen Thang, Head of the Vietnamese Academy of 
Social Sciences (VASS), in August 2007. 
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Table 5.1: Policy Milestones in the Vietnamese Transition 
1 2 
Date Measure  
(a) Pre- PRS adoption 
1986 Doi Moi reforms announced at Sixth Party Congress – proposals focussed on agricultural 
sector, but the announcement signalled end of the centrally planned economy. Reforms 
are accompanied by a tightening of monetary and fiscal policy.  
1987 Law on Foreign Investment - permits and facilitates DFI; VND de-valued  
1988 Land Law – initial land reform formalizes de-collectivization and allocates user rights to 
households.  Micro (household-based) enterprises are effectively recognized. 
1989 Most production subsidies and quotas curtailed. Commercial contracting recognized. 
1990 Law on Private Business and Companies Law passed – allows for registration of sole 
proprietor and joint stock companies, accompanied by tax reforms  
1991 SOE Reforms implemented – formalization  and  re-nationalization process, followed by 
major restructuring and rationalization   
1992 New Constitution adopted - recognizes property rights in  a “state-managed, market-based 
multi-sector economy with a socialist orientation”  
1993 Second Land Law – allows for trading and collateralization of land titles  
1995 SOE Law – consolidates  practice of equitization and divestiture 
1997 Commercial code approved and establishes economic courts.  
Some re-regulation of imports undertaken. 
1998  Major tariff Reforms – quotas abandoned, tariffs reduced 
1999 Enterprise Law – streamlines existing business regulations  
(b) Post-PRS adoption 
2001 I-PRS adopted; Socio-Economic Development Plan 00-05 launched; US Bilateral Free 
Trade Agreement ratified; constitutional amendments to protect private property rights 
2002 F-PRS adopted, named the Comprehensive Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy; 
Liberalization of labour laws – international firms now permitted to hire locally. 
2003 Third Land Law improves trading of land; Amended SOE Law solidifies divide between 
state and management (via the equitization model101) and hardens budget constraint  
2006 WTO Accession completed – trading rules made fully compliant.  
SEDP 2006-2010 replaces and incorporates the CPRGS,   
Sources: Van Arkadie and Mallon (2003), Hoang et al (no date), World Bank (1999 and 2004)  
                                                 
101
 Equitization is a state as shareholder model of corporate governance (see Tu Anh, 2005). 
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However, it cannot be denied that the national authorities’ investment in the PRS was 
substantial, the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms were of a high quality, and civil 
society consultations were extensive. The supporting structures also included the building of 
capacity in areas such as statistics, poverty and distribution analysis and social exclusion.  
Moreover, field studies show that these capacities have been maintained and have cross 
fertilized other activities102.  In the final analysis, it is impossible to fully identify the precise 
impact without a detailed examination of outcomes and the identification of the appropriate 
counterfactual case.  These tasks are addressed in the following sections. 
5.4 Economic and Social Outcomes 
This section provides a broad evaluation of the economic, poverty and social outcomes during 
the transition, paying particular emphasis to the years since the PRS was adopted.  The 
primary objectives are to track and analyse changes in income, poverty levels, and, to 
investigate the poverty-growth-inequality dynamics.  This is done using data from Vietnam’s 
five post transition poverty surveys (1993, 1998, 2002, 2004 and 2006) and via the application 
of a series of standard analytical tools, specifically, a growth versus inequality decomposition 
of changes in the poverty level, and spatial analysis of inequality.  These analyses provide the 
greater part of the material for the counterfactual appraisal of post-adoption performance in 
Section 5.5.  
5.4.1 Economic outcomes 
Vietnam’s post transition growth record, like that of its fellow gradualist reformer, the 
Peoples’ Republic of China, has been exceptional.  In stark contrast to the economies of 
central Asia and Eastern Europe, the country has enjoyed successive years of growth without 
any transition recession.  As Figure 5.3 shows, although Vietnam’s expansion faltered at the 
time of the East Asian financial crisis, growth rates recovered quickly and strengthened.  The 
annual overall rate averaged 7.7 per cent, and the per capita rate 6.3 per cent, between 2001 
and 2007. The recent global recession is, however, projected to slow output expansion to 4.7 
per cent in 2009 and a similar figure in 2010 (IMF, 2009b)103.  The drivers of Vietnam’s 
                                                 
102
 A major CPRGS benefit was the establishment of the VHLSS, a biennial sample survey undertaken 
by the GSO.  It is also possible to identify benefits within the NGO sector and in academia.  
103
 Taken from IMF (2009b) but note the ADB’s Updated Asian Development Outlook 2008 (ADB, 
2008a) is somewhat more optimistic about future prospects.  
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growth have varied over time, with agricultural output giving way to a substantial expansion 
in manufacturing.    
Figure 5.3: Annual total, and per capita, growth in the transition period (% change) 
 
Source: World Bank WDI database accessed via ESDS (www.esds.ac.uk) 
As Figure 5.4 illustrates, the stabilization outcomes were equally impressive, the initial 
macroeconomic reforms, involving both a tightening of monetary and fiscal policy, quelled 
inflationary pressures. The GDP deflator fell from around 70 per cent in 1991 per cent to 
below 20 in the space of three years. As noted in Section 5.3, Weeks (1997) finds that prior 
and concurrent State action to improve organizational and productive capacities was also 
central to achieving these outcomes.  Similar success was achieved in 1996 when inflationary 
pressures had re-surfaced after the export sector had expanded strongly from 1994.  The pre-
Doi Moi experiences of hyperinflation, associated with the failure of the more partial reform 
programmes of the 1980s, have cast a long shadow over policymakers, and stability has 
figured strongly.  Nevertheless, as Van Arkadie and Mallon (2003) note, achieving 
stabilization often required quite draconian policy responses and the institutional basis of 
monetary policymaking has remained weak. 
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Figure 5.4: Vietnam CPI and GDP Deflator 1989 to 2007 
 
Source: World Bank WDI database accessed via ESDS (www.esds.ac.uk)  
An additional key constraint throughout has been the need to maintain a competitive exchange 
rate, and this has been driven by Vietnam’s export-led growth strategy supported by DFI and 
remittance inflows.  Although convertibility remains limited, the standard Policy Trilemma 
has been a challenge.  Moreover, these pressures are likely to build as the authorities move 
towards greater external flexibility104.  The post-PRS pattern of outcomes illustrates the 
conflicting pressures at work.  Prices stabilized dramatically in 2000/01 with the CPI turning 
negative, but progressively rose to around 8 per cent per annum in 2007.  Although stability 
has always been a priority, policymakers increasingly took the view that monetary conditions 
should also be permissive of economic expansion. Yet this approach came under severe 
pressure in 2008 when prices spiralled with rapidly increasing input costs, exceptional capital 
inflows, and record levels of government infrastructure spending.   
The balance of payments position, depicted in Figure 5.5, is complex.  The surpluses which 
arose as Vietnam rebounded after the Asian crisis, gave way to a period of manageable 
deficits from 2002 to 2006, followed by exceptional imbalances from 2007.  This latter 
deterioration is bound up with very large inflows driven by the import of capital goods and 
foreign direct investment.  The further removal of tariffs associated with accession to the 
WTO and strong domestic demand for consumer goods also contributed (ADB 2008d; IMF 
                                                 
104 Nixson and Walters (forthcoming) argue that recent moves to permit offshore transactions in VND 
amount to a partial de-control of the capital account.  
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2009b).  The progressive decline in oil production, since the turn of the century, has had a 
longer term effect on the external balance (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003).   
Figure 5.5: Current account surplus or deficit as a percentage of GDP 
 
Source: WDI database accessed via ESDS (www.esds.ac.uk) 
Policymakers have, until very recently, retained strict control over the capital account. The 
Vietnamese Dong (VND) is non-convertible and Vietnam had accumulated substantial foreign 
exchange reserves (USD 23 billion at the end of 2008).   However, these had declined by 
around 35 per cent during 2009, and are reported to be in the region of USD 17 billion, 
equivalent to nine weeks of imports105.  It is also worth noting that moves, undertaken in 
2009, to partially de-control foreign exchange transactions have the potential to undermine 
this effective protection from external instabilities (Nixson & Walters, forthcoming). 
Considerable structural change has occurred during the transition. Figure 5.6, which tracks 
changes in the sector shares of value-added, shows that the initial increase in output driven by 
rapid productive growth in the agricultural sector has been displaced by growth in industrial 
activities.  This was boosted by the discovery of oil in the early 1990s, but has been driven, 
latterly, by an expanding manufacturing sector.  The share occupied by services peaked in 
1994 and has now stabilized. The post-PRS period has seen the consolidation of these trends 
with manufacturing value-added now accounting for over 20 per cent of the total (within an 
industrial share in excess of 40 per cent). It is argued that Vietnam’s movement through the 
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 Vietnam Business News, June 19th 2010, www.vietnambusiness.asia/vietnams-foreign-exchange-
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value chain, and the maintenance of high levels of employment, have been major factors in 
the consistency of poverty reduction (UNDP, 2004). 
Figure 5.6: Sector shares of Value-added 1989-2007 
 
Source: Authors calculations based on the WDI database accessed via ESDS (www.esds.ac.uk) 
In line with its strategic objectives, Vietnam has successfully integrated itself within the 
global trading system.  Exports have climbed progressively from 36.0 per cent of GDP in 
1990 to 76.7 per cent by 2007. This corresponds to a twenty one fold increase in their real 
terms value. These trends have continued in the post adoption years, with the average annual 
increase running at 19.3 per cent (2001 to 2007), versus a pre-adoption rate of 19.6 per cent. 
The composition of exports has, like the wider economy, increasingly come to reflect 
manufactures more strongly.  Significantly, this expansion has been achieved via a distinctly 
heterodox package of trade reforms, with export growth preceding, rather than following, 
liberalization. This has given rise to a lively debate about the policy drivers of its integration 
within global trade.  Views range from the account provided by Van Arkadie and Mallon 
(2003) of Vietnam as a nascent developmental state, to more prosaic Vent for Surplus type 
explanations106.  Nevertheless, it is impossible to deny the importance of the State in deftly 
managing this process.   
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 Interview with Jonathan Pincus, Country Economist , UNDP Vietnam, August 2007 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
%
 o
f 
N
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
V
a
lu
e
-a
d
d
e
d
 
Agriculture Industry Manufacturing (within Ind) Services, etc.
194 
 
Global integration has brought with it vulnerability to external conditions, highlighted during 
the recent economic downturn, and in contrast to the Asian crisis in the late 1990s, many of 
the levers of State control are no longer in place.  External commentators expect economic 
growth to halve to around 4.5 to 4.7 per cent in 2009 and recover to 6.5 per cent in late 2010 
(ADB, 2008a; IMF, 2009b).  Problematically, Vietnam is also exposed to reversals of DFI 
which, although not at the levels seen in those Asian economies most affected by 1997 crisis, 
are substantial.  Moreover, the policy stance has had to perform a rapid volte face, as the 
global crisis followed on quickly from commodity driven inflation in 2008.  Yet the national 
authorities have performed well in this task. The State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) moved to 
loosen monetary policy and widen the currency peg in late 2008, and the government 
announced a stimulus package of between 2 and 3 per cent of GDP. Commentators, notably 
the IFIs, remain divided on the medium term impacts of these actions, but DFI, exports and 
the VND had stabilized in early 2010 (IMF, 2010).  
5.4.2 Poverty 
Vietnam’s General Statistical Office (GSO) has undertaken five high quality household 
surveys in the transition period (GSO, 2008).  Initially supported through the World Bank’s 
LSMS programme, the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS) is now 
undertaken every two years.  As the data in Table 5.2 and the chart in Figure 5.7 illustrate, the 
level of poverty reduction achieved has been exemplary, with the Headcount measure falling 
from some 58 per cent in 1993 to under 16 per cent of the population in 2006 (columns 2 and 
6). This represents an overall reduction of 72 per cent reduction on the base.  It is also 
noteworthy that the reductions in the secondary measures have been stronger, with the Depth 
measure, for example, falling by 83 per cent over the full 13 year period.  It is also apparent 
that the reductions have been maintained throughout the period, though the level of change 
has declined. However, it is important to note that although the source is reliable and fully 
accessible, the Severity measure had to be estimated, as this is not published by the GSO 
(estimated results are shown in italic text in the table)107.  In addition, for domestic policy 
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 Estimated using POVCAL, based on distributional data given in GSO (2008) 
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Table 5.2: Poverty Aggregates from the VHLSS 1993 to 2006
1 
 
Headcount 
Depth 
Severity 
Sources: GSO (
Figure 5.7: Poverty aggregates 1993 to 2006
Source: GSO
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incidences of poverty: their respective 2006 headcount ratios are 5.8 per cent and 8.8 per cent 
(column 4); versus a national rate of 16.0 per cent.  Moreover, urban areas, although suffering 
an increase in the latest survey (column 4) enjoyed dramatically lower levels of poverty - at 
3.9 per cent versus 20.4 per cent for rural areas in 2006.  The Headcount remains highest in 
the most geographically peripheral areas: the North Central Coastland region (29.1 per cent in 
2006), the Central Highlands (28.6 per cent), and especially the Northwest (49.0 per cent). 
These areas also have the highest proportions of Vietnam’s minority populations (excluding 
the comparatively wealthy Chinese minority).  The disadvantaged groups include the Tay, 
Tai, Muong, Khmer, Nung and Hmong, and collectively account for around 12 per cent of the 
population (Kang, 2008).  Several research studies on the spatial pattern of poverty in 
Vietnam confirm that remoteness and ethnicity are covariant drivers of poverty (Kang, 2008; 
VASS, 2006).  
Table 5.3: Poverty Incidence by Region 2002 to 2006  
1 2 3 4 
Category 2002 Headcount 
 
2004 Headcount 
(% change) 
2006 Headcount 
(% change) 
Urban 6.6 3.6 (-83.3) 3.9 (+7.7) 
Rural 35.6 25.0 (-42.4) 20.4 (-22.6) 
Regions:    
Red River Delta 22.4 12.1 (-85.1) 8.8 (-37.5) 
Northeast 38.4 29.4 (-30.6) 25.0 (-17.6) 
Northwest 68.0 58.6 (-16.0) 49.0 (-19.6) 
North Central Coast 43.9 31.9 (-37.6) 29.1 (-9.6) 
South Central Coast 25.2 19.0 (-32.6) 12.6 (-50.8) 
Central Highlands 51.8 33.1 (-58.6) 28.6 (-15.7) 
Southeast 10.6 5.4 (-96.3) 5.8 (+6.9) 
Mekong Delta 23.4 19.5 (-20.0) 10.3 (-89.3) 
Source: GSO (2008)  
However, as Figure 5.8, which disaggregates poverty by region, makes clear, incidence does 
not correlate with the overall numbers in poverty.  Both the Central Highlands and the 
Northwest rank below the more populous Northeast and two River Deltas, in terms of their 
contribution to the total.  Following the standard policy targeting regime followed within most 
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PRSs, which focuses on the Headcount, the anticipated policy response would be to 
concentrate on these core regions.  Yet as noted in Section 5.3, this is precisely what the 
authorities have not done.  Instead, anti-poverty interventions continue to target remote 
regions and ethnic minority populations through a variety of area-based programmes. This 
reflects a deeper commitment to equity and social cohesion.  The data in Table 5.3, however, 
also shows that these efforts are meeting with mixed success.  
Figure 5.8: Rank ordered regional contributions to overall poverty  
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on GSO (2008)  
Analysis was undertaken to test the sensitivity of the poverty level to changes in the threshold 
value.  Using the poverty simulation program, POVCAL, the threshold value was flexed up 
and down by 5 and 10 per cent (column 2), and the poverty aggregates were then re-estimated 
(columns 3, 4 and 5)110. The results, provided in Table 5.4, show strong, but asymmetric, 
sensitivity, with proportionate increases in the poverty line resulting in disproportionate rises 
in the aggregates. For example, a reduction in the 2006 threshold value by 5.0 per cent is 
estimated to reduce poverty by 8.6 per cent, whereas an increase of 5.0 per cent in the 
threshold increases the headcount by 20.2 per cent.  Clearly, the poverty rate (for all three 
measures) is highly elastic to changes in the value of the poverty line. Underpinning this 
pattern is Vietnam’s overall distribution and the proximity of a high proportion of the non-
poor population to the line.   
  
                                                 
110See Chen, Datt and Ravallion (1991) for a guide to POVCAL and the discussion in 4.4.2. 
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Table 5.4 : Sensitivity of poverty aggregates to changes in the poverty line 
1 2 3 4 5 
Simulation Threshold 
VND000 
Headcount 
(% change on 
2006 actual) 
Depth 
(% change on 
2006 actual) 
Severity 
(% change on 
2006 actual) 
2006 value  – 10% 2,303 12.3 (-23.0) 1.9 (-38.7) 0.4(-50.0) 
2006 value – 5% 2,431 14.6 (-8.6) 2.5 (-19.4) 0.6 (-25.0) 
Actual 2006 2559 16.0 3.1 0.8  
2006 value + 5% 2687 19.2 (20.2) 3.9 (25.8) 1.0 (25.0) 
2006  value +10% 2815 21.4 (34.0) 4.6 (48.4) 1.3 (62.5) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on GSO (2008) 
Data disaggregated by demographic characteristics are hard to obtain from official sources. 
However, analysis undertaken by the World Bank and the Vietnamese Academy of Social 
Sciences (VASS), suggest Vietnam’s poverty profile has fairly familiar characteristics to other 
LDCs. Poorer households are generally larger, have weaker educational backgrounds and are 
more likely to have no formal sector employment (World Bank, 2004; VASS, 2006).  The 
gender dimensions are more complex, with the data showing a surprising degree of balance 
for households headed by men and women; however, participatory studies suggest there is 
substantial inequality in intra-household allocations (World Bank, 2004).   
A more specific facet of poverty is the extent of deprivation within the ethnic minority 
populations.  Moreover, as Figure 5.9, based on data within the VASS 2006 Poverty 
Assessment, shows, the variation in the Headcount and Depth measures between the Kinh 
majority (plus the Chinese minority) and the ethnic minorities appears to have widened over 
time.  In the diagram, the trend lines for the majority (the solid line) and the disadvantaged 
minorities (the broken line) are cleanly divergent.  Although, as noted, a considerable part of 
this variation is also driven by location, which co-varies with ethnic origin, marginal analysis 
provided by the World Bank finds that ethnic groups are on average 14 per cent poorer after 
allowing for other characteristics (World Bank, 2004).  This further suggests that official 
policy responses, which seek to target these groups, are having limited success. However, 
Kang (2008) finds that the situation is more nuanced, and has changed markedly in the latest 
survey data.  He notes that the dynamics of poverty reduction vary within groups, according to 
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their location and household characteristics, with some minorities closing the gap with the 
Kinh and Chinese groups in recent years.    
Figure 5.9: Majority (solid line) versus minority (broken line) poverty rates  
 
Note: the broken line indicates the minority population trends and the solid line the majority trends. 
Source: VASS (2006) page 25 
5.4.3 Inequality  
As has been emphasized elsewhere in this thesis, inequality is not merely important in its own 
right, but is central to determining the level of poverty reduction in an economy, both directly, 
and by moderating the impact of economic growth at different points in the distribution.  As 
the discussion in Section 2.4 makes clear, the policy consensus has coalesced around a 
position that places importance on both inequality and growth.  
Successful management of inequality has been a defining feature of the Vietnamese transition.  
As Table 5.5 illustrates, each of the aggregate measures records a limited deterioration in the 
2002 and 2004 surveys (columns 4 and 5), and an improvement in 2006 (column 5).  The Gini 
coefficient, for example, remains virtually static between 1993 and 1998, worsens by 5.7 per 
cent in 2002 and by a further 4.3 per cent in 2004, but improves by 3.6 per cent in 2006. For 
the full 13 year period, the Gini is only some 5.9 per cent higher.  This pattern of change is 
remarkable given that theoretical and empirical accounts would have predicted the reverse 
trajectory, on the basis of the growth record and the dispersion of asset ownership 
(particularly land tenure) in Vietnam111. Indeed, the improvement in distribution seen in the 
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2006 survey somewhat confounds past donor concerns over the trajectory given by the 2002 
and 2004 data112.     
Table 5.5: Summary comparison of inequality measures 1993 to 2006 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Year VLSS 
1993 
VLSS 
1998 
VHLSS 
2002 
VHLSS 
2004 
VHLSS 
2006 
  Metric  (% change on previous survey) 
Gini coefficient 35.68 35.52  
(-0.4) 
37.55 
(+5.8) 
39.16 
(+4.4) 
37.77 
(-3.5) 
Ratio of top to bottom 
quintiles 
5.62 5.48 
(-2.5) 
6.11 
(+11.5) 
6.58  
(+7.7) 
6.42 
(-2.4) 
Income share of bottom 
30% 
13.06 13.33 
(+2.1) 
12.44 
(-6.7) 
11.91 
(-4.3) 
12.00 
(+0.8) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Povcalnet database (accessed on line) 
A further important dimension, which is evident from the Lorenz curves for the 1993 and 
2006 surveys shown in Figure 5.10, is that the deterioration has predominantly affected the 
upper part of the distribution.  Indeed, the post-PRS (i.e. post-2002) surveys show a similar 
pattern, albeit with a worsening in 2004, offset by a compensating improvement in 2006.  
Figure 5.10: Lorenz Curves for 1993 and 2006  
 
Source: GSO (1994 and 2008) and author’s calculations 
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 UNDP (2004) in arguing for urgent action to stem worsening inequality is typical of donor 
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To examine the extent to which growth has been pro-poor in the post-PRS period, and thus 
investigate the impact of changes in inequality on the poverty level, a poverty-growth-
inequality decomposition exercise was undertaken for the four periods bounded by Vietnam’s 
five surveys.  These techniques, described in the previous chapter (see the discussion in 4.4.3), 
identify the separate contributions of growth and changes in distribution to poverty reduction 
over a given interval.  Full details of the method and analysis undertaken are given in 
Appendix P.  After establishing survey comparability, simulated Headcounts associated with 
distribution-neutral growth, and zero growth distributional change, were estimated using the 
World Bank’s POVCAL simulation software. The differencing procedure offered by Kakwani 
(1997), which is also discussed in Chapter Four (see 4.4.3), was then applied.  
The results for the two post-PRS episodes are provided in Table 5.6. The columns list interval 
dates, and the rows, the magnitudes of the two effects.  The data show that although poverty 
reduction has in the main been driven by growth, distributional change has played an 
important but also changing role.  In the 2002-2004 episode (block a), worsening inequality 
retards the level of poverty reduction - cutting the potential growth effect, a 41.5 per cent 
reduction by 9.0 per cent on the base.  During 2004-2006, the improved distribution augments 
the reduction, boosting the growth effect of 12.8 per cent by 5.1 per cent on the base.  In both 
cases, the impact of changes in inequality is significant.  The 2006 improvement is especially 
noteworthy, not merely because it occurs at this stage of the transition, but because the 
contribution made to the fall in poverty is around 30 per cent of the total.  More 
thoroughgoing analysis based on the counterfactual case is given in Section 5.5.  
Table 5.6: Decomposition estimates for the post-PRS period  
1 2 3 4 
Interval Growth effect 
% 
Distributional effect 
% 
Overall change 
% 
(a) 2002-2004    
Change in Headcount -12.0 +2.6 -9.4 
Change on 2002 -41.5 +9.0 -32.5 
(b) 2004-2006    
Change in Headcount -2.5 -1.1 -3.5 
Change on 2004 -12.8 -5.1 -17.9 
 Source: Author’s calculations based on GSO (2008) 
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A major component of inequality is typically the presence of spatial variations in income, and 
underlying this, variations in the level of economic activity and asset values.  Studies of 
similar transitional economies, notably China, have shown that the geographical factors are 
the primary drivers in the very large expansion in inequality in the post transition years (Wan 
and Zhou, 2005).  Using the standard analytical approach introduced in Chapter Four, 
Vietnam’s pattern of inequality was investigated using data from the 2004 and 2006 
household surveys.  The approach is described in full in Appendix R. The analysis employs 
the decomposability property of the Theil Index to identify the separate within group 
component, and the between group (or the spatial) component of inequality for Vietnam’s 
standard regions. The index and its spatial decomposition were formally derived in subsection 
4.4.3.   The results for Vietnam are provided below in Table 5.7 for the headline data, and 
Table 5.8 for the regional data. 
Table 5.7: Comparisons of Theil Indices and spatial components 2004 and 2006 
1 2 3 4 
Theil Index 2004 2006 Change 
Between (or spatial) component 0.051 0.044 -12.99% 
Within component 0.116 0.112 -3.45% 
Total 0.167 0.157 -6.35% 
Between comp. as a % of the total 30.46% 28.03% n/a 
Source: Author’s calculations based on GSO (2008) 
The summary data in Table 5.7 reveal that the spatial component of inequality (based on 
regional data) in Vietnam is sizeable and accounted for around 30 per cent of the total in 2004 
and 28 per cent in 2006 (final row, columns 2 and 3).  This underlines that geography is a 
major determinant of inequality.  However, the table also shows that the spatial (the between) 
component has declined in importance, falling by some 13.0 per cent versus a reduction in the 
within component of 3.5 per cent (column 4).  As a result, the overall Theil index declines by 
some 6.4 per cent between 2004 and 2006. 
The sub-national data, given in Table 5.8, suggest that the variations in inequality within 
regions between the two survey dates are mixed (column 4), and that something of an 
asymmetric pattern has emerged.  The core regions appear to have become more equal - the 
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Red River Delta, the South East show major improvements (declines in the index) of 14.3 and 
6.6 per cent respectively; while the peripheral ones have become less equal  - the Central 
Highlands and the North Central Coastal region show large deteriorations of 18.2 and 11.1 per 
cent respectively. In terms of causation, the decline in total inequality is predominately 
accounted for by the fall in spatial component (see Table 5.7).  Moreover, the regional pattern 
(given in Table 5.8) suggests, albeit tentatively, that this outcome is, in turn, underpinned by 
the apparent convergence between the core and peripheral areas. 
Table 5.8: Regional Theil indices for Vietnam  
1 2 3 4 
Region Theil Index 2004 Theil Index 2006 Change % 
Red River Delta 0.14 0.12 -14.3 
North East 0.10 0.11 10.0 
North West 0.13 0.12 -7.7 
North Central Coastal 0.09 0.10 11.1 
South Central Coastal 0.10 0.10 0.0 
Central Highlands 0.11 0.13 18.2 
South East 0.15 0.14 -6.6 
Mekong Delta 0.08 0.08 0.0 
Sources: Author’s calculations based on GSO (2008) 
However, it is also important to be cautious, as the GSO Theil data have two major 
limitations.  First, the Theil indices quoted above are based on regional quintile estimates, and 
therefore a portion of the overall variation is not being captured.  This will tend to under-
report the within component of total inequality.  Second, the base data rely on a nationally 
defined variant of consumption expenditure, which is somewhat more restrictive than the 
standard definition, as imputed items are excluded.  This has the effect of limiting the level of 
variation but, given also the higher levels of (non-measured) consumption in urban areas, it 
introduces a geographical bias.  This would operate in the opposite direction, boosting the 
relative size of the within component. The overall balance of these impacts, cannot however, 
be assumed with any certainty113.   
                                                 
113
 The under-reporting will be most acute therefore for urbanized regions. While neither of these 
factors has a direct impact on the dynamic position, because of urban to rural migration, there is some 
potential for the intra-survey position to be distorted. 
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5.4.4 Social Outcomes  
At the aggregate level, Vietnam’s impressive economic performance is replicated in its 
progress measured against various social indicators.  The Human Development Index (HDI), 
given in Figure 5.11, sourced from the UNDP’s global statistical series, shows a year on year 
improvement throughout the transition (rising from a value of 0.561 in 1985 to 0.715 in 
2005)114. This continues in the post-adoption period, although the rate of improvement levels 
off somewhat.  In addition, the 2005 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjustment implemented 
during 2008, revised down Vietnam’s per capita GDP, and hence also reduced Vietnam’s 
overall HDI (the broken line shows the pre-adjustment values)115.  While this reduction 
represents a fall in the level values, it has not altered the positive trajectory of change.  
Figure 5.11: Vietnam’s Human Development Index 1985-2005  
 
Source: UNDP (2008 and 2009)  
The post-PRS data for the constituent component indices of the HDI (given in Table 5.9) 
reveal a more mixed pattern of change. The overall index has grown relatively slowly in 
recent years with the maximum annual increase of 3.4 per cent recorded in 2005 (final row, 
column 6).  The sizeable reductions in 2006 to the HDI and the income component are due to 
                                                 
114
 The HDI is a composite multi-dimensional index. Summary details of its composition and calculation 
are given in Chapter Four, see footnote 79.  
115
 The World Bank’s International comparison Programme (ICP) revised the global PPP estimates 
based on a 2005 valuation; these were used  in  the HDI for the 2007/ 2008 report, see UNDP (2008). 
For a discussion see: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ICPEXT/Resources/ICP_2011.html 
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the PPP revision to the post 2005 values and these are not comparable therefore (column 7)116.  
Setting this aside, income growth makes a strong contribution between 2001 and 2005, 
alongside life expectancy, which adds a substantial 5.4 years between 2001 and 2006 (first 
row, columns 1 and 7).  However, the educational variables show a static to mildly 
deteriorating trend.  Of most concern is the combined enrolment rate which falls from 64 per 
cent in 2001 to 62.3 per cent in 2006.  As emphasized in Chapter 4, it is difficult to relate the 
individual components to the overall index due to the HDI’s non-linear specification. 
Table 5.9: Vietnam HDI Components 2001 -2006 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 2001 
(% 
change) 
2002 
(% 
change) 
2003 
(% 
change) 
2004 
(% 
change) 
2005 
(% 
change) 
2006 
(% 
change) 
Life Expectancy 68.6 
(n/a) 
69.0 
(0.6) 
70.5 
(2.2) 
70.8 
(0.4) 
73.7 
(4.1) 
74.0 
(0.4) 
Adult Literacy 92.7 
(n/a) 
90.3 
(-2.6) 
90.3 
(0.0) 
90.3 
(0.0) 
90.3 
(0.0) 
90.3 
(0.0) 
Combined 
Enrolment Rate  
64.0 
(n/a) 
64.0 
(0.0) 
64.0 
(0.0) 
63.0 
(-1.6) 
63.9 
(1.4) 
62.3 
(-2.5) 
GDP per capita 
USD PPP 
2,070 
(n/a) 
2,300 
(11.1) 
2,490 
(8.3) 
2,745 
(10.2) 
3,071 
(11.9) 
2,363 
(-23.1) 
Overall HDI 0.688 
(n/a) 
0.691 
(0.4) 
0.704 
(1.9) 
0.709 
(0.7) 
0.733 
(3.4) 
0.718 
(-1.8) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on UNDP on line data (www.undp.org/hdr)   
The Vietnam Development Goals (VDGs) Progress Reports provide somewhat more detailed 
data, and report on performance against 42 nationally specified milestone targets ordered 
around the eight global MDGs117. The fifth and latest progress report, published by the 
Ministry of Planning and Infrastructure (MPI) in December 2008, makes for very positive 
reading (MPI, 2008). Only one target, that relating to HIV infections for pregnant women is 
                                                 
116
 Data were sourced from consecutive global Human Development Reports (accessed on line at: 
www.undp.org/hdr). The revised component series are not available. 
117
 Although the report refers to 45 milestone targets only 42 are reported on, targets 34, 35 and 36 are 
missing are missing from the tables. 
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classified as being “unlikely to be met”118.  Of the remaining targets 3 are judged as already 
“exceeded”, 3 as “likely to be met” and 22 as “achievable”; perplexingly the data for a further 
14 targets are simply not given (MPI, 2008, pages 10-12). The report, however, also 
acknowledges localized problems in meeting the health goals, and that action is required to 
ensure more equitable health and educational provision.  A full list of the VDG targets, and 
their status in 2008, is provided at Appendix S.  
However, the monitoring and evaluation process which supports the VDG report relies on 
administrative data, is heavily dependent on the MPI, and has only limited external oversight.  
To an extent, the level of analysis and its generally uncritical language are unsurprising given 
the report is a product of a corporatist process between the government and several official 
NGOs.  The text tends to laud achievements without highlighting problems, and offers 
recommendations for the donor community as much as for official agencies.  Most notably, 
the text does not consider the impact of the government’s so-called socialization 
programme119 (essentially a mix of privatisation and greater self-financing) within the 
education and health sectors. 
5.5 Appraisal of PRS Effectiveness 
This final substantive section provides a counterfactual-based appraisal of PRS-adoption in 
Vietnam.  A series of analytical techniques are used to examine poverty, inequality and 
growth outcomes, to test the extent to which growth has become more pro-poor in the post 
PRS years.  As in the previous chapter, two counterfactuals are specified: a with and without 
evaluation, which compares performance against near neighbours and aggregates for 
comparable groups of countries; and a before versus after approach, where post-adoption 
outcomes are tested against past Vietnamese data.  As the discussion in section 4.5 made 
clear, neither of these offers a perfect means of testing for policy impacts, as neither can 
replicate the conditions of a controlled experiment. The former suffers from the impossibility 
of specifying a truly representative control measure free of general equilibrium effects, while 
the latter cannot properly screen out covariant time driven non-programme effects.  
                                                 
118
 Note that the whole area of HIV prevention and treatment is described as facing serious problems. 
119
 The Vietnamese define this term as meaning society and communities, as opposed to the State, 
taking on greater responsibility for the provision and cost of public services, in effect it implies the 
privatization of local services. 
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Nevertheless, the use of various analytical tools does, to some extent, ameliorate the 
challenges faced, and it is possible to draw useful conclusions. These appraisals are followed 
by a policy discussion which aims to attribute outcomes to policy choices, and identify, as 
definitively as possible, any role played by the PRS. 
5.5.1 With and Without Comparisons 
This approach, which most closely approximates the experimental ideal, requires the 
comparison of outcomes in Vietnam with similar countries and/ or similar groups of countries 
over the same period.  The appraisal begins by examining growth performance. This is 
followed by comparisons of poverty and inequality data.  It is important to recognize that this 
counterfactual comparison is difficult to frame, since there cannot be any precise comparator 
for Vietnam’s geographic, economic and political characteristics, and thus no certain means of 
removing country-specific non-programme factors. 
Figures 5.12 and 5.13 track Vietnam’s per capita growth record since 2000 against its 
immediate neighbours – Cambodia, China and Laos, the averages for low and middle income 
countries in East Asia, and the global average for low income countries (LICs).  In reviewing 
the data it is useful to recall that Vietnam adopted its I-PRS in 2001 and its F-PRS in 2002, 
and that Cambodia and Laos adopt PRSs within a similar time frame.  Given the presence of 
lagged effects, any PRS impact ought to be apparent from 2004 onward. 
In summary, the first chart (Figure 5.12) shows that Vietnam’s growth performance was very 
much better than the LIC category, generally better than that of Laos, yet weaker than others 
in East Asia, including Cambodia and China.  Indeed, as the second chart makes clearer, 
China, Cambodia and the East Asian average tended to accelerate away from Vietnam’s 
position in the years after 2003 (precisely the time when any PRS effects might be anticipated 
to emerge).  Nevertheless, the country’s individual performance is strong, recording a position 
some 50 per cent above the 2000 starting point.  Moreover, it is also apparent that Vietnam’s 
growth rate is consistent at between 5 and 7 per cent per annum, and is less volatile than its 
closest geographic and economic comparators, Laos and Cambodia.  
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Figure 5.12: Comparative per capita growth outcomes 2000-2007  
 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on WDI Database and author’s calculations 
Figure 5.13:  Cumulative comparative per capita economic growth 2000-2007 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on WDI Database and author’s calculations 
However, better comparative growth performance does not necessarily translate into greater 
poverty reduction.  Indeed, as the case of Cambodia (included as a comparator above) which 
has sparked much interest within the empirical literature shows, accelerated growth is not a 
sufficient condition for sustained poverty reduction (World Bank, 2006).  As has been argued 
above in subsection 5.4.3, Vietnam’s favourable poverty outcomes during the transition 
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appear to have been underpinned by both growth and the successful management of 
inequality.   
Using the panel dataset constructed to support the econometric analysis in Chapter Two, Table 
5.10 compares annualized changes in the national Headcount (column 2), the Gini coefficient 
(column 3), income per capita (column 4) and the Growth Elasticity of Poverty (GEP)  
(column 5) for Vietnam against a series of pooled averages.  The primary comparison to be 
made is against the non-PRS adopting country group, but useful insights can be gained from 
comparisons against PRS adopters and the overall sample averages. The table presents annual 
data for the two survey episodes since PRS-adoption, 2002 to 2004 and 2004 to 2006. The 
comparator group data are annualized averages for episodes of varying length over a 12 year 
period from 1996 to 2007.  
Table 5.10: Comparative poverty, growth and inequality data for post adoption 
1 2 3 4 5 
 National 
Headcount 
(Annual % 
change) 
Gini 
Coefficient 
(Annual % 
change) 
Income per 
capita 
(Annual % 
change) 
Growth 
Elasticity of 
Poverty120 
(Calculated 
separately) 
Vietnam (02 -04) -17.86 +2.11 +11.61 -1.32 
Vietnam (04 -06) -9.50 -1.80 +2.28 -3.93 
Pooled Non-PRS Countries (96-07)  -2.89 +0.28 +2.13 -1.61 
Pooled PRS Countries (02 -07) -4.33 +0.21 +4.18 -1.00 
All countries (97-07) -3.34 +0.26 +2.77 -1.41 
Source: Author’s calculations based on GSO (2008).  
Note:  the GEP results represent proportionate change in headcount ratios over the proportionate 
change in survey based consumption growth for Vietnam, but the proportionate change in the 
headcount over per capita economic growth for the comparator countries.  
Referring first to the poverty data (column 2): Vietnam’s performance in both PRS episodes is 
better than each of the comparator groups.  On average, the Headcount ratio declines annually 
by a sizeable 17.9 per cent in the first (2002-2004) interval, and by 9.5 per cent in the second 
                                                 
120
 GEPs were estimated from the two panel datasets created to support the analysis in Chapter 3.  It 
is important to note, as in the Mongolian case (see 4.5.1), the analysis excluded outlier values.   
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(2004-2006) episode.  In contrast, the non-PRS group average shows an annualized decline of 
only 2.9 per cent in the Headcount, and the PRS-adopting group achieves a decline of 4.3 per 
cent per annum.   
With regard to inequality, measured here by the change in the Gini coefficient (column 3), 
Vietnam’s performance varies with an annualized worsening of 2.1 per cent in the index 
between 2002 and 2004, and an annual 1.8 per cent improvement between 2004 and 2006.  
While the deterioration in the first episode is considerably worse than the comparator 
averages, the percentage improvement in the second is considerably better. The primary 
comparator, the non-PRS group, records an annual deterioration of 0.3 per cent. The other 
comparator groups show a similar rate of change.  If the data for Vietnam are aggregated 
together, the equivalent annualized change is a worsening of 0.1 per cent, and clearly this is 
still better than the average annualized change for the comparators.  Yet, the results do suggest 
that inequality remains a threat and that the distributional outcomes, although better than 
average, have not been consistently positive.   
The annualized per capita growth rates (column 5) for Vietnam are strong throughout both 
episodes at around 11.6 and 2.3 per cent respectively; versus the global sample average of 2.8 
per cent per annum (2002-2007 period). Clearly, Vietnam’s economic performance is a major 
driver of the better poverty reduction outcomes. However, it is important to underline that 
these data are not strictly comparable as the comparator averages are given in terms of 
economic growth (sourced from national accounts data), whereas the Vietnamese figures rely 
on the survey record and represent growth in consumption.  
The Growth Elasticity of Poverty (GEP) data given in the final column of Table 5.10, offer 
additional insights into the interplay of growth and distributional change, by measuring the 
responsiveness of the Headcount to per capita growth (or consumption in the case of survey-
based data).  Somewhat mirroring the Gini data, the GEP results broadly confirm the dual 
importance of growth and distribution in the poverty reduction record, but also that outcomes 
have varied.  Vietnam performs strongly against other PRS countries, recording GEPs of -1.3 
in the first episode and -3.9 in the second, versus GEPs of -1.0 for the PRS group and -1.6 for 
the non-PRS group.  However, use of survey data for Vietnam, and SNA data for the 
comparators, ensures (again) that these statistics are not strictly comparable. 
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The overall message to emerge is that Vietnam’s performance is markedly better than others, 
and that the differential is greatest against the non-PRS country group.  However, the fact that 
the variation against other PRS adopting nations is almost as great makes it hard to conclude 
that PRS-adoption is a decisive contributory factor.  However, it should also be borne in mind 
that these comparisons against the pooled dataset are limited in two important respects. First, 
as the pool includes intervals of varying lengths, spanning a nine year period from 1997 to 
2006, there are likely to be time trends at work. Moreover, the econometric analysis employed 
in Chapter Two, showed that growth and poverty outcomes strengthened during the latter part 
of the period. Second, the level of country heterogeneity implies that there are likely to be 
serious comparability problems which are not be addressed by these techniques.  
5.5.2 Before versus after comparisons  
The discussion below builds on the material presented in Section 5.4. A more detailed 
longitudinal record is presented for Vietnam, which makes use of a series of pro-poor growth 
statistics.  Before versus after comparative analyses are provided of the two prior and two 
post-PRS episodes bounded by the five poverty surveys: 1993 to 1998 and 1998 to 2002 
before adoption; and 2002 to 2004 and 2004 to 2006 after adoption. Tables 5.11 and 5.13 
provide a starting point for the discussion.  The first restates the main statistics (from Section 
5.4) in differences form, while the second table provides the annualized equivalents.  
Table 5.11: Changes in key statistics by episode 
1 2 3 4 5 
Variable 1993-1998 
VLSS 
1998-2002 
VLSS/ VHLSS 
2002-2004 
VHLSS 
2004-2006 
VHLSS 
Headcount -35.5 -22.7 -32.5 -18.1 
Depth  -48.7 -27.4 -27.5 -38.0 
Severity -64.4 -31.3 -59.1 -11.1 
Gini coefficient -0.6 +5.9 +4.3 -3.6 
Growth in mean consumption +36.6 +17.5 +24.6 +4.6 
Per capita economic growth +37.1 +22.9 +12.5 +14.4 
Source: GSO (1994 and 2008) and WDI data accessed via ESDS (www.esds.ac.uk) 
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Table 5.12 : Annualized percentage changes in key statistics by episode 
1 2 3 4 5 
Variable 1993-1998 
VLSS 
1998-2002 
VLSS/ VHLSS 
2002-2004 
VHLSS 
2004-2006 
VHLSS 
Headcount -8.4 -6.2 -17.9 -9.5 
Depth -12.5 -7.7 -14.9 -21.3 
Severity -18.7 -8.9 -36.0 -5.7 
Gini coefficient -0.1 -1.5 +2.1 -1.8 
Growth in mean consumption +6.4 +4.1 +11.6 +2.3 
Per capita economic growth +6.5 +5.3 +6.0 +7.0 
Source: GSO (1994 and 2008) and WDI data accessed via ESDS (www.esds.ac.uk) 
The annualized presentation allows for a better interpretation of the underlying trends, and 
therefore the following refers, almost exclusively, to Table 5.12.  Overall, the data show a 
consistent decline in poverty during the transition. However, the proportionate reduction is 
actually greatest in the immediate post-adoption episode between 2002 and 2004, when the 
Headcount declines by an annualized 17.9 per cent (column 4).  The reductions in the 
secondary measures (Depth and Severity) are generally higher than the decline in the 
Headcount in each episode, but this differential increases during the PRS years: the Depth 
measure falls dramatically, by an annualized 21.3 per cent in the final episode (column 5); and 
the (estimated) Severity measure by 36.0 per cent in the 2002-2004 episode (column 4). The 
Gini coefficient conforms to the pattern previously described (see 5.4.3). Reading across the 
columns, it is initially static, worsens in the second and third, then improves in the fourth 
episode.  Growth in consumption and per capita economic growth - the former sourced from 
the survey data and the latter from the national accounts - reassuringly follow a similar 
positive trajectory. Yet there is some mismatching between the episodes - consumption 
growth is higher than economic growth in the third, whereas the reverse is the case in the 
fourth episode (columns 4 and 5).    
At face value, these data tend to support a PRS performance gain.  The annualized decline in 
the poverty rate accelerates following adoption, and the Gini coefficient, which had been 
worsening, stabilizes and then improves.  Given economic growth is similar throughout, this 
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suggests that the growth process has become more pro-poor. This question is further 
investigated through the use of the more sophisticated analyses below. In addition, it is 
important to appreciate that the comparative changes are here expressed as percentages of the 
base values, and that in terms of absolute numbers, poverty reduction remains greatest in the 
first (1993 to 1998) episode when an astonishing 21 per cent of the population were lifted out 
of poverty.  Furthermore, it must be emphasized, that these comparisons cannot adjust for 
concurrent external influences not associated with adoption.  A key non-programme factor, 
which depressed growth and poverty reduction in the years just prior to adoption, was the East 
Asian financial crisis. 
The starting point for the more rigorous before-after evaluation of performance is the growth-
inequality decomposition exercise discussed and reported in Section 5.4.   This analysis 
identified the separate contributions of the growth in incomes (the growth effect), and changes 
in distribution (the inequality effect), to reductions in the headcount.  These methods and their 
conceptual underpinning are introduced in Section 4.4 and described in some detail in 
Appendices M and P.   Table 5.13 below extends the results reported in Section 5.4 (Table 
5.6) to all four episodes.  These provide an account of changes before (columns 2a and 2b), 
and after the PRS was adopted (columns 3a and 3b), and the dynamics of growth and 
inequality since the early transition.   
Table 5.13: Growth inequality decomposition results for pre- and post-PRS episodes 
1 2a 2b 3a 3b 
Effect / interval 1993-1998 1998-2002 2002-2004 2004-2006 
 Pre-PRS adoption Post PRS adoption 
Growth Effect 
(% change on base) 
-21.0 
(-36.1) 
-11.1 
(-30.6) 
-12.0 
(-41.5) 
-2.5 
(-12.6) 
Distribution/ Inequality Effect 
(% change on base) 
+0.4 
(+0.7) 
+2.6 
(+7.1) 
+2.6 
(+9.0) 
-1.1 
(-5.4) 
Change in Headcount 
(% change on base) 
-20.6 
(-35.5) 
-8.5 
(-22.7) 
-9.4 
(-32.5) 
-3.5 
(-18.0) 
Distribution effect as a % of 
the growth effect 
- 1.9 -23.1 -21.7 +44.0 
Source: Author’s calculations based on GSO (1994 and 2008) and World Bank (1999) 
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Prior to reviewing these, it is worth re-iterating the importance of the debate over the 
definition of pro-poor growth in shaping interpretations.  In the following, reference is made 
both to the Strong position, which holds growth is only pro-poor when it is accompanied by a 
distributional improvement, and the Weak position, which defines any poverty reducing 
growth as pro-poor, regardless of the distributional pattern (see 2.4.1 for a fuller discussion).   
Referring first to the two pre-PRS episodes: the 1993 to 1998 data (column 2a) show a very 
considerable decline in the absolute level of poverty equivalent to 21 per cent of the 
population (a 36.1 per cent reduction on the base), offset by a negligible rise in inequality. 
This period is pro-poor from both strong and weak perspectives.  In contrast, the second pre-
adoption episode sees a deceleration in the proportion taken out of poverty, and a significant 
offsetting impact from to worsening inequality.  The decline amounts to 11.1 per cent of the 
population and the offsetting worsening inequality effect is equivalent to 2.6 per cent of the 
population (column 2b). Thus this period is not strictly pro-poor from the strong viewpoint, 
but it must be recognized that the overall reduction is still high by international standards. The 
recorded fall of 8.5 population percentage points amounts to a reduction on the base of close 
to 23 per cent (column 3, final row). 
The third and first post PRS episode (column 3a), shows a similar distributional pattern to the 
second, with a growth effect offset by significantly worsening inequality. However, once it is 
taken into account that this interval spans only 2 years, it signals a dramatic rise in the 
proportionate reduction in the Headcount of over 32 per cent on the base.  This period has the 
highest annual poverty reduction rates of any of the episodes, but it also sees a dramatic 
worsening inequality effect (equivalent to 9.0 per cent of the base headcount and 2.6 per cent 
of the population).   
In contrast, the data for the fourth (2004-2006) episode (column 3b) reveals a relatively small 
growth effect – representing 2.5 per cent of the population (equivalent to 12.6 per cent 
reduction on the base).  However, the distributional effect is actually favourable here, 
augmenting the overall reduction in the Headcount ratio by 1.1 per cent of the population and 
5.4 per cent on the base. It is also worth noting that this positive distributional effect 
represents 44 per cent of the growth component.   
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To summarize these outcomes from the competing definitions, it is clear that neither offers an 
unambiguous signal on the impact of PRS adoption. From a Weak perspective, the first (and 
pre-PRS) period between 1993 and 1998 ranks highest as it records the largest proportionate  
reduction, but this is closely followed by the 2002 to 2004 (and post-adoption) episode.  
Reaching a conclusion on the impact of the PRS is problematic therefore. Interpretations from 
the Strong position are equally inconclusive, since here, the first and fourth episodes rank 
highest, whereas the third, and immediately post-PRS period ranks as least pro-poor.  
Although the conclusions vary between the two positions, they both place the most pro-poor 
episodes either side of PRS adoption.  
A similar template of pro-poor growth statistics to those employed in Chapter Four was 
calculated for Vietnam and the results are provided in Table 5.14 (see Appendix Q for details 
of the supporting calculations). The data are again examined as reflecting the pre- or post-
adoption outcomes. The results generally confirm the pattern of change given by the 
decomposition analysis.    
Table 5.14: Pro-poor Growth Statistics for Vietnam 
1 2a 2b 3a 3b 
 Pre-PRS Post –PRS 
Statistic 1993-1998 1998-2002 2002-2004 2004-2006 
Growth Elasticity of Poverty 
Total  
Partial (inequality held constant) 
 
-0.89 
-0.91 
 
-2.24 
-2.91 
 
-1.32 
-1.69 
 
-3.90 
-2.73 
Pro-poor Growth Index (PPGI) 0.98 0.77 0.78 1.43 
Poverty Equivalent Growth Rate (PEGR) 35.9% 7.8% 19.2% 6.6% 
Annualized PEGR 6.9% 1.9% 9.1% 3.3% 
Memo items 
Reduction in the headcount rate 
Annualized reduction in headcount 
Growth in mean consumption  
Annualized growth in mean consumption  
 
-39.0% 
-8.4% 
+39.8% 
+6.9% 
 
-22.7% 
-6.2% 
+10.1% 
+2.4% 
 
-32.5% 
-17.9% 
+24.6 
+11.6% 
 
-17.9% 
-9.5% 
+4.6% 
+2.3% 
Source: Author’s calculations based on GSO (1994 and 2008) and World Bank (1999) 
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Each of the statistics is reviewed in turn. The total Growth Elasticity of Poverty (GEP) for the 
four episodes varies throughout, but sees a dramatic improvement in the final interval to -3.9 
(first line of results, column 5).   The partial growth elasticity statistics, which provide a 
measure of the poverty rate’s responsiveness to growth had there been no distributional 
change, are higher than the total elasticity in all but the fourth episode. This reflects the 
distributional improvement given by the 2006 survey data.  The Pro-Poor Growth Index 
(PPGI), as a ratio of the two elasticities, compares actual poverty responsiveness to the 
distributional neutral case. It is favoured by supporters of the Strong viewpoint. Since, at a 
value of unity and above, the reduction in poverty is more than proportionate than the increase 
in avenge incomes.  This measure, given in the third line of results, somewhat predictably, 
shows the final episode to be the most pro-poor (with a value of 1.4).  Driving this is (again) 
the distributional improvement121. However, these measures, which are rooted in the strong 
position, do neglect the absolute levels of reduction taking place, which is actually lowest in 
the final episode.  
In contrast, the Poverty Equivalent Growth Rate (PEGR), which is capable of interpretation 
from either perspective, provides rather different conclusions.  This statistic gives an estimate 
of the growth rate consistent with the achieved level of poverty reduction had there been no 
distributional change. It suggests that poverty reduction in the final interval is weak relative to 
the others.  Moreover, the annualized PEGR (provided to take account of the varying period 
lengths) shows, instead, that the immediate post-adoption interval (2002-2004) is the most 
pro-poor.  Thus overall, as with the decomposition analysis, the pro-poor growth metrics 
provide a set of conclusions which vary depending on which definitional position is accepted.  
However, once again, neither is able to show an unambiguous post-adoption benefit. 
An alternative graphical presentation, using growth incidence curves (GICs) which depict the 
increases in consumption at different levels of the distribution, is provided for each of the four 
episodes in Figure 5.14. These provide similarly inconclusive findings.  Here it is necessary, 
given the different episode lengths, to refer to the distributional patterns depicted by the 
curves.  The first episode is the most pro-poor. The 1993-1998 curve shows larger increases in 
consumption at the lower deciles, while maintaining sizeable growth throughout the 
                                                 
121
 There may also be a measurement matching issue here. The survey growth (of consumption) data 
diverge from the SNA record, for the third and fourth intervals, but are reconciled for the overall period. 
217 
 
distribution. The shapes of the GICs for the two middle episodes are similar in depicting a 
generally non pro-poor pattern, with the upper deciles gaining higher increases. It is worth 
noting, however, given that the third episode only spans a period of two years and that the 
proportionate gains are high throughout the distribution.  Still more useful insights are 
provided in relation to the fourth episode.  Although the GIC for this period is suggestive of a 
distributional gain, it has a shallow inverted U shape with the middle income groups 
benefiting most. Such a pattern is still consistent with reductions in the Headcount (as above 
average increases are still delivered to those close to the poverty line), but the impact is less 
pro-poor than suggested by the pro-poor growth metrics. 
Figure 5.14: Growth Incidence Curves for Vietnam  
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on GSO (1994 and 2008) and World Bank (1999) 
Summing up, it is difficult to find clear evidence of a direct PRS impact from the time pattern 
of poverty reduction. Although the headline data are supportive of a post adoption 
improvement, particularly the annualized reductions in poverty, more rigorous analysis 
underlines the lack of a consistent pattern either side of adoption.  The decision problem is not 
made any easier by an examination of the data record from the competing Strong and Weak 
viewpoints.  In terms of the absolute changes, the early transition is strongly pro-poor, but this 
tails off prior to adoption, improving markedly again in the early post-adoption period, only to 
weaken in the final interval. In turn, the distributional pattern worsens immediately before and 
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after the PRS was adopted, yet an improvement is apparent in the latest survey.  It is also 
worth again re-iterating that this type of before versus after counterfactual is limited by the 
need to account for time varying non-programme events. The most prominent of these was the 
Asian crisis of 1997. Empirical accounts suggest that this had a lagged effect in Vietnam, and 
would have weakened performance immediately prior to adoption in 2001 (ADB, 2000). This 
implies that the data for the second (1998-2002) episode are not fully comparable with the 
others. 
5.5.3 Policy Discussion: Matching outcomes to policy choices 
The establishment of a causal relationship between performance outcomes and Vietnam’s 
adoption of a PRS is challenging.  As the discussion in Chapter Three makes clear, questions 
of identification (i.e. locating the policy stance within the PRS process) and attribution 
(tracing outcomes to policy choices) have to be addressed.   Problematically, as the discussion 
in Section 5.3 found, although a substantive preparation process took place, there is scant 
evidence that the PRS, or its supporting structures, had any real impact on the actual conduct 
of policy.   
Indeed, as Table 5.15, which presents a summary of the major policy events alongside the 
poverty data for the pre/post-PRS intervals, shows, policies and outcomes have tended 
throughout to follow the trajectory of the established transition approach. Notably there is no 
discernable change in approach before and after adoption. Major land reform is enacted in the 
first and third episodes, while liberalization measures in trade and the labour market take 
place in the second and third episodes respectively. As noted in the previous section, the 
Headcount data also show no discernable matching pattern. It seems that Vietnam rather 
closely approximates to the policy ventriloquist model outlined in Chapter Two.  
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Table 5.15: Key Policy measures and poverty outcomes by interval 
1 2 3a 3b 3c 
Interval Key Policy Events Changes in the 
Headcount Ratio 
Ab
so
lu
te
 
Ch
a
n
ge
 
 
 
To
ta
l %
 
Ch
a
n
ge
 
 
An
n
u
a
liz
ed
 
%
 
ch
a
n
ge
 
Pre-PRS adoption    
1993 - 
1998 
Introduction of second land law, makes agricultural land titles 
inviolable & permits trading 
SOE reforms consolidate prior policy choices, reaffirms 
equitization as opposed to privatization.  
-20.6 -35.5 -8.4 
1998 -
2002 
Tariff reforms culminating in signing of the US Bilateral Free Trade 
Agreement 
Enterprise law reforms strengthens SME sector 
-8.5 -22.7 -6.2 
Post PRS adoption    
2002 -
2004 
Labour law liberalization  
Third land reform enacted, further facilitates land trading   
-9.4 -32.5 -17.9 
2004 -
2006 
WTO accession, tariffs made compliant with agreement 
SEDP launched, maintains production focus, but incorporates 
poverty as a policy target & highlights regional policy initiatives 
-3.5 -18.1 -9.5 
Sources: Van Arkadie and Mallon (2003), World Bank (2004) & author’s calculations 
However, this may be too harsh a judgment on the CPRGS. Although there is very little 
evidence of any pivotal change, it is still possible to argue that institutional benefits, reflected 
in the overall conduct and implementation of policy, might have contributed to the ongoing 
positive outcomes.  This is precisely the narrative that the World Bank, and to some extent, 
commentators like Conway (2004), have set out.  These arguments are inevitably very 
difficult to substantiate, but there are some tentative signs of institutional spin-off gains within 
the 2006 SEDP, along with some qualitative evidence on the nature of policymaking.  
Nevertheless, the evidence still suggests that these impacts were of marginal importance. A 
better fitted and more persuasive account of the pattern of outcomes can be provided in terms 
of the evolution of Vietnam’s activist development strategy, and the impact of exogenous 
events, notably the Asian financial crisis.  Vietnam’s reforms draw on an alternative 
development paradigm rooted in State-led structural change and second-best approaches to 
institutional and regulatory reform.  While acknowledging, often negatively, the prominence 
of the State, mainstream commentators tend to mistake the early Doi Moi reforms - land 
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reform and de-collectivization in the agricultural sector, followed by the liberalization of the 
SME sector - as the substance of an orthodox growth story (Murray, 1997; Kim, 2008).  
However, these early policy responses are common to both the consensus and heterodox 
approaches.  Orthodox commentators are also highly dismissive of the reforms undertaken in 
the pre-Doi Moi period viewing them as essentially dysfunctional.  In contrast, Weeks (1997) 
describes these measures as playing a latent role in facilitating macroeconomic stabilization; 
and Van Arkadie and Mallon (2003) as part of a learning process in which policy responses 
were honed and State capacity was built. Moreover, although liberalization measures 
continued throughout the transition, particularly in the area of trade, economic policy has been 
crafted around largely heterodox objectives122. A de facto industrial policy has emerged 
rooted in the orchestration of DFI into competitive sectors regulated by partnership 
agreements, and the rehabilitation of the SOE sector and its re-organization into national 
champions (Van Arkadie & Mallon, 2003).  These policies also have a geographic dimension 
in effectively identifying three growth poles based on Vietnam’s major cities – the Red River 
Delta, the greater Ho Chi Minh City area and Da Nang.  
In addition, however, it is important to recognize that policy formulation in Vietnam is far 
from a formulaic replication of the East Asian experience.   As Van Arkadie and Mallon 
(2003) note, a practical cum-contingent orientation has been as significant as the dirigiste 
character of the transition planning.  In addition, official thinking has not been closed to 
orthodox advice.  This is evident in the rapid stabilization measures taken in the early 
transition, and in more recent departures from the model in relation to capital account 
convertibility.  It is also the case that Vietnamese indicative planning, although effective, does 
not yet approximate that deployed in Korea and Taiwan, either in terms of its technical 
capacity or its ambition (Nixson and Walters, forthcoming).   
The poverty reduction record broadly reflects the basic trajectory of the strategy. The early 
Doi Moi reforms in agriculture targeted poverty where it was highest, through raising rural 
productivity and incomes, while also limiting the inflationary impact of liberalization by 
freeing up the supply response. These measures drove the initial very large reductions in 
poverty levels.  Follow on policy changes supported a large expansion in the number of 
                                                 
122
 Based on in interviews with Jonathan Pincus (August 2007) and Brian Van Arkadie (October 2008) 
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SMEs, initially in household businesses and later in medium sized enterprises. This enabled 
the absorption of labour displaced from agriculture, and this maintained the pro-poor 
orientation of growth.  The transition strategy has also sought to manage the reduction in 
employment in SOEs, and activity has been sustained through a largely growth-supporting 
macroeconomic stance (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). When growth slowed following the 
Asian crisis, capital controls limited the contagion effect, while activist trade policies allowed 
regional markets to be replaced with those in Europe and the US.  Nevertheless, the crisis is 
reflected in the lower reduction in poverty in the 1998 to 2002 interval. 
Tackling emerging inequality has been an inherent policy goal, addressed within the transition 
strategy through equitable asset distribution and high employment levels. Decision makers 
have tended to view inequality as a geographic and ethnically driven phenomenon, to be dealt 
with via public provisioning and large investments in infrastructure (Van Arkadie & Mallon, 
2003; Kang, 2008).  Direct interventions to address the effect of the transition on income 
distribution are difficult to discern, but official action has tackled the controversial question of 
land tenure (and landlessness) in peripheral areas (Ravallion and Van de Walle, 2008).  These 
responses are more focussed than the typical PRS approach, and have proved successful in 
addressing spatial and therefore, overall inequality. As the data at 5.4.3 show, the fall in 
aggregate inequality during 2004-2006 was accompanied by a fall in the spatial component.     
As a final observation it is, however, useful to identify three specific areas in which the PRS 
experience has yielded positive benefits.  Firstly, the Ministry of Planning and Investment 
expended very considerable resources in preparing and monitoring the CPRGS and this 
includes the suite of poverty surveys undertaken by the GSO. State agencies have gained both 
capacity and policy feedback as a result.  Second, the quality and scope of the reporting, and 
the associated consultative forums, are impressive.  These offered some means for wider non-
party interests to inform policy development and have helped to establish analytical capacity 
in academia and in NGOs.  Third, and in spite of the strong critique offered by the IFIs in their 
final JSAN, it is possible to identify some PRS influences within the unified SEDP123. These 
are most clear in relation to the monitoring evaluation approach, but also in the wider set of 
policy mechanisms identified to address social exclusion.  
                                                 
123
 See IMF and IDA (2006) for the IFIs’ critique of the SEDP 
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5.6 Conclusions 
Vietnam offers an excellent case study for examining the role played by the PRS framework 
in adopting countries.  Although several features mark out its value, notably the quality of the 
data record and Vietnam’s apparent success in reducing poverty, it is the clarity of its policy 
signature, which sets it apart. Conclusions are ordered in terms of the four central questions 
posed by this thesis.   
First, in relation to outcomes, there is, at the surface level, some indication of PRS 
performance gains. Poverty falls dramatically in the early post-adoption period, and more 
recently, further reductions have been accompanied by improvements in distributional equity.  
However, the counterfactual appraisals presented within this chapter undermine the substance 
of any link between outcomes and adoption.  While with versus without comparisons show 
that Vietnam performs generally (but not overwhelmingly) better than others in the PRS 
period, before versus after appraisals demonstrate that the pattern of strong poverty reduction 
alongside consistently high growth was well established before adoption.   Indeed, on balance, 
the empirical record tends to show that the episode following the initial Doi Moi reforms in 
the early 1990s was rather more pro-poor than the most recent period.  An examination of the 
policy stance (referred to below) also rather casts doubt on the transformational role which the 
World Bank has claimed for the strategy.  Instead, there appears to have been little change in 
the basic strategic approach, and it can convincingly be argued that the evolution of Vietnam’s 
eclectic and heterodox policy stance enjoys a better fit with outcomes. 
It is useful to consider the second and third questions regarding the PRS policy mix and the 
role of the IFIs during the strategy’s development and implementation together.  It is possible 
to detect a change in the character of the stance articulated in the PRS over time, and that the 
IFIs became progressively more engaged in the process. Yet, as will be argued below, this 
also paralleled the strategy’s growing irrelevance to the actual policy choices made.  It is clear 
that initially, at the I-PRS stage, the documentation set out an approach not dissimilar to the 
established transition strategy.   This heterodox stance was broadly maintained in the F-PRS, 
but from then, over the successive APRs, the articulated thinking converged on more 
mainstream choices.  
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Underpinning the evolution in the stated PRS policy mix was a more robust IFI posture, which 
was also reflected in attempts to exercise greater external influence within consultative 
structures and via the TA, which supported the PRS.  While it is true, in the Vietnamese case, 
that considerable latitude was permitted by the IFIs in the early years, attitudes hardened over 
time.  The later JSAN reviews articulated ever more direct criticisms of the transition strategy.  
Equally, although the evidence is limited, it is possible to discern the impact of IFI inputs 
within PRS process itself, with the content of successive national APRs coming to reflect 
mainstream policy concerns. The IMF’s suspension of the PRGF arrangement in 2004 
represented the low point in relations.  Moreover, although the World Bank remained tolerant 
and enjoyed a good working relationship with the authorities, both IFIs very strongly 
criticized the absorption of the PRS within the SEDP (IMF and IDA, 2006).  Vietnam’s 
continued economic success, and its strong poverty reduction record, effectively limited the 
reach of any sanctions and ensured both the Bank and Fund lending continued regardless of 
their views124.   
These observations anticipate the conclusions on the fourth and most significant research 
question, specifically, the impact of adoption on the actual strategic direction.  Here it can be 
concluded, fairly unambiguously, that the PRS made no real difference to the conduct of 
policy. This was precisely because the framework was largely incidental to the established 
structures, and the authorities kept their distance both from the IFIs and their preferred policy 
choices.  However, the failure to embed the CPRGS resulted from more than merely poor 
institutional practice. Vietnam’s national political economy and the PRS Initiative’s avoidance 
of such issues are the more significant factors. Policymaking in Vietnam and the articulation 
of power, takes place within a political complex dominated by the Communist Party, and there 
was no real prospect of the PRS ever penetrating these structures. 
As a final conclusion, it is also important to recognize that the existing state structures and 
their ideological orientation are themselves part of the reason why the Vietnamese authorities 
have remained focused on rapid structural change alongside distributional equity, and have as 
a result, achieved substantial reductions in poverty.  Seemingly, the Party, for all its faults, is 
the one institution that can face down emergent private and sectional interests and maintain an 
                                                 
124
 Interview with Jonathan Pincus UNDP  Vietnam, August (2007) 
224 
 
adaptive transition strategy and a technically capable state.  In the language of the literature on 
the developmental state, the Vietnamese Communist Party ensures the State is both embedded 
and autonomous125.  This position is not secure however, and its legitimacy is under constant 
threat, both from political fragmentation as the transition progresses, and the pursuit of private 
interests from within its cadres.     
                                                 
125See discussion in Chapter One of Woo-Cummings (1999) 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter brings together the key themes, and the findings of the two part (cross sectional 
and case based) evaluation, to reach a judgment on the impact of the PRS Initiative on poverty 
outcomes and developmental practice. The chapter has three principal sections.  First, it 
recapitulates the substantive conclusions of each of the preceding chapters.  Second, 
judgments on PRSs effectiveness are made in terms of the four research questions (and the 
associated hypotheses) set out in Chapter One.  Third and finally, the Chapter offers an overall 
narrative, commenting on the Initiative’s wider impact and its ultimate legacy.    
6.2 Summary of Chapter Conclusions 
Chapter One provides a history of the Initiative, a summary of the main critical positions and 
an outline of PRS adoption and management processes.  It concludes that while the PRS 
arrangements represent a new departure for policy based lending, the associated policy 
template is avowedly orthodox and the framework is designed to maintain rather than dilute 
IFIs influence.  Furthermore, Chapter One finds that although administrative sanctions remain 
an important instrument of supervision, a process which can be referred to as policy tutelage, 
comprising the delivery of training, technical support and a series of donor-recipient 
interactions has proved to be a more significant mechanism of control.   
The review of the relevant literature provided in Chapter Two, in addition to informing the 
research presented in later chapters, locates this thesis within a longer tradition of the 
appraisal of IFI policy based lending.   A striking conclusion to emerge is that although PRSs 
have been in place for some ten years, little has been achieved in terms of their rigorous 
appraisal. Chapter Two examines three distinct bodies of work: the existing PRS appraisal 
literature; a set of studies which examine the IFI lending regimes which pre-date the PRS 
Initiative; and the pro-poor growth and policy literature.  The latter two literatures are used in 
framing and supporting the analysis provided in this thesis, and the former represents the 
research baseline.   
It is useful to recap the starting position vis a vis each of the four research questions. With 
regard to performance, the existing literature reaches few definitive conclusions.  Evaluations 
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of outcomes are especially weak.  This is due both to the unavailability of data and the 
restricted scope of enquiry.  Indeed, the World Bank holds to a line that PRSs, as nationally 
tailored documents, are not testable in a counterfactual sense.  However, there is a clear 
conflict between the IFI’s periodic joint reviews and the only published aggregative studies 
authored by the IFI’s external evaluation bodies.  While the former largely assert that progress 
has been made, the latter find only limited evidence of improvement, given by 
macroeconomic and process indicators for a small sample of countries. In addition, a number 
of independent case study evaluations find no strong evidence of a positive PRS impact. 
On the second and third questions regarding the policy mix and on the extent of IFI influence, 
the basic disagreement between IFI and non–IFI sources is still more apparent. The IFIs 
largely assert that PRSs are nationally owned, while independent contributions are critical.   
These accounts range from considered critiques of process and implementation practice, to the 
more radical, which view PRSs as repackaged structural adjustment programmes.  Although, 
the more balanced commentators find no overt biases, they also find that orthodox thinking is 
dominant within national PRS documents, and that policy alternatives are rarely considered. 
Moreover, many studies, including those of the evaluations bodies conclude that the IFIs are 
pivotal to the design and management of the majority of national PRSs.   
On the fourth question regarding quality of implementation, the critical evidence is also 
strong.  Case study materials, in particular, find much evidence of weak institutionalization 
and a lack of national buy-in.  Moreover, contributions within the aid effectiveness literature 
raise fundamental questions about the substance of the commitments given within PRS 
arrangements, and their ability to succeed in weak policy environments.  
Chapter Three represents the first part of the empirical appraisal, and offers a cross sectional 
evaluation of PRS performance using two specially constructed panel datasets, in which 
poverty is defined using national poverty lines and the international dollar-a-day line 
respectively.  The analysis adopts a counterfactual approach and is layered in its complexity, 
beginning with basic cross-tabulations of outcomes, and progressing to econometric 
evaluations based on standard panel methods. The impact of adopting a PRS is specified as 
treatment effect and estimated as the difference in outcomes between the adopting and non-
adopting groups.  The appraisal focuses on poverty reduction, but also examines its proximate 
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drivers of enhanced growth and lower inequality.   These cross sectional methods principally 
examine the first of the core research question, whether performance improvements can be 
traced to PRS adoption; but in addition, seek to probe the second question regarding the nature 
of the PRS policy mix.   
The overall picture to emerge is complex, yet there is some tentative evidence of a positive 
PRS impact on poverty levels, and more strongly, in relation to growth outcomes.  However, 
this evidence is partial and statistically fragile.  As the methods become more sophisticated 
and more comprehensive, the supporting evidence weakens.  A key issue is the impact of 
simultaneities and endogeneities on the relationships being tested.  The limitations of the 
available data ensure that efforts to resolve these biases can only be partially implemented.  
However, where it is possible to control for these potential biases, the PRS benefit is no longer 
found to be present.  This analysis also shows that it is the growth channel alone, through 
which any reductions are being achieved, and that adoption has no impact on distributional 
outcomes.  It can be concluded, therefore, that although PRSs may be poverty reducing, they 
are not distinctly pro-poor in a Strong sense.  In relation to the question of policy orientation, 
the findings are a little more positive for the Initiative. Statistical testing shows conclusively 
that there is no correlation between crude stabilization outcomes and adoption. This, taken 
together with the evidence of some poverty reduction impacts, rather discounts more radical 
views of PRSs as merely a veil for structural adjustment and stabilization.   
However, Chapter Three closes by emphasizing two sets of major evidential qualifications. 
The first concerns the general weakness of the datasets, the limited sample sizes and issues of 
consistency and comparability of country records. There is in addition a potential self-
selection problem, whereby the worst performing countries are effectively selected out of the 
analysis by simply not possessing any useful data126. As this disproportionately affects PRS 
countries, the analytical results are likely to inflate the adduced benefit.  A second set of 
objections relates to policy attribution and the weakness of cross-sectional analysis in 
identifying causation.  As the techniques employed do not, and cannot, effectively measure 
                                                 
126
 This is founded on the assumption that a lack of reliable data is likely to be correlated with the 
quality of policymaking and public administration, and the fact that these omissions occur for the most 
part within the PRS adopting group. 
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implementation performance, there is no guarantee that any identified gains are the causal 
result of the framework and policy effects that flow from PRS adoption.    
Chapters Four and Five, which present case studies of the Mongolian and Vietnamese 
experiences respectively, together form the second substantive part of the evaluation.  These 
cases were chosen purposely as they possess apparently sound longitudinal poverty records, 
have been claimed as PRS success stories, and significantly, have maintained clear, though 
diametrically opposed, policy stances, thus enabling the impact of any post-adoption policy 
changes to be identified.    
These country level investigations allow attention to be given to the latter research questions 
regarding the PRS policy mix, the influence of the IFIs and the quality of PRS 
implementation.  A common analytical approach is adopted in both chapters.  Each begins 
with a thorough review of the national context and an examination of the PRS policy template 
and relationship with the pre-existing policy stance.  Second, economic and social outcomes 
are examined and this includes the application of a series of quantitative poverty and 
inequality analyses. Finally, counterfactual appraisals of country performance are undertaken 
against comparators, and for the pre- and post-adoption periods.  
The Mongolian case is particularly useful in highlighting the difficulties faced in weak data 
and policy environments.  In spite of an apparently sound poverty record, based on four 
household surveys of an international standard, the analysis finds severe discontinuities in the 
published poverty record. This has implications both for interpreting the headline data and the 
analysis employed to examine changes over time.  A key task was to reconstruct the poverty 
series using simulation methods, and this radically re-writes Mongolia’s poverty reduction 
story.  While the official data show a stagnant headcount ratio  between 1995 and 2007/08, the 
revised estimates indicate there was a substantial decline between 1998 and 2002/03, and 
between 2002/03 and the latest data published in 2007/08. This pattern is concurrent with a 
substantial improvement in economic growth.   
As Mongolia’s PRS was concluded in 2002, this suggests, at face value, that PRS adoption 
has had a positive impact.  However, a more detailed examination discounts this, and finds 
that improved performance was established prior to adoption, and was the product non-
programme factors, chiefly the expansion of Mongolia’s minerals-based economy.  Moreover, 
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it is clear that inequality has continued to worsen, and that reductions in poverty are entirely 
the product of higher economic growth. The analysis also shows that growing inequality is 
increasingly limiting the poverty gains, and accepting the Strong definition, the post-PRS 
period has been distinctly less pro-poor. International comparisons are equally mixed, 
showing that while Mongolia performs well against the global non-adopting country average, 
on both growth and poverty outcomes, the trajectory of inequality is exceptionally poor, 
showing a much more marked deterioration.  Some social indicators do, however, show some 
post-adoption improvements. Chapter Four concludes that it is very difficult to trace the better 
poverty and economic outcomes to Mongolia’s PRS. In addition, that the poverty reduction 
process is based on trickledown effects from the minerals sector, and as such is vulnerable to 
changes in global commodity prices and trading conditions.  
It is similarly hard to make a case for a decisive post-adoption impact on policy orientation. 
The policy mix largely replicates the pre-existing laissez-faire approach, alongside a cautious 
macroeconomic stance.  Conclusions in relation to the role and influence of the IFIs are more 
interesting.   While the discussion finds that the PRS and the associated policy processes are 
dominated by the IFIs and especially the World Bank, it concludes, contrary to standard 
critiques, that these influences have served to make the existing stance more pro-poor than it 
would otherwise have been.  However, the PRS policy template, like the orthodox consensus 
which informs it, is a narrow one, and thus, the impact on outcomes has been marginal. 
With regard to PRS implementation, the Mongolian experience very much reflects the 
concerns articulated in the critical literature.  The strategy was poorly institutionally 
embedded from the outset, and viewed often as an external imposition.  From 2004 onward 
the PRS’s influence on policy weakened year on year, with its abandonment, and replacement 
by the National Development Plan in 2006.  Underpinning this failure were more fundamental 
forces driven by the unbalanced growth process rooted in the minerals sector and an asset 
price boom in the metropolitan core.  As a result, new political and economic interests 
emerged, and in turn, poverty lost its political salience.  In parallel, as the public revenues 
benefited from growth and concessional finance lost significance, the World Bank lost its 
potency as chief advocate for the PRS.   
230 
 
The second case study of the Vietnamese experience shows that although the policy stance 
and political economies of the two case countries are very different, the findings regarding the 
impact of the PRS on policymaking and the institutional domain are common.  Vietnam 
adopted a PRS in 2001, but did so largely to secure access to IFI lending, to support an 
already growing economy.   The Vietnamese State had already proved itself very capable in 
negotiating the transition to the market, yet here too, the PRS framework largely failed to 
affect the existing policy stance, and has also effectively been abandoned. 
The published data record is reliable and included five comparable household surveys.  These 
show that poverty reduction has been sustained in the pre- and post-adoption periods.  The 
two strongest episodes were the early Doi Moi years during the early 1990s, and the period 
immediately following adoption in 2001.  Moreover, although inequality has grown, its 
impact on the poverty level has been checked and the latest data suggest there has been some 
distributional improvement. Unsurprisingly, these gains led the World Bank to herald 
Vietnam as a PRS exemplar.  However, as with Mongolia, a more detailed review rejects its 
causal importance.  Before versus after comparisons of performance, show that post-adoption 
outcomes were neither better nor worse than in the pre-adoption period.  Similar conclusions 
arise from with versus without counterfactual comparisons.  Although poverty reduction has 
generally been better in Vietnam than those of non-adopting countries, it also outperforms 
other PRS adopters and has done so consistently.  Instead, the pattern of gains better reflects 
the evolution of the pre-existing, and highly eclectic, policy stance.   
Examination of the policy mix and the role of IFIs and policy implementation, finds that the 
Vietnamese authorities and the IFIs viewed the PRS framework in very different ways. In 
spite of considerable investment on both sides, the national authorities abandoned the PRS 
when they felt it had out lived its usefulness.  A key issue throughout was the lack of 
connection with the real policymaking structures.  Although, the authorities devoted new 
resources to the PRS, they retained the existing (former central) planning framework and this 
remained the effective driver of policy.  The IFIs initially adopted a hands-off approach to the 
PRS in Vietnam. With time, their posture became more assertive, but this also weakened the 
PRS’s authority.  Indeed, although considerably more developed and functional than its 
Mongolian counterpart, the Vietnamese framework had still less impact on policymaking.   
While some commentators have claimed some institutional spin-offs, these are marginal.  The 
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forces which determined the ultimate fate of the PRS were rooted in the dynamics of the 
national political economy and the institutional structures of Vietnam.   
6.3 Core Hypotheses and Research Questions  
This penultimate section offers specific conclusions on the four core research questions set out 
in Chapter One (see 1.4), which this thesis has been structured around.  To aid the discussion, 
the associated testable hypotheses, which were defined as critical statements, are reproduced 
in full below:   
 Poverty reduction performance has not been significantly better under PRS arrangements.    
 PRS policy packages invariably reflect orthodox policy approaches and objectives.  
 The IFIs exercise considerable influence over the content and management of PRSs, and 
the level of national ownership remains limited. 
 PRSs have had only a limited impact on the actual policy stance of adopting governments.  
The overall evidence relating to poverty reduction performance is mixed.  Indications of a 
partial poverty reduction benefit in the cross sectional analysis is rather contradicted by 
inconclusive findings from both the quantitative and qualitative parts of the case study 
appraisals.  Nevertheless, the evidence of an aggregate treatment effect is supported by the 
presence of some marginal gains in the Mongolian case (particularly in relation to social 
outcomes) and some capacity improvements in the Vietnamese case.  It should also be 
recognized that the evidence of a positive PRS impact on growth is rather stronger, drawing 
support from the aggregate evaluations and the case materials.  There is also no strong 
evidence that PRSs have worsened poverty outcomes or that they have merely served as a fig 
leaf for structural adjustment and stabilization policies.  
However, it should also be emphasized that the evidence of a PRS treatment effect is tenuous.  
Gains are largely confined to the international (dollar-a-day) panel dataset and are challenged 
by a series of evidential concerns.  The supportive case is rather compromised by clear 
indications that inequality, and thus the poverty elasticity of growth, generally worsens under 
PRS arrangements.   A major challenge is posed by a host of data problems, and especially the 
difficulties of establishing a consistent and comparable empirical record.  Moreover, the 
aggregate appraisal, which is more favourable towards the presence of positive PRS impact, 
suffers from a fundamental evidential problem, that of establishing a causal link between 
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adoption and outcomes.  Indeed, where it is possible to employ techniques (specifically 
instrumental variables methods) to resolve these issues, the treatment effect is no longer 
evident.  In addition, cross sectional methods cannot effectively deal with the identification or 
attribution of policy effects.  It is also important to note that the supportive country-level 
evidence, the alleged marginal improvements in social indicators and institutional quality, 
represent a rather optimistic reading of the facts.  It is clear in relation to the vital issue of 
causation, which the case studies are better able to test, that the supportive country-level 
evidence is exceptionally weak.  Nevertheless, on balance, there is some indication of a 
limited impact, and therefore it is not possible to accept the first critical hypothesis.   
Conclusions with regard to the neutrality of the PRS policy mix are rather stronger.  While 
both parts of the evaluation rather discount notions of PRSs as merely latter day forms of 
structural adjustment, the evidence does, however, point to a new narrowness of approach.  
The aggregate appraisal underlines the centrality of growth to the claimed reductions in 
poverty, and the generally stronger association between PRSs and better growth outcomes.  
The Mongolian case shows, fairly unambiguously, the limitations of the consensus policy 
agenda and its basic reliance on orthodox thinking.  Although this is not initially true in the 
Vietnamese case, orthodox choices come to dominate the policy position articulated within 
the PRS documentation.  These findings resonate with those accounts within the literature 
which offer a variation on more radical critiques, such as that of Craig and Porter (2006), who 
locate PRSs within an evolving neo-liberal paradigm.  It is possible, drawing on the analysis 
of the consensus which informs the standard template of reforms, and the outcomes, to 
construe PRSs as elaborated, but still narrow, growth strategies.  The second critical 
hypothesis is therefore accepted. 
Strong conclusions can also be made over the third question, regarding role and influence of 
the IFIs in the PRS process.   The case materials generally confirm the claims made in Chapter 
One that the IFIs play a pivotal role in shaping the policies outlined in PRS documents.  
Moreover, although the nature of their influence has changed, emphasizing policy tutelage 
over direct sanctions, their effective power over the content and management of PRSs remains 
considerable.  However, as will be found below, this failure to permit genuine ownership is 
also one of the Initiative’s greatest flaws. Additionally, the case study materials suggest that in 
the longer term PRSs have proved ineffective in ensuring policy compliance.  
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It is important to underline that the extent of control is also a function of the relative power of 
the local IFI missions (and within this the relative significance of concessional finance), 
versus the success of the national governments both in narrow economic terms and in 
reducing poverty.  As both cases studies show, external influence over national PRSs, and 
their impact, waxed and waned with the performance of national economies.  It is also 
important not to underplay the capability and authority of the State in shaping these relations.  
Indeed, in Vietnam, the PRS’s impact on the actual policy stance always remained within the 
gift of the national authorities.  Here again, therefore, the critical hypothesis is accepted. 
This final point leads on to the fourth, and arguably most significant question, that of the 
quality and extent of implementation – in essence whether PRSs genuinely impacted on the 
actions and strategic orientation of policymakers.  Here the evidence suggests PRSs had very 
little impact, and where influence was detected, it was shallow and transitory.  This is 
especially the case in Vietnam, where the PRS remained, as described by a local interviewee, 
“the cost of doing business with the World Bank”127.  Instead, it was the national authorities 
which orchestrated the PRS process for their own ends, and principally, to secure concessional 
finance. Yet these failures are also found in the weaker policy environment of Mongolia.  
Here although there are stronger indications of influence, a lack of effective 
institutionalization and a failure of the framework to engage with the political space ensured 
the PRS’s impact was marginal.  The final piece of evidence, which confirms acceptance of 
the fourth critical hypothesis, is the abandonment of the PRS in both countries after an interval 
of barely five years.  Indeed, similar events in many other PRS countries raise serious doubts 
over the Initiative’s future viability. This final set of conclusions represents the most 
compelling challenge to the claimed causal link between adoption and better outcomes.   
6.4 Overall conclusions  
Taken together, the conclusions paint a picture of PRSs as a policy mechanism whose 
potential was never fully realized.  However, the extent to which the Initiative substantively 
failed rather depends on the criteria employed, and as the review provided in Chapters One 
and Two suggests, the various actors within its development had very different understandings 
of the core aims and objectives.  This thesis, and the hypotheses examined above, took these 
                                                 
127
 Nguyen Thang, Director of the Vietnamese Academy of Social Sciences 
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as articulated in the published IFI materials. While on these grounds, performance was 
underwhelming, from a perspective which emphasizes narrow economic and governance 
gains, the picture is somewhat more positive.   
In addition, for a group of less critical commentators, rather too much was being expected of 
PRSs from the outset. As Kanbur (2009) argues, the challenging political environments, 
which typify most PRS adopting countries, ensure that distributional questions, such as land 
reform, which underpin successful historic models of poverty reduction, are highly politicized 
and exceptionally difficult to address.  However, while these arguments have some validity, it 
is surely the role of the policy framework to make such reforms possible – through building 
the necessary political coalition, enhancing technical capacity and establishing sound 
economic institutions.  Moreover, PRSs’ inability to tackle such issues surely lays bare their 
fundamental weaknesses. 
At heart, the inadequacies of the Initiative are three fold.  First and foremost, is its reliance on 
a policy consensus which is limited in scope and lacking in ambition about the role of the 
State.  In spite of much rhetoric, the policy template is avowedly orthodox and restricts rather 
than promotes experimentation.  The Initiative also tends to preclude the adoption of the types 
of policy models, such as those associated with the East Asian developmental state, which 
have been shown to secure sustained poverty reduction.  In addition, PRSs are underpinned by 
a limiting theory of governance.  As articulated in its most developed form in the World 
Development Report (1997), this views the only effective LDC government as one which 
accepts the limitations of its capability and a narrow policy reach.  PRSs aim also, therefore, 
to circumscribe the State through the imposition of self-discipline and a set of externally 
crafted accountability mechanisms.   Indeed, it can be argued, rather than avoiding the 
political space, the PRS Initiative, through its mantra of empowerment, consultative and 
accountability mechanisms and field assessments, seeks to supplant it with an idealized liberal 
form of governance.  
Second, at a systemic level, the Initiative fails to adequately resolve the principal agent 
problem, which is its theoretical underpinning.  As the field level evidence presented within 
this thesis and a growing literature has shown, the claim made for national ownership is 
deeply disingenuous.  For its IFI sponsors, PRSs are managed not with the objective of 
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liberating national policymakers to craft the alternative and adaptive approaches as envisaged 
by PRS optimists, but rather to convince, tutor and corral governments into accepting a sound 
(i.e. orthodox)  policy stance.  Yet this mission failed due to a suite of pressures.  Chief among 
these was the inability of the IFIs to assemble a sufficiently supportive collation of interests 
within adopting countries.  
Third, building on both of the above, is the much discussed, and well anticipated, failure to 
embed and secure PRS frameworks within national institutional matrices.  The evidence 
offered within this thesis suggests that the key constraint was not the lack of technical support, 
nor even the lack of willingness on the part of the IFIs to permit some latitude to 
policymakers, but rather the failure of individual PRS arrangements to address varied and 
evolving political economies.  In both Mongolia and Vietnam, it is the failure of their 
respective PRSs, and their IFI sponsors, to appreciate and interact with the dynamics and 
distribution of power, which underpins the abandonment of the arrangements.  
If the Initiative, and individual country PRSs, are to have a legacy beyond the establishment 
of the technical apparatus required for monitoring and evaluating the poverty and 
distributional impacts of policy, then lessons must be learnt about each of these failures.  Thus 
far, IFI thinking has tended to avoid such considerations, retreating instead to a more overtly 
economic and technical agenda. Only time will tell if national and donor governments take up 
this challenge in providing more durable development planning mechanisms.   
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APPENDIX B:  EPISODE-BASED FORMAT OF PANEL DATA  
Table B.1: National Poverty Data 
Country and Episode 
Total change in: 
Episode 
Length 
PRS 
Year  
PRS 
Status 
Income 
based 
data? Headcount 
Gini 
Coefficient  
Per 
Capita 
GDP 
Albania 2002 - 2005 -6.90 4.88 21.18 3 2000 1 0 
Armenia 1996 - 1998 -5.60 -7.22 10.61 2 2001 0 0 
Armenia 1998 - 2001 1.80 -2.80 46.43 3 2001 0 0 
Armenia 2001 - 2003 -8.00 -0.60 45.48 2 2001 1 0 
Bangladesh 2000 - 2005 -9.80 0.30 21.38 5 2001 1 0 
Belarus 1997 - 1999 -13.40 4.70 14.71 2   0 0 
Belarus 1999 - 2002 -7.50 -0.59 22.59 3   0 0 
Benin 1999 - 2002 -0.80 -9.10 4.38 3 2000 1 0 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 2001 - 2004 -1.70 7.75 24.88 3 2004 0 0 
Bulgaria 1997 - 2001 -23.20 7.96 18.97 4   0 0 
Burkina Faso 1998 - 2003 1.10 -0.30 13.87 5 2000 1 0 
Cambodia 1997 - 2004 -1.10 1.60 44.44 7 2000 1 0 
Cameroon 1996 - 2001 -13.10 -2.26 9.29 5 2000 0 0 
Chile 1996 - 2001 -4.90 0.30 10.44 5   0 1 
Chile 2001 - 2006 -8.00 -3.36 20.50 5   0 1 
Costa Rica 1998 - 2005 0.90 -0.90 17.93 7   0 1 
Cote d'Ivoire 1998 - 2003 3.40 4.64 -17.77 5 2002 0 0 
Dominican Republic 1997 - 2000 0.05 2.42 21.03 3   0 1 
Dominican Republic 2000 - 2002 0.40 -0.20 7.12 2   0 1 
Dominican Republic 2002 - 2004 14.90 0.30 -3.75 2   0 1 
Ecuador 1998 - 2001 -0.80 2.90 1.65 3   0 0 
El Salvador 2000 - 2002 -2.40 0.40 0.30 2   0 1 
Georgia 1997 - 2001 4.90 0.82 19.35 4 2000 0 0 
Georgia 2001 - 2004 1.20 3.68 35.20 3 2000 1 0 
Ghana 1998 - 2005 -11.00 2.01 17.16 7 2000 1 0 
Guatemala 2000 - 2006 -5.20 -0.81 1.08 6 . 0 0 
Honduras 1999 - 2003 -2.00 2.38 4.72 4 2000 1 1 
Indonesia 1996 - 1999 5.90 -4.90 -12.35 3 2003 0 0 
Indonesia 1999 - 2003 -6.00 2.77 14.14 4 2003 0 0 
Indonesia 2003 - 2005 -1.40 0.33 8.21 2 2003 1 0 
Jamaica 1996 - 1998 -10.20 2.50 -4.03 2 . 0 0 
Jamaica 1998 - 2000 2.80 2.62 0.82 2 . 0 0 
Jamaica 2000 - 2002 1.00 2.75 1.64 2 . 0 0 
Jamaica 2002 - 2004 -2.80 -2.83 2.14 2 . 0 0 
Jordan 1997 - 2002 -7.10 2.45 8.83 5 . 0 0 
Kazakhstan 1996 - 1998 4.40 -2.01 3.15 2 . 0 0 
Kazakhstan 1998 - 2001 -10.60 -2.01 29.87 3 . 0 0 
Kyrgyz Republic 2000 - 2003 -14.20 -1.32 11.01 3 2001 1 0 
Kyrgyz Republic 2003 - 2005 -6.10 -4.30 5.34 2 2001 1 0 
Lao PDR 1998 - 2003 -5.60 -1.93 21.25 5 2001 1 0 
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Country and Episode 
Total change in: 
Episode 
Length 
PRS 
Year  
PRS 
Status 
Income 
based 
data? Headcount 
Gini 
Coefficient  
Per 
Capita 
GDP 
Madagascar 1997 - 1999 -2.00 -0.90 2.49 2 2000 0 0 
Madagascar 1999 - 2001 -1.60 4.30 4.79 2 2000 0 0 
Madagascar 2001 - 2005 -1.00 -0.16 -6.44 4 2000 1 0 
Malawi 1998 - 2003 -1.50 0.02 -7.36 5 2000 1 0 
Mali 1998 - 2001 4.50 -4.43 4.77 3 2000 0 0 
Mali 2001 - 2006 -3.90 -1.11 15.70 5 2000 1 0 
Mexico 1998 - 2000 -9.20 2.88 8.20 2 . 0 0 
Mexico 2000 - 2002 -3.90 -2.19 -2.47 2 . 0 0 
Mexico 2002 - 2004 -2.70 -3.63 3.05 2 . 0 0 
Moldova 1999 - 2001 -18.40 -3.42 7.94 2 2000 0 0 
Moldova 2001 - 2003 -25.60 0.22 15.21 2 2000 1 0 
Moldova 2003 - 2005 0.00 1.10 25.90 2 2000 1 0 
Mongolia 1998 - 2002 0.50 -2.10 4.09 4 2001 0 0 
Mongolia 2002 - 2007 -0.90 5.10 33.19 5 2001 1 0 
Nicaragua 1998 - 2001 -2.10 -3.55 5.57 3 2000 0 0 
Pakistan 1997 - 2001 7.60 5.31 3.85 4 2001 0 0 
Paraguay 1997 - 2000 1.80 0.71 -9.99 3 . 0 0 
Paraguay 2000 - 2002 12.50 0.75 -1.78 2 . 0 1 
Peru 1997 - 1999 4.80 4.58 -3.22 2 . 0 0 
Peru 1999 - 2001 6.80 -2.40 -0.05 2 . 0 0 
Peru 2001 - 2004 -1.20 -1.00 10.13 3 . 0 0 
Philippines 1997 - 2000 -3.80 -0.07 2.14 3 . 0 0 
Philippines 2000 - 2003 -2.60 -1.56 5.27 3 . 0 0 
Romania 2000 - 2002 -7.00 2.06 11.09 2 . 0 0 
Romania 2002 - 2005 -13.80 0.04 20.64 3 . 0 0 
Russian Fed. 1997 - 2000 11.80 -4.72 12.15 3 . 0 0 
Russian Fed. 2000 - 2002 -16.30 -2.84 12.54 2 . 0 0 
Senegal 1998 - 2001 -9.90 -0.08 6.85 3 2000 0 0 
Senegal 2001 - 2003 -10.10 -1.03 2.58 2 2000 1 0 
Tajikistan 1999 - 2003 -10.10 1.12 44.82 4 2000 1 0 
Thailand 1996 - 1998 1.60 -2.03 -13.57 2 . 0 0 
Thailand 1998 - 2000 1.20 1.79 6.27 2 . 0 0 
Thailand 2000 - 2002 -4.40 -1.19 5.38 2 . 0 0 
Uganda 1997 - 2000 -9.00 5.00 7.95 3 2000 0 0 
Uganda 2000 - 2003 2.70 3.00 6.40 3 2000 1 0 
Uzbekistan 2000 - 2005 -1.70 9.92 24.27 5 2005 0 0 
Venezuela, RB 1999 - 2002 2.41 0.30 -6.60 3 . 0 1 
Venezuela, RB 2002 - 2005 -5.50 -2.10 10.60 3 . 0 1 
Vietnam 1998 - 2002 -8.50 2.03 23.52 4 2001 0 0 
Vietnam 2002 - 2004 -9.40 -1.39 16.79 2 2001 1 0 
Vietnam 2004 - 2006 -3.53 1.61 20.58 2 2001 1 0 
Zambia 1998 - 2002 -16.90 -11.36 6.92 4 2000 1 0 
Zambia 2002 - 2004 12.00 8.66 5.79 2 2000 1 0 
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Table B.2: Dollar a Day Poverty Data 
Country and Episode 
Total change in: 
Episode 
Length 
PRS 
Year  
PRS 
Status 
Income 
based 
data? Headcount 
Gini 
Coefficient  
Per 
Capita 
GDP 
Albania 1996 - 2002 0.37 -0.97 30.73 6 2000 1 0 
Albania 2002 - 2005 0.28 4.88 21.18 3 2000 1 0 
Argentina 1996 - 1998 -1.44 1.26 9.92 2 . 0 1 
Argentina 1998 - 2002 2.73 2.68 -23.90 4 . 0 1 
Argentina 2002 - 2004 -0.04 -1.24 13.91 2 . 0 1 
Argentina 2004 - 2006 -2.22 -2.51 15.41 2 . 0 1 
Armenia 1996 - 1998 0.53 -8.41 10.61 2 2001 0 0 
Armenia 1998 - 2001 -7.04 0.21 46.43 3 2001 0 0 
Armenia 2001 - 2003 -0.36 -2.42 45.48 2 2001 1 0 
Bangladesh 2000 - 2005 -5.64 0.30 21.38 5 2001 1 0 
Belarus 1997 - 2000 -2.33 4.73 22.50 3 . 0 0 
Belarus 2000 - 2005 -0.33 -2.43 62.92 5 . 0 0 
Bolivia 1997 - 1999 5.76 -0.67 5.75 2 2000 0 1 
Bolivia 1999 - 2002 -1.89 2.45 7.56 3 2000 1 1 
Bolivia 2002 - 2005 -3.19 -2.05 13.40 3 2000 1 1 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 2002 - 2004 0.16 7.75 16.91 2 2004 0 0 
Brazil 1996 - 1998 -0.40 0.04 0.34 2 . 0 1 
Brazil 1998 - 2001 -0.07 -0.54 1.93 3 . 0 1 
Brazil 2001 - 2003 -0.53 -1.08 -0.49 2 . 0 1 
Brazil 2003 - 2005 -2.67 -1.22 4.38 2 . 0 1 
Brazil 2005 - 2007 -2.55 -1.37 5.11 2 . 0 1 
Bulgaria 1997 - 2001 2.32 7.96 18.97 4 . 0 0 
Bulgaria 2001 - 2003 -2.64 -5.13 12.63 2 . 0 0 
Burkina Faso 1998 - 2003 -13.49 -7.25 13.87 5 2000 1 0 
Cameroon 1996 - 2001 -18.65 -2.26 9.29 5 2000 0 0 
Chile 1996 - 1998 0.25 0.68 7.06 2 . 0 1 
Chile 1998 - 2000 0.35 -0.38 1.11 2 . 0 1 
Chile 2000 - 2003 0.07 -0.44 6.48 3 . 0 1 
Colombia 1996 - 1998 2.56 2.15 0.12 2 . 0 1 
Colombia 1998 - 2000 0.67 -0.71 -4.89 2 . 0 1 
Colombia 2000 - 2003 -1.41 1.33 1.88 3 . 0 1 
Costa Rica 1996 - 1998 -3.12 1.05 8.87 2 . 0 1 
Costa Rica 1998 - 2001 -0.43 1.83 4.47 3 . 0 1 
Costa Rica 2001 - 2004 -1.16 -2.73 8.58 3 . 0 1 
Cote d'Ivoire 1998 - 2002 -0.72 4.64 -15.04 4 2002 0 0 
Dominican Republic 1996 - 2000 -1.46 3.40 27.80 4 . 0 1 
Dominican Republic 2000 - 2003 1.71 -0.23 2.71 3 . 0 1 
Dominican Republic 2003 - 2006 -2.16 0.03 16.44 3 . 0 1 
Ecuador 1998 - 2003 -4.43 8.25 3.94 5 . 0 0 
Ecuador 2003 - 2005 -0.71 -8.13 10.45 2 . 0 0 
Ecuador 2005 - 2007 -5.09 0.72 5.58 2 . 0 0 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1999 - 2004 0.18 -0.62 10.43 5 . 0 0 
El Salvador 1996 - 1998 -1.51 -0.08 3.78 2 . 0 1 
El Salvador 1998 - 2000 -0.71 -0.25 1.67 2 . 0 1 
El Salvador 2000 - 2003 1.48 -2.55 0.64 3 . 0 1 
El Salvador 2003 - 2005 -3.28 0.33 1.05 2 . 0 1 
Estonia 1998 - 2000 0.59 -0.64 11.68 2 . 0 0 
Estonia 2000 - 2003 -0.64 -1.22 30.32 3 . 0 0 
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Country and Episode 
Total change in: Episod
e 
Length 
PRS 
Year  
PRS 
Status 
Income 
based 
data? Headcount 
Gini 
Coefficient  
Per 
Capita 
GDP 
Georgia 1996 - 1998 2.42 0.25 18.03 2 2000 0 0 
Georgia 1998 - 2000 2.69 1.47 7.79 2 2000 0 0 
Georgia 2000 - 2002 5.51 1.46 15.18 2 2000 1 0 
Georgia 2002 - 2005 -1.66 0.47 42.37 3 2000 1 0 
Ghana 1998 - 2005 -9.13 2.01 17.16 7 2000 1 0 
Guatemala 1998 - 2000 -2.59 -0.68 2.10 2 . 0 0 
Guatemala 2000 - 2002 3.86 0.37 -0.72 2 . 0 0 
Guatemala 2002 - 2006 -4.27 -1.65 1.80 4 . 0 0 
Honduras 1997 - 1999 -1.16 -1.55 -4.31 2 2000 0 1 
Honduras 1999 - 2003 3.66 2.38 4.72 4 2000 1 1 
Honduras 2003 - 2005 4.80 2.83 4.10 2 2000 1 1 
Honduras 2005 - 2007 -4.71 -1.40 4.31 2 2000 1 1 
Jamaica 1996 - 1999 -0.48 3.75 -3.31 3 . 0 0 
Jamaica 1999 - 2004 -1.02 1.29 3.88 5 . 0 0 
Jordan 1997 - 2002 -0.35 2.45 8.83 5 . 0 0 
Jordan 2002 - 2006 -0.78 -1.15 17.16 4 . 0 0 
Kazakhstan 1996 - 2001 -4.47 -4.02 3.15 5 . 0 0 
Kazakhstan 2001 - 2003 2.61 2.55 55.42 2 . 0 0 
Kyrgyz Republic 1998 - 2002 2.19 -4.31 11.09 4 2001 0 0 
Kyrgyz Republic 2002 - 2004 -12.22 1.26 14.62 2 2001 1 0 
Lao PDR 1997 - 2002 -5.36 -2.28 18.34 5 2001 0 0 
Latvia 1996 - 1998 -0.42 2.02 15.68 2 . 0 1 
Lithuania 1996 - 1998 -0.02 -2.15 16.47 2 . 0 1 
Lithuania 1998 - 2000 0.12 1.64 4.62 2 . 0 1 
Lithuania 2000 - 2002 0.01 0.48 17.95 2 . 0 1 
Lithuania 2002 - 2004 -0.43 3.47 26.74 2 . 0 1 
Macedonia, FYR 1998 - 2000 2.94 6.23 8.51 2 2000 0 0 
Macedonia, FYR 2000 - 2003 -2.47 4.51 -2.05 3 2000 1 0 
Madagascar 1997 - 1999 10.28 2.65 2.49 2 2000 0 0 
Madagascar 1999 - 2001 -5.98 5.66 4.79 2 2000 0 0 
Madagascar 2001 - 2005 -8.51 -0.23 -6.44 4 2000 1 0 
Malawi 1997 - 2004 -9.21 -11.29 -6.41 7 2000 1 0 
Mali 2001 - 2006 -9.75 -1.11 15.70 5 2000 1 0 
Mexico 1996 - 1998 1.03 0.45 8.99 2 . 0 0 
Mexico 1998 - 2000 -3.19 2.88 8.20 2 . 0 0 
Mexico 2000 - 2002 -1.09 -2.19 -2.47 2 . 0 0 
Mexico 2002 - 2004 -0.93 -3.63 3.05 2 . 0 0 
Mexico 2004 - 2006 -2.15 2.06 4.75 2 . 0 0 
Moldova 1997 - 1999 29.07 -0.04 -9.58 2 2000 0 0 
Moldova 1999 - 2001 -11.16 -0.68 7.94 2 2000 0 0 
Moldova 2001 - 2004 -24.88 -0.58 23.99 3 2000 1 0 
Mongolia 1998 - 2002 -18.68 2.57 4.09 4 2001 0 0 
Mongolia 2002 - 2005 6.91 0.19 20.99 3 2001 1 0 
Morocco 1998 - 2000 -0.51 1.17 -1.92 2 . 0 0 
Morocco 2000 - 2007 -3.75 0.25 26.19 7 . 0 0 
Nicaragua 1998 - 2001 -2.34 -3.55 5.57 3 2000 0 0 
Nicaragua 2001 - 2005 -3.61 2.03 1.73 4 2000 1 0 
Pakistan 1996 - 1998 -19.09 4.40 -1.18 2 2001 0 0 
Pakistan 1998 - 2001 6.82 -2.66 3.67 3 2001 0 0 
Pakistan 2001 - 2004 -13.28 0.79 9.22 3 2001 1 0 
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Country and Episode 
 
Total change in: Episode 
Length 
PRS 
Year  
PRS 
Status 
Income 
based 
data? Headcount Gini Coefficient  
Per 
Capita 
GDP 
Panama 1996 - 2000 -0.94 0.25 10.66 4 . 0 1 
Panama 2000 - 2002 -0.71 -0.05 -0.98 2 . 0 1 
Panama 2002 - 2004 -1.59 -1.63 8.95 2 . 0 1 
Panama 2004 - 2006 0.28 0.05 11.06 2 . 0 1 
Paraguay 1997 - 1999 -5.30 0.33 -4.95 2 . 0 1 
Paraguay 1999 - 2002 2.90 1.13 -6.82 3 . 0 1 
Paraguay 2002 - 2005 -7.93 -4.09 5.36 3 . 0 1 
Paraguay 2005 - 2007 -2.85 -0.65 3.27 2 . 0 1 
Peru 1996 - 2001 6.54 7.37 1.76 5 . 0 0 
Peru 2001 - 2006 -7.19 -4.06 20.92 5 . 0 0 
Philippines 1997 - 2000 0.84 -0.07 2.14 3 . 0 0 
Philippines 2000 - 2003 -0.46 -1.56 5.27 3 . 0 0 
Philippines 2003 - 2006 0.63 -0.49 11.50 3 . 0 0 
Poland 1996 - 1998 -1.29 0.19 12.27 2 . 0 0 
Poland 1998 - 2000 0.03 0.08 9.97 2 . 0 0 
Poland 2000 - 2002 -0.03 1.12 4.75 2 . 0 0 
Poland 2002 - 2005 -0.01 0.87 16.80 3 . 0 0 
Romania 1998 - 2000 1.77 0.81 1.73 2 . 0 0 
Romania 2000 - 2002 -0.87 1.21 11.09 2 . 0 0 
Romania 2002 - 2005 -2.11 0.04 20.64 3 . 0 0 
Russian Federation 1996 - 1999 -1.20 -8.67 2.94 3 . 0 0 
Russian Federation 1999 - 2002 -1.96 -1.78 23.29 3 . 0 0 
Russian Federation 2002 - 2005 -0.16 1.81 30.75 3 . 0 0 
Senegal 2001 - 2005 -10.69 -2.06 9.59 4 2000 1 0 
Tajikistan 1999 - 2004 -23.04 2.09 59.79 5 2000 1 0 
Thailand 1996 - 1999 -0.36 0.14 -10.62 3 . 0 0 
Thailand 1999 - 2002 -0.83 -1.57 8.70 3 . 0 0 
Thailand 2002 - 2004 -0.30 0.49 10.60 2 . 0 0 
Turkey 2002 - 2005 0.72 0.52 18.61 3 . 0 0 
Uganda 1996 - 1999 -3.90 5.94 8.14 3 2000 0 0 
Uganda 1999 - 2002 -3.12 2.70 7.58 3 2000 1 0 
Uganda 2002 - 2005 -5.84 -3.15 6.19 3 2000 1 0 
Ukraine 1996 - 1999 0.10 -6.16 -2.81 3 . 0 0 
Ukraine 1999 - 2002 -1.49 -0.68 25.62 3 . 0 0 
Ukraine 2002 - 2005 -0.44 -0.07 35.46 3 . 0 0 
Uzbekistan 1998 - 2003 14.17 -8.63 15.17 5 2005 0 0 
Venezuela, RB 1996 - 1998 -0.74 0.74 2.42 2 . 0 1 
Venezuela, RB 1998 - 2003 4.44 -1.33 -22.93 5 . 0 1 
Venezuela, RB 2003 - 2006 -14.88 -4.76 24.23 3 . 0 1 
Vietnam 1998 - 2002 -9.60 2.03 23.52 4 2001 0 0 
Vietnam 2002 - 2004 -15.87 -1.39 16.79 2 2001 1 0 
Vietnam 2004 - 2006 -2.73 1.61 20.58 2 2001 1 0 
Zambia 1996 - 1998 -6.67 3.65 -5.15 2 2000 0 0 
Zambia 1998 - 2002 9.20 -11.36 6.92 4 2000 1 0 
Zambia 2002 - 2004 -0.31 8.66 5.79 2 2000 1 0 
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APPENDIX C:  PERIOD-BASED FORMAT OF PANEL DATA  
Table C.1: National Data 
Country  Survey Year     Headcount Ratio     Index of Per Capita GDP   Gini Coefficient     Income PRS 
  
1996-
99 2000-02 2003-05 2005-07 1996-99 2000-02 2003-05 2005-07 1996-99 2000-02 2003-05 2005-07 1996-99 2000-02 2003-05 2005-07 Based? Year 
Albania . . 2002 2005 . . 25.40 18.50 96.77 119.86 130.73 151.91 29.12 28.15 31.10 33.03 0 2000 
Argentina . . . . . . . . 105.63 101.93 92.86 114.75 . . . . 1 . 
Armenia 1997 2001 2003 . 51.90 50.90 42.90 . 105.31 157.04 202.52 257.38 40.81 34.40 33.80 . 0 2001 
Bangladesh . 2000 2005 . . 48.90 40.00 . 102.90 112.73 134.11 139.99 . 30.72 31.02 31.02 0 2001 
Belarus 1997 2000 2002 . 33.20 23.50 18.50 . 116.90 134.10 149.20 210.89 27.95 30.24 29.73 27.92 0 . 
Benin . 1999 2002 . . 29.30 28.50 . 102.24 106.43 110.81 114.60 . 50.60 41.50 . 0 2000 
Bolivia . . . . . . . . 105.09 113.24 122.13 135.77 . . . . . . 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina . 2001 2004 . . 19.50 17.80 . 126.20 176.61 201.49 220.25 . 28.03 35.78 . 0 2004 
Botswana . . 2002 . . . 31.00 . 108.56 132.50 146.30 184.50 . . . . 0 . 
Brazil 1998 . . . 22.00 . . . 100.34 101.45 103.26 108.64 59.23 . . . 1 . 
Bulgaria 1997 2001 . . 36.00 12.80 . . 95.15 114.12 127.39 152.91 26.38 34.34 . . 0 . 
Burkina Faso . 1998 2003 . . 45.30 46.40 . 104.90 110.37 124.24 135.38 46.20 46.20 45.90 . 0 2000 
Cambodia 1997 . 2004 . 36.10 . 35.00 . 100.15 116.28 144.59 164.65 40.40 . 42.00 . 0 2000 
Cameroon 1996 2001 . . 53.30 40.20 . . 100.00 109.29 110.24 112.67 46.82 44.56 . . 0 2000 
Chile 1996 2001 . 2006 23.60 18.70 . 10.70 100.00 110.44 115.48 130.94 55.40 55.36 . 52.00 1 . 
China 1998 . . . 4.60 . . . 115.61 132.39 168.99 221.72 . . . . 0 . 
Colombia 1999 . . . . 64.00 . . 94.15 94.78 97.43 106.49 58.21 57.92 58.83 58.49 1 . 
Costa Rica 1998 . . 2005 23.00 . . 23.90 108.87 114.29 118.50 126.80 48.13 46.60 49.76 47.23 1 . 
Cote d'Ivoire . 1998 2003 . . 33.60 37.00 . 103.36 106.31 88.54 89.47 . 43.75 48.39 . 0 2002 
Dominican 
Republic 1997 2000 2003 2004 26.70 27.15 31.08 42.05 106.77 129.40 132.72 131.17 49.58 51.95 51.88 52.10 1 . 
Ecuador 1998 2001 . . 46.00 45.20 . . 102.10 103.75 107.57 119.50 53.10 56.00 61.78 54.01 0 . 
Egypt, Arab Rep. . 2000 . . . 16.70 . . 104.23 119.99 121.69 131.92 . 32.76 . . 0 . 
El Salvador . 2000 2002 . . 39.25 37.20 . 101.96 105.35 105.75 108.98 51.74 52.02 52.32 49.70 1 . 
Estonia . . . . . . . . 110.44 130.00 161.55 209.69 37.64 . . . 0 . 
Georgia 1997 2000 2003 2004 48.20 51.57 53.30 52.30 108.55 127.01 149.32 167.94 36.73 37.93 40.34 40.78 0 2000 
Ghana . 1998 2005 . . 39.50 28.50 . 101.77 103.72 120.88 124.95 . 40.75 39.40 42.76 0 2000 
Guatemala . 2000 . 2006 . 56.20 . 51.00 101.83 105.99 104.97 107.07 55.65 54.50 49.40 53.69 0 . 
Honduras . 1999 2004 . . 53.00 51.00 . 101.51 97.85 102.57 108.80 53.05 51.50 49.40 56.01 1 2000 
India 1999 . . . . 28.60 . . 112.15 114.57 126.73 153.20 . 32.00 . . 0 . 
Indonesia 1996 1999 2003 2005 17.50 23.40 17.43 16.00 100.00 87.65 101.92 110.00 36.60 31.70 34.38 34.80 0 2003 
Jamaica 1997 2000 2003 2004 20.63 17.53 19.40 16.90 98.00 97.06 99.27 100.57 41.72 45.59 47.63 45.51 0 . 
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1996-99 2000-02 2003-05 2005-07 1996-99 2000-02 2003-05 2005-07 1996-99 2000-02 2003-05 2005-07 1996-99 2000-02 2003-05 2005-07 
Jordan 1997 . 2002 2006 21.30 . 14.20 13.00 100.77 103.97 109.06 117.34 36.42 . 38.87 37.72 0 . 
Kyrgyz Republic . 2000 2003 2005 . 59.90 49.97 43.10 104.86 106.24 125.93 131.13 35.98 33.14 32.30 28.00 0 2001 
Lao PDR . 1998 2003 . . 39.10 33.50 . 103.44 105.97 127.22 144.90 . 34.91 32.60 . 0 2001 
Latvia . . . . . . . . 108.35 132.44 166.87 223.25 32.30 . . . 1 . 
Lesotho . . . . . . . . 100.80 95.81 99.01 99.08 . . . . 0 2000 
Lithuania . . . . . . . . 108.08 122.07 153.02 192.24 31.29 . . . 1 . 
Macedonia . . . . . . . . 101.66 109.15 110.90 123.29 28.21 . . . 0 2000 
Madagascar 1997 1999 2001 2005 73.30 71.30 69.70 68.70 100.63 103.12 107.91 101.47 44.00 43.10 47.40 47.24 0 2000 
Malawi . 1998 2003 . . 53.90 52.40 . 102.08 102.25 94.89 102.98 50.31 39.00 39.02 . 0 2000 
Mali 1998 2001 . 2006 63.80 68.30 . 64.40 108.40 113.17 119.03 128.87 44.53 40.10 . 38.99 0 2000 
Mexico 1998 2000 2002 2004 33.40 24.20 20.30 17.60 108.99 117.19 114.72 117.77 48.77 51.87 49.68 46.05 0 . 
Moldova 1999 2000 2003 2005 73.00 61.20 31.97 29.00 90.53 95.52 114.17 139.58 36.90 37.89 37.30 37.50 0 2000 
Mongolia . 1998 2002 2007 . 35.60 36.10 35.20 102.50 104.85 108.94 142.13 . 35.00 32.90 38.00 0 2001 
Morocco . 1999 . . . 19.00 . . 99.47 100.62 111.48 122.01 . 39.46 . 40.88 0 . 
Nicaragua 1998 2001 . . 47.90 45.80 . . 102.23 107.80 106.44 111.19 53.85 50.30 . 52.33 0 2000 
Pakistan 1997 2001 . . 24.50 32.10 . . 98.64 102.49 107.18 123.77 35.98 41.29 . . 0 2001 
Panama . 2000 . . . 37.00 . . 105.09 110.66 113.53 129.62 52.42 56.53 56.51 54.93 1 . 
Paraguay 1997 2000 2002 . 32.10 33.90 46.40 . 100.82 90.83 89.05 95.96 56.52 56.85 57.98 53.57 1 . 
Peru 1997 2000 2003 2004 42.55 50.07 53.90 53.10 103.81 102.24 106.65 111.89 50.82 50.75 53.99 52.00 0 . 
Philippines 1997 2000 2003 . 36.80 33.00 30.40 . 102.84 104.98 110.25 121.95 46.16 46.09 44.53 44.04 0 . 
Poland . . . . 14.60 . . . 106.42 121.60 132.65 150.93 32.76 . . 34.92 0 . 
Romania . 2000 2003 2005 . 33.25 24.27 15.10 94.93 94.93 110.22 123.81 29.44 29.99 30.54 31.50 0 . 
Russian Federation 1997 2000 2003 . 27.75 34.53 19.60 . 98.94 113.69 136.38 168.02 41.82 38.54 35.70 37.51 0 . 
Senegal 1998 2001 2003 . 67.00 57.10 47.00 . 103.82 110.67 113.25 122.70 41.33 41.25 40.22 39.19 0 2000 
South Africa . . . . . . . . 100.16 102.93 110.25 121.54 . . . . 0 . 
Sri Lanka . . 2002 . . . 22.70 . 104.59 113.83 116.01 139.69 . . 41.06 . 0 2002 
Tajikistan . 1999 2003 . . 93.10 83.00 . 101.74 106.45 151.27 188.35 . 31.52 32.64 . 0 2000 
Tanzania . 2001 . . . 35.70 . . 100.82 109.68 119.81 136.19 . . . . 0 2000 
Thailand 1997 2000 2002 . 12.20 13.60 9.80 . 93.22 93.30 98.08 117.63 41.36 42.85 41.96 . 0 . 
Turkey . . 2002 . . . 27.00 . 105.71 101.67 102.12 124.79 . . 42.71 43.23 0 . 
Uganda 1997 2000 2003 . 44.00 35.00 37.70 . 102.38 110.33 116.73 124.35 35.00 40.00 43.00 42.62 0 2000 
Ukraine . . . . . . . . 98.27 105.92 137.18 166.37 35.12 . . 28.21 0 . 
Uzbekistan . 2000 2005 . . 27.50 25.80 . 102.43 110.23 134.50 142.38 45.35 26.80 36.72 . 0 2005 
Venezuela . 1999 2002 2005 . 49.34 51.75 46.25 102.21 94.43 87.83 98.43 49.04 47.20 47.50 45.40 1 . 
Vietnam 1998 2002 2004 2006 37.40 28.90 19.50 15.97 110.90 134.42 151.21 171.79 35.52 37.55 36.16 37.77 0 2001 
Zambia . 1998 2002 2004 . 72.90 56.00 68.00 98.22 94.85 101.77 107.56 . 53.44 42.08 50.74 0 2000 
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Table C.2: Dollar-a-day Data 
Country 
Survey Year Headcount Ratio Income per capita Gini Coefficient 
Income 
Based? PRS Year 1996-99 2000-02 2003-05 2005-07 1996-99 2000-02 2003-05 2005-07 1996-99 2000-02 2003-05 2005-07 1996-99 2000-02 2003-05 2005-07 
Albania 1996 2002 2004 2005 0.20 0.57 0.53 0.85 100.00 130.73 144.68 151.91 29.12 28.15 31.10 33.03 0 2000 
Argentina 1997 2001 2003 2006 0.85 2.86 4.71 0.80 104.96 97.57 92.86 111.66 49.21 52.52 51.28 48.77 1 . 
Armenia 1997 2001 2003 . 17.77 10.99 12.80 . 105.31 157.04 190.21 257.38 40.22 36.22 34.73 . 0 2001 
Bangladesh . 2000 2005 . . 56.11 50.47 . 102.90 112.73 134.11 139.99 . 30.72 31.02 31.02 0 2001 
Belarus 1997 2000 2002 2005 1.80 0.17 0.00 0.00 116.90 137.85 149.20 197.32 27.95 30.51 29.73 27.92 0 . 
Benin . . 2003 . . . 47.33 . 102.24 109.01 112.02 114.60 . . 38.62 . 0 2000 
Bolivia 1997 1999 2002 2005 18.94 24.70 22.81 . 105.00 110.75 118.31 131.71 58.46 57.79 60.24 58.19 0 2000 
Bosnia & Herzegovina . 2001 2004 . . 0.00 0.16 . 126.20 176.61 201.49 220.25 . 28.03 35.78 . 0 2004 
Botswana . . . . . . . . 108.56 132.50 146.30 184.50 . . . . 0 . 
Brazil 1997 2000 2003 2006 11.48 11.06 10.64 6.78 100.69 100.95 102.72 108.64 59.25 58.64 57.61 55.74 1 . 
Bulgaria 1997 2001 2003 . 0.32 2.64 0.00 . 95.15 114.12 126.75 152.91 26.38 34.34 29.21 . 0 . 
Burkina Faso . 1998 2003 . . 70.03 56.54 . 104.90 110.37 124.24 135.38 . . 39.60 . 0 2000 
Cambodia . . 2004 . . . 40.19 . 100.19 116.28 144.59 164.65 . . 41.71 . 0 2000 
Cameroon 1996 2001 . . 51.46 32.81 . . 100.00 109.29 110.24 112.67 46.82 44.56 . . 0 2000 
Chile 1997 2000 2003 2006 0.56 1.03 1.10 0.19 103.53 108.17 114.65 130.94 55.40 55.36 54.92 52.00 1 . 
China . . . . . . . . 107.94 132.39 168.99 221.72 . . 46.90 . 0 . 
Colombia 1997 2000 2003 2006 14.82 16.66 15.36 16.01 100.06 95.09 97.11 106.74 57.14 57.71 58.83 58.49 1 . 
Costa Rica 1997 2000 2003 2005 5.19 3.97 5.61 2.37 103.93 113.92 119.28 126.80 47.03 48.28 49.76 47.23 1 . 
Cote d'Ivoire . 1998 2002 . . 24.06 23.34 . 103.36 98.59 89.52 89.47 . 43.75 48.39 . 0 2002 
Dominican Republic 1997 2000 2003 2006 6.29 4.41 6.12 4.47 103.38 127.80 130.51 144.12 49.15 52.11 51.88 50.94 1 . 
Ecuador . 1998 2003 2006 . 14.92 10.49 7.24 101.36 102.10 106.04 119.28 . 53.53 61.78 54.01 1 . 
Egypt, Arab Rep. . 1999 2004 . . 1.81 1.99 . 104.23 113.37 123.80 131.92 . 32.76 32.14 . 0 . 
El Salvador 1997 2000 2003 2005 13.86 12.77 14.21 10.97 101.96 105.45 105.92 107.14 51.74 51.92 50.85 49.70 1 . 
Estonia 1998 2000 2003 2004 0.05 0.59 0.26 0.00 118.71 134.86 155.38 173.90 37.64 36.95 36.30 . 0 . 
Georgia 1997 2000 2003 2005 5.32 9.16 16.19 13.44 110.47 127.01 149.32 183.37 36.86 37.93 40.34 40.78 0 2000 
Ghana 1998 . . 2005 39.12 . . 29.99 103.72 106.99 110.63 120.88 40.75 41.32 42.19 42.76 0 2000 
Guatemala 1998 2000 2002 2006 15.65 13.06 16.92 12.65 103.89 105.99 105.27 107.07 55.65 54.97 55.34 53.69 1 . 
Honduras 1997 1999 2003 2006 15.60 14.44 18.10 20.19 102.16 97.85 102.57 108.82 53.05 51.50 53.88 56.01 1 2000 
India . . . . . . . . 103.30 114.57 119.76 153.20 . . . . 0 . 
Indonesia . . . . . . . . 97.13 92.16 98.44 114.60 . . . . 0 2003 
Jamaica 1996 1999 2002 2004 1.74 1.26 0.36 0.24 100.00 96.69 98.43 100.57 40.47 44.22 48.34 . 0 . 
Jordan 1997 . 2002 2006 1.51 . 1.16 0.38 100.77 92.16 109.60 126.76 36.42 37.89 38.87 37.72 0 . 
Kazakhstan 1996 2001 2003 . 4.98 0.51 4.14 . 100.00 133.02 152.24 203.83 35.32 31.30 34.40 . 0 . 
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1996-99 2000-02 2003-05 2005-07 1996-99 2000-02 1996-99 2000-02 2003-05 2005-07 1996-99 2000-02 1996-99 2000-02 2003-05 2005-07 
  Kyrgyz Republic 1998 1999 2002 2004 31.84 15.50 34.03 21.81 107.60 110.03 118.69 133.31 35.98 34.60 34.60 . 0 2001 
Lao PDR 1997 2002 . . 49.32 43.96 . . 104.36 122.70 122.70 144.90 34.91 33.54 32.63 . 0 2001 
Latvia 1997 2000 2003 . 0.33 0.00 0.00 . 108.35 131.85 153.72 223.25 32.30 34.77 36.79 . 1 . 
Lesotho . . 2002 . . . 43.40 . 100.80 95.81 98.12 99.08 . . 52.50 . 0 2000 
Lithuania 1997 2000 2002 2004 0.16 0.37 0.42 0.43 108.23 125.46 139.04 165.78 31.29 32.13 32.33 . 1 . 
Macedonia, FYR 1998 2000 2003 . 0.00 2.94 0.51 . 103.94 112.45 110.40 123.29 28.21 34.44 38.85 . 0 2000 
Madagascar 1997 2000 2005 . 72.04 79.33 67.83 . 100.63 105.51 101.47 103.64 39.16 41.81 47.47 47.24 0 2000 
Malawi 1997 . 2004 . 83.07 . 73.86 . 103.99 99.75 97.58 102.98 50.31 45.47 39.02 . 0 2000 
Mali . . 2001 2006 . . 61.18 51.43 103.56 108.52 113.17 128.87 . . 40.10 38.99 0 2000 
Mexico 1997 2000 2003 2006 7.50 4.82 3.27 0.65 104.49 117.19 116.24 122.52 48.77 51.87 47.87 48.11 0 . 
Moldova 1997 2000 2002 2004 15.11 38.60 17.08 8.14 100.11 94.50 106.36 122.46 36.90 36.52 36.05 . 0 2000 
Mongolia 1998 . 2002 2005 34.15 . 15.47 22.38 104.85 106.48 108.94 129.93 30.27 31.56 32.84 33.03 0 2001 
Morocco 1998 2000 . 2007 6.76 6.25 . 2.50 102.14 100.22 107.22 126.41 39.46 40.63 40.74 40.88 0 . 
Nicaragua 1998 2001 2005 . 21.76 19.42 15.81 . 102.23 107.80 109.53 111.19 53.85 50.30 51.32 52.33 0 2000 
Pakistan 1997 2001 2004 . 38.60 35.87 22.59 . 99.41 102.49 111.71 123.77 30.85 30.39 31.18 . 0 2001 
Panama 1997 2000 2003 2006 9.81 12.66 10.00 9.48 105.27 109.94 114.16 129.69 52.42 56.53 55.70 54.93 1 . 
Paraguay 1997 1999 2002 2006 19.63 14.33 17.23 7.88 100.82 95.87 89.05 96.05 56.52 56.85 57.98 53.57 1 . 
Peru 1996 1999 2002 2006 8.59 15.13 12.55 8.06 100.00 101.81 105.40 124.85 46.24 53.01 54.65 50.76 1 . 
Philippines 1997 2000 2003 2006 21.61 22.45 21.99 22.62 102.84 104.98 110.25 121.75 46.16 46.09 44.53 44.04 0 . 
Poland 1997 2000 2002 2005 0.76 0.12 0.11 0.10 106.98 121.60 126.99 143.79 32.76 32.95 34.05 34.92 0 . 
Romania 1998 2000 2002 2005 1.96 3.20 2.86 0.75 90.35 94.93 103.17 123.81 29.44 30.41 31.46 31.50 0 . 
Russian Federation 1996 2000 2002 2005 3.48 1.59 0.32 0.16 100.00 111.67 126.23 156.98 46.15 38.54 35.70 37.51 0 . 
Senegal . 2001 2005 . . 44.19 33.50 . 101.45 110.67 120.26 122.70 . 41.25 39.19 . 0 2000 
South Africa . 2000 . . . 26.20 . . 100.16 103.32 107.60 121.54 . 57.77 . . 0 . 
Sri Lanka . 2002 . . . . 13.95 . 104.59 116.01 116.01 139.69 . . 41.06 . 0 2002 
Tajikistan . 1999 2003 2004 . 44.53 36.25 21.49 101.74 106.45 151.27 166.24 . 31.52 32.64 . 0 2000 
Tanzania . 2000 . . . 88.52 . . 100.82 106.00 115.29 136.19 . 34.62 . . 0 2000 
Thailand 1997 2000 2002 2004 0.95 1.48 0.70 0.40 93.22 91.64 98.08 108.68 42.38 43.34 41.96 . 0 . 
Turkey . . 2002 2005 . . 2.00 2.72 105.71 101.67 102.12 120.73 . . 42.71 43.23 0 . 
Uganda 1996 1999 2002 2005 64.39 60.49 57.37 51.53 100.00 108.14 115.72 121.91 37.13 43.07 45.77 42.62 0 2000 
Ukraine 1996 1999 2002 2005 1.93 2.03 0.51 0.10 100.00 97.19 122.81 158.27 35.12 28.96 28.28 28.21 0 . 
Uzbekistan 1998 2002 2003 . 32.11 42.33 46.28 . 104.59 116.44 119.76 142.38 45.35 34.55 36.72 . 0 2005 
Venezuela, RB 1997 1998 2003 2006 12.14 13.97 18.41 6.76 204.22 102.42 79.49 95.13 48.80 49.53 48.20 45.53 1 . 
Vietnam 1998 2002 2004 2006 49.65 40.05 24.18 21.45 110.90 134.42 151.21 171.79 35.52 37.55 36.16 37.77 0 2001 
Zambia 1996 1998 2002 2004 62.07 55.40 64.60 64.29 100.00 94.85 101.77 107.56 51.62 53.44 42.08 . 0 2000 
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APPENDIX D: ANNUAL PANEL DATA FORMAT 
Table D.1: National Poverty Data 
Country 
  
Headcount Ratio Index of Per Capita GDP 
 
Gini Coefficient 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Albania . . . . . . 25.40 . 25.00 18.50 . . 100.00 89.07 101.25 111.93 119.73 127.91 130.73 137.36 144.68 151.91 158.71 167.40 29.12 . . . . . 28.15 . 31.10 33.03 . . 
Argentina . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.00 106.97 109.92 105.08 103.15 97.57 86.02 92.63 99.93 107.98 115.34 120.93 48.58 . . . . . . . . . . . 
Armenia 54.70 . 49.10 . . 50.90 . 42.90 . . . . 100.00 103.09 110.61 114.30 121.18 157.04 177.91 202.52 220.76 245.86 258.42 267.85 44.42 . 37.20 . . 34.40 . 33.80 . . . . 
Bangladesh . . . . 48.90 . . . . 40.00 . . 100.00 102.94 105.75 109.07 112.73 115.72 118.86 123.43 128.58 134.11 139.90 145.95 . . . . 30.72 . . . . 31.02 . . 
Belarus . 39.40 27.00 26.00 24.00 20.50 18.50 . . . . . 100.00 111.90 121.90 126.61 134.40 141.29 149.20 160.51 179.75 197.32 212.28 223.07 . 25.62 30.28 30.32 30.35 30.04 29.73 . . 27.92 . . 
Benin . . . 29.30 . . 28.50 . . . . . 100.00 102.81 103.92 106.43 108.51 112.09 110.81 112.02 112.35 112.51 114.36 116.94 . . . 50.60 . . 41.50 . . . . . 
Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.00 105.00 110.28 110.75 113.53 115.44 118.31 121.50 126.59 131.71 137.80 137.80 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Bosnia & Herzegovina . . . . . 19.50 . . 17.80 . . . 100.00 126.10 152.49 163.82 170.11 176.61 184.58 191.19 201.49 209.92 219.73 231.09 . . . . . 28.03 . . 35.78 . . . 
Botswana . . . . . . 31.00 . . . . . 100.00 107.92 117.75 124.65 133.66 139.18 146.30 155.30 164.79 175.68 184.15 193.66 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Brazil . . 22.00 . . . . . . . . . 100.00 101.72 100.34 99.63 102.44 102.27 102.72 101.78 105.28 106.16 108.51 111.27 . . 59.23 . . . . . . . . . 
Bulgaria . 36.00 . . . 12.80 . . . . . . 100.00 95.15 99.66 102.64 108.91 114.12 120.52 126.75 134.91 143.37 152.52 162.86 . 26.38 . . . 34.34 . . . . . . 
Burkina Faso . . 45.30 . . . . 46.40 . . . . 100.00 104.33 110.37 112.16 112.95 117.61 118.89 124.24 125.32 131.06 135.24 139.85 . . 46.20 . . . . 45.90 . . . . 
Cambodia . 36.10 . . . . . . 35.00 . . . 100.00 100.15 100.41 110.14 116.43 122.27 126.60 134.78 144.59 159.97 163.82 170.15 . 40.40 . . . . . . 42.00 . . . 
Cameroon 53.30 . . . . 40.20 . . . . . . 100.00 102.24 104.47 106.10 107.49 109.29 109.05 110.35 111.32 111.10 112.61 114.29 46.82 . . . . 44.56 . . . . . . 
Chile 23.60 . . . . 18.70 . . . . 10.70 . 100.00 105.12 107.06 104.86 108.17 110.44 111.50 114.65 120.29 125.99 130.94 136.44 55.06 . 55.74 . . 55.36 . . . . 52.00 . 
China . . 4.60 . . . . . . . . . 100.00 108.21 115.61 122.85 132.17 142.14 154.08 168.48 184.41 202.02 221.12 242.02 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Colombia . . . 64.00 . . . . . . . . 100.00 101.45 100.12 94.15 95.23 94.95 95.10 97.11 100.08 103.58 106.74 109.15 56.06 . 58.21 57.92 57.50 . . 58.83 . . 58.49 . 
Costa Rica . . 23.00 . . . . . . 23.90 . . 100.00 102.93 108.87 115.04 114.50 113.34 114.30 119.28 121.92 126.80 132.71 136.37 47.08 45.88 48.13 . 46.60 . . 49.76 . 47.23 . . 
Cote d'Ivoire . . 33.60 . . . . 37.00 . . . . 100.00 103.76 106.31 105.75 95.91 94.10 91.27 88.54 88.75 88.77 89.15 90.50 . . 43.75 . . . . 48.39 . . . . 
Dominican Republic . 26.70 . . 26.75 27.55 27.15 35.00 42.05 . . . 100.00 106.77 112.90 120.32 127.80 131.00 134.92 130.51 131.17 141.30 146.95 152.11 48.71 49.58 . . 52.00 51.90 51.80 51.95 52.10 49.97 51.91 . 
Ecuador . . 46.00 . . 45.20 . . . . . . 100.00 101.97 102.10 93.84 94.68 103.75 103.85 106.04 112.82 116.49 119.95 122.07 . . 53.10 . . 56.00 . 61.78 . 53.65 . 54.37 
Egypt, Arab Rep. . . . . 16.70 . . . . . . . 100.00 103.58 109.11 113.37 116.98 118.65 119.99 121.27 123.80 127.37 131.86 136.52 . . . . 32.76 . . . 32.14 . . . 
El Salvador . . . . 39.60 38.90 37.20 . . . . . 100.00 102.11 103.78 105.21 105.45 105.25 105.75 106.09 106.15 107.14 108.93 110.86 52.25 50.79 52.17 . 51.92 52.12 52.32 . . 49.70 . . 
Estonia . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.00 112.61 118.71 120.27 130.39 139.34 150.06 160.71 173.90 191.41 210.13 227.53 . . 37.64 . . . . . . . . . 
Georgia . 46.20 50.20 51.80 51.80 51.10 52.10 54.50 52.30 . . . 100.00 113.39 118.03 122.48 125.82 132.74 141.01 157.64 167.94 183.37 193.54 207.57 37.13 36.08 37.38 38.05 38.85 36.90 40.31 40.37 40.58 40.78 . . 
Ghana . . 39.50 . . . . . . 28.50 . . 100.00 101.60 103.72 105.61 106.83 108.52 110.63 113.53 117.12 120.88 124.90 129.07 . . 40.75 . . . . 39.40 . 42.76 . . 
Guatemala . . . . 56.20 . . . . . 51.00 . 100.00 101.59 103.89 105.07 105.99 105.66 105.27 104.76 104.89 105.52 107.07 108.53 . . 55.65 . 54.50 . . . 49.40 . 53.69 . 
Honduras . . . 53.00 . . . . 51.00 . . . 100.00 102.16 102.36 97.85 100.91 101.06 101.40 102.57 104.93 106.67 108.75 110.98 . 53.05 . 51.50 . . . 53.88 54.82 . 56.71 55.31 
India . . . 28.60 . . . . . . . . 100.00 102.93 106.96 112.15 114.69 116.85 119.76 126.26 134.18 143.85 153.55 162.20 . . . 32.00 . . . . . . . . 
Indonesia 17.50 . . 23.40 . . 18.20 17.40 16.70 16.00 . . 100.00 103.12 88.25 87.65 93.37 95.47 98.44 101.79 105.53 110.00 114.24 119.55 36.60 . 38.40 31.70 30.30 . 34.30 34.47 . 34.80 . . 
Jamaica 26.10 19.90 15.90 17.00 18.70 16.90 19.70 19.10 16.90 . . . 100.00 98.02 95.97 96.69 96.79 97.69 98.43 100.11 100.57 101.51 103.82 106.48 40.47 41.72 42.97 44.22 45.59 46.97 48.34 46.93 45.51 . . . 
Jordan . 21.30 . . . . 14.20 . . . . . 100.00 100.77 101.31 102.06 103.53 106.33 109.60 111.33 117.34 122.65 126.76 129.77 . 36.42 . . . . 38.87 . . . . . 
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Country 
Headcount Ratio Index of Per Capita GDP Gini Coefficient 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Kazakhstan 34.60 38.30 39.00 . 31.80 28.40 . . . . . . 100.00 103.57 103.15 106.39 117.08 133.02 145.90 158.57 172.37 188.38 203.81 219.29 35.32 34.32 33.31 . 32.31 31.30 34.95 33.85 . . . . 
Kyrgyz Republic . . . . 63.40 56.40 54.80 49.20 45.90 43.10 . . 100.00 106.99 107.60 110.03 114.78 119.89 118.69 125.79 133.31 131.13 136.25 142.21 . . 35.98 34.60 33.62 32.65 31.67 32.30 32.93 28.00 . . 
Lao PDR . . 39.10 . . . . 33.50 . . . . 100.00 104.36 105.97 111.04 114.80 118.58 122.70 127.22 132.25 138.37 145.14 151.20 . 34.91 34.53 . . . . 32.60 . . . . 
Latvia . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.00 109.37 115.68 122.20 131.85 143.25 153.72 165.80 181.08 200.74 223.94 245.08 31.60 31.69 33.62 . . . 35.91 37.67 . . . . 
Lesotho . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.00 104.07 98.32 95.59 95.38 96.45 98.12 99.03 99.89 99.40 99.16 98.69 . . . . . . . 52.50 . . . . 
Lithuania . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.00 107.78 116.47 115.31 121.09 129.82 139.04 154.22 165.78 179.26 192.13 205.34 32.36 . 30.21 . 31.85 32.40 32.33 . 35.80 . . . 
Macedonia . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.00 101.03 103.94 107.98 112.45 107.01 107.63 110.40 114.68 118.86 123.23 127.78 . . 28.21 . 34.44 . 38.75 38.95 . . . . 
Madagascar . 73.30 . 71.30 . 69.70 . . . 68.70 . . 100.00 100.63 101.49 103.12 104.82 107.91 91.50 97.59 99.80 101.47 103.34 106.12 . 44.00 . 43.10 . 47.40 . . . 47.24 . . 
Malawi . . 53.90 . . . . 52.40 . . . . 100.00 103.99 102.25 103.03 101.28 94.93 93.36 94.89 97.58 97.64 103.80 107.49 . 50.31 39.00 . . . . 39.02 39.02 . . . 
Mali . . 63.80 . . 68.30 . . . . 64.40 . 100.00 102.27 108.40 109.10 103.28 113.17 115.34 120.84 120.92 125.46 128.87 132.78 . . 44.53 . . 40.10 . . . . 38.99 . 
Mexico . . 33.40 . 24.20 . 20.30 . 17.60 . . . 100.00 105.23 108.99 111.52 117.19 115.49 114.72 114.70 117.77 119.53 122.52 124.99 48.54 . 48.99 . 51.87 . 49.68 . 46.05 . 48.11 . 
Moldova . . . 73.00 67.80 54.60 40.40 29.00 26.50 29.00 . . 100.00 100.11 93.71 90.53 92.58 98.47 106.36 113.68 122.46 139.58 143.77 148.08 . 36.90 . 39.60 37.89 36.18 37.20 36.40 35.60 37.50 . . 
Mongolia . . 35.60 . . . 36.10 . . . . 35.20 100.00 102.64 104.85 106.80 106.49 106.17 108.94 113.47 123.96 129.93 136.54 142.13 . . 35.00 . . . 32.90 . . . . 38.00 
Morocco . . . 19.00 . . . . . . . . 100.00 96.27 102.14 100.62 100.22 105.18 107.22 111.86 115.36 116.15 123.46 126.41 . . 39.46 . . . . . . . . 40.88 
Nicaragua . . 47.90 . . 45.80 . . . . . . 100.00 101.33 102.23 106.29 107.81 107.80 105.83 105.45 108.04 109.53 110.99 113.05 . . 53.85 . . 50.30 . . . 52.33 . . 
Pakistan . 24.50 . . . 32.10 . . . . . . 100.00 98.64 98.82 100.13 102.57 102.49 103.72 106.10 111.71 118.37 123.36 129.58 28.65 35.98 . . . 41.29 . . . . . . 
Panama . . . . 37.00 . . . . . . . 100.00 104.73 110.54 112.95 110.66 109.22 109.68 112.28 118.63 123.96 129.69 135.22 56.31 48.53 . . 56.56 56.49 56.51 . . . 54.93 . 
Paraguay . 32.10 . . 33.90 . 46.40 . . . . . 100.00 100.82 99.32 95.87 90.83 90.87 89.05 90.71 93.27 94.41 95.80 97.68 . 56.52 . 56.85 57.23 57.60 57.98 . . 53.89 . 53.24 
Peru . 42.70 42.40 47.50 48.40 54.30 53.80 54.00 53.10 . . . 100.00 105.03 102.58 101.81 103.14 101.76 105.40 107.90 111.89 117.40 122.68 127.02 46.24 50.82 55.40 . . 53.00 54.65 53.33 52.00 51.97 49.55 . 
Philippines . 36.80 . . 33.00 . . 30.40 . . . . 100.00 102.84 100.01 101.20 104.98 104.67 107.15 110.25 114.82 118.28 121.75 125.82 . 46.16 . . 46.09 . . 44.53 . . 44.04 . 
Poland 14.60 . . . . . . . . . . . 100.00 106.98 112.27 117.41 122.24 125.15 126.99 131.96 138.99 143.79 151.07 157.93 32.66 . 32.85 . . . . . . 34.92 . . 
Romania . . . . 35.90 30.60 28.90 25.10 18.80 15.10 . . 100.00 94.45 90.35 89.74 92.08 97.78 103.17 108.94 118.56 123.81 131.07 138.76 . . 29.44 . 29.40 30.57 31.46 29.60 30.55 31.50 . . 
Russian Federation . 24.10 31.40 41.50 35.90 26.20 19.60 . . . . . 100.00 101.54 96.35 102.94 113.69 120.40 126.23 136.20 146.72 156.98 167.75 179.34 46.15 43.26 40.37 37.48 38.54 39.60 35.70 . 37.51 37.51 . . 
Senegal . . 67.00 . . 57.10 . 47.00 . . . . 100.00 100.53 103.82 107.69 108.43 110.67 108.74 113.25 116.75 120.26 122.16 125.67 . . 41.33 . . 41.25 . 40.22 . 39.19 . . 
South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.00 100.81 99.66 100.51 103.32 104.95 107.60 109.68 113.47 117.91 121.51 125.20 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Sri Lanka . . . . . . 22.70 . . . . . 100.00 105.13 108.64 111.61 116.65 113.22 116.01 121.55 126.67 133.07 139.39 146.60 . . . . . . 41.06 . . . . . 
Tajikistan . . . 93.10 . . . 83.00 . . . . 100.00 100.82 104.41 106.45 116.59 127.46 138.12 151.27 166.24 176.32 189.29 199.44 . . . 31.52 . . . 32.64 . . . . 
Tanzania . . . . . 35.70 . . . . . . 100.00 100.79 101.68 104.27 106.00 109.68 115.29 119.44 124.70 130.35 135.55 142.66 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Thailand 11.40 . 13.00 . 14.20 13.00 9.80 . . . . . 100.00 97.73 86.43 89.38 92.70 93.90 98.08 104.08 108.68 113.47 117.37 122.03 43.39 . 41.36 43.53 43.15 42.56 41.96 . . . . . 
Turkey . . . . . . 27.00 . . . . . 100.00 107.24 109.89 103.12 105.71 96.17 102.12 106.36 114.08 120.73 124.74 128.92 . . . . . . 42.71 . . 43.23 . . 
Uganda . 44.00 . . 35.00 . . 37.70 . . . . 100.00 102.38 102.95 108.14 110.33 111.90 115.72 116.73 119.14 121.91 124.15 126.99 . 35.00 . . 40.00 . . 43.00 . 42.62 . . 
Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.00 97.97 96.83 97.19 104.93 115.64 122.81 135.63 153.11 158.27 167.43 173.40 35.12 . . . . . . . . 28.21 . . 
Uzbekistan . . . . 27.50 . . . . 25.80 . . 100.00 102.71 104.59 107.35 110.23 113.42 116.44 119.76 127.33 134.50 142.33 150.33 . . 45.35 . 26.80 . 34.55 36.72 . 36.72 . . 
Venezuela . . . 49.34 . . 51.75 . . 46.25 . . 100.00 104.22 102.42 94.43 96.01 98.29 87.83 79.49 91.83 98.43 103.72 105.40 48.79 48.80 49.53 47.20 . . 47.50 . . 45.40 . . 
Vietnam . . 37.40 . . . 28.90 . 19.50 . 15.97 . 100.00 106.48 110.90 114.46 120.60 127.19 134.42 142.19 151.21 161.63 171.79 182.18 . . 35.52 . . . 37.55 . 36.16 . 37.77 . 
Zambia . . 72.90 . . . 56.00 . 68.00 . . . 100.00 99.80 94.85 96.01 98.48 100.88 101.77 104.49 107.56 110.39 114.31 118.37 49.79 . 53.44 . . . 42.08 . 50.74 . . . 
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Table D.2: Dollar-a-day Data 
  
Country 
  
Headcount Ratio Index of Per Capita GDP 
 
 Gini Coefficient 
 
  
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Albania 0.20 . . . . . 0.57 . 0.53 0.85 . . 100.00 89.07 101.25 111.93 119.73 127.91 130.73 137.36 144.68 151.91 158.71 167.40 29.12 . . . . . 28.15 . 31.10 33.03 . . 
Argentina 1.57 . 0.13 . . . 2.86 6.59 2.82 0.99 0.60 . 100.00 106.97 109.92 105.08 103.15 97.57 86.02 92.63 99.93 107.98 115.34 120.93 48.58 . 49.84 . . . 52.52 . 51.28 . 48.77 . 
Armenia 17.50 . 18.03 . . 10.99 14.97 10.63 . . . . 100.00 103.09 110.61 114.30 121.18 157.04 177.91 202.52 220.76 245.86 258.42 267.85 44.42 . 36.01 . . 36.22 35.66 33.80 . . . . 
Bangladesh . . . . 56.11 . . . . 50.47 . . 100.00 102.94 105.75 109.07 112.73 115.72 118.86 123.43 128.58 134.11 139.90 145.95 . . . . 30.72 . . . . 31.02 . . 
Belarus . 2.66 0.93 . 0.33 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 . . 100.00 111.90 121.90 126.61 134.40 141.29 149.20 160.51 179.75 197.32 212.28 223.07 . 25.62 30.28 . 30.35 30.66 29.73 . . 27.92 . . 
Benin . . . . . . . 47.33 . . . . 100.00 102.81 103.92 106.43 108.51 112.09 110.81 112.02 112.35 112.51 114.36 116.94 . . . . . . . 38.62 . . . . 
Bolivia . 18.94 . 24.70 . . 22.81 . . 19.62 . . 100.00 105.00 110.28 110.75 113.53 115.44 118.31 121.50 126.59 131.71 137.80 137.80 . 58.46 . 57.79 . . 60.24 0.00 . 58.19 . . 
Bosnia-Herzegovina . . . . . 0.00 . . 0.16 . . . 100.00 126.10 152.49 163.82 170.11 176.61 184.58 191.19 201.49 209.92 219.73 231.09 . . . . . 28.03 . . 35.78 . . . 
Botswana . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.00 107.92 117.75 124.65 133.66 139.18 146.30 155.30 164.79 175.68 184.15 193.66 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Brazil 11.43 11.98 11.03 11.15 . 10.96 9.81 10.43 11.68 7.76 7.36 5.21 100.00 101.72 100.34 99.63 102.44 102.27 102.72 101.78 105.28 106.16 108.51 111.27 59.19 59.32 59.23 58.59 . 58.69 58.23 57.61 56.99 56.39 55.80 55.02 
Bulgaria . 0.32 . . . 2.64 . 0.00 . . . . 100.00 95.15 99.66 102.64 108.91 114.12 120.52 126.75 134.91 143.37 152.52 162.86 . 26.38 . . . 34.34 . 29.21 . . . . 
Burkina Faso . . 70.03 . . . . 56.54 . . . . 100.00 104.33 110.37 112.16 112.95 117.61 118.89 124.24 125.32 131.06 135.24 139.85 . . 46.85 . . . . 39.60 . . . . 
Cambodia . . . . . . . . 40.19 . . . 100.00 100.15 100.41 110.14 116.43 122.27 126.60 134.78 144.59 159.97 163.82 170.15 . . . . . . . . 41.71 . . . 
Cameroon 51.46 . . . . 32.81 . . . . . . 100.00 102.24 104.47 106.10 107.49 109.29 109.05 110.35 111.32 111.10 112.61 114.29 46.82 . . . . 44.56 . . . . . . 
Chile 0.43 . 0.68 . 1.03 . . 1.10 . . 0.19 . 100.00 105.12 107.06 104.86 108.17 110.44 111.50 114.65 120.29 125.99 130.94 136.44 55.06 . 55.74 . 55.36 . . 54.92 . . 52.00 . 
China . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.00 108.21 115.61 122.85 132.17 142.14 154.08 168.47 184.41 202.02 221.12 242.02 . . . . . . . . 46.90 . . . 
Colombia 13.54 . 16.10 16.54 16.77 . . 15.36 . . 16.01 . 100.00 101.45 100.12 94.15 95.23 94.95 95.10 97.11 100.08 103.58 106.74 109.15 56.06 . 58.21 57.92 57.50 . . 58.83 . . 58.49 . 
Costa Rica 7.08 4.52 3.96 . 4.41 3.53 . 5.61 . 2.37 . . 100.00 102.93 108.87 115.04 114.50 113.34 114.30 119.28 121.92 126.80 132.71 136.37 47.08 45.88 48.13 . 46.60 49.96 . 49.76 . 47.23 . . 
Cote d'Ivoire . . 24.06 . . . 23.34 . . . . . 100.00 103.76 106.31 105.75 95.91 94.10 91.27 88.54 88.75 88.77 89.15 90.50 . . 43.75 . . . 48.39 . . . . . 
Dominican Republic 5.87 6.71 . . 4.41 . . 6.12 . 4.98 3.96 . 100.00 106.77 112.90 120.32 127.80 131.00 134.92 130.51 131.17 141.30 146.95 152.11 48.71 49.58 . . 52.11 . . 51.88 . 49.97 51.91 . 
Ecuador . . 14.92 . . . . 10.49 . 9.78 . 4.69 100.00 101.97 102.10 93.84 94.68 103.75 103.85 106.04 112.82 116.49 119.95 122.07 . . 53.53 . . . . 61.78 . 53.65 . 54.37 
Egypt, Arab Rep. . . . 1.81 . . . . 1.99 . . . 100.00 103.58 109.11 113.37 116.98 118.65 119.99 121.27 123.80 127.37 131.86 136.52 . . . . 32.76 . . . 32.14 . . . 
El Salvador 14.99 13.11 13.48 . 12.77 . 14.16 14.25 . 10.97 . . 100.00 102.11 103.78 105.21 105.45 105.25 105.75 106.09 106.15 107.14 108.93 110.86 52.25 50.79 52.17 . 51.92 . 52.32 49.37 . 49.70 . . 
Estonia . . 0.05 . 0.64 0.53 0.51 0.00 0.00 . . . 100.00 112.61 118.71 120.27 130.39 139.34 150.06 160.71 173.90 191.41 210.13 227.53 . . 37.64 . 37.00 36.90 36.81 35.78 36.00 . . . 
Georgia 4.48 4.58 6.90 8.65 9.59 9.24 15.10 17.27 . 13.44 . . 100.00 113.39 118.03 122.48 125.82 132.74 141.00 157.64 167.94 183.37 193.54 207.57 37.13 36.08 37.38 38.05 38.85 36.90 40.31 40.37 . 40.78 . . 
Ghana . . 39.12 . . . . . . 29.99 . . 100.00 101.60 103.72 105.61 106.83 108.52 110.63 113.53 117.12 120.88 124.90 129.07 . . 40.75 . . . . . . 42.76 . . 
Guatemala . . 15.65 . 13.06 . 16.92 . . . 12.65 . 100.00 101.59 103.89 105.07 105.99 105.66 105.27 104.76 104.89 105.52 107.07 108.53 . . 55.65 . 54.97 . 55.34 . . . 53.69 . 
Honduras . 15.60 . 14.44 . . . 18.10 . 22.19 . 18.19 100.00 102.16 102.36 97.85 100.91 101.06 101.40 102.57 104.93 106.67 108.75 110.98 . 53.05 . 51.50 . . . 53.88 . . 56.71 55.31 
India . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.00 102.93 106.96 112.15 114.69 116.85 119.76 126.26 134.18 143.84 153.55 162.20 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.00 103.12 88.25 87.65 93.37 95.47 98.44 101.79 105.53 110.00 114.24 119.55 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Jamaica 1.74 . . 1.26 . . 0.36 . 0.24 . . . 100.00 98.02 95.97 96.69 96.79 97.69 98.43 100.11 100.57 101.51 103.82 106.48 40.47 . . 44.22 . . 48.34 . 45.51 . . . 
Jordan . 1.51 . . . . 1.16 . . . 0.38 . 100.00 100.77 101.31 102.06 103.53 106.33 109.60 111.33 117.34 122.65 126.76 129.77 . 36.42 . . . . 38.87 . . . 37.72 . 
Kazakhstan 4.98 . . . . 0.51 5.15 3.12 . . . . 100.00 103.57 103.15 106.39 117.08 133.02 145.90 158.57 172.37 188.38 203.81 219.29 35.32 . . . . 31.30 34.95 33.85 . . . . 
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Country 
 Headcount ratio Index of Per Capita Incomes Gini Coefficient 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Kyrgyz Republic . . 31.84 15.50 . . 34.03 . 21.81 . . . 100.00 106.99 107.60 110.03 114.78 119.89 118.69 125.79 133.31 131.13 136.25 142.21 . . 35.98 34.60 . . 31.67 . 32.93 . . . 
Lao PDR . 49.32 . . . . 43.96 . . . . . 100.00 104.36 105.97 111.04 114.80 118.58 122.70 127.22 132.25 138.37 145.14 151.20 . 34.91 . . . . 32.63 . . . . . 
Latvia 0.42 0.56 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 . . . 100.00 109.37 115.68 122.20 131.85 143.25 153.72 165.80 181.08 200.74 223.94 245.08 31.60 31.69 33.62 . . . 35.91 37.67 . . . . 
Lesotho . . . . . . 43.40 . . . . . 100.00 104.07 98.32 95.59 95.38 96.45 98.12 99.03 99.89 99.40 99.16 98.69 . . . . . . . 52.50 . . . . 
Lithuania 0.00 . 0.32 . 0.30 0.43 0.42 . 0.43 . . . 100.00 107.78 116.47 115.31 121.09 129.82 139.04 154.22 165.78 179.26 192.13 205.34 32.36 . 30.21 . 31.85 32.40 32.33 . 35.80 . . . 
Macedonia, FYR . . 0.00 . 2.94 . 0.55 0.47 . . . . 100.00 101.03 103.94 107.98 112.45 107.01 107.63 110.40 114.68 118.86 123.23 127.78 . . 28.21 . 34.44 . 38.75 38.95 . . . . 
Madagascar . 72.04 . 82.32 . 76.34 . . . 67.83 . . 100.00 100.63 101.49 103.12 104.82 107.91 91.50 97.59 99.80 101.47 103.34 106.12 . 39.16 . 41.81 . 47.47 . . . 47.24 . . 
Malawi . 83.07 . . . . . . 73.86 . . . 100.00 103.99 102.25 103.03 101.28 94.93 93.36 94.89 97.58 97.64 103.80 107.49 . 50.31 . . . . . . 39.02 . . . 
Mali . . . . . 61.18 . . . . 51.43 . 100.00 102.27 108.40 109.10 103.28 113.17 115.34 120.84 120.92 125.46 128.87 132.78 . . . . . 40.10 . . . . 38.99 . 
Mexico 6.98 . 8.01 . 4.82 . 3.73 . 2.80 . 0.65 . 100.00 105.23 108.99 111.52 117.19 115.49 114.72 114.70 117.77 119.53 122.52 124.99 48.54 . 48.99 . 51.87 . 49.68 . 46.05 . 48.11 . 
Moldova . 15.11 . 44.18 . 33.02 17.08 . 8.14 . . . 100.00 100.11 93.71 90.53 92.58 98.47 106.36 113.68 122.46 139.58 143.77 148.08 . 36.90 . 36.86 . 36.18 36.05 . 35.60 . . . 
Mongolia . . 34.15 . . . 15.47 . . 22.38 . . 100.00 102.64 104.85 106.80 106.49 106.17 108.94 113.47 123.96 129.93 136.54 142.13 . . 30.27 . . . 32.84 . . 33.03 . . 
Morocco . . 6.76 . 6.25 . . . . . . 2.50 100.00 96.27 102.14 100.62 100.22 105.18 107.22 111.86 115.36 116.15 123.46 126.41 . . 39.46 . 40.63 . . . . . . 40.88 
Nicaragua . . 21.76 . . 19.42 . . . 15.81 . . 100.00 101.33 102.23 106.29 107.81 107.80 105.83 105.45 108.04 109.53 110.99 113.05 . . 53.85 . . 50.30 . . . 52.33 . . 
Pakistan 48.14 . 29.05 . . 35.87 . . 22.59 . . . 100.00 98.64 98.82 100.13 102.57 102.49 103.72 106.10 111.71 118.37 123.36 129.58 28.65 . 33.05 . . 30.39 . . 31.18 . . . 
Panama 12.44 7.17 . . 11.50 13.81 10.79 . 9.20 . 9.48 . 100.00 104.73 110.54 112.95 110.66 109.22 109.68 112.28 118.63 123.96 129.69 135.22 56.31 48.53 . . 56.56 56.49 56.51 . 54.88 . 54.93 . 
Paraguay . 19.63 . 14.33 . . 17.23 . . 9.30 . 6.45 100.00 100.82 99.32 95.87 90.83 90.87 89.05 90.71 93.27 94.41 95.80 97.68 . 56.52 . 56.85 . . 57.98 . . 53.89 . 53.24 
Peru 8.59 . . 15.13 . . 12.55 . . 8.18 7.94 . 100.00 105.03 102.58 101.81 103.14 101.76 105.40 107.90 111.89 117.40 122.68 127.01 46.24 . . . . 53.01 54.65 . . 51.97 49.55 . 
Philippines . 21.61 . . 22.45 . . 21.99 . . 22.62 . 100.00 102.84 100.01 101.20 104.98 104.67 107.15 110.25 114.82 118.28 121.75 125.82 . 46.16 . . 46.09 . . 44.53 . . 44.04 . 
Poland 1.40 . 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.11 . . 0.10 . . 100.00 106.98 112.27 117.41 122.24 125.15 126.99 131.96 138.99 143.79 151.07 157.93 32.66 . 32.85 33.08 32.93 32.84 34.05 . . 34.92 . . 
Romania . . 1.96 . 3.73 2.67 2.86 . . 0.75 . . 100.00 94.45 90.35 89.74 92.08 97.78 103.17 108.94 118.56 123.81 131.07 138.76 . . 29.44 . 30.25 30.57 31.46 . . 31.50 . . 
Russian Federation 3.48 . . 2.28 . 0.89 0.32 . . 0.16 . . 100.00 101.54 96.35 102.94 113.69 120.40 126.23 136.20 146.72 156.98 167.75 179.34 46.15 . . 37.48 . 39.60 35.70 . . 37.51 . . 
Senegal . . . . . 44.19 . . . 33.50 . . 100.00 100.53 103.82 107.69 108.43 110.67 108.74 113.25 116.75 120.26 122.16 125.67 . . . . . 41.25 . . . 39.19 . . 
South Africa . . . . 26.20 . . . . . . . 100.00 100.81 99.66 100.51 103.32 104.95 107.60 109.68 113.47 117.91 121.51 125.20 . . . . 57.77 . . . . . . . 
Sri Lanka . . . . . . 13.95 . . . . . 100.00 105.13 108.64 111.61 116.65 113.22 116.01 121.55 126.67 133.07 139.39 146.60 . . . . . . 41.06 . . . . . 
Tajikistan . . . 44.53 . . . 36.25 21.49 . . . 100.00 100.82 104.41 106.45 116.59 127.46 138.12 151.27 166.24 176.32 189.29 199.44 . . . 31.52 . . . 32.64 33.61 . . . 
Tanzania . . . . 88.52 . . . . . . . 100.00 100.79 101.68 104.27 106.00 109.68 115.29 119.44 124.70 130.35 135.55 142.66 . . . . 34.62 . . . . . . . 
Thailand 1.89 . 0.00 1.53 1.43 . 0.70 . 0.40 . . . 100.00 97.73 86.43 89.38 92.70 93.90 98.08 104.08 108.68 113.47 117.37 122.03 43.39 . 41.36 43.53 43.15 . 41.96 . 42.45 . . . 
Turkey . . . . . . 2.00 . . 2.72 . . 100.00 107.24 109.89 103.12 105.71 96.17 102.12 106.36 114.08 120.73 124.73 128.92 . . . . . . 42.71 . . 43.23 . . 
Uganda 64.39 . . 60.49 . . 57.37 . . 51.53 . . 100.00 102.38 102.95 108.14 110.33 111.90 115.72 116.73 119.14 121.91 124.15 126.99 37.13 . . 43.07 . . 45.77 . . 42.62 . . 
Ukraine 1.93 . . 2.03 . . 0.51 . . 0.10 . . 100.00 97.97 96.83 97.19 104.93 115.64 122.81 135.63 153.11 158.27 167.43 173.40 35.12 . . 28.96 . . 28.28 . . 28.21 . . 
Uzbekistan . . 32.11 . . . 42.33 46.28 . . . . 100.00 102.71 104.59 107.35 110.23 113.42 116.44 119.76 127.33 134.50 142.33 150.33 . . 45.35 . . . 34.55 36.72 . . . . 
Venezuela, RB 14.71 9.57 13.97 . . . . 18.41 . 9.98 3.53 . 100.00 104.22 102.42 94.43 96.01 98.29 87.83 79.49 91.83 98.43 103.72 105.40 48.79 48.80 49.53 . . . . 48.20 . 47.61 43.44 . 
Vietnam . . 49.65 . . . 40.05 . 24.18 . 21.45 . 100.00 106.48 110.90 114.46 120.60 127.19 134.42 142.19 151.21 161.63 171.79 182.18 . . 35.52 . . . 37.55 . 36.16 . 37.77 . 
Zambia 62.07 . 55.40 . . . 64.60 . 64.29 . . . 100.00 99.80 94.85 96.01 98.48 100.88 101.77 104.49 107.56 110.39 114.31 118.37 49.79 . 53.44 . . . 42.08 . 50.74 . . . 
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APPENDIX E: DEBT LEVELS DATA 
Table E.1: Concessional Debt Data 
Country 
Concessional IFI Debt as a % of GDP Bilateral Debt as a % of GDP 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Albania 6.21% 9.04% 10.20% 10.78% 11.44% 10.61% 12.17% 11.58% 10.12% 8.75% 8.82% 8.02% 7.29% 9.83% 8.55% 6.18% 12.49% 12.03% 8.56% 8.06% 6.58% 5.69% 5.87% 4.97% 
Argentina 2.36% 2.04% 1.86% 1.62% 1.83% 5.35% 15.16% 12.72% 9.79% 5.37% 0.00% 0.00% 3.65% 2.74% 2.42% 2.02% 1.53% 1.27% 4.83% 4.08% 3.61% 2.70% 2.37% 0.61% 
Armenia 17.70% 21.42% 24.73% 29.12% 28.70% 27.52% 29.41% 30.20% 26.88% 18.33% 15.23% 11.84% 5.57% 6.66% 8.35% 9.30% 8.82% 7.72% 7.58% 4.42% 3.02% 2.25% 1.99% 2.53% 
Bangladesh 14.88% 13.90% 14.48% 14.27% 13.61% 13.55% 14.34% 14.85% 15.33% 14.20% 14.82% 14.39% 11.19% 9.53% 9.73% 9.77% 8.05% 7.31% 7.51% 7.17% 6.56% 5.29% 5.12% 4.53% 
Belarus 1.86% 1.83% 1.60% 1.47% 0.90% 0.66% 0.38% 0.15% 0.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.96% 0.89% 1.35% 1.57% 1.45% 1.36% 1.58% 1.31% 1.54% 1.60% 1.37% 3.67% 
Benin 28.63% 28.43% 27.41% 28.10% 29.53% 28.69% 26.15% 22.83% 21.39% 19.34% 2.78% 3.31% 25.05% 24.53% 23.08% 21.63% 21.81% 21.83% 19.32% 12.19% 10.35% 9.82% 7.98% 5.47% 
Bolivia 15.47% 15.24% 15.71% 16.62% 16.10% 17.06% 19.68% 23.77% 24.52% 17.46% 2.00% 2.00% 19.31% 16.55% 17.06% 15.84% 14.07% 2.08% 2.55% 2.67% 3.40% 3.06% 3.19% 3.35% 
Bosnia Herzegovina 5.98% 6.04% 7.89% 8.62% 8.24% 8.81% 10.01% 9.18% 9.86% 8.77% 7.89% 6.84% . . . 10.96% 9.28% 8.81% 8.79% 8.09% 7.23% 6.14% 6.76% 4.88% 
Botswana 0.24% 0.21% 0.19% 0.18% 0.16% 0.15% 0.16% 0.10% 0.08% 0.07% 0.06% 0.05% 2.99% 2.17% 2.13% 2.15% 1.93% 1.69% 2.48% 1.81% 1.65% 1.43% 1.03% 1.01% 
Brazil 0.01% 0.00% 0.58% 1.55% 0.28% 1.56% 4.26% 5.27% 3.87% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.93% 1.42% 1.39% 1.82% 1.77% 1.76% 2.08% 1.72% 1.24% 0.77% 0.33% 0.18% 
Bulgaria 6.16% 9.40% 8.96% 9.79% 10.76% 8.14% 6.57% 5.85% 4.74% 2.42% 1.11% 0.00% 16.15% 13.36% 10.42% 9.20% 8.64% 5.82% 4.13% 3.33% 2.61% 2.15% 2.01% 1.24% 
Burkina Faso 27.65% 29.77% 29.32% 29.04% 27.04% 26.80% 26.49% 23.10% 22.38% 21.18% 6.88% 7.49% 5.46% 5.65% 5.06% 5.50% 7.61% 8.33% 4.59% 3.45% 4.15% 3.84% 4.21% 3.59% 
Cambodia 5.15% 5.40% 6.58% 7.20% 7.74% 8.23% 9.98% 11.09% 10.67% 8.76% 7.14% 6.69% 57.57% 54.09% 58.53% 56.05% 53.74% 50.48% 49.11% 44.31% 39.07% 33.80% 30.70% 27.86% 
Cameroon 6.40% 7.61% 9.36% 9.43% 10.61% 10.91% 11.30% 9.86% 9.21% 8.08% 1.01% 1.04% 76.17% 75.07% 80.31% 68.35% 70.60% 69.78% 66.59% 58.98% 43.99% 26.28% 8.42% 7.69% 
Chile 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.85% 0.72% 0.80% 0.85% 0.70% 0.65% 0.60% 0.56% 0.36% 0.26% 0.22% 0.17% 
China 0.90% 0.83% 0.87% 0.83% 0.74% 0.66% 0.65% 0.63% 0.55% 0.43% 0.37% 0.32% 2.58% 2.21% 2.29% 2.49% 2.08% 1.81% 1.63% 1.54% 1.59% 1.15% 1.03% 0.87% 
Colombia 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.83% 1.48% 1.44% 1.73% 1.58% 1.48% 1.48% 1.41% 0.97% 0.65% 0.52% 0.26% 
Costa Rica 0.03% 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 8.29% 6.28% 5.74% 4.99% 4.18% 2.70% 2.27% 2.10% 1.71% 1.39% 1.22% 1.22% 
Cote d'Ivoire 13.55% 14.09% 16.48% 16.86% 19.71% 17.98% 19.24% 16.99% 15.01% 12.54% 12.04% 11.01% 45.64% 41.85% 40.03% 34.98% 38.20% 34.83% 34.35% 31.12% 35.26% 29.33% 30.46% 22.66% 
Dominican Republic 0.64% 0.24% 0.35% 0.33% 0.29% 0.27% 0.16% 0.72% 1.07% 1.28% 1.38% 1.42% 10.78% 9.90% 9.03% 8.57% 6.14% 5.11% 4.38% 5.15% 5.47% 3.89% 4.11% 4.40% 
Ecuador 0.84% 0.70% 0.42% 0.14% 1.16% 1.05% 1.39% 1.50% 1.00% 0.27% 0.09% 0.03% 10.89% 8.99% 9.37% 15.55% 18.08% 12.58% 11.15% 9.69% 8.07% 6.15% 4.99% 2.16% 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1.63% 1.53% 1.48% 1.39% 1.25% 1.26% 1.48% 1.67% 1.86% 1.59% 1.37% 1.13% 34.95% 27.78% 26.40% 23.50% 19.83% 19.96% 23.41% 26.82% 28.40% 22.33% 18.61% 13.46% 
El Salvador 0.19% 0.17% 0.15% 0.14% 0.13% 0.11% 0.10% 0.09% 0.08% 0.07% 0.06% 0.05% 5.19% 4.74% 4.47% 4.24% 4.70% 4.51% 4.73% 4.90% 4.59% 3.86% 3.24% 3.27% 
Estonia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Georgia 11.53% 12.82% 15.17% 22.63% 19.70% 21.02% 23.49% 21.77% 18.13% 14.08% 12.89% 11.13% 23.18% 22.21% 22.24% 27.48% 24.48% 23.73% 23.29% 20.09% 14.25% 10.20% 6.96% 5.10% 
Ghana 45.30% 43.91% 45.01% 45.18% 70.85% 66.44% 63.58% 59.03% 55.08% 44.15% 7.69% 8.56% 12.75% 12.79% 14.03% 14.66% 21.52% 22.02% 21.51% 18.93% 5.05% 3.52% 2.43% 1.64% 
Guatemala 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.51% 0.52% 0.52% 0.49% 0.50% 0.48% 0.40% 0.30% 0.23% 0.18% 0.15% 0.12% 
Honduras 3.10% 3.09% 3.60% 5.81% 5.53% 6.03% 5.92% 6.09% 6.35% 5.65% 1.27% 1.29% 10.25% 8.63% 7.37% 7.62% 7.24% 6.71% 6.44% 6.64% 6.47% 3.17% 2.18% 1.71% 
India 501.34% 417.38% 377.50% 363.90% 271.75% 270.23% 284.11% 293.71% 284.17% 253.69% 235.50% 227.47% 667.67% 511.71% 463.39% 521.87% 290.10% 260.28% 274.59% 270.39% 239.94% 201.74% 192.46% 180.47% 
Indonesia 0.19% 0.91% 2.37% 2.45% 2.54% 2.08% 1.92% 1.87% 1.53% 1.10% 0.15% 0.13% 7.51% 6.57% 7.55% 8.14% 7.66% 7.01% 7.52% 6.98% 5.93% 5.02% 4.26% 2.93% 
Jamaica 0.07% 0.06% 0.12% 0.06% 0.04% 0.03% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.76% 0.68% 1.51% 1.01% 0.80% 0.68% 0.53% 0.46% 0.40% 0.30% 0.21% 0.15% 
Jordan 6.36% 6.70% 6.30% 6.56% 5.99% 5.63% 5.90% 5.33% 4.03% 2.68% 1.76% 1.04% 51.38% 43.42% 41.63% 43.36% 40.22% 45.61% 46.82% 54.24% 51.90% 43.27% 41.79% 27.18% 
Kazakhstan 2.65% 2.34% 2.99% 2.82% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.39% 3.65% 3.79% 5.21% 4.44% 3.08% 2.78% 2.90% 2.45% 1.77% 1.31% 1.00% 
Kyrgyz Republic 18.82% 24.43% 32.12% 45.33% 43.86% 38.75% 41.27% 39.44% 37.25% 31.32% 27.82% 21.69% 18.49% 19.17% 23.26% 37.50% 35.83% 30.82% 32.38% 30.17% 28.53% 23.87% 24.13% 16.76% 
Lao PDR 21.53% 24.88% 36.76% 31.98% 26.75% 26.60% 29.27% 29.71% 27.14% 23.97% 19.84% 17.21% 77.42% 84.06% 114.45% 99.29% 84.83% 82.76% 79.16% 22.76% 19.62% 17.37% 16.06% 14.92% 
  
264 
 
Country 
IFI Debt as a % of GDP IFI debt per capita (real USD) 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Latvia 2.31% 1.39% 0.96% 0.65% 0.44% 0.29% 0.17% 0.05% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.17% 1.19% 1.18% 1.00% 0.62% 0.51% 0.57% 0.42% 0.34% 0.17% 0.15% 0.11% 
Lesotho 16.30% 15.38% 18.71% 19.20% 19.23% 22.75% 28.77% 21.91% 19.11% 17.45% 16.39% 15.74% 10.96% 7.75% 6.20% 7.58% 10.41% 6.28% 8.93% 6.18% 5.67% 4.40% 3.41% 1.54% 
Lithuania 3.38% 2.76% 2.32% 2.16% 1.70% 1.26% 0.87% 0.25% 0.12% 0.00% 0.00% . 2.25% 2.02% 2.17% 2.30% 1.99% 1.70% 1.69% 1.62% 1.21% 0.71% 0.07% . 
Macedonia, FYR 4.41% 6.36% 8.05% 9.01% 9.38% 9.53% 9.63% 9.29% 8.43% 7.47% 6.92% 5.16% 7.47% 8.29% 9.70% 9.16% 9.82% 9.04% 8.65% 7.74% 6.36% 5.05% 4.26% 1.60% 
Madagascar 31.79% 37.09% 37.53% 38.73% 38.92% 34.36% 41.65% 39.81% 58.23% 50.61% 12.23% 12.45% 48.34% 62.52% 62.04% 68.47% 63.54% 42.48% 45.41% 38.61% 14.92% 6.67% 6.29% 2.00% 
Malawi 65.34% 56.49% 96.22% 96.50% 98.10% 100.78% 71.14% 86.40% 83.95% 71.64% 5.64% 5.85% 13.33% 10.64% 17.39% 29.68% 28.25% 23.85% 15.32% 16.92% 21.29% 17.13% 10.77% 10.02% 
Mali 42.04% 46.02% 46.94% 48.64% 47.33% 46.75% 41.88% 35.47% 33.88% 30.07% 5.25% 6.24% 50.71% 51.54% 49.59% 47.50% 48.40% 45.45% 24.59% 19.97% 18.47% 12.83% 13.01% 13.27% 
Mexico 4.16% 2.34% 2.05% 0.96% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.64% 1.68% 1.46% 1.10% 0.64% 0.51% 0.48% 0.39% 0.35% 0.28% 0.22% 0.10% 
Moldova 14.15% 13.53% 12.84% 21.10% 19.65% 16.45% 16.74% 14.34% 11.16% 9.10% 10.07% 9.36% 11.27% 16.49% 19.65% 16.68% 25.93% 20.80% 19.14% 15.64% 8.96% 7.63% 7.36% 2.93% 
Mongolia 9.53% 13.88% 17.10% 19.99% 17.28% 17.20% 17.60% 19.25% 18.35% 13.85% 10.90% 9.25% 20.15% 20.33% 27.93% 42.90% 34.02% 28.94% 30.04% 31.24% 27.52% 21.25% 16.22% 13.84% 
Morocco 0.10% 0.09% 0.07% 0.07% 0.07% 0.07% 0.06% 0.05% 0.04% 0.03% 0.03% 0.02% 27.25% 26.80% 21.29% 18.98% 18.57% 16.42% 15.29% 11.72% 9.94% 7.93% 7.89% 6.34% 
Nicaragua 12.15% 12.66% 15.92% 21.24% 22.03% 21.96% 25.76% 30.96% 33.16% 28.26% 6.15% 7.26% 104.57% 92.60% 87.49% 82.87% 80.83% 74.90% 73.26% 72.58% 24.82% 21.45% 20.07% 11.10% 
Pakistan 7.73% 7.76% 8.37% 8.98% 7.34% 8.48% 10.22% 9.29% 8.69% 7.46% 7.18% 7.21% 16.17% 15.63% 17.18% 18.97% 15.94% 16.95% 17.02% 16.39% 13.79% 10.99% 9.70% 8.98% 
Panama 1.45% 1.47% 1.70% 1.38% 0.82% 0.48% 0.41% 0.37% 0.28% 0.17% 0.09% 0.03% 4.45% 3.86% 3.32% 2.98% 2.42% 1.89% 1.90% 1.90% 1.63% 1.36% 1.16% 0.95% 
Paraguay 0.39% 0.37% 0.39% 0.41% 0.40% 0.41% 0.50% 0.43% 0.33% 0.28% 0.20% 0.14% 5.59% 5.46% 6.66% 7.29% 6.63% 6.17% 8.53% 8.05% 9.32% 7.80% 5.79% 3.42% 
Peru 1.71% 1.76% 1.63% 1.46% 1.08% 0.73% 0.43% 0.24% 0.16% 0.08% 0.02% 0.00% 20.62% 18.00% 18.12% 18.11% 17.11% 16.07% 15.87% 15.80% 13.90% 7.56% 6.32% 2.62% 
Philippines 0.69% 1.22% 2.59% 2.53% 2.77% 2.84% 2.32% 1.65% 1.04% 0.55% 0.15% 0.12% 14.65% 13.35% 18.33% 17.37% 15.72% 14.56% 14.93% 16.01% 14.75% 11.19% 9.25% 7.67% 
Poland 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 18.12% 15.67% 14.54% 13.67% 12.55% 8.21% 8.80% 8.48% 6.79% 2.57% 1.85% 0.19% 
Romania 1.86% 1.83% 1.29% 1.30% 1.23% 0.97% 0.94% 1.01% 0.60% 0.27% 0.09% 0.00% 4.69% 4.01% 3.06% 2.38% 2.14% 1.84% 1.58% 1.22% 0.94% 0.56% 0.49% 0.32% 
Russian Federation 3.24% 3.34% 7.47% 8.11% 4.59% 2.46% 1.91% 1.21% 0.62% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 15.64% 14.72% 24.07% 34.33% 25.22% 18.97% 14.40% 11.12% 8.89% 3.90% 0.65% 0.11% 
Senegal . . . . . . . . . . 5.61% 6.17% . . . . . . . . . . 7.73% 5.50% 
South Africa 0.63% 0.28% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Sri Lanka 14.94% 13.05% 12.96% 12.42% 11.06% 11.54% 12.13% 13.07% 12.03% 10.27% 8.92% 8.15% 25.15% 22.29% 24.20% 24.75% 21.99% 21.88% 22.24% 22.80% 22.24% 18.36% 16.43% 14.63% 
Tajikistan 5.35% 8.96% 14.83% 21.43% 32.44% 27.36% 24.82% 22.36% 20.90% 19.44% 14.13% 11.30% 57.73% 61.33% 41.85% 50.00% 66.38% 48.28% 46.84% 35.06% 12.58% 11.71% 12.78% 11.06% 
Tanzania 38.38% 33.74% 32.99% 34.02% 32.55% 31.30% 34.12% 38.59% 38.90% 30.02% 7.58% 9.94% 44.34% 34.22% 32.52% 32.77% 25.21% 20.89% 21.68% 13.51% 12.15% 9.19% 9.54% 7.15% 
Thailand 0.06% 1.72% 3.09% 2.96% 2.60% 1.56% 0.39% 0.06% 0.05% 0.04% 0.04% 0.03% 4.26% 8.05% 12.59% 13.80% 12.80% 12.08% 10.48% 7.37% 6.11% 4.32% 3.78% 3.00% 
Turkey 0.44% 0.38% 0.19% 0.41% 1.63% 7.44% 9.73% 8.09% 5.58% 3.07% 2.07% 1.11% 4.18% 3.81% 3.04% 3.04% 2.71% 3.34% 2.91% 2.15% 1.56% 0.94% 0.84% 0.57% 
Uganda 37.77% 37.55% 35.66% 40.34% 39.94% 45.11% 46.73% 50.85% 44.79% 36.40% 4.58% 7.28% 13.17% 14.19% 13.43% 6.91% 6.46% 7.83% 6.02% 5.51% 3.80% 2.78% 2.29% 1.18% 
Ukraine 5.14% 4.85% 6.81% 9.14% 6.84% 5.12% 4.49% 3.70% 2.51% 1.39% 0.78% 0.31% 7.64% 5.84% 6.64% 12.31% 8.67% 7.76% 7.02% 5.80% 4.23% 2.77% 2.00% 1.15% 
Uzbekistan 1.71% 1.53% 1.56% 1.19% 0.94% 0.70% 0.65% 0.43% 0.20% 0.08% 0.15% 0.19% 6.76% 7.21% 8.39% 9.44% 12.28% 15.34% 18.52% 18.22% 15.45% 11.67% 9.28% 6.57% 
Venezuela, RB 3.30% 1.94% 1.38% 0.77% 0.17% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.93% 1.67% 2.68% 2.81% 2.38% 1.43% 1.08% 0.61% 0.34% 0.31% 0.37% 0.08% 
Vietnam 3.92% 3.87% 4.65% 4.75% 4.65% 5.30% 6.08% 7.35% 7.44% 6.55% 6.57% 7.06% 82.22% 50.90% 53.08% 53.75% 22.09% 21.59% 22.20% 23.14% 20.72% 17.87% 16.52% 13.83% 
Zambia 84.94% 71.88% 92.04% 96.89% 96.10% 82.11% 88.62% 77.15% 70.19% 45.55% 3.17% 4.09% 98.88% 79.81% 98.76% 72.37% 65.18% 56.48% 56.30% 49.16% 40.89% 7.62% 2.87% 1.32% 
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APPENDIX F:  PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING METHODS (PSM)  
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) offers a rigorous alternative to regression analysis in 
appraising counterfactual treatment outcomes and is increasingly being used for policy 
analysis.  The approach has two stages.  First, the estimation of matching estimators to rank 
subjects according to a unitary scale, and second the calculation of treatment effects by 
comparing outcomes relative to this scale, via a number of weighting methods (Caliendo and 
Kopeinig, 2006).    
However, as the assumptions and data requirements of a full PSM exercise are demanding, 
here the propensity score (PS) is used only to improve the quality of the match of the 
comparator groups within basic statistical tests. Here the treatment and control groups are 
limited to the area of common support (i.e. the area in which the two groups’ PS distributions 
overlap).   
The propensity score is defined as the likelihood of adopting a PRS arrangement.  In line with 
standard practice, this is estimated as a probit regression of a series of (prior) conditioning 
variables. The following were modelled: the prior income level (PCY), prior growth 
performance (GNI), prior debt levels (IFI Debt), the initial poverty level (P0), and the initial 
distribution (Gini). Experimentation revealed the most satisfactory and parsimonious 
specification included simply the pre-PRS income level (taken as the US dollar value in 2000) 
and prior growth performance (taken as an average of the annual change in GNI between 1996 
and 1999).  Formally:  
87D?@: PrgUh = R + H  23 + H	 { + HT  0 + HV 787 + HY  _B`D + K 
78?@:  PrgUh =  R +  H  23 + H	 { + K 
Table F.1 lists the estimated propensity scores (these are common for both panels). However, 
it is worth noting, as illustrated in Figure F.1, the distributions are somewhat divergent, 
underlying the different characteristics of the PRS and non-PRS groups, and therefore their 
lack of comparability. 
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Figure F1: Histogram of Propensity Scores (0=Non PRS and 1=PRS)
 
Table F1: Estimated Propensity Scores  
 Country  Prop score Common Support Country  Prop score Common Support  
(a) PRS  (b) Non-PRS  
Albania 0.4285 Yes Argentina 0.0000  
Armenia 0.9315 Yes Belarus 0.4889 Yes 
Bangladesh 0.9598 Yes Botswana 0.0000  
Benin 0.9460 Yes Brazil 0.0000 Yes 
Bolivia 0.6103 Yes Bulgaria 0.1091 Yes 
Bosnia & Herz. 0.7746 Yes Chile 0.000  
Burkina Faso 0.9805 Yes China 0.7431 Yes 
Cambodia 0.9713 Yes Colombia 0.0100  
Cameroon 0.8325 Yes Costa Rica 0.0000  
Cote d’Ivoire 0.8480 Yes Dominican Rep 0.0014  
Georgia 0.8927 Yes Ecuador 0.24756 Yes 
Ghana 0.9669 Yes Egypt  0.1752 Yes 
Honduras 0.5663 Yes El Salvador 0.0093  
Indonesia 0.5895 Yes Estonia 0.0000  
Kyrgyz Rep 0.9721 Yes Guatemala 0.1106 Yes 
Lao PDR 0.9621 Yes India 0.9385 Yes 
Lesotho 0.9117 Yes Jamaica 0.0000  
Macedonia 0.0568 Yes Jordan 0.0500  
Madagascar 0.9664 Yes Kazakhstan 0.3645 Yes 
Malawi 0.9799 Yes Latvia 0.0000  
Mali 0.9762 Yes Lithuania 0.0000  
Moldova 0.9077 Yes Mexico 0.0000  
Mongolia 0.9423 Yes Morocco 0.3689 Yes 
Nicaragua 0.7529 Yes Panama 0.0000  
Pakistan 0.8656 Yes Paraguay 0.2074 Yes 
Senegal 0.9279 Yes Peru 0.0097  
Sri Lanka 0.7107 Yes Philippines 0.5331 Yes 
Tajikistan 0.9823 Yes Poland 0.0000  
Tanzania 0.9648 Yes Romania 0.0425  
Uganda  0.9746 Yes Russian Fed 0.0473  
Uzbekistan 0.8878 Yes South Africa 0.0000  
Vietnam  0.9576 Yes Thailand 00082  
Zambia 0.9374 Yes Turkey 0.0000  
   Ukraine 0.7920 Yes 
   Venezuela 0.0000  
0
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APPENDIX G:  STATISTICAL TESTING OUTPUT 
Table G.1: Cross tabulation: Annualized Change in the Poverty Headcount Tests 
National dataset 
 
Full Sample T = 1.1352 Restricted Sample T = 0.7933 
Group Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Non-PRS (0) 57 -0.9009 0.3963 2.9916 -1.6948 -0.1072 30 -1.0902 0.5357 2.9342 -2.1858 0.0055 
PRS (1) 26 -1.7467 0.6308 3.2166 -3.0459 -0.4475 26 -1.7467 0.6308 3.2167 -3.0459 -0.4475 
Combined 83 -1.1659 0.3369 3.0696 -1.8362 -0.4956 56 -1.3950 0.40865 3.0581 -2.2139 -0.5760 
Difference  0.8457 0.7450  -0.6543 2.3457  0.6656 0.8276  -1.0049 2.3179 
Ho: diff= 0 
 
Ha: diff<0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.8689 
Ha: diff ≠0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.2622 
Ha: diff>0, Pr(T < t) 
0.1311 
Ha: diff<0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.7844 
Ha: diff ≠0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.4313 
Ha: diff<0, Pr(T < t) 
0.2156 
Dollar-a-day poverty dataset T = 2.1656  T = 1.6729 
Non-PRS (0) 113 -0.3360 0.2056 2.1851 -0.7433 0.0712 49 -0.3694 0.4556 3.1894 -1.2855 0.5467 
PRS (1) 30 -1.4918 0.4925 2.6977 -2.4992 -0.4845 30 -1.4918 0.4925 2.6977 -2.4992 -0.4845 
Combined 143 -0.5785 0.1957 2.3399 -0.9653 -0.1917 79 -0.7956 0.3425 3.0441 -1.4774 -0.1138 
Difference  -1.1558 0.5337  0.7685 2.2347  1.1225 0.6710  -0.2160 2.4609 
Ho: diff= 0 
 
Ha: diff<0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.9818 
Ha: diff ≠0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.0364** 
Ha: diff<0, Pr(T < t) 
0.0182** 
Ha: diff<0,  Pr(T < t)  
0.9056 
Ha: diff ≠0,  Pr(T < t)  
0.0989* 
Ha: diff<0, Pr(T < t)  
0.0494** 
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Table G.2: Cross tabulation: Annualized change in Per Capita Income (Indexed to 1996) Tests 
National dataset 
 
Full Sample T = -2.9274 Restricted Sample T=  -1.8618 
Group Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Non-PRS (0) 57 2.4454 0.4904 3.7027 1.4628 3.4277 30 3.0161 0.7463 4.0488 1.4898 4.5424 
PRS (1) 26 5.3811 1.0279 5.2415 3.2640 7.4981 26 5.3811 1.0279 5.2415 3.2640 7.4981 
Combined 83 3.3649 0.4861 4.4290 2.3978 4.3320 56 4.1141 0.6369 4.7659 2.8378 5.3904 
Difference  -2.9359 1.0029  -4.9312 -0.9404  -2.3650 1.2703  -4.9204 0.1905 
Ho: diff= 0 
T=  
Ha: diff<0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.022** 
 
Ha: diff ≠0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.044** 
Ha: diff>0, Pr(T < t) 
0.9978 
Ha: diff<0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.0344** 
Ha: diff ≠0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.0689* 
Ha: diff<0, Pr(T < t) 
0.9656 
 
Dollar-a-day dataset T = -1.5682  T = -1.2473 
Non-PRS (0) 113 3.2928 0.4220 4.4859 2.4567 4.1289 49 3.3824 0.7730 5.4111 1.8281 4.9367 
PRS (1) 30 4.8834 0.9224 5.0521 2.9970 6.7699 30 4.8835 0.9224 5.0521 2.9970 6.7700 
Combined 143 3.6265 0.3878 4.6375 2.8599 4.3931 79 3.9524 0.5958 5.2958 2.7662 5.1286 
Difference  -1.5907 1.0143  -3.6377 0.4564  -1.5011 1.2035  -3.9048 0.9026 
Ho: diff= 0 
 
Ha: diff<0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.0622* 
Ha: diff ≠0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.1244 
Ha: diff<0, Pr(T < t) 
0.9378 
Ha: diff<0,  Pr(T < t) 
0. 1084 
Ha: diff ≠0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.2168 
Ha: diff<0, Pr(T < t) 
0.8916 
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Table G.3: Cross tabulation: Annualized Change in the Gini Coefficient Tests 
National dataset 
 
Full Sample T = -0.0415 Restricted Sample T = 0.1379 
Group Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Non-PRS (0) 57 0.0484 0.1657 1.2510 -0.2835 0,3804 30 0.1138 0.2564 1.4042 -0.4106 0.6381 
PRS (1) 26 0.0618 0.2760 1.4075 -0.5067 0.6303 26 0.0618 0.2760 1.4075 -0.5067 0.6303 
Combined 83 0.0526 0.1420 1.2934 0.2298 0.3350 56 0.0896 0.1862 1.3931 -0.2835 0.4627 
Difference  -0.0134 0.3219  -0.6623 0.6356  0.0520 0.3767  -0.7037 0.8076 
Ho: diff= 0 
T = 
Ha: diff<0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.4835 
Ha: diff ≠0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.9671 
Ha: diff>0, Pr(T < t) 
0.5165 
Ha: diff<0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.5546 
Ha: diff ≠0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.8908 
Ha: diff<0, Pr(T < t) 
0.4454 
Dollar-a-day dataset T = -0.3662  T = -0.1473 
Non-PRS( 0) 113 0.0300 0.1116 1.1862 -0.1911 0.2511 49 0.0742 0.2225 1.5574 -0.3731 0.5216 
PRS (1) 30 0.1239 0.2309 1.2646 -0.3483 0.5961 30 0.1239 0.2309 1.2646 -0.3483 0.5961 
Combined 143 0.0497 0.1003 1.1991 -0.1485 0.2479 79 0.0931 0.1626 1.4449 -0.2305 0.4167 
Difference  -0.0939 0.2564  -0.6109 0.4231  -0.4966 0.3371  -0.7209 0.6216 
Ho: diff= 0 
 
Ha: diff<0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.3580 
Ha: diff ≠0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.7160 
Ha: diff<0, Pr(T < t) 
0.6420 
Ha: diff<0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.4416 
Ha: diff ≠0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.8833 
Ha: diff<0, Pr(T < t) 
0.5584 
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Table G4:  Cross Tabulation:  Change in the Growth Elasticity of Poverty Tests 
 
National dataset 
 Full Sample  T = -0.6284 Restricted Sample T =  -0.7511 
Group Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Non-PRS (0) 54 -1.6122 0.6517 4.7887 -2.9192 -0.3051 30 -1.6811 0.7773 4.2575 -3.2709 -0.0913 
PRS (1) 26 -0.9962 0.3915 1.9963 -1.8026 -0.1899 26 -0.9962 0.3915 1.9963 -1.8026 -0.1899 
Combined 80 -1.4120 0.4573 4.0902 -2.3222 -0.5018 56 -1.3631 0.4529 3.3893 -2.2708 -0.4555 
Difference  -0.6159 0.9801  -2.5672 1.3353  -0.6848 0.9118   1.1432 
Ho: diff= 0 
T= 
Ha: diff<0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.2658 
Ha: diff ≠0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.5316 
Ha: diff>0, Pr(T < t) 
0.7342 
Ha: diff<0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.2279 
Ha: diff ≠0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.4558 
Ha: diff<0, Pr(T < t) 
0.7721 
Dollar-a-day dataset T = -0.8404  T = -0.8756 
Non-PRS (0) 98 -1.3759 0.6178 6.1155 -2.6020 -0.1498 42 -1.3785 0.8325 5.3954 -3.0598 0.3028 
PRS (1) 29 -0.3699 0.6846 3.6867 -1.7723 1.0324 29 -0.3699 0.6846 3.6867 -1.7723 1.0324 
Combined 127 -1.1462 0.5019 5.6562 -2.1394 -0.1529 71 -0.9666 0.5659 4.7682 -2.0952 0.1621 
Difference  -1.0060 1.1971  -3.3751 1.3632  -1.0086 1.1532  -3.3091 1.2919 
Ho: diff= 0 
 
Ha: diff<0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.2012 
Ha: diff ≠0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.4023 
Ha: diff<0, Pr(T < t) 
0.7988 
Ha: diff<0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.1924 
Ha: diff ≠0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.3848 
Ha: diff<0, Pr(T < t) 
0.8076 
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Table G5: Cross Tabulation: Stabilization Variables Tests 
 
 
Current account balance as % of GDP, variation against the mean 
T = 4.2275 
Group Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Non-PRS (0) 615 0,3326 0.1666 4.1305 0.0055 0.6597 
PRS (1) 159 -1.2865 0.3905 4.9240 -2.0578 -0.5152 
Combined 774 -0.000 0.1564 4.3516 -0.3070 0.3070 
Difference  1.6191 0.3830  0.8673 2.3709 
Ho: diff= 0 
 
Ha: diff<0,  Pr(T < t) 
1.000 
Ha: diff ≠0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.000 
Ha: diff>0, Pr(T < t) 
0.000 
 
Consumer Prices Index,  variation against the mean 
T= -0.8893 
Non-PRS (0) 627 -0.6353 1.7308 43.3402 -4.0343 2.7636 
PRS (1) 173 2.3027 0.4147 5.4545 1.4841 3.1212 
Combined 800 -0.000 1.3599 38.4647 -2.6695 2.6695 
Difference  -2.9380 3.3038  -9.4231 3.5471 
Ho: diff= 0 
 
Ha: diff<0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.1872 
Ha: diff ≠0,  Pr(T < t) 
0.3741 
Ha: diff<0, Pr(T < t) 
0.8129 
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APPENDIX H: STABILIZATION DATA   
COUNTRY 
 
PRS 
YEAR 
 
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (CPI) CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE AS % OF GDP 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Albania 2000 12.73 33.18 20.64 0.39 0.05 3.11 7.77 0.48 2.28 2.37 2.37 2.93 -3.56 -12.40 -2.39 -4.52 -4.24 -5.31 -9.16 -7.20 -4.80 -6.82 -7.37 -10.62 
Argentina   0.16 0.53 0.92 -1.17 -0.94 -1.07 25.87 13.44 4.42 9.64 10.9 8.83 -2.49 -4.14 -4.84 -4.21 -3.16 -1.41 8.59 6.28 2.10 2.88 3.60 2.71 
Armenia 2001 18.68 13.96 8.67 0.65 -0.79 3.15 1.06 4.72 6.96 0.64 2.89 4.41 -18.20 -18.70 -22.07 -16.64 -14.56 -9.42 -6.22 -6.75 -0.55 -1.06 -1.83 -6.41 
Bangladesh 2001 2.38 5.39 8.4 6.11 2.21 2.01 3.33 5.67 9.17 7.05 6.77 9.11 -2.44 -0.68 -0.08 -0.80 -0.65 -1.14 1.55 0.25 -0.49 -0.29 1.93 1.25 
Belarus   52.71 63.94 72.87 293.68 168.62 61.13 42.54 28.4 18.11 10.34 7.03 8.42 -3.50 -6.08 -6.68 -1.60 -2.66 -3.24 -2.29 -2.39 -5.16 1.44 -3.92 -6.72 
Benin 2000 4.91 3.47 5.75 0.33 4.17 3.98 2.49 1.49 0.87 5.36 3.78 1.3 -1.85 -7.14 -5.68 -6.52 -3.57 -3.16 -5.56 -9.31 -7.13 -5.27 -4.69   
Bolivia 2000 12.43 4.71 7.67 2.16 4.61 1.59 0.93 3.34 4.44 5.39 4.29 8.71 -5.13 -6.98 -7.84 -5.89 -5.32 -3.37 -4.45 0.94 3.85 6.52 11.50 13.72 
Bosnia &  Herzegovina 2004   5.6 -0.4 3 5.1 3.2 0.3 0.6 0.3 1.9 6       -8.38 -10.70 -7.19 -12.92 -17.90 -19.49 -16.36 -17.14 -8.00 -10.54 
Botswana   10.08 8.72 6.66 7.75 8.6 6.56 8.03 9.19 6.95 8.61 11.56 7.08 10.31 13.93 3.27 10.38 8.83 9.91 2.64 5.58 3.14 15.19 17.62 19.75 
Brazil   15.76 6.92 3.2 4.86 7.04 6.84 8.45 14.71 6.6 6.87 4.18 3.64 -2.77 -3.50 -4.01 -4.33 -3.76 -4.19 -1.51 0.76 1.77 1.59 1.25 0.12 
Bulgaria   121.61 1058.37 18.67 2.57 10.32 7.36 5.81 2.16 6.35 5.04 7.26 8.4 0.16 4.12 -0.49 -5.04 -5.58 -5.92 -2.05 -5.11 -6.78 -12.31 -18.52 -25.39 
Burkina Faso 2000 6.1 2.32 5.08 -1.07 -0.3 5.01 2.18 2.03 -0.4 6.42 2.33 -0.23         -12.21 -10.34             
Cambodia 2000 10.07 3.17 14.81 4.01 -0.79 -0.6 3.23 1.21 3.92 6.35 6.14 7.67 -5.25 -5.69 -5.04 -5.20 -3.63 -2.20 -2.56 -4.94 -3.32 -4.75 -3.58 -6.50 
Cameroon 2000 3.92 4.79 3.17 1.87 1.23 4.42 2.83 0.62 0.23 2.01 5.12 0.92 -2.95 -5.92 -1.57 -4.86 -2.47 -3.92 -4.09 -4.61 -3.97 -4.69 -0.84 -2.64 
Chile   7.36 6.14 5.11 3.34 3.84 3.57 2.49 2.81 1.05 3.05 3.39 4.41 -4.07 -4.42 -4.94 0.14 -1.19 -1.60 -0.86 -1.05 2.17 1.23 4.87 4.39 
China   8.32 2.81 -0.84 -1.41 0.26 0.46 -0.77 1.16 3.89 1.82 1.46 4.75 0.85 3.88 3.09 1.95 1.71 1.31 2.44 2.80 3.55 7.19 9.53 11.78 
Colombia   20.8 18.47 18.68 10.87 9.22 7.97 6.35 7.13 5.9 5.05 4.3 5.54 -4.78 -5.39 -4.93 0.78 0.86 -1.15 -1.39 -1.06 -0.80 -1.30 -1.84 -2.81 
Costa Rica   17.52 13.23 11.67 10.05 10.99 11.23 9.16 9.45 12.32 13.8 11.47 9.36 -2.23 -3.75 -3.69 -4.22 -4.43 -3.68 -5.09 -5.02 -4.28 -4.91 -4.67 -6.01 
Côte d'Ivoire 2002 2.48 4.02 4.69 0.79 2.46 4.28 3.11 3.35 1.44 3.89 2.47 1.89 -1.34 -1.32 -2.27 -0.95 -2.32 -0.58 6.69 2.14 1.56 0.24 2.76 -0.74 
Dominican Republic   5.4 8.3 4.83 6.47 7.72 8.88 5.22 27.45 51.46 4.19 7.57 6.14 -1.17 -0.83 -1.60 -1.98 -4.28 -2.98 -3.00 4.87 4.73 -1.39 -3.58 -5.00 
Ecuador   24.37 30.64 36.1 52.24 96.09 37.68 12.48 7.93 2.74 2.41 3.03 2.28 -0.26 -1.93 -9.02 5.50 5.81 -3.08 -5.11 -1.47 -1.66 0.93 3.87 3.49 
Egypt   7.19 4.63 3.87 3.08 2.68 2.27 2.74 4.51 11.27 4.87 7.64 9.32 -0.28 -0.91 -3.02 -1.80 -0.97 -0.40 0.71 4.51 4.97 2.34 2.45 0.32 
El Salvador   9.79 4.49 2.55 0.51 2.27 3.75 1.87 2.12 4.45 4.69 4.04 4.58 -1.64 -0.88 -0.76 -1.92 -3.28 -1.09 -2.83 -4.67 -3.97 -3.33 -3.63 -5.49 
Estonia   23.05 10.58 8.21 3.3 4.03 5.74 3.57 1.34 3.05 4.09 4.43 6.59 -8.45 -11.16 -8.58 -5.19 -5.32 -5.24 -10.67 -11.36 -11.78 -10.02 -16.77 -18.00 
Georgia 2000 39.36 7.09 3.57 19.19 4.06 4.65 5.56 4.78 5.7 8.23 9.22 9.25   -14.65 -7.63 -7.09 -8.80 -6.58 -6.35 -9.60 -6.90 -11.07 -15.13 -19.74 
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COUNTRY 
 
PRS 
YEAR 
 
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (CPI) CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE AS % OF GDP 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Ghana 2000 46.56 27.89 14.62 12.41 25.19 32.91 14.82 26.67 12.62 15.12 10.92 10.73 -4.43 -5.86 -6.98 -12.51 -7.76 -6.11 -0.52 3.65 -6.39 -10.30 -8.20 -14.35 
Guatemala   11.06 9.23 6.97 4.86 5.98 8.91 6.33 5.85 9.23 8.57 5.79 8.75 -2.86 -3.56 -5.36 -5.60 -5.44 -6.70 -5.94 -4.74 -4.84 -4.55 -5.00 -4.99 
Honduras 2000 23.84 20.2 13.67 11.66 11.05 9.67 7.7 7.67 8.11 8.81 5.58 6.94 -8.31 -5.84 -2.84 -4.48 -7.15 -6.33 -3.62 -6.79 -7.79 -3.15 -4.75 -10.02 
India   8.98 7.16 13.23 4.67 4.01 3.68 4.39 3.81 3.77 4.25 5.8 6.37 -1.53 -0.72 -1.66 -0.72 -1.00 0.30 1.39 1.46 0.11 -0.97 -1.03   
Indonesia 2003 7.97 6.23 58.39 20.49 3.72 11.5 11.88 6.59 6.24 10.45 13.11 6.32 -3.37 -2.27 4.29 4.13 4.84 4.30 4.00 3.45 0.61 0.10 2.98 2.43 
Jamaica   26.41 9.66 8.63 5.95 8.17 6.99 7.08 10.32 13.63 15.3 8.59 9.29 -2.18 -4.45 -3.82 -2.45 -4.08 -8.33 -11.10 -8.23 -5.02 -9.61 -9.87 -13.34 
Jordan   6.5 3.04 3.09 0.61 0.67 1.77 1.83 1.63 3.36 3.49 6.25 5.39 -3.20 0.40 0.18 4.97 0.71 0.05 5.68 12.21 0.78 -17.44 -10.77 -16.79 
Kazakhstan   39.18 17.41 7.15 8.3 13.18 8.35 5.84 6.44 6.88 7.58 8.59 10.77 -3.57 -3.61 -5.53 -1.01 2.00 -6.27 -4.16 -0.88 0.78 -1.85 -2.47 -7.85 
Kyrgyz Republic 2001 31.95 23.44 10.46 37.03 18.7 6.92 2.13 2.97 4.11 4.35 5.56 10.18 -23.24 -7.84 -22.11 -14.71 -5.55 -1.25 -1.89 -2.21 1.31 -1.44 -9.96 -6.10 
Lao People's Democratic Republic 2001 13.02 27.51 90.98 128.42 25.08 7.81 10.63 15.49 10.46 7.17 6.8 4.52 -14.15 -11.79 -5.98 6.17 -0.49 -4.66 0.17 -2.90 -7.55 -6.97 1.38 2.50 
Latvia   17.61 8.44 4.66 2.36 2.65 2.48 1.92 2.96 6.19 6.74 6.53 10.11 -5.01 -5.63 -9.82 -8.98 -4.73 -7.53 -6.71 -8.23 -12.80 -12.42 -22.68 -22.54 
Lesotho 2000 9.33       6.13 -9.62 33.81 6.67 5.02 3.44 6.05 8.03 -35.02 -29.46 -33.96 -27.33 -19.34 -13.38 -21.28 -13.55 -5.27 -7.41 4.37 12.69 
Lithuania   24.62 8.88 5.07 0.75 0.99 1.36 0.28 -1.13 1.14 2.66 3.75 5.74 -8.83 -9.81 -11.62 -10.94 -5.90 -4.72 -5.09 -6.87 -7.65 -7.05 -10.70 -14.64 
Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of 2000 2.47 1.29 0.54 -1.28 6.61 5.2 2.31 1.1 0.93 0.16 3.27 3.61 -6.52 -7.38 -7.81 -1.78 -2.72 -6.87 -9.95 -3.98 -8.43 -2.71 -0.88 -3.11 
Madagascar 2000 19.76 4.49 6.21 9.93 11.86 6.94 15.93 -1.22 13.81 18.51 10.77 10.3 -3.82 -5.69 -7.74 -6.04 -6.72 -3.09 -10.85 -5.99 -9.14 -11.00     
Malawi 2000 37.6 9.14 29.75 44.8 29.58 22.7 14.74 9.58 11.43 15.41 13.97 7.95 -6.46 -10.37 -0.25 -8.87 -4.22 -3.49 -7.53           
Mali 2000 6.81 -0.36 4.04 -1.2 -0.68 5.19 5.03 -1.35 -3.1 6.4 1.54 1.41 -9.96 -7.21 -8.02 -9.84 -10.51 -11.79 -4.45 -6.21 -8.39 -8.25 -3.93 -8.49 
Mexico   34.38 20.63 15.93 16.59 9.5 6.36 5.03 4.55 4.69 3.99 3.63 3.97 -0.75 -1.91 -3.80 -2.90 -3.21 -2.85 -2.18 -1.03 -0.68 -0.52 -0.46 -0.80 
Moldova 2000 23.51 11.77 7.7 39.26 31.3 9.76 5.3 11.75 12.52 11.96 12.78 12.37 -11.32 -14.24 -20.42 -5.80 -7.62 -1.81 -1.19 -6.57 -1.78 -7.56 -11.14 -15.80 
Mongolia 2001 46.89 36.56 9.36 7.56 11.6 6.28 0.92 5.13 8.24 12.72 5.1 9.05 -3.13 9.76 -7.68 -5.73 -6.42 -5.32 -8.25 -6.82 3.49 3.63 7.07   
Morocco   2.99 1.04 2.75 0.68 1.89 0.62 2.8 1.17 1.49 0.98 3.28 2.04 0.10 -0.26 -0.36 -0.42 -1.28 4.27 3.65 3.17 1.70 1.75 2.15 -0.16 
Nicaragua 2000         7.07 5.99 3.75 5.3 8.47 9.6 9.14 11.13 -24.84 -24.85 -19.22 -24.81 -21.39 -19.62 -18.48 -16.16 -14.52 -15.12 -13.40 -17.47 
Pakistan 2001 10.37 11.38 6.23 4.14 4.37 3.15 3.29 2.91 7.44 9.06 7.92 7.6 -7.01 -2.74 -3.61 -1.46 -0.11 2.60 5.33 4.29 -0.83 -3.29 -5.30 -5.81 
Panama   1.26 1.32 0.56 1.25 1.5 0.31 1.01 0.39 0.18 3.18 2.1 4.17 -2.15 -5.02 -9.29 -10.11 -5.79 -1.44 -0.78 -4.15 -7.07 -6.61 -3.07 -7.30 
Paraguay   9.8 6.95 11.55 6.75 8.98 7.27 10.51 14.24 4.32 6.81 9.59 8.13 -4.04 -7.33 -2.02 -2.27 -2.30 -4.13 1.84 2.33 2.06 0.21 1.38 1.35 
Peru   11.54 8.56 7.25 3.47 3.76 1.98 0.19 2.26 3.66 1.62 2 1.78 -6.52 -5.69 -5.88 -2.68 -2.90 -2.23 -1.96 -1.55 0.03 1.45 2.98 1.40 
Philippines   7.51 5.59 9.27 5.95 3.94 6.77 3.01 3.56 5.89 7.65 6.26 2.77 -4.77 -5.28 2.37 -3.77 -2.93 -2.45 -0.36 0.36 1.88 2.01 4.55 4.94 
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COUNTRY 
 
PRS 
YEAR 
 
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (CPI) CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE AS % OF GDP 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Poland   19.82 15.08 11.73 7.28 10.06 5.49 1.9 0.79 3.58 2.11 1.11 2.39 -2.08 -3.66 -4.01 -7.44 -6.04 -3.12 -2.80 -2.52 -3.98 -1.22 -2.75 -4.73 
Romania   38.83 154.76 59.1 45.8 45.67 34.47 22.54 15.27 11.88 8.99 6.58 4.84 -7.28 -5.96 -6.93 -3.64 -3.66 -5.55 -3.33 -5.56 -8.45 -8.60 -10.42 -13.88 
Russia   47.74 14.77 27.67 85.74 20.78 21.46 15.79 13.68 10.86 12.68 9.68 9.01 2.77 -0.02 0.08 12.57 18.04 11.07 8.48 8.21 10.06 11.07 9.56 5.97 
Senegal 2000 2.75 1.58 1.16 0.83 0.73 3.07 2.23 -0.03 0.51 1.7 2.11 5.85 -3.96 -3.96 -4.89 -6.22 -7.08 -5.03 -5.94 -6.37 -6.36 -7.78 -9.19 -11.60 
South Africa   7.35 8.6 6.88 5.18 5.34 5.7 9.16 5.6 -0.88 2.11 3.19 6.09 -1.17 -1.50 -1.64 -0.51 -0.14 0.29 0.80 -1.14 -3.24 -4.00 -6.25 -7.32 
Sri Lanka 2002 15.94 9.57 9.36 4.69 6.18 14.16 9.55 6.31 7.58 11.64 10.02 15.84 -4.91 -2.62 -1.44 -3.59 -6.39 -1.37 -1.38 -0.37 -3.13 -2.66 -5.30 -4.33 
Tajikistan 2000           38.59 12.25 16.3 7.14 7.09 10.01 13.15             -1.24 -0.31 -2.75 -0.82 -0.76 -13.34 
Tanzania 2000 20.98 16.09 12.8 7.89 5.92 5.13 0.98 5.3 4.74 5.03 7.25 7.03 -6.35 -6.16 -8.96 -9.67 -5.49 -4.19 -0.38 -1.15 -3.19 -6.11 -8.18 -11.03 
Thailand   5.81 5.63 7.99 0.28 1.59 1.63 0.7 1.8 2.76 4.54 4.64 2.24 -8.09 -2.00 12.73 10.16 7.59 4.41 3.67 3.35 1.71 -4.56 1.10 6.66 
Turkey   80.35 85.73 84.64 64.87 54.92 54.4 44.96 25.3 10.58 10.14 10.51 8.76 -1.34 -1.39 0.74 -0.37 -3.71 1.92 -0.27 -2.47 -3.67 -4.57 -6.02 -5.75 
Uganda 2000 7.19 8.17 0.07 5.78 3.39 1.87 -0.29 8.68 3.72 8.45 7.31 6.14 -3.50 -5.04 -5.52 -4.89 -5.79 -6.33 -5.86 -5.35 -1.51 -0.72 -4.37 -4.44 
Ukraine   80.33 15.94 10.58 22.68 28.2 11.96 0.76 5.2 9.05 13.51 9.09 12.84 -2.66 -2.66 -3.09 5.25 4.74 3.69 7.49 5.77 10.65 2.94 -1.50 -3.69 
Uzbekistan 2005   70.9 16.7 44.7 49.5 47.5 44.3 14.8 8.8 21 19.3                           
Venezuela   99.88 50.04 35.78 23.57 16.2 12.53 22.43 31.09 21.75 15.95 13.66 18.7 13.06 4.35 -4.85 2.16 10.12 1.61 8.18 14.12 13.80 17.26 14.71 8.77 
Vietnam 2001 5.67 3.21 7.27 4.12 -1.71 -0.43 3.83 3.22 7.76 8.28 7.39 8.3 -8.19 -5.69 -3.95 4.10 3.55 2.09 -1.72 -4.97 -2.11 -1.06 -0.27 -10.19 
Zambia 2000 43.07 24.42 24.46 26.79 26.03 21.39 22.23 21.4 17.97 18.32 9.02 10.66   -4.65 -17.62 -12.34 -18.26 -19.07 -14.70 -14.68 -7.73 -8.38 1.20 -4.43 
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APPENDIX I: FIRST DIFFERENCES (FD) REGRESSION OUTPUT 
This Appendix provides the First Differences (FD) regression output for the principal OLS 
(base) and Instrumental Variables (IV) models for each of the panel datasets.  The following 
Tables include the:  
 Base results for both panels (Table I.1) 
 IV results for both panels (Table I.2) 
 Test regressions for Instrumental Variables (Table I.3) 
 First stage of the IV process results (Table I.4) 
 Endogeneity Tests (Table I.5) 
The base regressions were carried out for the full data and a restricted sample, comprising 
only those records supported by consumption based poverty surveys.  Follow up regressions 
were also undertaken, where a significant PRS impact was found, to examine the channel of 
causation (via growth or distributional change).  This involved interacting the PRS variable 
with either the income index or the Gini coefficient.  The full output for these follow up 
models are not provided, but are summarized in the main body of the text.   
The FD estimates were calculated using the periodic form of the panel datasets, which 
provided a balanced panel by parsing the base data into four equal three year periods (1996-
1998, 1999-2001, 2002-2004 and 2005-2007) and averaging the variables within each period. 
This yielded a national panel of 76 observations and a dollar a day panel of 129 observations. 
The adopted specification was based on the standard poverty-growth-inequality identity 
expressed in differences, and included: the change in the poverty Headcount as the dependent 
variable; the first difference of per capita incomes indexed to 1996 and the Gini coefficient as 
the standard independent variables; plus binary variables for PRS adoption (allowing for a two 
year lead-in time) and time indicators for the third and fourth periods (the first period was 
omitted as the base case).  
The instruments used within the IV estimators are the current and lagged (by one full three 
year period) level of concessional IFI (World Bank IDA and IMF) debt as a share of GDP.  
The supporting intuition is that access to HPIC funds offers incentives for adopting a PRS 
which are independent of the poverty level.  The debt variables are specified in differences 
matching with the FD approach employed in the base regressions. The expectation is that the 
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pre-adoption debt level (i.e. the lagged variable) would have a positive correlation with 
adoption, and the post adoption instrument negative one (of low magnitude).    
The validity of the instruments was determined within a preliminary regression, and is given 
by their joint significance against PRS adoption.   In the event, both instruments were found to 
be significant at the one per cent level (Table I.4).  A standard two stage OLS procedure was 
then adopted, with the first stage being a linear probability model (LPM) of PRS adoption 
(Table I.3).  This was followed up by a regression-based test for endogeneity, whereby the 
residuals derived within the first stage are included within the structural equation alongside all 
of the original repressors.  Any endogeneity is then established by testing that the coefficient 
on the residual variable is not significantly different from zero (Table I.5). The test results 
confirm the presence of endogeneity biases in the dollar-a-day panel dataset but not in the 
national panel.  
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Table I.1: First Differences Estimator – National Panel Output  
 
OLS RESULTS IV RESULTS 
 
 No. of Obs 76  No. of Obs 50 
 
 F stat  [Prob>F] 3.16 
[0.0125] 
 F stat  [Prob>F] 7.07 [0.0002] 
  R squared 0.2105  R squared 0.4047 
Variable  
 
Dep variable =  
Annual change in 
Poverty Rate 
Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
t P>I t I 95 % Conf. Interval  Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
t P>I t I 95 % Conf. Interval  
Annual change in 
Per capita income 
-0.2339  
 
0.0640 -3.65 0.000 -0.3615 -0.1062 -0.2602 0.0663 -3.92 0.000 -0.3937 -0.1266 
Annual change in 
Gini coefficient 
+0.4576 
 
0.2883 +1.59 0.117 -0.1174 1.0326 0.9924 0.2364 4.20 0.000 0.5162 1.4686 
PRS adoption 
  
-0.6018 
 
0.7122 -0.85 0.401 -2.0222 0.8186 -0.6402 0.8560 -0.75 0.458 -2.3644 1.0839 
Third period  
 
+0.2797 0.7187 +0.39 0.698 -1.1537 1.7131 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Fourth period 
 
+1.4362 1.0157 +1.41 0.162 -0.5895 3.4619 1.0578 0.7333 1.44 0.156 -0.4191 2.5347 
Constant 
 
-0.5069 0.5534 -0.92 0.363 -1.6107 0.5969 0.0052 0.5746 0.01 0.993 -1.1521 1.1625 
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Table I.2: First Differences Estimator - Dollar a day Panel Output  
 
OLS RESULTS IV RESULTS 
 
 No. of Obs 129  No. of Obs 82 
 
 F stat  [Prob>F] 2.43 [0.0391]  F stat  [Prob>F] 1.17 [0.3329] 
  R squared 0.1200  R squared 0.000 
Variable  
 
Dep variable =  Annual 
change in Poverty 
Rate 
Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
t P>I t I 95 % Conf. Interval  Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
t P>I t I 95 % Conf. Interval  
Annual change in Per 
capita income 
-0.0817 0.6658 -1.23 0.222 -0.2135 0.0501 -0.2030 0.1416 -1.43 0.156 -0.4850 0.0790 
Annual change in Gini 
coefficient 
+0.3393 0.2491 +1.36 0.176 -0.1537 0.8325 0.0013 0.3543 0.00 0.997 -0.7043 0.7069 
PRS adoption -1.8752 0.6727 -2.79 0.006 -3.2067 -0.5436 1.6036 2.2830 0.70 0.485 -2.9425 6.1497 
Third period  +0.5656 0.5753 0.98 0.327 -0.5733 1.7045 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Fourth period  -0.0574 0.5957 +0.10 0.923 -1.2365 1.1218 -0.3756 0.6053 -0.62 0.537 -1.5809 0.8298 
Constant -0.1289 0.5354 -0.28 0.782 -1.2081 0.9113 -0.2933 0.5370 -0.55 0.587 -1.3625 0.7759 
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Table I.3: FD Instruments Test Regression 
 
NATIONAL RESULTS DOLLAR-A-DAY RESULTS 
 
 No. of Obs 60  No. of Obs 93 
 
 F stat  [Prob>F] 12.05 [0.0000]  F stat  [Prob>F] 18.07   [0.0000] 
  R squared 0.2471  R squared 0.1517 
Variable  
Dep variable =  PRS 
Adoption 
Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
t P>I t I 95 % Conf. Interval  Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
t P>I t I 95 % Conf. Interval  
FD of IFI Debt -2.1361 0.4786 -4.46 0.000 -3.0944 -1.1778 -1.7351 0.3132 -5.54 0.000 -2.3573 -1.1129 
FD of Lagged IFI 
Debt 
2.8891 0.9275 3.11 0.003 1.0318 4.7464 2.1643 0.8987 2.41 0.018 0.3789 3.9497 
Constant 0.3343 0.0648 5.16 0.000 0.2047 0.4641 0.2760 0.0497 5.55 0.000 0.1772 0.3747 
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Table I.4:  FD IV First Stage Regressions 
 
NATIONAL RESULTS DOLLAR-A-DAY RESULTS 
 
 No. of Obs 50  No. of Obs 82 
 
 F stat  [Prob>F] 5.48 [0.0005]  F stat  [Prob>F] 4.07 [0.0025] 
  Adj R squared 0.3138  Adj R squared 0.1592 
Variable  
Dep variable =  PRS 
Adoption 
Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
t P>I t I 95 % Conf. Interval  Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
t P>I t I 95 % Conf. Interval  
FD of IFI Debt -2.0470 0.6533 -3.13 0.003 -3.3637 -0.7303 -1.7619 0.5982 -2.95 0.004 -2.9533 0.5705 
FD of Lagged IFI 
Debt 
3.0138 1.0122 2.98 0.005 0.9739 5.0537 2.5353 1.2855 1.97 0.052 -0.0249 5.096 
Annual Change in 
Per capita income 
0.0348 0.0122 2.85 0.007 0.0120 0.0593 0.0258 0.0124 2.08 0.041 0.0011 0.0506 
Annual Change in 
Gini coefficient 
-0.0449 0.05065 -0.89 0.380 -0.1470 0.0571 0.0730 0.0463 1.58 0.119 -0.0192 0.1653 
Fourth period 0.1061 0.1419 0.75 0.459 -0.1799 0.3921 -0.1048 0.1134 -0.92 0.358 -0.3307 0.1210 
Constant 0.1605 0.0951 1.69 0.099 -0.0313 0.3522 0.1946 0.0777 2.50 0.014 0.0398 0.3495 
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Table I.5: FD IV Auxiliary Regressions for Endogeneity Tests and Test Results 
 
NATIONAL RESULTS DOLLAR-A-DAY RESULTS 
 
 No. of Obs 50  No. of Obs 82 
 
 F stat  [Prob>F] 5.69 [0.0004]  F stat  [Prob>F] 2.82 [0.0216] 
  R squared 0.4102  R squared 0.2306 
Dep variable =   
Annual Change in 
Poverty Rate 
Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
t P>I t I 95 % Conf. Interval  Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
t P>I t I 95 % Conf. Interval  
Annual Change in 
Per capita income 
-0.2602 0.0692 -3.76 0.001 -0.3997 -0.1207 -0.1966 0.1183 -1.66 0.101 -0.4321 0.0390 
Annual Change in 
Gini coefficient 
0.9924 0.2323 4.27 0.000 0.5242 1.4606 0.0229 0.2954 0.08 0.938 -0.5655 0.6113 
PRS adoption -0.6402 0.8741 -0.73 0.468 -2.4019 1.1214 -0.4311 0.5196 -0.83 0.409 -1.4660 0.6037 
Fourth period 1.0578 0.7401 1.43 0.160 -0.4337 2.5493 1.4194 1.6998 0.84 0.406 -1.9659 4.8048 
Residuals from 1st 
stage 
0.5491 0.7960 0.69 0.494 -1.0551 2.1532 -3.7966 1.8312 2.07 0.042 -7.4440 -0.1492 
Constant 0.0052 0.5766 0.01 0.993 -1.1568 1.1672 -0.2554 0.4008 -0.64 0.526 -1.0537 0.5430 
Test Statistics: 
(a) National         (b) Dollar-a-day 
Ho: β u = 0, H1: β u ≠ 0       Ho: β u = 0, H1: β u ≠ 0 
F (1. 44) = 0.48        F (1, 76) = 4.30 
Prob > F = 0.4939        Prob > F = 0.0415 
Null is not rejected - no evidence of endogeneity found. Null is rejected (at the 5 per cent level) - evidence of endogeneity 
found. 
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APPENDIX J: FIXED EFFECTS (FE) REGRESSION OUTPUT 
 
This Appendix provides the regression output for the OLS modelling within each of the panel 
datasets for the Fixed Effects (FE) specification.  It also provides the test regressions for 
potential Instrumental Variables, in the event these were found not to be valid. The following 
two tables provide: 
 FE base results (Table J.1) 
 Test regressions for Instrumental Variables (Table J.2) 
Additional iterations were carried out for a restricted sample comprising only those records 
supported by consumption based poverty surveys. Regressions were also undertaken, where a 
significant PRS impact was found, to examine the channel of causation (via growth or 
distributional change). This involved interacting the PRS variable with either the income 
index or the Gini coefficient.  The full outputs for these regressions are not provided, but these 
are summarized in the main body of the text.   
The FE estimates were calculated using the original unamended annual panel datasets (Table 
J.1). This gave two unbalanced panels of 175 observations in 58 groups for the national data 
seta, and 256 observations in 63 groups for the dollar-a-day dataset. The specification 
employed a time de-meaned version of the standard model (expressed in levels). The sample 
variables were as used by the FD model, but instead are given as variations against the record 
mean, and eleven time binary variables were used (the excluded year being 1996). 
As with the FD specification, concessional IFI debt levels were tested as potential 
Instrumental Variables for PRS adoption, using an FE approach. Various lags were employed 
(ranging from zero to four years) using a basic Linear Probability Model, with the variables 
specified in levels. The expectation was that the lagged debt variables prior to adoption (three 
and four year lags, reflecting the lead in period plus one-two years), would show a strongly 
positive correction; and post adoption variables showing weakly positive or negative 
correlation.  However, the results (given in Table J.2) show that no significant correlations 
were found, and thus, that IFI debt levels do not provide valid instruments for PRS adoption.  
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Table J.1: Fixed Effects (FE) Regression Results 
 NATIONAL RESULTS DOLLAR A DAY RESULTS 
 
 No. of Obs [Groups] 175 [58]  No. of Obs [Groups] 256  [63] 
 
 F stat  [Prob>F] 3.09 [0.001]  F stat  [Prob>F] 3.92  [0.005] 
  Within R squared 0.3400  Within R squared 0.2421 
Variable  
Dep variable =  
Poverty Rate 
Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
Z P>I z I 95 % Conf. Interval  Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
z P>I z I 95 % Conf. Interval  
Per capita income -0.1852 0.0676 -2.74 0.007 -0.3192 -0.0511 -0.0040  0.0257 -0.15 0.878 -0.5470 0.0468 
Gini coefficient +0.1124 0.2964 0.38 0.705 -0.4754 0.7003 +0.1178  0.1339 0.88 0.380 -0.1464 0.3820 
PRS adoption  -4.2841 2.2260 -1.92 0.057 -8.6989 0.1365 -4.2664 1.4788 -2.89 0.004 -7.1845 -1.3483 
1997 dummy -2.2126 3.4934 -0.63 0.528 -9.1410 4.7158 -2.5301 1.3995 -1.81 0.072 -5.2917 0.2316 
1998 dummy -2.1350 2.8310 -0.75 0.452 -7.7495 3.4796 -0.6650 1,3096 -0.51 0.612 -3.2493 1.9193 
1999 dummy 0.5567 3.9548 0.14 0.888 -7.2867 8.4001 -0.0369 1.8796 -0.02 0.984 -3.7459 3.6721 
2000 dummy -0.0373 3.0657 -0.01 0.990 -6.1172 6.0427 -1.3749 0.9439 -1.46 0.147 -3.2374 0.4877 
2001 dummy -2.0082 2.6676 -0.75 0.453 -7.2988 3.2824 -1.1781 1.3936 -0.85 0.399 -3.9282 1.5719 
2002 dummy -1.9374 2.7996 -0.69 0.490 -7.4898 3.6150 -0.6177 1.1600 -0.53 0.595 -2.9068 1.6714 
2003 dummy -0.3626 3.2168 -0.11 0.910 -6.7424 6.0172 +0.4232 1.4799 +0.29 0.775 -2.4971 3.3435 
2004 dummy -0.6051 3.9420 -0.15 0.878 -8.4230 7.2129 -3.6323 1.7141 -2.12 0.035 -7.0148 -0.2499 
2005 dummy -3.9578 3.4697 -1.14 0.257 -10.8391 2.9235 -2.4186 1.3992 -1.73 0.086 -5.1796 0.3423 
2006 dummy -2.6908 3.7938 -0.71 0.480 -10.2149 4.8832 -4.2340 1.4330 -2.95 0.004 -7.0618 -1.4063 
2007 dummy +7.6660 4.2688 1.80 0.075 -0.8001 16.1322 -5.0344 2.4271 -2.07 0.039 -9.8239 -0.2450 
Constant 55.4057 15.3425 3.61 0.000 24.9776 85.8339 12.8853 6.8617 1.88 0.062 -0.6549 26.4255 
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Table J.2: FE Instrumental Variables Test Regressions 
 
NATIONAL RESULTS DOLLAR A DAY RESULTS 
 
 No. of Obs [Groups] 71 [44]  No. of Obs [Groups] 119 [59] 
 
 F stat  [Prob>F] 0.71 [0.6222]  F stat  [Prob>F] 0.88 [0.5022] 
  Within R2 0.2625  Within R2 0.1673 
Variable  
Dep variable =  PRS 
Adoption 
Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
t P>I t I 95 % Conf. Interval  Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
t P>I t I 95 % Conf. Interval  
IFI Debt -3.0865 5.2973 -0.58 0.566 -14.0724 7.8994 0.2304 1.1778 0.20 0.846 -2.1301 2.5908 
IFI Debt – 1 yr lag -4.1340 10.7299 -0.39 0.704 -26.3866 18.1185 2.7056 2.2277 1.21 0.230 -1.7588 7.1701 
IFI Debt – 2 yr lag 0.5225 6.6693 0.08 0.938 -13.3088 14.3539 -0.1973 1.8877 -0.10 0.917 -3.980 3.5857 
IFI Debt – 3 yr lag 5.8163 4.9980 1.16 0.257 -4.5489 16.1816 -1.2139 1.4096 -0.86 0.393 -4.0388 1.6110 
IFI Debt – 4 yr lag 6.2539 4.5486 1.37 0.183 -3.1793 15.6872 2.8593 1.7343 1.65 0.105 0.6163 6.335 
Cons. -0.4821 1.2168 -0.40 0.696 -3.0056 2.0415 -0.1444 0.2906 -0.50 0.621 -0.7268 0.43881 
  
APPENDIX K: IMPACT OF VARYING PRS LEAD-IN TIME 
The regression approaches reported in Chapter Three and Appendices I and J estimate the 
impact of PRS adoption through a binary variable which assumes a lead-in time of two 
years128.  This period aims to fully allow for any impacts to emerge and was chosen 
subjectively based on maximum permissible within the available data129.   To examine the 
reliability of the results, both the First Differences and Fixed Effects specifications were 
estimated  with varying lead-in times – for zero, one and the standard two years. The results 
are summarized and discussed below.  
The FD results are reported in Table K.1.  Here the standard (two year) lead-in specifications 
showed contradictory findings: with no PRS impact evident in the national data versus a 
significant and sizable treatment effect in the dollar-a-day panel.  Varying the lead-in time 
within the national data had no impact. In the dollar-a-day data, the PRS impact remained, but 
weakens in significance (from the one to five per cent level) and in magnitude, when the 
period is reduced to one year, and is not evident with a zero lead-in.   
Table K.1: FD Regressions for different lead in times 
Coefficient 
[t & F Statistics] 
National Data Dollar-a-day Data 
0 Years 1 Year 2 Years 0 Years 1 Year 2 Years 
Annual change in Per 
Capita Income 
-0.2385*** 
[-3.73] 
-0.2417*** 
[-3.74] 
-0.2339*** 
[-3.65] 
-0.0967 
[-1.35] 
-0.0856 
[-1.28] 
-0.0817 
[-1.23] 
Annual change in Gini 
Coefficient 
0.4841* 
[1.68] 
0.4584 
[1.61] 
0.4576 
[1.59] 
0.2985 
[1.22] 
0.2877 
[1.18] 
0.3394 
[1.36] 
PRS Adoption -0.3688 
[-0.59] 
-0.4252 
[-0.73] 
-0.6018 
[-0.85] 
-0.8039 
[-1.36] 
-1.5002** 
[-2.53] 
-1.8752*** 
[-2.79] 
Period 3 0.0997 
[0.13] 
0.1613 
[0.23] 
0.2797 
[0.39] 
0.0968 
[0.17] 
0.3402 
[0.64] 
0.5656 
[0.98] 
Period 4 
 
1.1701 
[1.27] 
1.2667 
[1.37] 
1.4362 
[1.41] 
-0.4988 
[-0.86] 
-0.2975 
[-0.52] 
-0.0574 
[-0.10] 
R2 0.2073** 
[3.16] 
0.2083** 
[3.15] 
0.2105** 
[3.16] 
0.0709 
[1.88] 
0.1050** 
[2.32] 
0.1200** 
[2.43] 
Observations 76 76 76 129 129 129 
 
                                                 
128
 Based on two years after the IFIs’ Executive Boards granted their ascent 
129
 In the sense that a sufficient number of observations remained within the treatment group 
286 
 
The comparable FE regression results follow below at Table K.2.  Here the results show a 
greater correspondence between the two panels – with a PRS effect, albeit marginally, present 
within the national data, alongside a strong significant benefit within the dollar-a-day data.  
Varying the lead-in time within the national data, results in the disappearance of this effect 
within the one and zero year iterations. Within the dollar-a-day panel however, the effect 
remains evident within each and at a similar level of significance and magnitude.  This 
suggests the evidence of a PRS adoption benefit is less fragile within the FE approach. 
Table K2: FE Results for different lead in times  
Coefficient 
[t & F Statistics] 
National Data Dollar-a-day Data 
0 Years 1 Year 2 Years 0 Years 1 Year 2 Years 
Per Capita Income 
 
-0.2145*** 
[-3.10] 
-0.2030*** 
[-2.99] 
-0.1852*** 
[-2.74] 
-0.0029 
[-0.11] 
-0.0018 
[-0.07] 
-0.0040 
[-0.15] 
Gini Coefficient 
 
0.1715 
[0.55] 
0.1246 
[0.41] 
0.1124 
[0.38] 
0.1026 
[0.80] 
0,0905 
[0.71] 
0.1178 
[0.93] 
PRS Adoption 
 
0.0331 
[0.01] 
-2.8910 
[-1.33] 
-4.2841* 
[-1.92] 
-3.3812*** 
[-2.81] 
-3.6183*** 
[-2.99] 
-4.266*** 
[-3.57] 
Year 2 
 
-1.8100 
[-0.51] 
-1.9292 
[-0.55] 
-2.2126 
[-0.63] 
-2.5905* 
[-1.81] 
-2.6885* 
[-1.89] 
-2.5301 
[-1.80]* 
Year 3 
 
-1.5000 
[-0.51] 
-2.1525 
[-0.75] 
-2.1350 
[-0.75] 
-0.8083 
[-0.66] 
-0.7434 
[-0.61] 
-0.6650 
[-0.55] 
Year 4 
 
1.3845 
[0.34] 
0.8962 
[0.23] 
0.5567 
[0.14] 
-0.0103 
[-0.01] 
-0.1015 
[-0.07] 
-0.0369 
[-0.03] 
Year 5 
 
0.3231 
[0.10] 
0.2477 
[0.08] 
-0.0373 
[-0.01] 
-0.9473 
[-0.67] 
-1.3484 
[-0.96] 
-1.3759 
[-0.99] 
Year 6 
 
-1.3564 
[-0.48] 
-0.8433 
[-0.32] 
-2.0082 
[-0.75] 
0.0112 
[0.01] 
-0.1995 
[-0.14] 
-1.1781 
[-0.87] 
Year 7 
 
-2.0981 
[-0.71] 
-1.4437 
[-0.50] 
-1.9374 
[-0.69] 
-0.3010 
[-0.23] 
-0.3093 
[-0.24] 
-0.6177 
[-0.50] 
Year 8 
 
-1.7557 
[-0.50] 
-0.5741 
[-0.17] 
-0.3626 
[-0.11] 
0.1058 
[0.07] 
0.1937 
[0.13] 
0.4232 
[0.28] 
Year 9 
 
-1.6618 
[-0.40] 
-0.7277 
[-0.18] 
-0.6051 
[-0.15] 
-3.8699 
[-2.39]** 
-3.9483** 
[-2.46] 
-3.6323** 
[-2.27] 
Year 10 
 
-5.4891 
[-1.57] 
-4.2689 
[-1.23] 
-3.9578 
[-1.14] 
-2.8172 
[-1.80]* 
-2.8408* 
[-1.83] 
-2.4186 
[-1.56] 
Year 11 -3.6098 
[-1.01] 
-3.1576 
[-0.87] 
-2.6908 
[-0.71] 
-4.4835*** 
[-2.60] 
-4.5814*** 
[-2.67] 
-4.2340** 
[-2.49] 
Year 12 
 
4.3957 
[1.10] 
5.6438 
[1.31] 
7.6660* 
[1.80] 
-5.2337** 
[-2.13] 
-5.2781** 
[-2.15] 
-5.0344** 
[-2.07] 
Within R2 
 
0.3177*** 
[3.49] 
0.3297*** 
[3.29] 
0.3400*** 
[3.09] 
0.2224*** 
[3.66] 
0.2267 
[3.75] 
0.2421 
[4.08] 
Obs. [Groups] 175 [58] 175 [58] 175 [58] 256 [63] 256 [63] 256 [63] 
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APPENDIX L: RE-ESTIMATION OF MONGOLIAN POVERTY DATA  
This appendix outlines the methods used to provide a comparable Headcount ratio for the two 
disputed intervals (1998- 2002/03 and 2002/03 – 2007/08) on the basis of two consistent 
(higher and lower) poverty thresholds.  It is emphasized that as the exercise treats the two as 
separate, and a common poverty threshold is not used, the results cannot be chained together.  
Poverty rates were re-estimated using the POVCAL program, using re-priced, and in the case 
of the 1998-2002/0, further adjusted, consumption means.  The poverty thresholds were held 
constant in real terms, re-priced using the CPI, additionally for 2002/03-2007/08, a specially 
constructed index reflecting prices affecting the poor (PAP).  This is a re-weighted index 
matching the consumption patterns of the poor, adopting a ratio of 52:48 food: non-food items 
(see NSO, 2009).  A further adjustment made to the 1998-2002/03 consumption data, 
amounting to a 15 per cent increase on the base value, was to reflect the impact of new survey 
design on recorded consumption.  This is disclosed in World Bank (2006). The base data for 
the two exercises is given below in tables L.1 and L.2: 
Table L.1: Base Data – 1998 to 2002/03 Interval 
 1998  2002/03 
Nominal Mean 21,795 36,747 
Re-pricing index (midpoint IMF & Mongolian CPI series, 1995=100) 202.0 261.9 
Means at 1998 prices 21,795 28,340 
Means at 2002/03 prices 28,260 36,747 
Further adjustment methodological change (World Bank, 2006) 100.0 114.99 
Mean after adjustment (forward projection, 1998 basis) Preferred 
option 
n/a 24,674 
Mean after adjustment (backward projection , 2002/03 basis) 32,495 n/a 
Nominal Poverty Lines 14,674 24,743 
Published  Gini 0.35 0.33 
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Table L.2: Base Data – 2002/03 to 2007/08 Interval 
  2002/03  2007/08  
Nominal Means 36,747 100,865 
Re-pricing indices (CPI series 2002=100)  100.0 191.76 
Means at 2002/03 prices (CPI) 36,747 54,250 
Means at 2002/07 prices (CPI) 68,323 100,865 
Re-pricing indices (PAP series 2002=100), Preferred Option 100.0 197.97 
Means at 2002/03 prices (PAP) 36,747 51,088 
Means at 2002/07 prices (PAP) 72,550 100,865 
Nominal Poverty Lines 24,743 62,494 
Published  Gini 0.33 0.36 
The simulated poverty rates below based on the POVCAL output follow, first in Table L.3 for 
the 1998-2002/03 interval, and then in Table L.4 for 2002/03-2007/08. The second set of 
results includes projections based on the CPI and the specially constructed PAP index.  The 
preferred scenarios for both intervals are based on the lower poverty lines in each case. 
Table L.3: Simulated Poverty Data for the 1998 to 2002/ 03 Interval 
 P0 P1 P2 
Higher line (2002/03 basis) 
2002/03 Actual 36.1 11.0 4.7 
1998 Estimates (Generalized Quadratic spec) 43.3 15.2 7.3 
Lower  line (1998 basis) Preferred 
2002/03 Estimates (Beta spec) 29.1 8.3 3.3 
1998 Actual 35.6 11.7 5.6 
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Table L.4: Simulated Poverty Data for the 2002/ 03 to 2007/ 08 Interval 
(a) Using CPI re-pricing  P0 P1 P2 
Higher line (2007/08 basis) 
2007/08 Actual 35.2 10.1 4.0 
2002/03 Estimates (Beta spec) 55.1 20.3 9.8 
Lower line (2002/03 basis) 
2007/08 Estimates (Beta spec) 19.1 4.2 1.2 
2002/03 Actual 36.1 11.0 4.7 
(b) Using PAP re-pricing 
 
P0 P1 P2 
Higher line (2007/08 basis) 
2007/08 Actual 35.2 10.1 4.0 
2002/03 Estimates (GQ spec) 51.6 18.2 8.5 
Lower line (2002/08 basis) Preferred 
2007/08 Estimates (Beta spec) 21.8 5.1 1.6 
2002/03 Actual 36.1 11.0 4.7 
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APPENDIX M: GROWTH-INEQUALITY DECOMPOSITION FOR MONGOLIA 
The purpose of growth-inequality decomposition techniques is to identify the separate 
contribution of changes in incomes (the growth effect) and changes in distribution (the 
inequality effect) to the reduced or increased level of poverty.  These two effects are 
illustrated in Figure M.1 below, which depicts the change from an initial distribution (the bold 
line) with a poverty rate equivalent to the area below each of the curves, to the final 
distribution (the broken feint line), with a poverty level given by the non-shaded area.  The 
two effects are identified by simulating the impact of growth in incomes without any change 
in the shape of distribution (given by the non-bold line).  
Figure M.1: Diagrammatic representation of growth and inequality effects  
 
Source: Bourguignon (2004) 
The two effects are represented formally below, for a change between two poverty rates (P1 
and P2), based on two distributions (ψ1 and ψ2), with mean incomes (µ1+ µ2): 
	d	, e	  − d, e  =  +        
A standard decomposition specification is used to identify the two effects.  Here the method 
given in Kakwani (1997) is followed. This represents an improvement over that favoured by 
Ravallion (1992) as it avoids a residual term.  The growth component (PG) is given by: 

	  {gd	, e  − d, e h + gd	, e	  − d, e	 h}    
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And the inequality component (PI): 
+ 	  {gd, e	  − d, e h + gd	, e	  − d	, eh}    
The results for the three intervals were estimated following repeated use of the World Bank’s 
POVCAL program (see http://www.worldbank.org/html/prdph/lsms/tools/povcal/).  This tool 
simulates poverty and summary distributional data on the basis of estimated Lorenz Curves. 
The curves were parameterized using decile distributional data and the re-priced respective 
poverty thresholds and means for the each of the three intervals.  The source data was the 
published record for 1995-1998 and the preferred scenarios for 1998 to 2002/03 and 2002/03 
to 2007/08 (based on the lower poverty thresholds given in Appendix L).  The output data is 
provided in the table below.  
Table M.1 Decomposition Analysis Outputs  
Headcount/ simulated Headcount 1995-1998 1998-2002/3 
Re-estimated 
2002/3-2007 
Re-estimated 
New mean, old distribution d	, e  33.3 29.2 19.0 
Old mean, old distribution d, e  36.3 35.6 36.1 
New Mean, new distribution d	, e	  35.6 29.1 21.8 
Old mean new distribution d, e	 36.3 36.0 40.0 
Applying the formula, the respective growth and inequality effects on the Headcount ratio 
were calculated: 
Growth effect   Inequality effect 
1995 to 1998:     -1.9    +1.2 
1998 to 2002/03:   -6.7    +0.2  
2002/03 to 2007/08:    -17.6    +3.4 
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APPENDIX N: PRO-POOR GROWTH STATISTICS FOR MONGOLIA 
The full sets of statistics are provided in the table. Many of the statistics rely on estimates 
from the growth-inequality decomposition analysis.  Again, the results for the latter two 
episodes rely entirely the on re-estimated data (using the preferred simulated scenarios). 
Table N.2:  Pro-poor growth metrics for Mongolia  
Metric Formula 1995-1998 1998-2002/03 2002/03 -2007/08 
Growth Elasticity of 
Poverty     
- Total εH = δH/ δµ  µ/H -1.65 -1.40 -1.02 
 Total % change in 
Headcount (H) -1.9% -18.3% -39.6% 
 
 
Change in Mean 
Consumption 1.2% 13.1% 39.0% 
 - Partial εHG = δHG/ δµ  µ/H -4.47 -1.43 -1.25 
 Change in P0 holding 
inequality constant -5.2% -18.7% -48.9% 
Pro-poor Growth 
Index (PPGI) 
  
  
φ = εH / εHG 
Total over partial elasticity 
 
   
0.37 0.98 0.81 
   
  
Poverty Equivalent 
Growth Rate (PEGR) 
γ*= φ γ 0.4% 12.8% 31.6% 
PPGI x mean Growth Rate    
  
PEGR compared with 
growth rate 
Well below Just below Below 
Commentary from 
Strong & Weak 
positions 
  
  
Low overall 
reduction in 
Headcount.  
Responsive to 
growth, but also a 
very large Inequality 
effect. Not pro-poor 
in either sense. 
Large reduction in 
Headcount. 
Responsive to 
growth and low 
offsetting 
Inequality effect. 
Pro-poor in weak 
sense and neutral 
in strong sense. 
Large reduction in 
Headcount. But 
less responsive to 
growth and large 
Inequality effect. 
Pro-poor in weak 
sense but not 
strong sense. 
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APPENDIX O: ANALYSIS OF SPATIAL INEQUALITY IN MONGOLIA 
Spatial decomposition techniques enable the separate identification, within a given population 
made up of a set of mutually exclusive groups, of the within and between group components 
of the overall level of inequality.  When the groups are defined by locality, the between group 
component reflects the spatial variation across locations. 
The two effects are estimated by partitioning the data, calculating the inequality at group 
level, and then the level across the partitioned groups.  The procedure requires that the 
inequality measure is additively decomposable, and typically, a member of the generalized 
entropy (GE) class is employed.  Here (y) represents income or consumption and (c) the GE 
parameter.   
9jF = jkj  

l ∑  
n 
ȳ !
jl − 1$           
Formally, the between group (Ib) and within group (Iw) components can be estimated for a 
population (n) made up of (j=1, 2..k) mutually exclusive groups (locations) as follows.  Note 
that the income share of each group is specified as (vj) and the population share (fj)130. 
 = o + p            
o = ∑ qr  j srj 9Artru          
p = jkj  v∑ srtru  
ȳw
ȳ
!j − 1x         
The estimation approach here makes use of the Theil index (GE1), where the GE parameter is 
set at 1.  Assuming (j…k) groups, (i..l) members of each group, a population of (n) and mean 
group income of (ȳj), the two components are defined as follows:  
 9 =    l ∑  ln
n 
ȳ .
n 
ȳ ! l = 9| + 9}        
9o = ∑ ȳ w ~l  tr

~ ∑  ln
n 
ȳ .
n 
ȳ ! ~G          
9p = ~l ∑ ln
ȳw
ȳ .
ȳw
ȳ !tr           
                                                 
130
 This derivation relies on Shorrocks and Wan (2005) and Litchfield (1999). 
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Following the above, the between component is given by calculating the Theil index based on 
the respective group means weighed by the group population shares. The within component is 
given by the consumption weighted sum of the group by group indices.   
For Mongolia, the components are calculated for the standard HIES strata for the 2002/03 and 
2007/08 surveys (appropriate data for the 1995 and 1998 surveys was not available).  The full 
calculations and results are provided in the four tables below. 
Table O.1: Spatial decomposition data for the 2007/08 survey  
(a) Between component 
 
   
Group   Pop share (p) Mean (x) Mean (x bar) / µ T [p  * x/µ * ln x/µ] 
          
UB  39.13% 126,494 1.254 0.111 
Aimag  21.62% 97,680 0.968 -0.007 
Soum  13.44% 89,197 0.884 -0.015 
Countryside 25.80% 75,344 0.747 -0.056 
   100,865  0.034 
(b) Within component 
    
Group   Cons share T 
Weighted by Inc 
%  
UB  48.50% 0.230 0.112  
Aimag  20.70% 0.200 0.041  
Soum  11.75% 0.220 0.026  
Countryside 19.05% 0.160 0.030  
    0.209  
 
Total [Between component as a % of the total] 
 
0.243 
[12.1%] 
 
Table O.2: Spatial decomposition data for the 2002/03 survey 
(a) Between component 
    
Group   Pop share (p) Mean (x) Mean (x) / µ T [p  * x/µ * ln x/µ] 
UB  30.19% 43,002 1.170 0.056 
Aimag  25.24% 37,175 1.012 0.003 
Soum  16.19% 31,881 0.868 -0.020 
Countryside 28.38% 32,491 0.884 -0.031 
    36,747 0.008 
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(b) Within component 
 
   
Group   Cons share T Weighted  
UB  35.33% 0.190 0.067  
Aimag  25.53% 0.170 0.043  
Soum  14.05% 0.170 0.024  
Countryside 25.09% 0.160 0.040  
    0.175  
Total [Between component as a % of the total] 
  
0.182 
[4.0%] 
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APPENDIX P: GROWTH-INEQUALITY DECOMPOSITION FOR VIETNAM 
The decomposition approach employed to analyse the four intervals bounded by Vietnam’s 
five poverty surveys, is identical to that used for the Mongolian data in Chapter Four.  The 
identification of the separate contributions of growth and distributional change follows the 
method given in Kakwani (1997).  The process involves the estimation of notional poverty 
rates; firstly to simulate the impact of growth in incomes with no distributional change; and 
second, distributional change with no growth. These simulated outcomes are then differenced 
against the actual start and end of period poverty rates to isolate the two effects.  A fuller 
discussion is provided at Appendix M. 
The Kakwani specification, which is a modification of the Ravallion (1992) method, defines 
the growth and inequality components (PG, PI), for a change in the poverty rate (P1 to P2) with 
means (µ1, µ2) and distributions (ψ1 ψ2), as below.  
 	d	, e	  − 	d, e  =  +  
The growth effect is then given by: 
 12 {gd	, e  − d, e h + gd	, e	  − d, e	 h} 
And the inequality effect:  
+ 12 {gd, e	  − d, e h + gd	, e	  − d	, eh} 
Simulated poverty data were derived by using the World Bank’s POVCAL program 
(http://www.worldbank.org/html/prdph/lsms/tools/povcal/) to estimate and plot the respective 
Lorenz Curves.  These were parameterized using decile distributional data and the re-priced 
poverty thresholds and consumption means.  The results are given in Table P.1. 
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Table P.1:  Simulated Decomposition Data 
Headcount/ simulated 
Headcount 
1993-1998 1998-2002 2002-2004 2004-2006 
New mean, old distribution 
d	, e  
37.5 26.7 17.7 17.6 
Old mean, old distribution 
d, e  
58.1 37.4 28.9 19.5 
New Mean, new distribution 
d	, e	  
37.5 28.9 19.5 16.0 
Old mean, new distribution 
d, e	 
58.9 40.3 32.3 19.0 
 Source: Author’s calculations based on GSO (1994 and 2008) and Povcalnet data 
After applying the formula, the respective growth and inequality effects can be calculated 
(results are shown as changes in the headcount proportion of the total population): 
Growth effect   Inequality effect 
1993 to 1998:     -21.0    +0.4 
1998 to 2002:    -11.1    +2.6 
2002 to 2004:    -12.0    +2.6  
2004 to 2006:      -2.5     -1.1   
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APPENDIX Q: PRO-POOR GROWTH STATISTICS FOR VIETNAM 
The analytical approach, again, is as used in Chapter Four for the Mongolia data.  However, 
there is no need in the Vietnamese case, to reconstruct the poverty record, and therefore the 
base data are sourced from the survey materials (GSO, 2008). The statistics and supporting 
calculations are given in Table Q.1 below.  The statistics rely on the growth-inequality 
decomposition analysis given in Appendix P.   
Table Q.1: Pro-poor growth metrics for Vietnam 1992 to 2006 
Metric Formula 93-98 98-02 02-04 04-06 
Growth Elasticity of 
poverty  εH = δH/ δµ  µ/H -0.89 -2.24 -1.32 -3.90 
- Total Total % Change in P0 -35.5% -22.7% -32.5% -17.9% 
  
Change in Mean 
Consumption +39.8% +10.1% +24.6% +4.6% 
 - Partial εHG = δHG/ δµ  µ/H -0.91 -2.91 -1.69 -2.73 
  
Change in P0 holding 
inequality constant -36.1% -29.5% -41.5% -12.6% 
Pro-poor Growth 
Index (PPGI) 
  
  
φ = εH / εHG 
Total over partial elasticity 
 
    
0.98 0.77 0.78 1.43 
    
  
Poverty Equivalent 
Growth Rate (PEGR) 
γ*= φ γ 39.0% 7.8% 19.2% 6.6% 
PPGI x mean Growth Rate     
  
PEGR compared with 
growth rate 
Matches Below Below Above 
Commentary from 
Strong & Weak 
positions 
  
  
Highly pro-
poor - in both 
senses. A 
large reduction 
in poverty 
driven by a 
large increase 
in incomes. 
Inequality only 
marginally 
impacts 
poverty. 
Pro-poor in the 
weak sense 
only. Not so in 
the strong 
sense - there 
is a sizeable 
inequality 
effect. The 
annualized 
impact is 
relatively low. 
Very pro-
poor in a 
weak 
sense. Not 
pro-poor in 
strong 
sense, 
given 
worsening 
inequality.  
Most pro-
poor from a 
strong 
viewpoint, 
least so from 
a weak 
perspective. 
Distribution 
improves, but 
the absolute 
reduction is 
the low. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on GSO (2008). 
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APPENDIX R: ANALYSIS OF SPATIAL INEQUALITY IN VIETNAM  
Following the approach introduced in Chapter Four (Section 4.4), the extent and pattern of 
spatial inequality in Vietnam was estimated using standard decomposition techniques.  These 
methods make use of the decomposability property of the generalized entropy class of 
inequality measures (here the Theil index) to provide estimates for the between group (or 
spatial) contribution, and the remaining within group contribution, to overall inequality.  A 
formal discussion and derivation of the decomposition is provided at Appendix O.  
In line with methods given in Shorrocks and Wan (2005) and using VHLSS data, the level and 
change in spatial inequality was estimated for 2004 and 2006 and the intervening interval.  
The workings are provided in Tables R.1 and R.2 below.  Here the between component is 
given by calculating the Theil Index based on the respective group (locality) means weighed 
by the group (locality) population shares. In essence this is the level of inequality which 
would arise if every member of each of the group had the average level of income.  The within 
component is the (consumption) weighted sum of the group indices.   The calculations are 
based on Vietnam’s standard planning regions and rely on a more restricted measure of 
consumption than the international standard.   
Table R.1: Spatial decomposition data for 2002  
(a) Between component 
Group   Pop share (p) Reg mean (x bar) 
Reg/ nat mean 
(x bar) / µ 
T [p  * x/µ *ln 
x/µ] 
Red River Delta 21.89% 271.2 1.01 0.00 
North East 11.46% 220.2 0.82 -0.02 
North West 2.95% 179.0 0.67 -0.01 
North Central Coast 12.92% 192.8 0.72 -0.03 
South Central Coast 8.51% 247.6 0.92 -0.01 
Central Highlands 5.53% 201.8 0.75 -0.01 
South East 15.78% 447.6 1.66 0.13 
Mekong Delta 20.96% 258.4 0.96 -0.01 
0.051 
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(b) Within component 
Group   Cons share T' 
Weighted by Inc 
% 
Red River Delta 21.85% 0.14 0.030 
North East 9.28% 0.10 0.009 
North West 1.94% 0.13 0.002 
North Central Coast 9.16% 0.09 0.008 
South Central Coast 7.75% 0.10 0.008 
Central Highlands 4.10% 0.11 0.004 
South East 25.98% 0.15 0.040 
Mekong Delta 19.93% 0.08 0.015 
0.116 0.167 
Total [Between component as a % of the total] [30.46%] 
 
Table R.2: Spatial decomposition data for 2006  
(a) Between component 
Group   Pop share (p) Reg mean (x bar) 
Reg/ nat mean 
(x bar) / µ 
T [p  * x/µ *ln 
x/µ] 
Red River Delta 21.67% 475.0 1.03 0.01 
North East 11.24% 372.8 0.81 -0.02 
North West 3.10% 296.3 0.64 -0.01 
North Central Coast 12.65% 314.1 0.68 -0.03 
South Central Coast 8.46% 414.7 0.90 -0.01 
Central Highlands 5.77% 391.1 0.85 -0.01 
South East 16.44% 740.5 1.61 0.13 
Mekong Delta 20.68% 434.5 0.94 -0.01 
0.044 
(b) Within component 
Group   Cons share T' 
Weighted by Inc 
% 
Red River Delta 22.23% 0.12 0.027 
North East 9.05% 0.11 0.010 
North West 1.98% 0.12 0.002 
North Central Coast 8.58% 0.10 0.008 
South Central Coast 7.58% 0.10 0.007 
Central Highlands 4.87% 0.13 0.006 
South East 26.29% 0.14 0.036 
Mekong Delta 19.41% 0.08 0.016 
0.112 0.157 
Total [Between component as a % of the total] [28.30%] 
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APPENDIX S: VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 
Table S.1 Summary of Progress (as at 2008) 
Status VDG Target 
Exceeded (3) 
Areas of natural land where bio-diversity has been preserved 
Employment participation rate 
Urban unemployment rate 
Likely to be met (2) Malnutrition rate among children under 5 Gini coefficient (for consumption) 
Achievable (22) 
Poverty headcount 
Net primary enrolment 
Net lower secondary enrolment 
Gender ratio in primary education 
Gender ratio in lower secondary education 
Gender ratio in upper secondary education  
% of Land titles issued in jointly to husbands and wives 
Mortality rate for children under 5 
Mortality rate children under 1 
Maternal mortality rate 
% Births attended by skilled staff 
% Married women using contraception 
% Pregnant women receiving three medical checks during pregnancy 
Malarial infection rate  
Malarial mortality rate 
TB infection rate 
TB mortality rate  
% Population with a clean water supply 
% Rural population with access to a clean water supply 
% Communes with basic infrastructure 
% Women in labour force 
% Labour force with a training qualification 
Unlikely to be met (1) % Pregnant women HIV carriers 
Not reported on (14) 
Poverty Gap ratio 
Primary education completion rate  
% Women in the National Assembly 
% Women in  provincial councils 
% Women in district councils 
% Woman in commune council 
Carbon Dioxide emissions per capita 
% Children vaccinated against measles  
% Forest coverage retained 
% Population with improved sanitary condition  
No. of telephones per 100 population 
No. of mobile phones per 100 population  
No. of ADSL subscribers per 100 population 
% Households with WCs  
Source: Ministry of Planning and Infrastructure (2008) 
